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Dedication
It was suggested that I should ask a well known person to write a foreword.
However I could find few better words to express the spirit of what I am
ultimately trying to say than those of Soren Kierkegaard, the nineteenth-
century Danish writer and theologian:
What is a poet? A poet is an unhappy being whose heart is so torn by
secret sufferings, but whose lips are so strangely formed that when the
sighs and cries escape them, they sound like beautiful music ... and
men crowd around the poet and say to him: "Sing for us soon again"
that is as much as to say: "May new sufferings torment your soul, but
may your lips be formed as before; for the cries would only frighten us,
but the music is delicious". And the critics come too, and say: "Quite
correct, and so it ought to be according to the rules of aesthetics".
Now it is understood that a critic resembles a poet to a hair; he only
lacks the suffering in his heart and the music upon his lips. So, there-
fore, I would rather be a swineherd, and be understood by the swine,
than be a poet and be misunderstood by men.
I therefore dedicate this work to analysts of public policy, that we
might transcend the fate of the critics and begin to understand.

Preface
This book is one product of the project on Institutional Settings and
Environmental Policies (INS) undertaken at the International Institute for
Applied Systems Analysis (nASA), Laxenburg, Vienna. INS began under
my leadership in January 1983, and lasted until my return to Lancaster in
May 1984. It had a brief but interesting organizational career which
reflected the intense uncertainties, excitements, and frustrations of that tur-
bulent period in IIASA's history. INS merged the previous Risk project
with broader interests in technology, environmental policy implementation,
uncertainty, and surprise.
As a scientist turned to sociology, my leadership naturally led us to
try to analyze the interactions of technical knowledge and institutional reali-
ties in regulation. This was consistent with a general current - not then felt
much at nASA - that technical decision methods focusing on optimizing or
"satisficing" public decisions as discrete events had become too abstractly
concerned with decisions as products, and had lost sight of the importance
of processes. The previous nASA Risk project on facility siting had rightly
emphasized the importance of decision processes. However decisions on sit-
ing - even controversial ones - are relatively well defined, and encourage the
analytic assumption that all parties have the same problem - siting, and
how to achieve it, stop it, or shift it. While it may be a reasonable starting
point for well structured, specific decisions, this is not a generally realistic
assumption. Indeed, work that does recognize the importance of processes
often regresses into the abstract language of procedural rationality, as if
universal procedural prescriptions for rational decisions can be made,
regardless of the technological and institutional setting or context, and as if
procedure handles a problem definition that is common to all parties.
Having been largely sheltered from this operations research based
tradition, I had started with a different orientation, from the social analysis
of scientific knowledge. From this angle credibility is always a problem, and
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experts are always tacitly negotiating different problem definitions, even
whilst engaged in rational discourse about evidence, models, probabilities,
etc. In practical "external" contexts, such as regulation and risk manage-
ment, the analytical framework from the sociology of science that links
knowledge construction with the processes of credibility negotiation or per-
suasion, becomes an important resource. When one considers more diffuse
risk-regulation systems, where implementation of decisions is often distant
from their birthplace, the related problems of credibility and competing
problem definitions are even more significant - analytically and practically.
Regulation and risk management use scientific knowledge as a central
currency, but they are encountering increasing difficulties in achieving credi-
bility - and hence effectiveness - for their standards and policies. The ensu-
ing costs in economic, health, and general political terms are beyond reckon-
ing. As is widely apparent, the legitimation of public policies, including
regulatory methods and standards, is now a major preoccupation of their
makers. Thus, how public knowledge is constructed to achieve persuasion;
how this affects its other roles; and how technical knowledge and other
institutional arrangements are related to achieve most effect are the basic
concerns of this book. In taking an institutional focus, we also decided that
we had to understand the underlying processes of institutional credibility.
It is at the level of public credibility of regulations, and of expertise
generally, that this book aligns itself with the concerns about brittleness and
resilience toward surprise and viability, which have been the basis of the
policy research programs introduced by Buzz Holling, Bill Clark, and oth-
ers. It is one of my regrets that we did not have the opportunity to explore
properly the connections between the approach developed in the INS group,
as reflected in this book and our other products, and that broader research
program from systems ecology.
Being a comparative book, the relative effectiveness of different regula-
tory practices is an implicit concern throughout. However, although we do
make evaluations and suggestions, we make no simple comparative judg-
ments. The effectiveness of regulation is a complicated notion conceptually,
and an elusive one empirically. To illustrate this book's evaluative orienta-
tion, we can return to the question of processes.. Regulation is clearly more
than a succession of separate "optimized" decisions; it involves continuing
relationships; moreover these are developed in multiple arenas. Finding
appropriate decision processes is far more complex than constructing
rational procedural norms, because, as we see in real issues, different images
of rationality and science are used as legitimating resources - as competing
models of authority - by different parties. These imply different procedural
arrangements. No procedure is neutral, nor is it ever completely issue-
specific. A logical consequence is that we should be concerned to evaluate
institutional processes and relationships of regulation. In the parlance of
systems, we should regard decisions as open systems, not merely as a
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temporary device to find a more expansive reclosure, but because social sys-
tems are inherently open, and nondeterministic. In this necessarily more
dialectical mode, attention shifts from sole preoccupation with "correct"
decisions toward a more open-ended concern for socially feasible and robust
decisions, and thus for the quality and integrity of policy relationships and
interactions.
The argument in this book challenges convention by suggesting that
the underlying approach of regulation in the developing climate of public
justification reflects a misleading image of rationality and science. What-
ever value this image may have had, it is now outliving its worth in a new
context of public decision-making. Indeed, its use may be inadvertently cor-
roding public credibility (credibility as far as the public is concerned) rather
than nurturing it.
The central factor in this failure is the misconception that science is
inherently and boundlessly uncertainty-seeking: scientific approaches will
therefore ensure a comprehensive appreciation of uncertainties. However,
science advances by the systematic limitation of its attention to known
uncertainties within single frameworks stripped of their context. In public
issues like risk management, the unrecognized context includes multiple
social perspectives; these influence even technical terms like "risk" and
"hazard" which are not merely imprecise, but subject to inherent ambiguity.
Thus, the conventional regulatory language of rationality (derived from sci-
ence) artificially reduces structural uncertainty and latent conflict to techni-
cal imprecision. Lack of control, deriving from ignorance and latent
conflict, is concealed by the scientific language of manageable uncertainties.
There is a curious paradox here, in that individual regulators, policymakers,
and other experts privately recognize this syndrome, that the credibility of
scientific approaches is almost inversely proportional to their degree of ela-
boration. The responsibility for believing in the myth (and thereby per-
petuating it) is passed onto someone else - the public, the media, sociolo-
gists, naive scientists, or whoever. Yet none of these groups appear to
believe it, either! They sometimes behave as if they do, but when pressed to
act on it (e.g., by accepting a decision based on it, affecting them) they also
renounce their faith.
The eerie conclusion is that we are all busy enacting a public frame-
work of regulation driven by certain fundamental tenets of rational
knowledge, that no one believes in. Now, there is always a certain tension
between norms and actions. However the size and nature of the gap
matters, and it now seems so large as to approach a collective hypocrisy -
even institutionalized schizophrenia - on a grand scale. The public norms
of rational control and decision in regulation seem to be little more than
degenerate caricatures of reasoning. "Being pragmatic" as a (legitimate)
norm has thereby been practically converted into a cynical lack of any
greater purpose or hope than immediate survival, with the public language
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of rationality being left adrift to be elaborated as a Baroque facade of
mounting structural dishonesty. One is reminded of the baroque fantasies
played out in public life during the final years of the Habsburg dynasty.
This brief outline may put the situation too starkly. But I suggest the
essentials are authentic enough. The myths of scientific rationality are no
longer adequate to comprehend our experience of modern technology and
the searching questions of its adequate control. We should not seek to
throwaway myths, but to develop more capacious and more human ones.
These would be consistent with a critical social learning of the limitations of
analytical control of technology via back-end regulation alone, and with a
broader social interest in the purposes and control of (front-end) technologi-
cal development.
After this confession of my ultimate concerns, what about the more
practical dimensions of this book? What has all the foregoing moralizing to
do with hazardous waste? Interdisciplinary works are notoriously difficult
to orient to definable populations of readers. Systems analysis was sup-
posed to transcend the reductionisms of single disciplines, but it has
developed a recognizable reductionism of its own, toward formal quantita-
tive models. Faced with this sterile scientism, sociologists often fall to the
temptation of advancing their own, alternative reductionism. But this may
do no more justice to reality than its opposite. This book offers a sociologi-
cal perspective; but it is not a smoothly reductionist one. It does not claim
to integrate the sociological and technical dimensions, or to reduce one to
the other. All it claims is to hold them in something like proper tension. In
so far as the reader's difficulty reflects that tension, I do not apologize for it.
The analytical framework threading the whole book is unashamedly
interpretive - it tries to hold the descriptive and the normative in construc-
tive balance. It goes beyond "the evidence", but does not wantonly neglect
it. It is not a direct evaluation of policy options in the usual sense, but
attempts to outline a new basic orientation toward the issues - to highlight
some less obvious features of the present situation which may alter our
taken for granted anchor-points for evaluation. This is potentially an
important practical contribution.
I learnt at IIASA how pervasive and crippling is the lack of an institu-
tional perspective in policy analysis. This is not a merely analytical matter,
but more of an underlying moral philosophy. Along with its benefits, the
scientific world view has brought to the understanding of public affairs a
thoroughly corrosive duality, whereby meanings only come from either a
monolithic objective truth of nature or a personal subjectivity. If we cast
loose from the moral sheet-anchor of single facticity, it is therefore assumed
that there is no stopping short of rampant subjectivity and anarchy. The
dominant intellectual mood at IIASA then was of this kind, with an under-
lying belief that institutional analysis was really an encouragement of
"antiscientific" subjectivism.
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Though small, the INS project at nASA actually incorporated three
different strands. These were the analysis of methodological issues in policy
modeling with Bill Keepin; hazardous waste, with Joanne Linnerooth and
Mike Dowling; and Himalayan deforestation, with Mike Warburton and
Mike Thompson. All of these (and more) diverse interests were united in
our group's common concern to understand ways of defining and handling
uncertainties and conflicting rationalities. We included as part of our
domain how analysts, like ourselves, regularly become part of the policy
problem by misconceiving and inadvertently misrepresenting these
dimensions.
INS's place within nASA is an instructive lessons about the above
bifurcation. As an ex- "hard" scientist I assumed that a scientific approach
to regulation meant actually looking - with a theoretically informed per-
spective - at what is happening. This meant looking at the back end, where
regulatory approaches are actually implemented (or not), rather than
assuming that the world behaves as in the abstract scholastic exercises of
formal models of policy systems. This general approach, innocently
advanced, was received with studied neglect and incomprehension, punc-
tuated by sporadic eruptions of hostility. Ironically it seemed, "soft" social
science was being rejected by so-called "hard" science as threatening,
because it proposed too close a look at reality. Here was cause for
reflection! The kind of answer we moved to in all three areas we examined
was that abstract mathematical policy modeling - while fine and valuable in
the proper situation - represented the artificial bifurcation outlined above.
It tended to freeze a given institutional structure as natural and inevitable,
and enshrine a given problem-definition corresponding with those (now
invisible) institutional structures. In the act of commitment to a model
structure, it then implied that any alternative approach was the onset of
subjectivism. (It was not surprising that the throwaway, "quick and dirty"
interactive modeling of Carl Walters, Mike Staley, and colleagues was our
nearest intellectual companion at nASA, and also suffered rejection symp-
toms). Indeed the tension of intellectual styles was not strictly between the
technical and the social - but between a basic orientation that treated insti-
tutional questions as naturalistic (thus did not-really treat them at all) and
one that did not. Beneath this distinction lay the following questions:
Are institutional dimensions to be handled analytically in a quasi-
technical manner which assumes that they obey naturalistic laws - even if
these are within the expanded frameworks of "liberal" systems approaches,
which may include evolutionary perspectives and discontinuities? Or are
they to be recognized as inherently and forever open-ended, and therefore
incomplete? Does the very lack of analytic tidiness and completion in the
latter represent the arena of legitimate human freedom and responsibility?
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The liberal wing of systems analysis appears to be ambivalent on this
issue, and may confuse (its focus) "adaptive management" with (the
emphasis of sociological critical theory) "political learning" .
Whether conventional or liberal, the dominant IIASA intellectual style
was arguably a reflection of the Institute's own institutional setting, and its
relationship to typical clientele, "the policymakers of the upper reaches".
Complex computer models of the applied systems vintage have often
appeared to shelter such policy elites from the wider and baser realities that
impinge on ordinary folk, and to exclude such questions from conceptualiza-
tion. This is the very opposite of what is now needed.
Largely undebated methodological differences of this sort sat uncom-
fortably on top of some fundamental political and institutional issues. A
thorough institutional analytical approach appears to encourage a fearful
response because it does cast off from the comforting anchorage of universal,
single rationality, including the more expansive liberal version. However, in
the prehistoric age before "policy analysis" and "applied systems analysis"
there did use to be, recognized as normal, an institutional dimension under-
lying the framing of issues, negotiations, and "decisions". Research alive to
this social fabric recognizes the plurality available in factual accounts of the
world (within the restriction that all accounts "work"); yet equally it rem-
inds us that the social institutions of which we are part reduce to nonarbi-
trary patterns what would otherwise be a mess of countless subjectively
chosen views of the world. These institutional frameworks of cognition are
negotiable and malleable at the margins, and over the long term; but they
are not immediately reconstructible, nor freely chooseable, except to the
extent that migration is possible into alternative existing institutionalized
frameworks. Solidly objective and elaborate institutional networks of
norms, expectations, identities, traditions and forms of explanation severely
restrict (but do not totally determine) the "caprice" of supposedly free indi-
vidual will. Human beings are social animals. In neglecting or distorting
the institutional dimension therefore, the rationalist approach to "policy"
would effectively replace the responsibility and freedom of ordinary institu-
tions and social actors by abstract and authoritarian "expertise". In the
end, practical policy is likely to be best served by research that does not
maintain the delusion that such institutional dimensions either do not exist,
or - if they do exist - that they are only subjective distortions of rational
commitments. Freed from these shackles, it might then foster analysis that
does not preemptively shatter institutional processes into nothing but a
kaleidoscope of fragmented, arbitrary, and competing individual values or
wills. Policy analysis will first have to recognize and systematically address
these institutional dimensions, before it can help in making such institutions
and their policies resilient, and might we also dare to hope - just.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction: A Conceptual Overview
Brian Wynne
1.1. The IIASA Hazardous Waste Study in Perspective
The production, conversion, or disposal of wastes pervades almost every
human activity. Many of these wastes are harmful, or potentially so. They
can also be valuable - and hence "goods" - depending upon different per-
ceptions. Despite their ubiquity, wastes exist in a twilight zone where no
clear, "natural" definition of them can be given, within wide margins of
uncertainty and variation. They provide no service, and no one has an
inherent self-interest in their safekeeping. Yet, overall, their damaging
effects upon the environment and human health can be colossal. Major
economic and social perturbations have been created by uncontrolled past
toxic waste dumping, and adequate long-term management' of hazardous
wastes remains one of the most difficult challenges ever faced by regulatory
authorities.
Current difficulties over radioactive waste disposal are serious enough,
but they look simple by comparison with the problems of controlling
thousands of differenthazardous-waste-generating activities, waste types,
handlers and transporters, diverse economic relationships, and disposal
sites. On top of all this are still the environmental uncertainties of possible
routes back to human or environmental harm. In hazardous waste life-
cycles (unlike say, discharges from a plant), natural processes and human
interactions are jumbled together in complex and widely variable ways,
making a badly structured and, indeed, indeterminate behavioral-technical
risk-generating system. It seems to be a testing ground for the institutional
viability of regulation, where uncertainties and implementation difficulties
feed on one another to threaten its public credibility.
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This book draws the technical field of risk analysis toward the more
messy organizational realities which make up technologies, regulatory insti-
tutions, and their practices. As risk analysis has perforce been dragged
away from well defined engineering systems toward such decision-making
arenas, approaches to risk seem to have divided into two sorts, both of them
incomplete. Either they have remained within the same traditions of
engineering reliability but have been extended to try to incorporate new
relationships and uncertainties, without fundamental reshaping; or they
have been sociologically defined - although often insightful, they have virtu-
ally neglected the physical and technical dimensions of the issues [1]. Our
approach offers a novel treatment of this bifurcation of the technical and
institutional dimensions of risk assessment and regulation. In tackling one
of the more complicated environmental regulation problems, the study ela-
borates a fresh perspective on the general role and nature of scientific
knowledge in public decision making and its practical enactment.
Risk analysis involves the scientific elucidation of damage mechanisms
from different natural or technical processes, and the quantification of pro-
babilities and consequences. As an aid to social management of risks, the
analysis has to be integrated with evaluations and choices, usually under
uncertainty and conflict. It is normally assumed that risk analysis takes
place as a scientific process, free from the context of institutional interests
and constraints, which enter at a later evaluative stage. Whilst this may
have been a reasonable first-order approximation for a discrete engineering
plant (which is where risk analysis developed), it is an inadequate founda-
tion for the kinds of risk management problem, such as hazardous wastes
and toxic chemicals generally, that have risen to prominence in the last
decade or so.
Risk analysis aims to achieve replicability and control of a scientific
sort. However, scientific progress and precision requires two simplifying
principles:
(i) That the environment or context of a given relationship can be held in
suspension.
(ii) That ideal conditions and entities (such as perfectly elastic solids or
friction-free surfaces) really exist.
The "background" is frozen and stripped away, and the entities idealized, so
as to "purify" the phenomenon of interest and render it manipulable and
analyzable. This scientific orientation in risk assessment of complex techno-
logical networks has yielded benefits, but at the expense of other limitations
whose extent and significance is only now becoming apparent. In particular,
the focus on "risk" stripped of context and in terms defined by the analyst
is increasingly being seen to lack foundation in the interpenetrating problem
definitions, constraints, and concerns of real decision makers. What the
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analyst defines as external context may be part of the primary analytical
problem. Our institutional approach is an attempt to take these contextual
realities into account, without reducing the analytical framework to
exclusively technical or sociological factors.
One can understand how the "context-free" fallacy has taken root. In
addition to the general mythology that science is context free, there are rea-
sons specific to the origins of risk analysis. Until the recent emergence of
environmental risk analysis, the field of risk management was dominated by
calculation of risks from well defined and monolithic problems, such as
those of nuclear reactors and chemical plants. As risk systems, these were
indeed relatively free of their context. A central problem for such "zero-
infinity" type risks is how to model their extremely low probability
processes and events in the absence of data based on experience [2]. Expert
disagreement was attributed to the lack of data (reflecting an empiricist
model of science). Even in such risk analyses, however, it was noticed in the
previous IIASA study on the siting of liquid energy gas (LEG) facilities that
uncertainty and expert disagreement over risks are not only due to lack of
empirical data resulting in subjective disagreement on probabilities, but also
to subtly divergent expert definitions of the precise risk-generating system.
This was a clue to how to approach the more typical risk problems, which
are not so well structured. Since expert disagreement and uncertainty had
become (and remains) of great concern in every domain of technology and
environmental policymaking, it seemed that a potentially useful way of
developing the theory and practi'Ce of risk assessment was to examine risk-
management issues where the risk-generating "technology" was manifestly
less well structured than, say, LEG terminals or nuclear reactors, and more
open to ambiguity in its precise definition.
We therefore decided to examine hazardous waste management, an
important and growing risk management problem, which is ill structured
and heterogeneous. Our aim was to clarify the forms of interaction between
institutional settings, behavioral factors, and technical knowledge. The
analytical framework of this book is made up of three linked fronts. The
first is an integration of implementation into the framework for analyzing
decision processes in risk management or regulation. The second front
involves a basic revision of the conventional model of scientific knowledge
and uncertainty embedded in dominant approaches to policy, regulation,
and policy analysis. The third front involves a radically different interpre-
tation of the origins and nature of public perceptions of "risk", and an
attempt is made to follow through the supplementary argument that public
reactions are reactions not to perceived risks as such, but to the institu-
tional relationships that are part and parcel of technologies. These institu-
tional relationships are normally excluded from attention because the
analytical frameworks are structured by conventional notions of scientific
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rationality. An overall problem deriving from the way these three dimen-
sions interact is the credibility (and hence the viability) of regulation.
1.2. Implementation
Our interest in implementation derived from a general curiosity about real-
ity, as contrasted with the often rarefied and unreal perspectives of policy
modeling and design. The latter seem to adopt the definitions of decisions
that policymakers themselves naturally employ. However, there is an
important distinction between "decisions" (e.g., regulatory standards or
aims) and their practical enactment. Clearly, what substantive decision is
made has an effect upon practices and outcomes, but it does not automati-
cally determine them, especially where - as is normal for regulation - deci-
sions are part of a continuing multiorganizational process of interaction,
negotiation, commitment, and adaptation. Much environmental policy
analysis - perhaps influenced by siting controversies - has tended to focus
on decisions as definitive events, as outcomes in themselves, rather than to
try to examine their relationship to practical outcomes. It is a moot point
whether "decision" ought to mean what "decision makers" "decide", or
what actually happens. Frequently, "decisions" are defined analytically as
what "decision makers" do; but the definition of "decision makers" here has
been influenced by the analyst's relationship only with central policymakers.
This has consolidated a quasi-scientific "purification" of the behavioral
arena to exclude the complications involved in "implementation". Down-
stream actors or "implementers", and associated organizational complexi-
ties, have thus been relegated analytically to the role of the merely mechani-
cal (decision-less) enactment (or obstruction) of policymakers' "decisions"
or rules.
The general view of policymaking as largely incremental, and decisions
as embedded in continuing social relationships, is more congenial to us. Our
concern is to bring implementation into more even analytical balance with
more synoptic phases of regulatory policy-making, to treat it as an interact-
ing decision-making forum of comparable importance and complexity.
Implementation is more than mere external or secondary context to the
"real" analytical arena. Our orientation was encouraged by the growing
body of empirical work demonstrating that implementation is often different
from that imagined in the policymaking phase. The widespread "enforce-
ment deficits" or "implementation gaps" [3] identified by environmental pol-
icy analysts imply not only wasted policy resources, but worse, withdrawal
of public acceptance from policy bodies and processes which manifestly fail
to fulfil their formal goals and promises. Unrealistic assumptions that
implementation is a supposedly trivial after-phase have often been built into
policy decisions themselves, which subsequently fail to meet policy targets
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and promises. This undermines the credibility of the policy system, poten-
tially entering a vicious circle of decreasing implementability. As a leading
policymaker in the hazardous waste field has warned:
. .. the discrepancy between the daily practice of disposal and official
political objectives and pretensions is obvious ... In many cases there is
an obvious discrepancy between regulatory requirements and the actual
means of meeting them. The enforcement gap is not only a permanent
threat to the environment, it also affects the credibility of legal provi-
sions in place [4].
This issue of regulatory authority and credibility was the ultimate
interest underlying our work. It derived significant benefit from the com-
parative institutional analysis of national "regulatory styles" at the level of
implementation. There is an international corollary of the realization that
many "policy decisions" simply flutter in mid-air, as symbolic gestures [5].
In the growing number of issues with international implications, this
encourages a cynicism and protective self-interest that threatens already
fragile international policy negotiation and collaborative enactment.
The mounting problems of policy implementation are not due to
inadequate technical knowledge, but to the institutional mechanisms for
putting it to effective use, in contexts of conflicting organizational con-
straints, interests, and rationalities. Indeed, what counts as technically ade-
quate is a variable determined by institutional factors. There are different
kinds of technical knowledge and regulatory instruments whose effectiveness
can only be evaluated in relationship to their institutional settings. Even
within the same regulatory organization, the appropriate form of technical
knowledge (or language) may be different at different levels, as we show
later. Technical regulatory instruments (and the knowledge they imply) are
codes for behavioral relationships, and can only have meaning and construc-
tive effect in proper relationships with their surrounding networks of social
relationships, perceptions, and interactions.
In its very framing risk and policy analysis ignores - or radically
oversimplifies - implementation complexities, and treats failings as due to
technical uncertainty or incompetence; this is hardly likely to help alleviate
implementation problems. Indeed, it may inadvertently undermine public
acceptance of technologies and their regulatory institutions. This idea is
developed in the following sections.
In summary, our argument on implementation is that it is more than
merely downstream decision enactment, but involves new organizational
realities and rationalities which are artificially excluded from policymaking
(and usually from policy modeling and analysis). These are more than
merely "deviations" or "counter-implementations" of the optimal, but
reflect objective local institutional realities whose pragmatic accommodation
is just as important for regulatory stability. This is part of the "context"
that scientific approaches unconsciously amputate.
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1.3. Scientific Knowledge and Uncertainty
Risk assessment has developed as a more sophisticated, probabilistic
scientific treatment of essentially the same regulatory problems as its prede-
cessor, technology assessment, but under explicit conditions of uncertainty.
However, the basic conception of uncertainty that structures risk analysis is
fundamentally misleading, and is encouraged by a false underlying view of
scientific rationality. As the difficulties, especially failures to achieve credi-
bility, have multiplied, "scientific uncertainty" has been made the culprit,
leading to intensification of scientific effort. In 1983 the then chief of the US
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) observed that "a climate of fear
now dominates the discussion of environmental issues" [6]. Typically, he
saw only one way out:
Somehow our democratic technological society must resolve the disso-
nance between science and the creation of public policy. Nowhere is
this more troublesome than in the formal assessment of risk - the esti-
mation of the association between the exposure to a substance and the
incidence of some disease, based on scientific data.
I believe that part of the solution to our distress lies with the idea
that disciplined minds can grapple with ignorance, and sometimes win
- the idea of science. We will not recover our equilibrium without a
concerted effort to more effectively engage the scientific community.
Likewise, when NATO's Committee on Challenges to Modern Society
(CCMS) completed a major comparative study of national hazardous waste
management policies in 1981, it· noted the same public anxiety, linking it
with implementation failures. But it expressed the same faith in science to
overcome this and wider regulatory uncertainties:
[There exist] obvious differences in political attitudes and philosophies
about how hazardous waste disposal should be carried out. A priority
task ... should be to develop a more common understanding of techni-
cal disposal requirements and to achieve some sort of harmonization of
disposal standards and quality ... With regard to this objective, more
efforts have to be made to put hazardous waste management on a
sound scientific footing [7].
Implementation gaps and regulatory failings generally are thus attri-
buted to technical inadequacy, an incomplete "sound scientific footing". On
this reasoning, lack of public credibility is caused by uncertainty, which is
caused by incomplete science. The self-evident solution is therefore to inten-
sify and standardize the application of scientific knowledge in risk analysis,
to provide more clear and uniform technical standards, more scientifically
precise and universal legal norms, etc. All this assumes that the technical
world is free of institutional context.
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This underlying approach is very nearly universal in hazardous waste
regulation (and elsewhere), and certainly dominates its public language and
processes. It incorporates questionable assumptions about the nature of the
problems and of prevailing uncertainties, the nature of scientific knowledge,
the basis of public perceptions of the risks, and indeed of the appropriate
nature of social authority. Our alternative orientation emphasizes that
issues are made up of multiple interacting social groups, which have
different cognitions of "the issue" at stake. These may incorporate different
interests, so that divergent values or social assumptions may be built subtly
into factual arguments and uncertainties about risks. Expert disagreement
in risk analysis is also frequently due not to imprecision or ignorance, i.e.,
technical uncertainty alone, but to different expert definitions (not only lay
perceptions) of what the risk problem is. These may partly reflect different
institutional or disciplinary positions, and other assumptions which may
imply behavioral judgments or prescriptions, i.e., indirect value
commitments.
Whether at expert or public level, we call these divergent basic prob-
lem structures deriving from institutional realities, structural uncertainties.
"Uncertainty" generated by such structural conflict of expert perception is
fundamentally different from, but normally mistaken as, purely technical
uncertainty or imprecision. Implementation is analytically important in this
distinction of uncertainty types because it is usually most distant organiza-
tionally from the level of "scientific" input, i.e., where regulations are
decided. Even at centralized levels different cognitive structures and not
merely interest structures exist (e.g., expert disagreement), but implementa-
tion shows most sharply the operation of different substantive rationalities
even within the same regulatory organization. What the conventional
approach assumes to be lack of technical precision (scientific uncertainty) is
often structural uncertainty or latent conflict between divergent perceptions
and social rationalities. In its unawareness of these social dimensions fram-
ing rationality, we argue that "rational" methods in regulation and decision
analysis effectively reject a necessary dimension of democratic negotiation
between expertise and lay experience. By inadvertently dismissing a poten-
tial development of the relations of expertise with lay experience, they ulti-
mately undermine the credibility and authority of expertise altogether.
To give a brief example, central regulatory managers normally have to
relate to composite bodies (industrial lobbies, parliamentary scrutineers, the
media, environmentalist groups, and international agencies) who want to
know the rationale and see the overall "system" consistency of regulation.
They may therefore define regulations as if they are clear and uniform, and
as if key control terms such as "hazard" or "waste" are unambiguous and
admit no significant loopholes. Local implementing actors, on the other
hand, relate to local industrial plants and operators, local residents, and
other particularistic conditions. They have to shape the practical
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interpretations of those very same regulations in ways that are viable in
their setting, in negotiation with a different set of actors, interests, and con-
straints. This may frequently be the source of perceived "implementation
gaps", as for example when a local inspector judges that he cannot enforce
legal sanctions on a firm violating the regulations, because he knows his own
legal department does not have the resources for a successful legal prosecu-
tion, or because he knows that the company is basically honest and diligent,
but in temporary difficulties.
Whereas central regulators may defend the credibility of the regula-
tory process amongst their reference groups by projecting a universalistic,
rigorous scientific image of regulation, local regulators may defend the via-
bility of regulation by ad hoc accommodation to contingent local realities,
thus potentially contradicting the centrally projected image of technical
consistency, precision, and rigor. The most significant factor affecting
implementation is not scientific uncertainty or incompleteness, but struc-
tural conflict of rationalities among the diverse legitimate parties in the
regulatory arena. Under pressure for public justification and credibility,
however, the language of science artificially reduces these into apparently
one-dimensional technical ':lncertainties, which seem to be manageable by
scientific methods - probabilistic risk analysis, etc. We call this the bureau-
cratic processing of uncertainty. It is supported by the myth that science is
uncertainty seeking, whereas at a deeper level it is uncertainty rejecting.
The most central example of the practical and conceptual effects of
this uncertainty fallacy is the dominant policy assumption that the key
terms "hazard" and "waste" can even in principle be precisely defined. This
is a major point developed throughout the book, that the main cause of
inadequate hazardous waste management is believed to be the inconsistency
and imprecision of these "technical" terms. But this assumes that they can
be precisely defined (by more scientific effort), free of context. Our research
shows that this is not so - they are rooted in their institutional context, and
reflect their context. They are more than transcientific questions, because
an infinity of extra data will not achieve their clear definition. "Hazard"
and "waste" are therefore not just imprecise or statistically fuzzy - they are
fundamentally ambiguous. Their intrinsic physical meaning is not given and
objectively predetermined in nature; it is always incomplete, and has to be
completed by social construction. This social construction has to be repeat-
edly achieved and repaired by partly tacit processes of negotiation in
specific regulatory settings and waste life-cycle situations.
On a large scale, we find that the different national institutional set-
tings resolve regulatory definitions of hazard and waste in different ways.
And even within a single regulatory framework the precise practical
definition of "fixed" technical criteria is an institutional process. The con-
struction involves actors and groups with divergent interests, perceptions,
constraints, and rationalities, and thus with competing favored definitions.
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The viability of the regulatory process may therefore actually depend upon
the very opposite of intensification of science; it may require that some
imprecision and ambiguity of formal regulatory standards and definitions be
maintained, as an adaptive arena in which the contending parties can
interact, negotiate, and settle and renegotiate the practical meanings as they
go along.
Indeed, the lack of technical precision may allow the intra-
organizational "inconsistency" at different levels of regulation (as outlined
before). This accommodates irredeemably conflicting social forces and
demands without their ever being brought into immediate, destructive con-
frontation. This ability of the institutional domain to absorb intrinsic social
contradictions, aided by appropriate formulation of scientific norms, may be
an important buttress against regulatory paralysis, especially since regula-
tion has changed from an administrative function to the more political role,
traditionally performed by legislatures, of compromising between conflicting
social values. The general insight to be drawn is that the technical lan-
guage of regulation is a code for its social context. Contrary to the conven-
tional view, it does not derive from a context-free scientific framework.
Comprehensive, elaborate, and inflexible technical frameworks are likely to
be established where structural (institutional) uncertainty is greatest. Con-
versely, when structural uncertainty is low (e.g., a relatively stable, high-
trust social environment) precise, comprehensive, and inflexible technical
language is unnecessary.
Here we can clarify the analytical distinction between prescription and
description. For a badly structured issue like hazardous wastes, it may
make no sense descriptively to employ standard, apparently precise models
in risk analysis. However, if there is high structural uncertainty in the insti-
tutional setting, regulation will employ such precise and standardized
technical language as a prescriptive code for controlling highly uncertain
behavior, or for reassuring mistrustful and truculent social groups. In prac-
tice the analytical distinction between description and prescription is con-
fused, and the institutional needs for prescription drive the criteria of techn-
ical description.
One could say that uncertainty does not exist in objective amounts;
the threshold of perceived uncertainty is inversely proportional to the
degree to which it is defined as a problem. This depends upon the amount
of cherished commitment that it appears to threaten, which is a reflection of
social factors.
These correspondences between technical and institutional uncertain-
ties, and the roles of scientific knowledge in processes of regulatory credibil-
ity and viability, are a central concern of this book. As we show later, the
specific mode of scientific knowledge in regulation is influenced by several
factors, including its simultaneous use in more than one social role. One of
these is its interaction with processes of public perception.
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1.4. Public Perceptions - Credibility and the Politics of
Anxiety
Policymakers, regulators, or risk managers face an increasingly difficult
problem achieving credibility and authority, or legitimation of their policies,
regulations, etc. As Peter Crawford, then head of OECD's Chemicals
Management project, remarked in 1982:
The era in which government decision makers can accept expert gui-
dance without being able to point to, explain and validate the pro-
cedures followed is receding rapidly [8].
It has continued to recede, and the public justification of decisions has
become a dominating dimension. The precise decision rules underlying risk
assessments and regulations have been required to be more transparent.
This has centrally involved science, and the authority of descriptions of
scientific practice. As with implementation difficulties generally, the reac-
tion has been molded by misconceptions about the basic nature of public
skepticism about science [9]. The lack of expert consensus is blamed for the
public's skepticism, the remedy being more and better technical knowledge,
including more rigorous procedures for defining risks, and for converting
analysis into practical regulation [10].
All this is founded on the premise that "exaggerated" public percep-
tions of risk originate in expert disagreement and in public ignorance and
lack of intellectual rigor. However, we reject the idea embedded in conven-
tional approaches, that "risk perceptions" are (subjectively distorted) per-
ceptions of (objective) risk, which is supposed to be a single context-free
dimension. We argue that it is artificially abstracted by analysts from
people's multidimensional social experience of issues, technologies, and
decision-making institutions. We propose instead that people rationally
react to their (past and current) social experience of decision-making rela-
tionships, in which physical risk defined by analysts is inextricably embed-
ded as only one element. For example, public reactions to "hazardous
waste risks" and associated regulations or proposals are reactions to accu-
mulated experience of "regulation" as a historical relationship. This
includes control of public health and environmental damage, but also the
intelligibility, competence, trustworthiness, and social identifiability of insti-
tutions, which themselves have several public interfaces. These social rela-
tionships are the grounding of "public perceptions of risk" . In some areas of
regulation they are already mediated by impenetrable scientific languages ~
they are already socially alienated.
As we argue in Chapters 11 and 12, past public "acceptance" should
be regarded more realistically as passive quiescence, no more. Apparently
declining public willingness to trust regulatory institutions may thus be a
reflection, not of an inherently less-trusting public, but of escalation in what
technological and regulatory elites ask of public credulity.
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Therefore, the conventional response to regulatory problems, of inten-
sifying the scientific content of regulation, may well undermine the author-
ity of regulatory bodies because it may extend the existing social alienation
on which, we argue, public risk perception is founded. We could say that
the "risks" people objectively perceive and respond to are the social risks
embodied in the social relationships of unintelligible control and apparently
arbitrary power between risk receivers and risk managers. By pretending
that "risk perception" is perception of (physical) risks, and by obliterating the
institutional dimension, conventional policy analysis may only add more fuel
to the already amply fueled fire of public opposition. The regulatory impor-
tance of social credibility and the assumptions outlined above mean that sci-
ence has been drawn into a dual role in regulation. On the one hand is the
ordinary practice of analyzing risks, their variances, determinants, and
potential controls (we might call this the "descriptive" or "empirical"
dimension), while on the other is the role of negotiating public credibility,
i.e., of public justification. This involves a symbolic role, of projecting reas-
surance and persuasion that public expectations of trustworthiness and
credibility have been fulfilled.
The first role only involves substantive statements, e.g~, "the risk of
activity X under conditions Y is Z: it can be reduced to Z' under conditions
Y' ". However, the second role involves public accounts of the internal pro-
cess of science, to claim credibility for the first kind of statement (and
related regulations). This exposure of the internal practices of science has
immense practical political implications for the credibility of science in pub-
lic, and thus for the decisions and prescriptions that lean upon science for
their authority.
To policymakers the "hazardous" aspect of hazardous waste is a rela-
tively minor issue, and their main concern is to convince an uneasy public:
Extensive efforts are needed to inform the public better on the techni-
cal criteria involved in hazardous waste disposal and on how far pre-
cautionary measures are taken to exclude or limit short term and long
term risks. It has to be demonstrated to the public that disposal facili-
ties are designed and managed properly so that people feel confident
that things are done in the right way and in the interest of citizens
themselves... There are experiences well proved and persuasive dispo-
sal concepts and technologies existing. What we have to do is to sell
them better to the public [11].
Largely as a result of this pressure to justify policy commitments to third
parties, environmental risk analysis has implied the existence of developed
scientific underpinnings that are often not there. To some extent this has
been beneficial in forcing such scientific attention and development in areas
such as pollution control technology. But frequently the elaboration of stat-
utory regulations (and the political pressure behind them) has proceeded as
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If the science were already developed, and has created enormous pressure to
produce the necessary "appHed science" very hastily, and thus within strong
constraints on the scope and. depth of such research. The inevitable result
has been the understatement of uncertainties and methodological limita-
tions, the over-elaboration of scientific models, inadequate peer review, and
even downright falsification [121. Whether for "third-party" reassurance or
to reduce institutional unpredictability, scientific knowledge has inevitably
been shaped by its social role.
Both internal bureaucratic dynamics and external reassurance may
require a belief in objective, rule-bound knowledge. But the full extent of
this policy "forcing" of science, and of the ignorance, uncertainty, variabil-
ity, and lack of normal scientific standards that underly it, is becoming
increasingly, if incoherently, recognized by the public.
Unrealistic public expectations of science have been cultivated in the
past by regulatory institutions, which have (not necessarily illegitimately)
kept uncertainties and expert conflicts from public view. This may have
been feasible when the scope of technologies and the speed of change were
relatively limited. But such social filtering of experience is made less feasi-
ble by new conditions, under which uncertainties and limitations of method
cannot be privatized by experts and other elites. As these institutional bar-
riers between the public and uncertainties are broken down, daunting prob-
lems of credibility and communication are emerging, aggravated by the
expectations engendered by past practices and social relationships in
regulation.
Part of the problem is that even scientists themselves tend to underes-
timate the extent of informal judgments and unspecifiable decision rules
within their own science; these cannot be formally justified, especially not in
skeptical settings such as policy or legal arenas. When so tested, even
maturely developed scientific knowledge frequently fails the test of credibil-
ity [131. This not only damages specific policies or claims, but also the insti-
tu tions' general credibility.
Our suggestion is therefore that prevailing approaches to regulation
and their founding assumptions about science are in a cycle of self-
destruction of institutional credibility. This is self-fueling as erosion of
authority engenders more symbolic projection of images of formal scientific
procedures and evidence, and ensuing (frequent) inspection leads to further
public contradiction of this mode of authority.
In the hazardous wastes case there is an extra twist to this cycle. The
symbolic reassurance discourse of science emphasizes standardized, univer-
sal risk and regulation frameworks. But the dispersed and heterogeneous
nature of hazardous wastes life-cycles requires the particularistic, situation-
specific, analysis of risks, in the descriptive or empirical mode. The pres-
sure upon regulatory bodies to appear credible and to reassure may more
sharply than for other issues conflict with accurate situational analysis.
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Concrete examples of this conflict are given in later chapers. To illustrate
the problem here we can quote the concern of a UK regulator over the pub-
lication of nuclear risk analysis criteria:
Before any decision can be taken as to the wisdom of expressing policy
in such terms, due regard must be given to the possible consequences of
enshrining figures of this nature. One point is that if a certain proba-
bility figure is approved, any improvement required will be seen as
illogical [14].
In other words, the symbolic credibility dimension forbids acknowledgment
of the contingent property of current scientific beliefs, because credibility
currently attaches to a universalistic image of scientific knowledge. Social
analysis of science suggests that knowledge is more context-specific than is
usually recognized, because there are many assumptions about contextual
relationships that are assumed to stay constant or hold true in order for a
given relationship to be valid [15]. These many "network" relationships are
conditions for the validity of ·a scientific statement and limit its strict scope,
but they are so taken for granted by scientists that they do not recognize
their existence. These qualifications are therefore rarely fully stated, espe-
cially in the context of public debate, thus giving an exaggerated impression
of universal truth to scientific knowledge. Of course, many such conditions,
e.g., that Newtonian mechanics is only accurate for systems of velocity less
than the speed of light, or for levels of energy transfer greater than sub-
atomic energy quanta, are fulfilled over huge ranges of "natural" experience,
so the qualifications become largely irrelevant and go "invisible". Ho·.vever,
in systems of greater variability, complexity, and ignorance such as those
involving behavioral relationships and unknown environmental processes, as
with hazardous wastes, the universalist faith about science may be a bad
model, and the tension between universalistic ("intrinsic risk") considera-
tions and the actuality of situation-specific risk may be thereby exacerbated.
Because the foregoing orientation is complex, and unfamiliar, I will
attempt to summarize, before introducing the practical issue of hazardous
wastes and the structure of the rest of the book. The conceptual overview is
central to the contribution we attempt to make, which is to analyze the
significance for regulation of the new context of legitimation in which the
scientific language and practice of risk analysis is increasingly embroiled.
(1) Policy and risk analysis has neglected the significance of implementa-
tion, which involves much more than the mechanical local enactment
(or lack of it) of central rules. "Deviation" or "deficits" often entail
correspondence with local factors; these are just as important as cen-
tral considerations in making policies practically viable. Such local,
situational factors are akin to the context of a relationship or problem
usually assumed stable by science. Like science, risk analysis and other
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"rational" methods in policymaking all unconsciously strip away this
context and assume that it is, at most, marginal.
(2) Particularly where behavioral uncertainties interact with physical
parameters, and ignorance is significant - as is true of most risk
analysis problems (perhaps especially hazardous wastes) - this basic
neglect of context is drastically misleading. From the "context" arise
different definitions of the decision problems, different perceptions of
what the primary risk-generating system is, and different kinds of
relevant experience and expertise. These multiple rationalities
represent latent structural conflict over the key technical terms, "risk",
"hazard", and "waste". This institutional uncertainty in the heart of
the issue is misrepresented as technical imprecision. Implementation
difficulties, technical imprecision, expert disagreements, and public
opposition are all taken to be ultimately remediable by more precise
and rigorous scientific standardization.
(3) Because of the intensifying need for justification of regulations to
achieve public credibility, universal and precise scientific models are
disseminated whilst the underlying scientific ignorance and uncertain-
ties escalate. The tension is therefore sharpening between the
scientific roles of symbolic reassurance and of empirical analysis of
actual, situated risks. As expertise is increasingly used to justify regu-
latory decisions, it is increasingly challenged, leading to public exami-
nation of the internal scientific process. This is also found to fall short
of (unrealistic) formal, rule-bound images of scientific practice, leading
to further deterioration of regulatory credibility.
(4) Public reactions are falsely defined as "exaggerated" psychological per-
ceptions of risks defined by the established experts. These artificially
abstracted physical concepts of risk bear only distant relationship to
the concrete institutional relationships of technology - social risks -
which are arguably the authentic and legitimate sources of public per-
ceptions and reactions. These divergent public definitions of the
relevant problems are distantly indicated, but not at all adequately
represented, by the elaboration of risk attributes, which people are
thought to perceive and weight differentially in "subjective" reactions
to risk. Current conceptions and uses of science as the basis of risk
management artificially, if inadvertently, conceal the full uncertainties
and ignorance. This precludes mature social learning through regula-
tion and instead encourges inconsistent and often extreme public reac-
tions as the intelligibility gap between the public and policy elites
increases.
In these circumstances it seems there are only two overall directions
left. We can try business as usual, with more desperate patching up as we
go along, with rising polarization, instability, the devaluation of public
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discourse into "public relations" , and social embrittlement of public decision
processes generally [16]. The sense that in this direction we have to run fas-
ter and faster even to stand still on the sand is aptly summed up by
Greenberger's observation that we are using scientific expertise more and
more, for it to be believed less and less [171. Whatever abstract expertise
may be intensified in this process, overall there is no mutual learning.
An alternative is to seek out the elements of current practices and
approaches where critical dialogue of frameworks and mutual learning does
seem possible, and to build upon these. The particularly critical need seems
to be to explore new forms of dialogue and learning, and new institutional
relationships between "experts" and "nonexperts". This should not be
taken as anti-expertise. To the contrary, if expertise means legitimate
authority, it is to restore a context in which expertise can exist. I would
echo the observation of Harvey Brooks, that:
... perhaps the principal lesson from our experience with the interac-
tions of experts and laymen in public policy decisions with high techni-
calor scientific content is the need for greater introspection into the
non-technical values and preferences that affect both the selection of
evidence and its interpretation by all the participants, both laypersons
and experts [18].
Brooks' thoughts were directed to "big" decisions, as one-off events,
but when reoriented toward the kind of process decisions or relationships
involved in typical regulatory settings, they provide the idea of a gradual
elicitation of fundamental frameworks held by different parties, at the
deeper level where values, basic problem definitions and clusters, and
descriptions of the world, all meet. Some thoughts on the kind of institu-
tional relationships and moral-cognitive heuristic (the equivalent of the role
that "rationality" now plays, but something less authoritarian and narrow)
needed to give effect to such principles are given in Chapter 12. A step in
this general direction has been the interactive modeling workshops initiated
by Holling and colleagues [19]. A common experience of these has been that
during five intensive days well away from the shop, policymakers have been
fired by fundamentally new insights into the problems they confront, only to
find the inspiration relentlessly melt away as they are re-enclosed in their
usual organizational world. Some kind of analogy to the interactive
workshop process of joint exploration and mutual appreciation, but on a
more public and more mature and regular basis, will eventually have to be
found.
The analysis as outlined above indicates why I believe the develop-
ments in the practical experience of regulation in the last decade require a
new look at scientific rationality in public arenas, because of the rapid
development of the legitimatory or justification dimension. It has always
been there; but I believe it is now of a different scale, quality, and
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significance where, starting from conventional approaches to risk assess-
ment, we can see the need for a new orientation.
It should by now be clear to the reader why this book is about Hazard-
ous Management of Wastes. In Chapter 2, I explain why hazardous wastes
is such an apt analytical focus as well as an important empirical one.
1.5. The Chapters in Outline
Having given an overview of the issues that this book addresses, we now
outline how the book is structured. First, however, a word on strategy.
The cross-national comparative work on which the book is founded
was not a large-scale effort with several fieldworkers operating to the same
methods and question schedules in every country. Nor did we see any value
in a rigid comparative framework; we were using comparative opportunities
to help structure a more analytical problematique about the interactions
between technical knowledge and uncertainties, institutional structures, and
regulatory credibility. The research was based on our own interviews, some
commissioned interviews, IIASA meetings, documentation, and data collec-
tion, supplemented by collaboration, especially in the Netherlands and Hun-
gary_ This collaboration was limited by the existing commitments of col-
leagues working for us on their own funds.
The chapters are thus orga~ized as much around analytical sub-
themes as descriptive case studies of specific countries. However, the central
issue of each chapter is illustrated by empirical materials from a leading
country, with supplementary comparative materials from other countries.
Comparative analytical discussion is woven into the chapters where it
naturally arises. To define a problem more deeply may ultimately be the
most important practical contribution.
In Chapter 3 we analyze some key features of the hazardous waste
issue that seem to exist in whatever cultural-institutional system it finds
itself. Most of these properties add up to an issue that is more poorly
defined than most - not merely technically uncertain, but institutionally
uncertain and indeterminate, on top of a great deal of technical ignorance.
How different societies define the "technical" boundaries and structure of
"the" hazardous waste risk analysis and regulation problem reflects institu-
tional factors in that society. Although they are influenced by different set-
tings, as we see in subsequent chapters the heterogeneity and extensive
behavioral-technical life-cycle of hazardous wastes create important general
conditions for the proper role of risk analysis in relation to local institu-
tional relationships. Other properties of hazardous wastes are also
identified that have a marked effect upon the interaction of these dimen-
sions with public credibility of regulation.
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Chapter 4 describes the processes of issue definition into formal regu-
latory frameworks in the Netherlands, and the practical relationship
between such formal prescriptive systems and the institutional processes of
enacting them. The relatively elaborate formal precision of the Dutch regu-
lations, and the contrast with the vagaries of their implementation, is inter-
preted in terms of issue-specific factors worked out in a particular and (for
Europe) unusual political-administrative culture.
Chapter 5 analyzes the factors that underly what is regarded as the
central problem for rigorous national regulation of hazardous wastes, as well
as for international control - making the definition and classification of
hazardous wastes more precise and standardized. After reviewing the
different technical approaches that have been taken toward this problem,
the chapter analyzes the way in which such hazardous waste classification
lists were constructed, especially in the USA, the FRG, and Austria. A
point of prime importance throughout the book emerges, namely the inevit-
ably social constitution of technical frameworks. This is because the
detailed choices of method, criteria, discriminations, etc., were found to
depend upon local administrative purposes and institutional needs (includ-
ing legitimation or public justification), as well as upon more universal
scientific-technical factors. This has important practical implications for
attempts to stem international loopholes by intensifying the scientific effort
to find precise, universally meaningful hazard definitions and classifications.
One of the most important issue properties described in Chapter 3 is
the diffuseness and dispersion of hazardous waste life-cycles. Chapter 6
examines one concrete approach to the unusually severe risk management
problems that this presents; this approach is reflected in the regulatory sys-
tems of Hesse and Bavaria in the FRG. These states (like Denmark and
Sweden) effectively reduce the indeterminacies of multicentric, multiactor
definition, movement, and "control" of hazardous wastes by "condensing"
the hazardous waste life-cycle from its "cradle" at production to its "grave"
at final disposal or destruction, into one, comprehensive organization for
regulation and management. We call this the government ownership or
"absorption" of risks, which would otherwise be at the mercy of auto-
nomous behavioral, perceptual, economic, and technical interactions. Impor-
tant institutional initiatives include combinations of public and private
investment (though increasing public input to capital programs), and obli-
gations on all waste generators to register and transfer their waste to the
ownership of the public management authority. Public investment has been
followed elsewhere, more recently in the Netherlands, but the FRG's export
restriction has occasioned a great deal of controversy. Its merits and draw-
backs are discussed in the light of recent developments.
A sharp contrast in the institutional approach is then examined in
Chapter 7. The UK has devolved regulation to local county councilor dis-
trict council authorities who have ultimate responsibility for the provision of
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treatment and disposal (T&D) capacity, and responsibility for interpreta-
tion of central technical principles. This has led to inconsistencies in stan-
dards, disposal costs, and enforcement, and has obstructed capital invest-
ment in new and better T&D facilities. Controlled codisposal of some kinds
of hazardous waste in municipal landfills is a central crutch of UK policy, to
the chagrin of a substantial body of international opinion. The institutional
decentralization, technical flexibility, and virtually total private enterprise
T&D of the UK system are discussed in the context of policy development
in the UK and Europe.
The Dutch and UK cases are the most clear illustrations of an impor-
tant general point that technical knowledge is a code for behavioral relation-
ships and expectations. Where there is informal trust among the relevant
institutions, (e.g., the UK in the past, but this is changing) elaborated
technical codes are unnecessary. Conversely, where there is institutional
fragmentation (here Dutch political culture bears some resemblance to that
of the USA), elaborated, inflexible, and precise technical norms effectively
stand surrogate for institution{ll uncertainty.
Chapter 8 is an account of the Hungarian system of managing hazar-
dous wastes. As well as providing information not hitherto available, the
chapter also underlines the point that political-economic factors of indus-
trial structure and financing, and government-industry relations, are more
fundamentally important in risk regulation than technical risk analysis per
se. Disconnected from organizational realities the latter is meaningless. It
is interesting to note too that the wider institutional relations of govern-
ment and industry in Hungary probably have more potential for fundamen-
tal, upstream regulatory solutions than do most market economies.
Chapters 9 and 10 turn from case studies of national processes of regu-
lation toward risk analysis and management, the requirements of it, and the
constraints upon it in the light of earlier chapters. Chapter 9 elaborates the
distinction between two fundamentally different kinds of uncertainty, whose
confusion has important and damaging effects. This chapter's underlying
framework allows an examination of the tension between standardization of
scientific risk criteria and more variable, situation-specific optimization.
This is a special case of the more general point that expert risk analyses
often differ not due to imprecision, but to the different underlying risk prob-
lems they have framed. These may well embody institutional assumptions.
A key observation of Chapter 10 is that hazardous waste belongs to a class
of policy issues whose uncertainties embody multiple, contradictory social
definitions of the problem, and even widely divergent constructions of cen-
tral technical terms like "hazardous", and of apparently straightforward
data such as hazardous waste arisings and movements (d. other fields such
as oil reserves, or deforestation rates and fuel wood consumption).
Chapter 9 argues that the dominant approaches continually misper-
ceive what is in reality behavioral-institutional uncertainty, as if it were
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technical uncertainty. Thus, at a strategic level the need to work on dimin-
ishing or constructively living with the former is obliterated in the
automatic intensification of scientific work on the latter. More specifically,
the greater basic importance of institutional uncertainties than is recognized
generally in risk and policy analysis (not only for hazardous wastes) implies
that institutional strategies such as those analyzed in Chapter 6, may be
more valuable than usually recognized. We argue that social-institutional
uncertainty generates and maintains technical uncertainty. The dominant
rational decision-making approach in policy assumes the opposite, that
institutional uncertainty or conflict is generated, or anyway, allowed,
because of unresolved technical uncertainties.
In general, our inversion of the conventional framework of rational
public decision making restores a rightful emphasis on the quality of social
relationships in decision making - to negotiation and mediation as well as
discovery and declaration; to process as well as products. However, this
involves more than embracing the frameworks of "procedural rationality"
which have evolved from the conventional framework in response to this
point [20]. This argument is elaborated in Chapter 11. Notions of pro-
cedural rationality are built upon the belief that rational procedures can be
developed, but for given and discrete problems that are assumed to be
shared by all parties. Our institutional relations framework is also about
process, but it includes the essential point that the process must recognize
the legitimacy of, and allow for negotiation between, diverse definitions of
the fundamental issue(s) at stake. Defining a problem is also an expression
of values, and to assume a given definition is already to impose authori-
tarian restrictions, however "liberal" or "rational" subsequent procedures
may be. In risk issues at least, events and decisions are part of a stream of
relationships and experiences. It is reasonable for people to judge these
institutional relationships when they are asked to accept risks under condi-
tions of uncertainty. No issue is an island.
In Chapter 11 we show how public "perceptions of risks" are being
falsely interpreted by essentially the same dominant approach, which takes
a single scientific framework for granted without appreciating its own
context-free artificiality. This has led to the elaboration of technical
decision-analytic management methods instead of more negotiative, open-
ended, and mutually appreciative social relationships of decision making.
Finally, in Chapter 12 we attempt to integrate the insights from the
more empirical chapters with the more theoretical discussion of Chapters
9-11. This involves an extensive analysis of the legitimation dimension of
regulatory decision making, as problems of institutional credibility and pub-
lic reassurance have escalated markedly in the 1980s. Science as risk
analysis is caught up in both these intertwined dimensions - descriptive and
symbolic action. The tension between them, analyzed in Chapter 10, has
been amplified by the need for public justification. The symbolic projection,
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however, is not a disconnected "secondary" shell of false consciousness; it
shapes and constrains the empirical discourse, limiting what it can and can-
not analytically recognize, and what meanings can be invested in empirical
analysis. The justificatory dimension tends inevitably to condense and obli-
terate real situational variances in a universalistic language of risk assess-
ment and regulatory implementation. Especially for hazardous wastes, this
does violence to the realities of variable risks, and of local regulatory imple-
mentation, and thus paradoxically it undermines its own attempts to reas-
sure the public. Attempts to climb out by intensifying and elaborating con-
ventional "rational" scientific methods only dig the pit deeper. We con-
clude the book by outlining a more constructive general alternative, based
upon notions of adaptiveness of institutional relations, broader social learn-
ing, and more open-ended, critical, and pragmatic notions of rationality.
Chapters 9-11 therefore work through the complicated and interacting
themes: of implementation, which accentuates the importance of cross-
cutting rationalities and institutional uncertainties; of the tension between
these unrecognized uncertainties, and the assumption that implementation
gaps are due to scientific or technical imprecision alone; the contradiction
between the dual roles of science, in description and justification; and the
dialectics of credibility problems set up by the unceasing attempt to use a
misleading model of science in regulation - even to respond to public con-
cern - in ways that are fundamentally insensitive to the institutional deter-
mination of practical rationality.
Hazardous waste has been an important practical issue in which to
work out these ideas, but they would be useless if they could not be shown
to have some corresponding practical implications. Some of these are
described in Chapter 12. The general analysis of the book tilts the balance:
in favor of greater "condensation" of waste life-cycles by some form of insti-
tutional "ownership" of risks; and in favor of greater intervention to regu-
late "upstream" waste production, rather than back-end disposal which
treats waste production as an impenetrable "black-box".
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CHAPTER 2
Hazardous Wastes Risk Management
and Environmental Regulation
Brian Wynne
2.1. Introduction
In 1979, the Dutch waste treatment company, UNISER, was found to have
illegally disposed of large quantities of hazardous wastes by defrauding its
customers, which included most of the Dutch chemicals industry [1]. A
member of UNISER's board who was jailed, was also a member of a govern-
ment expert advisory committee. The only law under which the company
could be prosecuted dated from the 1870s, and was originally designed to
prevent the sale of contaminated meat. The credit for eventual prosecution
went to local authorities who had persisted doggedly through years of eva-
sion, lack of support and even informal obstruction from central govern-
ment. Despite the existence of formal regulations from 1981, the lack of
domestic treatment facilities meant that until now the main method of
Dutch hazardous waste "control" has been to export it to other countries.
Some of these countries allegedly have unacceptable disposal practices, such
as uncontrolled landfilling next to national frontiers. Others (e.g., Belgium)
have objected to certain Dutch export practices and have demonstrated the
inherent fragility of a system dependent upon large-volume exports by
imposing bans on their wastes.
In the USA, the original 1976 legislation to control hazardous wastes,
under the Resources Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), was widely
recognized to be the most elaborate and comprehensive environmental pro-
tection framework ever. Yet the timetables for implementing regulations
were so badly breached, and the regulations (even when they came) so full
of loopholes, that some analysts judged that there would have been less of
24 Ri8k Management and Hazaroow Waste
an environmental risk problem had there been no legislation at all [2]. The
US Congressional Office of Technology Assessment's 1983 review of the
"Superfund" program to clean up past uncontrolled toxic waste dumps
actually concluded that despite this program, more superfund toxic sites
needing remedial cleanup would be created under RCRA's "control regime"
than Superfund would clean up [3]! The same report conservatively
estimated that more than half of the toxic waste generated by US industry -
over 40 million tonnes (mt) - was escaping control. Large sectors of US
toxic waste disposal have been found to be in the hands of organized crime.
Superfund's allocation of $1.6 billion was estimated to be anywhere between
10 and 100 times too small to deal with discovered past toxic waste dumps.
In another case, a waste disposal company operating in Denver, Colorado,
was officially found to have been deceiving the EPA and the Colorado State
authority between at least 1980 and 1982, yet the courts judged that no
legal penalty could be applied under RCRA or anything else [4]. These and
many other flagrant loopholes in RCRA led the US Congress to reauthorize
and extensively strengthen hazardous waste control legislation in 1983 [5].
Two mammoth legislative programs, supported by endless policy
analysis, have therefore seen the exacerbation of the problems. This offers
an invitation, not to sayan obligation, to examine the issues afresh.
In the UK, which often boasts of the longest established framework for
environmental protection, a 1985 review of hazardous waste regulation by
the newly established Hazardous Wastes Inspectorate (HWI) produced one
of the most outspokenly critical official reports ever seen from a UK govern-
ment agency [61. It noted that
... a considerable number of undesirable disposal practices have been
witnessed. It may be inferred that malpractice at hazardous waste
sites is not uncommon. ... standards are anything but consistent or
satisfactory, ... all too many major hazardous waste landfill sites have
been seen which exude an atmosphere of total dereliction and decay.
The regulatory system appeared to encourage the "cheapest tolerable
option", and could not be expected to command public confidence. About
150 incidents of discovered illegal disposal are recorded every year, and
some places were recognized officially as "cowboy country", where enforce-
ment officers had to proceed in groups for protection against physical
assault. The HWI was especially severe on what had been officially claimed
as the long-standing linchpin of hazardous waste control, namely site licens-
ing to restrict uncontrolled dumping. So appalling was this system found to
be that in many cases the HWI could not even understand from the license
conditions whether a site was meant to be a hazardous (in the UK, "spe-
cial") waste site or not! Even in the UK's traditionally quiescent climate of
environmental protest, public antagonism has grown toward hazardous
waste practices - ironically, this has so far been most intensely focused on
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the high-technology, supposedly cleaner, sector of waste treatment and
disposal. However, cracks are beginning to appear, almost literally, in the
waste management practice of landfill codisposal of hazardous wastes with
municipal wastes, on which the UK is more dependent than any other
industrial country.
Despite a vigorous defence of the ext.ensive dependence on this prac-
tice, justified by a widely referenced scientific research program in the 1970s
[7], criticism of unacknowledged uncertainties and biases in this program
have begun to emerge, and groundwater contamination from landfilling has
been found. Some UK water authorities have expressed concern at this
state of affairs, and have had to close some aquifers as supplies because of
contamination [8].
In the EC, which issued a toxic waste Directive in 1978 requiring all
member states to implement certain controls, and to submit reports of pro-
gress, about half of the member states were being threatened with legal
action by the Commission of the European Communities (CEC) because
they had not fulfilled their responsibilities, even many years after the dead-
line. In addition, the inherent difficulty of even establishing a coherent
overall policy perspective has been underlined by a major conflict within the
EC as to whether wastes should be treated as a fully commercial commodity
with free trade movement across frontiers, or whether they should be seen
as part of environmental protection and subject to locally financed and
managed public-industrial treatment and disposal (T&D) services. This
issue is developed later.
In most countries, hazardous waste management is in a state of inter-
nal flux and public strife. International controls are crippled by problems
and divergence in national approaches. The "disorderly state of affairs"
reported by one European regulator in 1982, with "discrepancies between
the reality and spirit of regulations" [9] could be an appropriate description
for the general situation, after about ten years or so of legislation in most
countries.
There is also a growing concern that the problems in developing coun-
tries may become far worse due to the rapid growth of chemical industries
in some regions (e.g., in India, at nearly 20% per year, between 1975 and
1985), the lack of environmental control expertise, infrastructure and
resources, and the potential interest of firms in industrialized countries in
exporting their most expensive (and thus, most toxic) wastes to such cheap
options.
Figures compiled by Harvey Yakowitz at the OECD suggest that
approaching 400 mt of hazardous wastes are produced worldwide, though
the definitions employed are extremely variable and uncertain [10].
Roughly 5 mt arise in less-industrialized countries, 20 mt in Western
Europe, and 15 mt in Eastern Europe. These figures conceal rapidly
developing volumes of hazardous waste arising in particular geographical
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and technical areas, and new patterns of waste trading, e.g., between less-
industrialized countries, both of which put special strains upon proper con-
trols. Indeed, international trade in wastes seems to be increasing in all
dimensions, between industrial countries, between less-developed countries,
and between industrial and developing countries. In addition to the fact
that local waste management directly affects international movements and
problems, industrial-world regulatory frameworks are being used as models
for the less-industrial countries, so there is an extra impetus to examine
carefully their technical and (especially) institutional characteristics,
interactions, and implications.
A central and unique dimension of the hazardous waste issue is
highlighted by the belief of experienced environmental policy staff in inter-
national organizations that much toxic waste legally allowed to be exported
to developing countries never even arrives, because cheaper T &D prices to
the customer and a larger profit margin to the handler are achieved if the
waste is quietly discharged into the ocean from tankers en route. By
definition, no one knows the full extent of this. But such "active" diversion
only exemplifies the general point, that whereas "dispersive" pollution is
distributed by natural processes, hazardous waste is distributed by human
and natural processes together. Organized crime cannot intervene - nor
indeed can legitimate actors - to extract profits from the distribution of sul-
fur particles in aerial discharges. The scientific uncertainties about natural
processes in environmental risk analysis are daunting enough. But to these
are added the even greater uncertainties created by the intervention of stra-
tegizing human agents, with diverse interactions, motives, perceptions, and
values. Many of the challenges in even adequately conceptualizing the
hazardous wastes issue turn on this point, whose full implications have not
hitherto been properly recognized.
Conventionally, environmental regulation is seen as a process of back-
end cleaning up around industrial production. It has been taken to be a
marginal adjustment problem; technically, of processes, and economically,
of resultant prices. With many hazardous wastes, like some other major
pollution issues, such as acid deposition, this is no longer true. Adequate
regulation of these issues may involve major shifts of production, or at least,
major increases in production costs. A reason why this is particularly true
of hazardous wastes is that it is a "last frontier" environmental problem.
That is the earlier moves to control dispersive (air and water) pollution,
instead of internalizing the full costs upstream in production, have
"unloaded" into the less costly, largely unregulated, adjacent back-end
option of indefinitely storing or dumping the concentrated toxic wastes that
accumulate from reducing dispersive emissions. An important implication
is that there is less room for compromise and fudging the conflict between
minimizing production (including waste) costs and charges, and maximizing
environmental and public health protection. To put this another way, there
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is even more pressure upon regulatory bureaucracies to interpret the
ignorance and the many large uncertainties in the estimations of risks into
lesser uncertainties and, thus, marginal costs.
Yet because the waste is not merely dispersed and diluted, but "pack-
aged" and moved around as such by human agents there is a greater range
of more complex behavior to be controlled, and less chance of concealing the
lack of control from public experience (as witnessed in many episodes, such
as Times Beach and Love Canal in the USA, the Seveso dioxin-
contaminated waste barrels in Europe, etc.). Hence the public trust of regu-
lation is more fragile and brittle for hazardous wastes than for other issues.
Even as a clean up or containment exercise, let alone anything more
positively interventionist, hazardous waste regulation has been swamped by
the rapid growth of the chemicals industry during the 1950s and 1960s.
Because of the roundabout historical route to hazardous waste control via
earlier dispersive emission control and then the ad hoc storage or dumping
of concentrated hazardous waste, the full implications of this past growth
and lack of anticipatory control in the industrialized countries have only
recently become apparent. Although many countries legislated in the mid-
or late-1970s, actual regulations did not appear until the early 1980s, and
have had to be continually revamped to try to keep up. Indeed, the target
is not merely moving, but is rapidly changing shape. A key factor now is
not only growth in production and its environmental risk after-effects, but
structural change and diversification, from bulk chemicals toward greater
numbers of more diverse, esoteric, and more active (and hence, usually,
more toxic) "fine chemicals" for more refined uses.
Set against this rapid growth, diversification, and "toxic
intensification" of waste production, the development of corresponding
effective regulatory institutions and methods has been lethargic. Despite
extensive activity and some progress, effective regulation, especially at the
international level, lags well behind the growth in scale and sophistication of
waste types and life-cycles. Formal legislation is often undermined in prac-
tice by discretionary decisions in favor of deregulation, gross ignorance
about actual waste arisings and life-cycles, or resource starvation for
enforcement. An overall result is a developing tension between the values
and expectations created by legislation for risk control, and the evident lack
of substance of these formal policy promises. This only encourages public
cynicism, as it is made to look like symbolic hand-waving only.
We do not suggest that hazardous waste regulation is unique among
environmental risk management issues in suffering failures. But regulation
is qualitatively more complicated for hazardous wastes: they are "managed"
by autonomous human beings, not nature alone. Thus, although "imple-
mentation gaps" are neither unique to hazardous wastes nor to the last few
years, the momentum of expectations generated by modern environmental
initiatives, combined with specific structural features of the hazardous
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wastes issue make it more practically acute and analytically challenging
than the conventional "dispersive" pollution risk problems whose control, in
many respects, sired it.
One major factor in the complex behavioral life-cycles of hazardous
wastes is that they are traded, and this can take place between different
economic and regulatory systems. This affects the significance and the
strategy of comparative analysis.
2.2. International Dimensions and Local Interactions
International movements of hazardous wastes have been increasing dramati-
cally - more rapidly than have the volumes of wastes generated. Indeed, in
Europe between 1982 and 1983 wastes shipped across national frontiers vir-
tually doubled. Although some of this could be an artefact of reporting, a
significant real increase has undoubtedly occurred. Somewhere between 2
and 3 mt of hazardous waste is. thought to cross European borders every
year (about 10% of the total industrial waste produced) in consignments of
about 20 t each. This means about 100 000 frontier crossings per year of
declared waste to be managed, documented, and checked in the EC alone.
These occur between national, even local, state systems with different waste
definitions, legal requirements, and technical standards. In addition there
are an unknown number of transfrontier movements of "recycleable" toxic
materials, a significant amount of which undergoes uncontrolled disposal.
Some countries rely very heavily upon exports - estimates for the Nether-
lands range from 35% [11] to 60% (see Chapter 4). Some also act as large
conduits for waste in transit - until recently the Netherlands took about
25% of the industrial waste from the FRG on its way to sea disposal. A
major international movement of hazardous wastes has also developed from
Western Europe to the GDR; for example trade from the FRG to the GDR
doubled between 1982 (140 000 t) and 1983 (275 000 t) [12]. This is now
said to be declining.
The uncertainties in even these rough figures are very large, however -
a point whose implications are discussed in detail in later chapters.
Ironically, the lack of implementation and the inconsistency in
national and local policies and costs, spill over into increased international
transport, and make the lack of effective regulatory frameworks and stable
agreements at this level all the more costly and vulnerable to major distur-
bances. There is therefore a very strong interaction between local dimen-
sions (e.g., standards and T&D costs) and international ones.
A growing list of international bodies have become concerned with the
problems caused by inadequate regulation of cross-border movements of
hazardous wastes. These include the EEC, which enacted a 1984 directive
on cross-border waste transport [13], OECD, UNEP, WHO, IRPTC,
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UNECE, and the UN Special World Commission on Environment and
Development. The intractability of risk management problems in the haz-
ardous waste field is indicated by the fact that the international insurance
business, which might in principle be able to use its financial influence to
form a regulatory alliance with regulators to help strengthen national and
international control, has shied away from the area (as is its right to do)
because of the colossal uncertainties that it sees there. However, regulatory
bodies do not have the freedom to walk away from the problems. Further-
more, it is not only environmental sectors of governments that have to try
to coordinate, but industrial, agricultural, construction, and service sectors.
In the bodies dealing with international pollution issues, the usual national
conflicts of interest groups and institutional uncertainties are complicated
by basic differences between national regulatory styles.
Regulatory bodies, local and international, have to find a balance on
an increasingly sharp knife-edge between international concern about
hazardous waste trade and local concern about standards and facilities,
which nevertheless have international ramifications. In operations research
language, the feasibility space for effective regulatory solutions appears to
be relentlessly diminishing. The apparent intractability of many local waste
disposal conflicts, especially siting difficulties for new T&D facilities, creates
pressure to export. Pragmatism thus requires the belief that international
regulatory regimes can adequately control increasing volumes of hazardous
waste. Evidence to the contrary then undermines local confidence and
practices, which in turn exacerbates the international problems.
Hazardous waste management has joined a group of environmental
issues - such as acid rain, carbon dioxide, and other RATS (radiatively
active trace substances) emissions, and marine pollution - which are major
transnational pollution issues. Yet for all its complex international dimen-
sions the local complexities of hazardous waste are also daunting - arguably
more so than its partners in the "transnational" pollution risk category.
Because of certain unique properties, hazardous waste may be
described as the black sheep issue even in this problem family. At least
with acid rain there are some uniformities - there is pretty good agreement,
for example, at least as to what sulfur is (even if there is disagreement
about its causal role in creating damage). There is no such agreement even
as to what "hazardous waste" is (and also disagreement about its role in
creating harm). Furthermore, although on the face of it an essentially
valueless material, it is packaged, concentrated, and traded - it is passed
between human agents and institutions which define it in different ways.
Some may define "waste" as "goods". Recall the estimated 100 000 border
crossings of hazardous wastes per year in Europe. In OECD countries, on
average, it is estimated that a hazardous waste cargo crosses a national
border once every five minutes, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. These are
heterogeneous cargoes, wastes and risks, involving varied materials,
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relationships, and rationales. Social mechanisms transform and channel the
environmental disposition and risks of hazardous wastes more significantly
than, say, for acid rain. As described in Chapter 3, these and other factors
introduce qualitatively new challenges to regulation, and to policy analysis.
The growth in scale and the complexity of the international aspect of
hazardous waste management naturally raises the idea of a supra-national
control regime. As already indicated in the Introduction, the predominant
response - almost a reflex reaction - to failings is to intensify the scientific
and technical basis of regulation. The assumption is that this is tan-
tamount to clarity, unification, and coordination. Research to help handle
the international problems tends to fall within this assumption. Whilst not
wishing to deny the importance of clarity and realistic international coordi-
nation, we have adopted a fundamentally different approach in our
research. Although this is international, we perceived that much of the
existing work at this level - either policy analysis or policy development -
already begged important questions, especially about the relationship
between different local technical regulatory frameworks and their institu-
tional settings, and thus what could be expected of a supranational frame-
work. Our international research was therefore comparative national
research rather than supranational in premise. The predominant assump-
tion is that free international trade in all wastes is legitimate, therefore,
regulation simply has to cope, whatever shape or volume trade reaches
through market forces. We did not take this for granted. Given the pres-
sure on underdeveloped international frameworks caused by local inadequa-
cies, we decided that it was necessary first to see whether comprehensive
local approaches could not adequately handle the problems, bearing in mind
the public acceptance and implementation dimensions. We therefore had to
compare different local approaches to implementation and legitimation, as
well as technical practices, as a necessary prior input to deliberation about
supranational initiatives.
Large-scale potential perturbations of policy systems, international
trade, and other arrangements are created by some of the key structural
properties of the hazardous waste issue. Yet these structural properties are
analytically unclear even within single regulatory systems; their interactions
with conventional uses of science in risk analysis, implementation processes,
and public reactions need to be clarified at this level first.
In this work these interactions are systematically analyzed for their
national, technical, and institutional variations. Since international regula-
tion of hazardous waste is widely regarded as urgent, yet in practice is still
embryonic, we have attempted to return to first principles. In particular,
we believe that moves to establish effective international regulatory regimes
should be based upon a better understanding of how characteristic national
or regional institutional factors influence the definition, meanings, and
diverse uses of what is in theory the universal resource of scientific
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knowledge and technical methods for regulation. It is therefore appropriate
now to review existing work at the international level, and then discuss
what comparative institutional analysis of regulation might offer.
2.3. Previous Work and the Present Study
Several international organizations have become involved in policy research
and development for hazardous waste management. This has involved com-
binations of research, expert meetings, policy negotiations and feedback
from specific actions, such as the EEC's 1978 toxic and dangerous waste
directive [14]. It is worth outlining this work to show how the IIASA study
is complementary to it.
The largest study has been that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation (N ATO) Committee on Challenges to Modern Society (CCMS),
which began in 1973. A first phase was completed in 1977, and a subse-
quent phase in 1981 [15]. Later work has focused on the problems in
reclaiming contaminated land. However, the main effort was more or less
completed before any of the countries then legislating or about to legislate
policies for hazardous waste managements had been able to gain experience
of the formidable implementation problems, which have since become so
prominent. At that stage the general assumption was that if loopholes
existed in regulation, these could be closed by making the legal definitions of
key technical terms more scienti1kally accurate and precise, and by invest-
ing more effort in local enforcement.
The NATO study examined regulatory and/or technical options, but
being an early effort was naturally not sensitive to the full impact of
ignorance and uncertainties, and their interactions with different institu-
tional arrangements, in risk-defining methods and processes. A further limi-
tation of comparative insight was that the study was confined to liberal
market economies, and although there are many interesting and important
differences of approach amongst these, the opportunity for comparison with
a centrally planned economy did not exist.
One prophetic observation stands out from the 1977 Final Report of
the NATO study, but its prospective insight was not followed up in further
research. It was noted that if implementation of hazardous waste legislation
was not more effective, then public credibility of the legal regulatory frame-
works would be threatened. We would go further and add that the credibil-
ity and viability of the governing institutions themselves - not only their
regulations - is undermined by the ineffective and uneven implementation
that has been widely experienced since the NATO CCMS report and the
enactment of most hazardous waste legislation in the mid- to late-1970s.
OECD's Council adopted a formal recommendation on a comprehen-
sive waste management policy in 1976 [161. Its Waste Management Policy
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Group began in 1974, and has been compiling data and acting as an infor-
mation exchange for several years. More recently its level of activity has
increased and diversified, gathering data worldwide, as far as possible, on
waste arisings, movements, and costings. In addition important policy ana-
lytic work has been conducted, especially on several aspects of the
transfrontier movement problem (resulting in a formal policy in 1984 [17]),
but also on problems of past waste dumps, the economics of hazardous
waste regulation compliance, and the liabilities of different parties in the
hazardous waste life-cycle [18]. An important project has been the attempt
to develop a single cross-referencing scheme, which would relate the
different hazardous waste classification systems of OECD countries, of the
EEC, and in international agreements, such as the London and Oslo sea-
dumping conventions [19]. Some kind of workable cross-referencing is
required in order to track hazardous waste movements across regulatory
frontiers and to close the many loopholes for diversion into uncontrolled
disposal. Having explored the harmonization of hazard classification systems
to the full, however, attention is now returning to the intrinsic limits of har-
monization, and the origins of the international transfrontier problem.
These lie in the lack of consistency in institutional processes, practices, and
costs between individual nations or subnational regulatory authorities. This
is why our study was focused there.
Although its own in-house policy analytic resources are slight, the
EEC's practical experiences as an international regulator of hazardous
wastes are important as an input to policy research. A brief digression into
the practical experience of the EEC is therefore in order here.
The EEC, with whom the OECD has coordinated its policy develop-
ment, first took action on wastes in 1975 [20]. A framework Directive was
filled out later by more specific measures. These enactments were on waste
oils (1975), PCBs (1976), and a more general framework for "toxic and
dangerous wastes" (1978), involving a list of 27 categories of substances to
be included under special control. In 1984 a Directive was also issued con-
sistent with that of the OECD on transfrontier shipments of hazardous
wastes within the Community [21].
The main difficulty for the EEC has been that, to obtain agreement
between member states on a regulatory framework, it has had to limit the
specificity of requirements and to allow significant national discretion in
implementation. Thus, the original Directive proposal from the Commission
to the Council of Ministers contained provisions for a more closely defined
list of hazardous wastes, to license transporters, and to specify legal liabili-
ties, all of which were omitted from the finally agreed Directive [221. This
politically necessary, interpretive license for implementation, however, has
undermined the aim of improving overall control. Tightening up in some
countries has also led to increased transfrontier flows to (legally or illegally)
escape local increases of costs. A recent report on the implementation of
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the 1978 Directive [231 shows a discouraging level of success, and criticizes
as a main culprit the weakness and ambiguity of the original Directive. The
same was admitted by a Commission regulator [241, but with the realistic
extra comment that had it not been ambiguous there would never have been
agreement on a Directive at all. In the absence of a strong and consistent
political mandate, and without any significant scientific expertise and policy
research of its own to call upon, the Commission's regulatory effect in this
area is hampered by reliance for information and expertise upon delegates
from member states, who naturally have a certain vested interest in defend-
ing their own national autonomy or approach.
Indeed, the 1984 "transfrontier" Directive occasioned controversy
within the EEC because the principles of prenotification of intention and
permission to ship waste, registration, and inspection at frontiers, etc.,
etched national customs boundaries even deeper, against the strong current
of European opinion wishing to do away with internal economic boundaries
altogether. The hurried finalization of the Directive in the very nationalistic
political aftermath of the miss.ing Seveso dioxin-contaminated waste barrels
(1983) added to the difficulties, and the whole affair became tangled up with
internal EEC conflict with the FRG, who (under pressure from the German
Green Party) were introducing new federal amendments to the waste law
(see Chapter 6), to include a ban on imports to and exports from each of the
German Lander (the regulatory authorities), except under special exemp-
tions. This approach is viewed as contravening the free trade principles of
the Treaty of Rome and provoked the Commission into threatening to take
the FRG authorities to the European Court in order to revoke the
import-export ban policy [251. Some countries would be left with virtually
no "regulation" at all if they were not free to export; others depend on
imports to maintain the load factor and economic viability of domestic
waste T &D facilities.
The whole issue of transfrontier shipments and the rigorous methods
of waste classification for registration and monitoring is therefore seen to be
directly linked to the broader issue of coordinating local waste arisings with
appropriate treatment facilities. This issue is dealt with in later chapters.
The reason for describing the EEC position here is to indicate how its pro-
cess of policy development has been overwhelmingly influenced by inter-
member state trade and politics, and very little by considerations of overall
optimality, or by expert analysis responsible to the Commission itself. The
practical experience of extreme difficulties in controlling the transfrontier
movement of wastes in the EEC also underlines the importance of better
comparative understanding of the local variations in practice and approach,
which are largely the cause of the international problems.
The UN Environment Program has taken considerable interest in
hazardous waste management since 1980. UNEP has attempted to provide
a framework for ensuring that less-developed countries do not repeat the
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mistakes of industrialized countries, which now find that the economic and
political costs of old, uncontrolled waste dumping far exceed the costs of
controlled treatment and disposal from the start 126]. Part of this concern
has caused UNEP to attempt to gather reliable data on the production and
movements of hazardous wastes, especially across international borders and
to poor countries desperate for foreign currency and with no technical
resources to deal properly with such wastes.
Recently, a special UN Commission, the World Commission on
Environment and Development, has taken on the hazardous waste issue,
like UNEP in a mainly North-South framework. WCED's work, coordi-
nated with that of UNEP, OECD, and the UN Economic Commission for
Europe, is attempting to take a fresh look at the role that different kinds of
uncertainty play in undermining policy initiatives, as well as to actually
generate new, practical initiatives [27].
A major concern of all international bodies has been the lack of an
internationally agreed definition of a hazardous waste. This cripples even
the compilation of basic data. Attempts at conventional forms of regula-
tion, such as registering and controlling all movements and disposals of
hazardous waste, fall at this first hurdle because no workable, universal
definitions of the crucial terms exist. Even so, such bodies continue to seek a
formula that would act as a single internationally meaningful framework
into which all national and regional definitions and hazard classifications
could be fitted. This objective has been the cornerstone of all attempts at
regulation; where difficulties of harmonization and implementation of inter-
national agreements or directives have been encountered, the blame has
been attached to imprecision in the key terms, especially the definition of a
hazardous waste. The assumption has tended to be that this ambiguity
could be eradicated by more careful analysis and technical precision. How-
ever more recently, some experts have begun to appreciate that these
apparently purely technical terms always of necessity incorporate behavioral
assumptions, and reflect local, particularistic administrative concerns and
other institutional factors [28]. The fact that these are not random, but are
systematic, and amenable to cultural and institutional analysis, has not
been developed until the present work.
International policy initiatives, therefore, such as UNEP /WHO's 1983
collaborative document, Hazardous Waste Management - Policy Guidelines
and Code of Practice [29], offer important policy principles, especially for
less-industrialized countries; but these lack consideration of the further
problems of implementation that may arise in varying local institutional cir-
cumstances. Many of the very severe problems of implementation that
hazardous waste policy has encountered have to do with the widely different
perceptions, purposes, and strategic definitions being used by diverse actors
in the hazardous waste field. Even common technical definitions can take
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on widely different practical meanings when transformed from policy into
implemented reality.
With the possible exception of the UNEP and WCED work, all of the
previous international policy analyses of hazardous waste management
were, naturally enough, conceived and/or conducted at a time of innocence
about the implementation difficulties yet to come. That innocence has
rapidly and, in some cases, painfully evaporated. We now know that making
policy reality rather than myth, especially at the international level, involves
far more than making the crucial terms and definitions more precise. But
the complex interactions between technical and local institutional factors,
which make (inconsistent) implementation such an important part of poli-
cymaking, have yet to be understood. This is where the IIASA study is tar-
geted, as a complementary effort to those already in existence.
Thus, in summary, two important points of difference between our
research and other internationally oriented work should be stressed. First, it
is conducted from the relative luxury of a less directly engaged, more
analytical level. Second, it seeks to examine the origins of international
problems and pressures in local practices. International policy bodies tend,
instead, to focus on the international dimensions of the regulatory problem:
they take commercially autonomous waste export trading for granted, then
attempt to control it at the "back-end", or on its margins. The technical
harmonization and consistency of local costs and implementation practices
needed for regulation at the international level is intrinsically limited by
national institutional factors. Therefore, comparative research on domestic
policies and institutional processes is research on the international policy
options too.
2.4. Cross-Cultural Analysis of Regulation
It is widely thought that the regulatory systems of the UK and the USA are
poles apart, especially on the basic question of landfill. The relaxed UK
acceptance of codisposal (of toxic wastes with domestic wastes) is con-
trasted with the supposedly zealous restriction of landfill, initially in Cali-
fornia, but since the 1983 RCRA reauthorization, in the whole of the USA.
Yet when we examine the details, this picture is shattered. The concentra-
tion limits for landfill codisposal on a list of waste constituents for the US
system are found to be about the same as those in the UK. In some cases
the UK limits are more restrictive (two examples are given in Table 2.1).
Yet the perception about the UK's laxity is widely held, even amongst
some regulators and policy analysts. The point is, however, that these
apparently precise technical norms play very different practical (and sym-
bolic) roles in each system. The UK concentration limits are advisory - and
they are scattered throughout the labyrinth of advisory documents and
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Table 2.1. Examples of UK and USA concentration limits for landfill [30].
Constituent
Cyanides
PCBs
USA
1000 mg/l
50 ppm
UK
1000 mg/I
10 ppm
circulars, up-dating notes, etc., in that system. The US figures are manda-
tory, and they are now listed clearly for all to see in the legislation itself.
Further, the US projects an anti-landfill image, whilst the UK's symbolic
projection is forthrightly in favor of landfill.
Thus we begin with a widely held belief that the US and UK landfill
policies are vastly different; we then see that technical norms are in fact
about the same; but even closer inspection reveals that these norms mean
very different things in each regulatory system - they support different
practices and relationships, and embody different uncertainties. One can-
not, however, conclude that because the UK norms are advisory they are
more lax: they may allow more discretion - but discretion is also explicitly
built into the US use of the limits. The UK may also be, in practice, more
lax because of the symbolic projection. In the (large) range of uncertainty
between clearly allowed and clearly forbidden waste compositions for
landfill (the precision of the figures is misleading), pressure to allow landfill
is more likely in a symbolic climate of presumption in favor of it.
This brief example is introduced to demonstrate the importance - and
the complexity - of comparative analysis of political cultures, and to extend
this into the processes of implementation, enforcement, and legitimation or
justification, not regulatory "decisions" alone.
There are several ways of approaching cross-national studies of regula-
tion and risk management. Cross-national research seems most obviously
relevant for issues where there are pressures toward international harmoni-
zation, and important loopholes due to local inconsistencies [31].
Interest in cross-national comparison of risk management began in the
mid-1970s from two starting points. The first arose in a combination of
geography and political science, for example, in comparing coastal zone
management in California and France [32]. This developed into environmen-
tal policy analysis using the conceptual equipment of political science. The
second starting point was in science and policy studies, where the observa-
tion was made that, despite the assumed universality of the underlying
scientific knowledge, different regulatory decisions were being made on the
same problem in different countries. This was manifestly more complicated
than the conventional wisdom that scientists provided the objective facts to
society, which then exercised its (variable) values of acceptable risk upon
the facts. The first studies focused upon USA-UK contrasts; for example,
the USA banned aldrin/dieldrin and DDT for alleged carcinogenicity,
whereas the UK reviews cleared them [33]. Analysis showed that although,
in principle, the science base may have been the same, what scientists
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perceived as the facts in the science varied strongly between the two coun-
tries; scientific and policy "facts" could not be clearly distinguished, with
scientists centrally involved in both domains.
These and other comparative studies found clusters of elements that
tend to be found together, influencing the conversion of science into practi-
cal risk management or regulation, in consistently different ways. These
patterned clusters were called characteristic styles or cultures. Thus, the
USA was characterized as an "adversarial" political culture or regulatory
style, the UK was called "consensus" or "consultative", and the FRG was
called "corporatist", [341.
Comparative studies have varied widely in their empirical scope, con-
ceptual depth, and policy ambitions. Many have been largely descriptive
[35], whereas others have kept to abstract political theory, trying to gen-
erate theoretical models of policy implementation processes. Some have sug-
gested policy prescriptions merely by giving accounts of national discrepan-
cies, for example, in the implementation of pollution control regulations
[36]. Others have argued that such "discrepancies" are the natural out-
comes of autonomous cultural systems, which exist sui generis [37].
In interpreting comparative studies it is worth remembering that, even
without formal regulation, regulation of a sort is already taking place via
the ordinary marketplace, cultural norms, consumer attitudes, existing
social, legal, and perhaps professional obligations, public and media atti-
tudes, wider bargaining with related parties, etc. Formal regulation may
enter into these preexisting dimensions, but it does not supersede them; it
shapes, and is in return shaped by them. The point is important because it
emphasizes that form is not necessarily identical to outcome or substance,
and that apparent strictures or laxity in regulatory standards may conceal
the opposite in effects. Equally, it cautions against simplistic plucking of
standards or other indices out of context and comparing them superficially.
This raises the question of what indices to use as a measure of regulatory
"outcomes". The growth of comparative studies of regulatory implementa-
tion has sharpened these questions [38]. There are therefore tremendous
problems involved in the real comparison of practical outcomes, and - if
desired by policy - in standardization. One of the values of comparative
research may, indeed, be to demonstrate just how inaccessible such ambi-
tions are, and to ask whether there is a policy need to find means that rely
less upon such convergence.
Another important objective of comparative research is to explore the
reduction of transaction costs involved in elaborate superstructures of for-
mal regulatory organizations, by reintroducing more direct relationships
between actors partly regulating themselves. These may be market or
quasi-market arrangements, or they may be informal cultural traditions and
social networks, where regulators blend as advisors and colleagues with
those they regulate. A large literature has developed on this general issue,
38 Rislr: Management and Hazardous Waste
some of it in open admiration of the British approach, which, in comparison
with that of the USA, economizes enormously on processes of expertise,
review, and complaint [39]. The role of natural knowledge (scientific exper-
tise) in negotiating social credibility suggests an inverse relation between
institutionalized authority and the volumes of (disputed) scientific expertise
in circulation. The work of Douglas, Wildavsky, and Thompson is in this
general vein [40].
It is not easy to draw simple policy conclusions from such work, how-
ever. Analysis at the political-cultural level may indicate that "wasteful"
competition between all parties in an "adversarial" culture, like the USA
agencies, is part and parcel of the general culture of competitive social rela-
tionships necessary for a dynamic economy. Thus, the counterpart of more
economical and consensual regulation might be a noncompetitive economy,
as indeed the UK is widely thought to be. Jasanoff's (noncomparative)
analysis of innovation and regulation in biotechnology in the FRG is sugges-
tive here [41]. Comparative analysis may show the limited viability of cul-
tural transfer of specific regulatory mechanisms, taken out of their original
context. Comparison can show where flexibilities and rigidities exist in a
given system. This may show up needs for the negotiation of new institu-
tional possibilities. For example, the fact that full sharing of production
information between regulator and regulated can occur with benefit in Hun-
gary may cause it to be more seriously considered in places where
"upstream" production intervention is seen as an important need, but
where it has hitherto been regarded as impossible. Like transfer of technical
methods required however, care is required because such conditions may
only prevail in one system by invisible support from other institutional
arrangements. Thus, the Hungarian arrangement may only be possible
because of the lack of competition at the level of large firms.
Good comparative research on regulation will always be seeking to
identify such discriminations, the boundary conditions on the effectiveness
of specific mechanisms or procedures, and the interconnectedness or other-
wise of specific regulatory instruments. This applies whether they are tech-
nical approaches (e.g., how precise should a standard be?), institutional
instruments (e.g., an expert advisory committee or a public hearing?), or
broader institutional strategies (e.g., the balance between market forces and
public intervention in regulation).
The complexity and degree of detailed discrimination necessary is
shown by the case of concentration limits for hazardous wastes in the UK,
Belgium, and the Netherlands. At one level, the systems are similar because
of this property, and differ from the rest of Europe. However, Belgium has
not implemented its regulations at all, and the UK and the Netherlands use
the limits in very different ways. The regulations play completely different
institutional roles, involving different organizational responsibilities and
relationships, and have different effects on the material control of wastes.
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Generalizations can be made, for example, about the familiar, litigious,
adversarial nature of US regulation and the paternalistic, discretionary
character of British ways of converting science into regulation. However,
within any system there is always significant variation. The particular his-
tories of given issues and regulatory bodies, their surrounding reference
groups and formal responsibilities, the rates of change in the issue climate,
etc., affect both the style and content of actual decisions within the same
overall "culture" [421. Mingled with these factors will also be the inherent
properties of an issue (for example, is it extremely high technology or not,
international or local, etc.).
Whereas the tendency has been to suggest that given regulatory styles
or political cultures are all-embracing and monolithic in their imprint upon
all issues within their range, a matrix framework would be more appropri-
ate. This would have an axis embodying issue characteristics orthogonal to
elements of overall national regulatory style. This might, at least, indicate
where incompatible or compatible combinations of issue property and regu-
latory option are likely to arise. For example, it is difficult to envisage
nuclear power being regulated by decentralized municipal authorities; in
other cases, extreme scientific uncertainty in the issue has been incompati-
ble with legal trial of the regulations, and moves toward negotiation have
been encouraged by that issue property, even in an "adversarial" culture.
In the case of an issue like hazardous wastes, therefore, with strong
but poorly defined interactions between local practices and international
regulation problems, comparative analysis may help to distinguish which
general issue parameters are matched by which optimal modes of regula-
tion. For example, their boundary limits of effectiveness might be analyzed,
or inconsistencies in technical instruments might be examined to see
whether they could be compensated by other instruments at some other
point in the system. The heterogeneity of the hazardous waste problem
seems to match best with more local responsibility for risk management.
But the extent of its life-cycle, stretching across several local areas, as in the
rising international trade in wastes, might militate in favor of the opposite.
One of these dimensions of the issue may be more curtailable than the
other; for example, shifting the balance of decentralization or centralization,
or curtailing the extensiveness and behavioral uncertainty of waste Iife-
cycles. As another example, an imprecise hazard classification system may
not be so bad if monitoring and inspection or transporter licensing is
rigorous, or if self-policing is strong. Discretionary standards may be
acceptable so long as strong mechanisms for informed open, local, case-by-
case review are available. Whether such supporting conditions can be
fulfilled will vary from one regulatory culture to another. Such comparative
exercises will not discover regulatory answers, but it should help to clarify
which trade-offs are the important and feasible ones in a highly imperfect
regulatory world.
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To return to the matrix approach, examination of the structure of an
issue across cultures will clarify the extent to which international con-
sistency is necessary. If it appears to be necessary, cross-cultural com-
parison of the regulation of specific issues can help to elucidate, practically,
how far it is realistic to push international technical harmonization before
one begins to imply cutting into the sovereignty and internal consistency of
administrative styles, and thus risk purely symbolic, nonimplementable ges-
tures rather than effective policies. For example, the attempt to establish
precise concentration threshold values of hazardous chemicals and to define
legally regulatable wastes uniformly across countries in a trade area such as
the EEC would encounter opposition from countries that, as a general
decision-making style, not only on the single issue in question, give estab-
lished scientific advisors large areas of discretionary judgment in policy
decision making. To change the regulatory style on one issue, so as to try to
make it internationally consistent on that issue, might not only threaten
established local institutional arrangements for that issue; it might also
upset the more general consistency of domestic decision-making style, or
power relationships that have been established within it.
This brings us to the question of how much elements of regulatory
style, such as "adversarial" or "consensual" modes, are bound up in public
legitimation processes for regulatory bodies. I examine this again in
Chapter 12, but it is worth anticipating that discussion briefly by recalling
the example with which we began this section, of the widespread perception
that the USA regulates landfill far more severely than does the UK. What-
ever the real case - and the evidence points to variability and unacceptable
landfill practices in each system - these cultural perceptions are clearly of
practical political importance. They must relate to the styles of legitimation
- the discourse of credibility negotiation around regulations - in each sys-
tem. The main point is that forms of legitimation are bound up in the sub-
stance of different risk analyses and decision and outcomes. They are not
only post hoc persuasion exercises. This is true even when apparently simi-
lar technical norms exist in different regulatory regimes or political cultures.
As Hawkins has put it, regulation is done in a moral, not a technical world
[431. I would only qualify this by emphasizing that it is done in both; but
the negotiation of shared moral perceptions, which Hawkins rightly
described as necessary to effect practical compliance, and the validity of
technical instruments, are both constituted in the cultural and institutional
settings of different national regulatory systems.
If the push of cross-national issues toward consistency were strong
enough, inconsistency might have to be accommodated in the local political
culture. For hazardous wastes, there is already a strong concern to achieve
international consistency, so the value of comparative research is more
direct than it might otherwise be. Finding different approaches, contexts,
and technical standards in different countries, we still need to distinguish
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what is universal, and what is a function of local factors. In addition to its
increasingly international dimensions, however, the hazardous waste issue
has other distinct structural properties of importance. We turn to these in
the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3
Hazardous Waste - What Kind of Issue?
Brian Wynne
The structure of an issue - even a "physical" environmental issue - is not
given and ordained by nature, but is organized by social processes. This
seems obvious at the margins of an issue: for example, what size of producer
is to be regulated as a hazardous waste generator. But the internal struc-
ture is also socially defined: for example, how "hazard" is classified, what
counts as "waste", or whether the main problem is to reduce waste genera-
tion or keep existing treatment and disposal (T&D) facilities operating at
full capacity.
However, this analytical insight should not seduce us into sociological
reductionism. A given issue does have intrinsic physical and technical
characteristics - and perhaps some organizational parameters - that are
common to whatever social context in which it arises. A troubling point
about hazardous waste is that one of its intrinsic features seems to be the
great freedom of social actors within the system to define the problem and
its key terms. In this chapter we explore the complex balance between the
social bounding and construction of "the" hazardous waste issue, and the
intrinsic properties with which the processes of social construction operate.
Regulators, of course, are key problem constructors, though as indi-
cated in Chapter 1 there are systematic divergences even within regulatory
authorities, especially between center and periphery. These are more than
divergences of interest, but more of fundamental frameworks. The chal-
lenge for regulatory policymakers is to impose a problem framework, of risk
analysis and management, which structures the behavior of the different
regulated parties in acceptable ways, while not interfering with other free-
doms that are regarded as legitimate.
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For perspective we begin by noting the arbitrariness of the conven-
tional boundaries of the hazardous waste issue. Then we note its relation-
ships with adjacent issues, and different possible strategic orientations
toward its regulation. We then examine some idiosyncratic properties of
hazardous wastes, which make their management peculiarly difficult and
analytically interesting. These structural properties interact strongly with
our central analytical themes - implementation, uncertainties, and credibil-
ity - and their implications are developed through the book.
3.1. The Social Construction of Natural Problems
Although all policy issues are socially defined, amongst issues with prom-
inent technical dimensions hazardous waste does seem to stand out as espe-
cially sensitive to institutional factors.
The largest, most elaborate regulatory framework for hazardous
wastes ever devised, namely the US Resources Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA) of 1976 [1], was, as its name suggests, originally intended as a
response to the 1974 energy crisis, and hazardous waste management was a
minor part of the bill. This was dramatically overturned in 1978 with the
discovery of Love Canal [2]. In every country practical hazardous waste
regulation is strongly shaped by its origins in ordinary garbage disposal,
whatever the formal content of more recent legislation. It is always worth
digging beneath the current structure into the historical emergence of such
problems, to see how unnatural such problem boundaries may be, and to
understand the social influences that shape and constrain them. Exploring
in this way can help to understand practical options and constraints, and
the time scales on which these operate. Defining hazardous waste is a
hazardous task, and ultimately rests on institutional values and commit-
ments as well as innate properties of materials.
Let us look briefly at just some of the problem boundaries:
(1) Like squeezing a balloon in one place, for it to inflate in another,
hazardous waste volumes and types are directly affected by regulation
of atmospheric or aqueous dispersal of pollutants.
(2) "Hazardous" waste should strictly include municipal, household waste,
because the toxicity of many domestic wastes - batteries, cleaning and
polishing fluids, cosmetics, medicines etc. - is higher than that of some
industrial wastes. The toxicity of some leachates from municipal
landfills is at least as high as that from controlled, "hazardous" waste
landfills [3]. The greatest source of environmental cadmium is thought
to be from batteries thrown out in domestic waste. Municipal waste
incinerators are also known to emit dioxins with their aerial
discharges, possibly to worse levels than toxic waste incinerators. Yet
municipal waste is excluded, not for technical risk, but pragmatic
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reasons. To control municipal wastes as hazardous would not only
swamp resources, but would probably create enormous political reac-
tion too [4].
(3) Radioactive waste disposal falls under entirely separate legislation,
interest groups, and institutions. Although there are analogies, espe-
cially in terms of siting difficulties, hazardous waste management nor-
mally excludes radioactive wastes [5]. The contrast is discussed later.
(4) Hazardous waste should include all domestic sewage, which is usually
itself toxic in organic matter and heavy metals. The US Environmen-
tal Protection Agency's (EPA) standard test criterion to define wastes
as hazardous was relaxed by a factor of ten because the original con-
tamination criterion would have included most domestic sewage, again
swamping the system [6].
(5) Agricultural wastes are generally excluded from hazardous waste regu-
lation, yet they can be highly toxic. In the EEC, roughly 40 times
more agricultural waste is generated than "hazardous" industrial
waste. Of course, such materials may be seen as goods instead. In
Hungary the "hazardous waste" population to be regulated suddenly
increased by a factor of two or more when animal carcasses from the
meat industry were included in the regulations.
(6) Most systems exclude mill and mine tailings simply because they are
so colossally voluminous. It also seems to offend common sense that
something should be neutral when in the ground, but when extracted,
even if a toxic component (e.g., a metal) has been removed, it is
regarded as toxic waste. Often, of course, residual contaminants may
be more environmentally mobile (e.g., radon and radon daughters
from uranium mining and mill tailings) and thus more hazardous than
when in geological strata. This kind of ambiguity caused a controversy
in the USA, where oil drilling muds and brines were initially defined
by EPA as hazardous wastes, only eventually to be excluded because
the implications for the oil exploration industry were so horrendous.
Dow Chemicals also (in the end successfully) argued against having
brine from which they had extracted bromine defined as hazardous
waste when they proposed to pump the less toxic brine back from
where they had extracted it [7].
(7) Many common natural substances would be defined as hazardous
waste if the definitions used in regulations were strictly enacted.
"Phenolic substances" (e.g., wood) and "biocides" (e.g., salt) are
categories of toxic and dangerous waste in the EEC's 1978 Directive.
Some regulatory definitions of hazardous waste by the property of
"reactivity" include the emission of methane and hydrogen sulfide.
Without discretionary freedom to ignore this criterion when pragmati-
cally necessary, all bulk domestic wastes would have to be regulated as
hazardous on this count. To specify precisely and comprehensively the
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appropriate conditions of inclusion or exclusion from control would be
absurdly elaborate, if not downright impossible.
(8) Many hazardous wastes are exempted from national regulatory sys-
tems of registration because they are dealt with in-house by their pro-
ducer. This excluded proportion of all hazardous waste is estimated to
be as high as 96% in the USA, and over 70% in several other coun-
tries. It is thus a major factor in the social narrowing of the official
problem definition.
(9) Nearly all hazardous waste regulations exclude small-volume waste
generators, which markedly reduces the population of generators to be
regulated; but in aggregate this excluded sector may produce large
amounts of hazardous waste, moving around unregulated. The amend-
ments to the US RCRA in 1983 reduced the threshold for small pro-
ducers to be regulated from 1000 kg per month to 100 kg per month.
The original threshold was claimed to have excluded 90% of the
hazardous wastes generated in the USA from regulation [8], though
this is contradicted by official views 191, which state that the 1000 kg
threshold regulates 99% of the hazardous waste (which is not, of
course, 99% of the generators). Others have pointed out that the
695000 estimated generators who collectively produce 1% of all hazar-
dous wastes in the USA may nevertheless be a disproportionately large
contributor to improper disposal [10].
(10) Many substances defined as "goods" are wastes being stored
indefinitely, for theoretically possible future recycling. This is a
notoriously difficult loophole. It was partly in response to this ambi-
guity that the 1983 amendments to the US RCRA obliged the EP A to
include underground storage of petroleum products and hazardous
substances: this was also a major expansion of the population of regu-
lated materials.
For a further perspective on the selectiveness of regulatory attention,
it is useful to remind ourselves of some general figures: [11]:
(1) There are about 7000000 known chemicals.
(2) Approximately 80000 are in commercial circulation.
(3) Approximately 1000 new chemicals enter commercial use each year.
(4) Using the total of world laboratory resources, about 500 chemicals per
year could be testable for toxicity (at colossal expense).
(5) One test, for carcinogenicity alone, can involve 800 test animals and
40 different tissue specimens per animal for pathology examinations;
that is, 32000 specimens. This needs approximately $500000 and 3.5
years to perform.
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(6) There are approximately 14 000 food additives and contaminants.
Many natural components are also thought to be toxic.
(7) The US EPA hazardous substances list contains approximately 500
substances. In practice, only 114 of these are regulated.
(8) The UK and EEC hazardous substances lists contain about 30 items.
(9) The US EPA's EP test for hazardous wastes covers only 14 chemicals.
(10) In the USA, the Occupational Safety and Health Agency (OSHA) had,
in 1984, regulated no new chemical for six years.
(11) In the EEC in 1981, the total waste generated was estimated to be 1.8
billion tonnes, of which about 20 mt was legally defined as "toxic and
dangerous" for formal regulation [12].
Even this rough indexing indicates just how severely any framework
for hazardous waste reduces the full scope of the potential issue to manage-
able proportions. This reduction creates artificial boundaries and internal
categories and structures, which have little to do with objective, natural dic-
tates, and much to do with social factors, pragmatic necessities, and admin-
istrative purposes. An example is the way that agencies are created around
a given social function - e.g., agriculture and soil - thus creating incon-
sistent but often overlapping jurisdictions. It is reported that during the
development of the RCRA regulations at the EPA a pesticide waste stan-
dard was proposed that would have rendered a sprayed apple, that could be
legally sold and eaten, prohibited from disposal on a municipal landfill [13J!
In this case the anomaly was spotted and rectified. The process of reduc-
tion also leaves many central aspects of the problem - even apparently pre-
cise technical matters - open to contradictory definition. As is shown later,
neither "hazard" nor "waste" have intrinsic natural meanings free of social
and institutional determination. This is true between different national or
state systems, but it is also the case between different groups and authori-
ties within the same system.
In practice, different countries create roughly the same frameworks to
attempt to regulate this ill-defined field of risks. At first sight the resultant
differences may appear small when set against the enormity and vagueness
of the target. But in reality they inevitably leave large loopholes and incon-
sistencies, which are rightly a major concern. It is not only that systems
differ in their initial definition of precisely what counts as a hazardous waste
for regulation, but they also differ in who they make responsible for such
identifications; what they require, of different parties, once a waste is so
defined; at what stage of the waste life-cycle and for what purposes, and
with what degree of precision it needs to be so defined; and in various
further respects. We will look later at these differences and the implications
they have for risk analysis.
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3.2. Strategic Orientations for Hazardous Waste Manage-
ment
Historically, the developing framework of environmental regulation has fol-
lowed relatively self-evident empirical categories - specific media, such as
public hygiene, occupational groups, food, water, air, and soil, or, occasion-
ally, specific agents, such as pesticides. Different reasons for regulation,
different interest groups, different economic and other constraints, different
legislative initiatives and implementing institutions, and different technical
specialist inputs have tended to compartmentalize policies, criteria, regula-
tions, and practices into these separate fields. Each has developed its own
momentum, purposes, and traditions. Sometimes there is coordination
between overlapping agencies, but often there is not. Yet actions and
approaches in one field may have strong effects upon neighboring areas, and
in their full life-cycle toxic chemicals may pass through several such uncoor-
dinated regulatory fields, allowing loopholes, confusion, and the wastage of
already scarce regulatory resources. Furthermore, each sectoral approach
has been marginal and reactive to upstream production decisions and
practices.
The hazardous wastes problem is conditioned by the fact that it even-
tually came to regulatory attention largely through ordinary domestic waste
management. Since this was always of low priority compared to air, water,
or food pollution, it was subjected to explicit attempts at control later than
all these other environmental areas. Cleaning up dispersive emissions to air
and water to meet tightening regulations for these media left increased
volumes of more concentrated, hazardous materials, such as filter sludges,
condensates, dry-precipitated dusts, slags, and so on. These could not be
handled by domestic garbage systems. It was the dramatic impact of previ-
ous regulation in the conventional areas upon volumes of toxic sludges, con-
centrated liquids, etc., that eventually stimulated industrial and regulatory
concern about what to do with hazardous (packaged or concentrated)
wastes.
These intermedia switches are the product of unsystematic sectoral
decisions and of arbitrary historical sequences of selective attention. A
"chemical life-cycle" regulatory framework, for example, would be more
proactive, and analyze projected chemicals through production, products,
uses, waste cycles and dispositions across media. Waddell refers to the syn-
drome of "solving one environmental media problem at the expense of
another medium," and in particular, "a tendency to generate solid/-
hazardous waste problems [by] solving air and water discharge problems"
[14]. This is one of the reasons why hazardous waste arisings have been
thought to be growing faster than the general economic growth in the last
decade or so. A sense of the potential scale of this perturbation is given by
noting that a typical, medium-scale, coal-fired power station burning
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medium grade sulfur coal would yield hazardous solid waste of one square
mile of elemental sulfur one foot deep, if all the sulfur were electrostatically
precipitated out from the normal annual aerial emissions [151.
Risk processes in themselves are basically continuous across the
socially constructed boundaries of legislative framing, administrative com-
petence and attention, technical specialization, and political-economic
interest. There is no guarantee that regulatory boundaries as established
bear any relationship to some optimal, overall environmental or economic
norm; indeed, there are many reasons to suppose the opposite. Yet, for
better or for worse, these (often contradictory) socially institutionalized
boundaries and divisions have developed and evolved as the concrete reality
in which policymaking and implementation have to perform. These institu-
tional processes and structures have substantial, objective [161, causal
effects on events.
The arbitrariness of the institutional patterns that carve up natural
systems is sharpened by conflicting pressures, e.g.:
(1) Intermedia continuity and movements of pollutants, which coincide
with the political pressure toward integration and centralization of
pollution management.
(2) A dynamic of fragmentation within regulatory bureaucracies as a
rational response to their organizational environment. Internal bureau-
cratic groups specialize toward separate problems, expertises, and
external interests, and thus define separate boundaries round their
fields of attempted control [17].
There is no preordained formula that balances such conflicting institu-
tional tendencies; compromises evolve ad hoc with shifting, and often con-
tradictory definitions and boundaries. Formal legal definitions and regula-
tions are therefore highly unlikely ever to end up totally consistent between
different regulatory systems, nor are they ever likely to overcome interpre-
tive variances and uncertainties that can undermine regulatory
effectiveness.
We can now see that, even from a central policy standpoint, there are
at least three fundamentally different, primary definitions of hazardous
waste management as a policy problem:
(1)
(2)
(3)
As an extension of conventional pollution abatement, risk manage-
ment, and environmental protection.
As a problem of industrial innovation and investment.
As a problem in changing industrial processes.
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3.2.1. An extension of conventional environmental protection
As historically the last area to be regulated, hazardous wastes are not only
swollen in volume but also leave less room to maneuver between different
possible options for proper treatment and disposal. Thus, physical prohibi-
tion (e.g., discharge limits) or ambient performance standards as regulatory
instruments for dispersal into air, water, etc., left some room for the auto-
nomous choice by an industry as to how to meet such standards. Further-
more, the economic implications of controlling and internalizing such exter-
nalities were artificially suppressed precisely by creating the hazardous
waste problem. The economic costs of hazardous waste control therefore
become less marginal and loom larger over mainstream production decisions
than those of conventional pollution control. The logic of hazardous waste
management is thus to become more positively interventionist, implying
external direction of industrial practices and choices. As a leading figure in
the field, Berndt Wolbeck, put it, "A sound policy should not confine itself
to saying what should not be done, but should, above all, indicate what
should be done" [18]. Indeed, in the 1984 amendments to the FRG's
Federal Waste Law, there are included stipulations about the proper treat-
ment technology for specific wastes. The UK is also considering more
specific regulations on this point [191, and the US Congress RCRA reautho-
rization [20] expressly excluded landfill for a range of specified wastes.
This naturally implies more potential conflict between industry and
regulatory bodies. It also raises the shadow of a greater political burden on
science, as the technical justification for stronger (and more contested)
interventionist directives. This is the context of risk analysis in regulation,
where science is one of the few resources of authority (in addition to formal
legal sanctions) available to regulatory bodies.
A further implication of the risk management perspective is that the
problem area should be capable of definition in terms of risks to human
health and valued environmental entities, and in comparative terms where
possible. Yet, the hazardous waste issue is, in important respects, simply
underripe for conventional risk management - it may be dominated by
dimensions of sheer ignorance and indeterminacy, rather than by definable
risks. This important difference is obscured by the social process wherein
organizations artificially redefine such radical uncertainties as manageable
probability functions [21]. It may be significant that whilst regulatory bodies
responsible for the issue may portray it as manageable in terms of risk
definition, others more free to choose, such as insurance companies, are vot-
ing with their feet and steering clear of this area of risk coverage, at least
until it becomes better defined [22].
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3.2.2. A problem of industrial innovation and investment
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Although conventional dispersive pollution control needs technological
development (e.g., filter systems), the management of hazardous wastes
requires that a whole new industrial field be created and maintained. When
most industrial countries enacted legislation on hazardous or "special"
wastes in the 1970s, few of them had much existing industrial facilities or
infrastructure for collection, transport, storage, treatment, and disposal of
hazardous industrial wastes, beyond what was available for ordinary gar-
bage. Therefore, an urgent problem was to develop such an industrial net-
work. The US EPA's aim in implementing the 1976 Resources Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA) was to stimulate the growth of such a T&D
industry via private investment in what were assumed to be relatively well
known technologies. The theory was that the regulations would create a
large, attractive "market", that is, a defined population of hazardous wastes
legally requiring licensed treatment; and free enterprise would do the rest.
However, as Kragg descripes [23], this failed to happen for a complex set of
reasons. Foremost is' undoubtedly the unusually direct connection between
the details of regulations and the scale of the potential market of wastes
thus defined. The uncertainties surrounding regulatory definitions created
crippling uncertainties as to the scale of the market for possible investors.
These were exacerbated by the variability of waste mixes, physical forms,
and chemical compositions, making for unpredictable variations in the
required treatment conditions. Not only that, but the degree of regulatory
intervention necessary to fulfill regulation was too stifling to a fledgling
industry in an already unstable technical and commercial state.
This paradox, that regulation requires industrial innovation, which is
itself jeopardized by requiring regulation, is unusually sharp in the hazard-
ous wastes case. It does not really exist for dispersive pollution; here, regu-
lation often involves development of control technology, but not of a whole
industrial network that itself also needs extensive regulation [24].
Other countries, such as the Netherlands and UK, adopted approaches
similiar to those in the USA and encountered the same difficulties. The
Netherlands, for example (see Chapter 4), enacted formal legislation to
define and regulate chemical wastes (including prohibition of landfill) before
establishing an industrial treatment and disposal infrastructure. It was per-
suaded by industry that such an infrastructure already existed, but of the
three central elements, one (the AVR incinerator) developed serious techni-
cal and financial difficulties, one (UNISER) was closed down after prosecu-
tion for fraud, and the other option was export. The government presump-
tion that, once controlled wastes were legally defined the market would
ensure private investment in T&D, was undermined by a combination of
uncertainties, and the freedom to use cheaper export options. Other regions
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or countries, such as Bavaria and Hessen in the FRG (see Chapter 6), and
Denmark, adopted very different approaches.
From this industrial innovation perspective the problem of further
analyzing and discriminating risks from different T&D sites and methods,
etc., is less important than the organizational problems of evolving and pro-
tecting an effective industrial infrastructure for waste management. The
degree of refinement of the risk-analytic framework that is considered to be
necessary and feasible is, in practice, more crude than formal risk manage-
ment approaches imply.
There is, therefore, a deep conflict in the issue: between necessary
industrial innovation, which usually requires protection; and regulation,
which involves interference and restriction. Different actors in the overall
arena define this problem in different ways, as is made clear in Chapter 4.
Indeed, in any T &D facility siting or safety conflict, the regulators' prime
objective is usually to keep the T &D industry in business. A crucial factor
in the management of this balance is the hazardous waste classification list
(see Chapter 5), whose technical specifications may substantially affect the
market of declared wastes for T&D. The key point, however, is a conun-
drum: Hazardous waste regulation needs industrial innovation of a fragile
industry whose own maintenance requires that it not be regulated too
closely.
3.2.3. A problem in changing industrial processes
In this perspective the critical focus is further upstream in the production-
waste cycle. Despite the prominence given to resource recovery, recycling,
and waste reduction in the public language of hazardous waste management
policies, the reality is that rates of recycling have in some places languished,
even fallen back in recent years [251. Claims of success are made, but by and
large progress, if it exists, has been patchy and unimpressive overall.
Undoubtedly, a critical problem is the inevitable lack of stability of volume
and quality of the input "raw materials" - which are someone else's wastes
- to recovery plants, which may be highly sensitive to input composition. It
is generally agreed that here, technical and commercial possibilities are
severely undermined by institutional factors, including contradictory per-
ceptions of the materials in question.
Recovery and recycling overlap with, but are different from, innova-
tion in waste-reducing production technologies, since the latter are self-
evidently in-house to the waste generator, whereas recovery and recycling
may well be through transfer to some other operator(s) in the "waste" life-
cycle. The production--innovation approach has found its sharpest concep-
tual expression in proposals to integrate notions of "true" waste costings in
strategic planning and in the choice of new processes and products in
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industry. This is consistent with the integrated "chemical life-cycle",
cross-media approach mentioned before.
While waste reduction and recycling is in theory convergent with
proper waste T&D, in practice there are several intractable conflicts:
(1) Investment in adequate "downstream" T&D facilities creates a vested
interest against successful "upstream" waste reduction, because of the
need to run T&D facilities at full capacity.
(2) Waste reduction is encouraged by increasing the costs of proper T&D,
but this is only effective if the waste life-cycle (see later) does not
"leak". In reality, increased costs of a T&D option tend simply to push
the wastes elsewhere, e.g., into illegal disposal or (legal) exports to
cheaper alternatives.
(3) Encouragement of waste recycling requires loosening restrictions on
waste definitions, movements, and exchanges, so as to allow
entrepreneurial wisdom the scope to identify valuable resources in oth-
ers' wastes. Again, a mechanism that encourages upstream innovation
also facilitates downstream laxity.
Recovery and recycling imply that the materials are goods, whereas
T&D implies that they are wastes. If they are defined as the former they
are exempt from regulation, yet the discrimination is ambiguous, slippery,
and dependent upon who is defining it. A galvanic sludge containing copper,
for example, might be "stored" uncontrolled against speculation on the
future price of copper or against further accumulation into an economically
viable tonnage. Many solvents move around unregulated as "recycleable"
materials, only to be eventually burned or dumped in improper ways. The
implications of this are further explored in Chapter 10. The impossibility of
tightening this boundary by precise definition of waste is illustrated by an
expression of legitimate concern on behalf of the UK reclamation industry:
The UK reclamation industry has a turnover of some 2.5 billion pounds
sterling amongst 1000 firms involving 20000 employees; there is a 1.25
million pounds sterling credit as a result to the UK balance of trade.
We have already seen how difficult it often is to distinguish between
process materials and waste materials to be processed: excessive docu-
mentation based upon fictional descriptions must not impede the free
movement of these materials [26].
Whereas one sector in the system sees "fictional description" of wastes
as a main cause of lax practice and unacceptable environmental or health
risk, another, equally active sector sees "fictional description" of wastes as
an unacceptable commercial risk to a legitimate industry.
To summarize, there is a basic three-way conflict. Successful T&D
creates a demand for wastes, which undermines recovery and waste-
reducing production innovations. Successful external reclamation also
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undermines back-end T&D, and production-innovation. Encouraging
upstream innovations by demanding tighter and more costly legal T &D
risks pushing wastes into export or illegal dumping. Organizing a regula-
tory industry commercially creates wicked conundrums.
Ultimately, a risk assessment framework for the waste-reducing stra-
tegy can probably only be developed via a chemicals' life-cycle approach.
The OECD's program on toxic chemicals regulation, for example, has expli-
citly incorporated the adequate disposal of wastes as part of an integrated,
anticipatory control framework covering the entire life-cycle of a chemical,
from inception (as a good or a waste, regardless) to grave [271. This would
be a systematic way of reflecting what is happening anyway - but as yet
unpredictably and inconsistently - as sporadic public resistance and
unevenly multiplied back-end costs force industry selectively to bring waste
considerations from the margins into the center of upstream investment and
technology development calculations.
The aim of this section has been to demonstrate some deep strategic
conflicts and dilemmas within the structure of hazardous wastes manage-
ment. These are prior to the concrete workings of conflicting frameworks
brought by the diverse actors within hazardous wastes life-cycles. It does
not seem possible to reconcile these different strategic definitions of the core
problem, so our interest should be on the ways in which the different insti-
tutional structures in different national systems negotiate different practical
compromises between them. We then need to ask how these strategic
definitions proliferate or transform under the influence of diverse actors and
interests in the field - its ill-structured, heterogeneous behavioral nature -
even within a single regulatory setting.
In the background of these questions remain those about the interac-
tions between scientific knowledge, technical uncertainties in risk analysis,
and the deeper institutional uncertainties, which the technical language
obscures. Analyzing the inherent structural properties of hazardous wastes
performs some necessary groundwork for clarifying these interactions.
3.3. Structural Properties of Hazardous Wastes as a
Regulatory Problem
We have identified six main issue characteristics that have crucial effects
upon rational strategies for its management, and for its analysis. These
interpenetrate, but it is useful to describe them separately - the extreme
heterogeneity of the field; the extensive and indeterminate
behavioral-technical life-cycles of wastes; the tension between intrinsic and
situational risks of wastes; the multiple and often competing points of possi-
ble intervention, decision, and analysis for regulation; the levels of profes-
sionalism; and the uniquely inverted exchange relationship for materials and
payments when wastes rather than goods are involved.
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3.3.1. Heterogeneity
Potentially hazardous chemical wastes arise in a huge range of industrial
activities. Indeed, chemicals are used in almost every human activity and,
inevitably, eventually become regarded as waste. Most, if not all, hazardous
waste legislation expressly excludes not only domestic and other nonindus-
trial wastes that may contain hazardous chemicals, but also specifically
exempts small waste generators (typically < 10 tonnes per year) and many
other wastes, such as oil drilling sludges, various refining slags and mining
tailings, etc. (see earlier). Even so, with the framework so whittled down
that some estimate it to legally exclude more than 90% of all hazardous
wastes, the US RCRA, for example, is still supposed to regulate the activi-
ties of over 60000 separate waste generators, producing and transferring to
a free market thousands of widely different chemicals in different consign-
ments and unknown mixtures. Regulation has to cope with great uncertain-
ties in these figures, despite repeated analysis. Early attempts to survey the
US problem produced even greater estimates of generators, and reducing
the generator threshold to 100 kg per month multiplies the regulated popu-
lation to about 200000 (and to zero, up to about 700000) [28]. These
thresholds are very flexible in practice, and single generators may also have
multiple sites and operations. There are also approximately 50000 waste
transporters in the USA, performing an estimated 200000 million tonne-
miles per year of waste haulage in about 1.5 million vehicles [29]. The treat-
ment and disposal industry in the USA, let alone waste generators and tran-
sporters, involves an estimated 75000 facilities of many different types. In
addition, there are over 4000 officially reported hazardous waste storage
facilities of varying kinds, storing about 600000 tonnes of diverse hazardous
wastes. The movements, transfers, mixing, storage, and treatment of these
wastes is all performed by countless, uncoordinated decisions and arrange-
ments operating under normal decentralized market principles.
The regulated actors range from international giants, such as DuPont,
to tiny family businesses with one operation. There are also many new
industries, emerging rapidly in areas like microelectronics and biotechnol-
ogy, that are small, but numerous, and use small quantities of highly toxic
and little-known materials. The extreme differentiation of scale in the field
is emphasized by the fact that 4% of hazardous wastes in the USA was gen-
erated by 84% of the generators. There are countless industries creating
chemical wastes with less than 100 employees, yet 30% of all chemical sales
(in all market economies) are achieved by only 25 giant companies. One
giant hazardous waste T &D company, Safety Kleen, began as a solvent col-
lector from small dry-cleaning firms with an average pick-up of 7 gallons
[301. This also indicates why a key expertise in hazardous waste T&D has
been in transport and collection systems, and why middle stages, such as
collection and transfer station, mixing, storage, etc., complicate the regula-
tory problem.
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A similar portrait of extreme heterogeneity, albeit on a correspond-
ingly smaller scale, can be painted for other countries. Japan is estimated to
have about 9000 T&D plants. In the UK there are thought to be over
100000 different "special" (hazardous) waste producers; but these special
wastes have to be segregated from the wastes of between 1.5 and 2 million
producers of industrial wastes overall. The UK also has a register of over
5000 T&D facilities (mainly landfills), but it was unable to determine how
many of these were genuine "special" waste facilities, because their legal,
site license conditions were so vaguely worded (see Chapter 7). Transporters
and intermediate waste handlers, or brokers, are unlicensed.
Thus, both hazardous wastes themselves, and their generating indus-
tries, transporters, brokers, and T&D operators, are extremely dispersed,
heterogeneous and ill-defined. Under these circumstances it is easy to
understand why, even after major efforts to obtain information in the last
decade, ignorance, uncertainty, and indeterminacy predominate, especially
in defining hazardous waste for registration of its types, producers, volumes,
movements, handlers, and final disposal. Apparent details, such as quantity
thresholds or concentration thresholds for producers of toxic constituents,
can influence the regulated population enormously. So, too, can autonomous
and variable interpretations of the regulatory definitions by waste producers
and handlers themselves. Even in a supposedly coordinated system like the
EC, for example, inconsistent standards and methods create an extra
heterogeneity. For example, the FRG defines any waste containing hazard-
listed chemicals as "special", whereas the Netherlands, UK, and Belgium
use concentration thresholds. Even the latter are inconsistent, however,
being based on very different approaches. Thus, cyanide wastes are legally
hazardous above 50 mg/kg in the Netherlands, but above 250 mg/kg in Bel-
gium. A dioxin content above only 1.2 ppm is regarded as hazardous waste
in the UK, but above 50 ppm in the Netherlands [31]. Even within single
national systems, marked variations exist between authorities on, e.g., site-
licensing standards, transport controls, and even hazard classifications. In
practice this means that even the same material can change character as it
moves from one handler to another, or one area to another, without any
physical or chemical transformation occurring.
In addition to this general uncertainty and irreducible indeterminacy,
there may be genuinely different optimal regulatory strategies for different
kinds of waste and different kinds (e.g., size) of generator. However, they
are all combined under an undifferentiated policy umbrella of "hazardous
waste management", in which the extreme problems of identifying and
discriminating the organizational targets for regulation are directly exacer-
bated by the conceptual impossibility of precisely defining the relevant
materials, and vice versa.
All this offers a striking contrast to the structure of the nuclear waste
problem, with which chemical waste is often compared. Relatively speaking,
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nuclear wastes involve a very narrow range of well known radionuclides in
relatively narrow bands of composition. Furthermore, they arise in a limited
number of well known sites and are transported in a small number of con-
signments to very few treatment or storage facilities. It is easy to keep tabs
on the arisings and movements, and those arisings are, in chemical and
hazard terms, rather uniform and easily supervised. The largest waste pro-
ducer, the nuclear industry itself, is relatively monolithic, with few centers
of decision, control, and responsibility [32].
Thus, whereas regulators of nuclear waste or spent fuel at least know
what is produced and moving where, chemical waste regulators are in a
completely different position. In important respects the regulatory problem
for chemical wastes is more akin to regulation of nuclear proliferation than
of nuclear wastes; there is a need to define, detect, and control unknown,
perhaps clandestine, activity.
Those problems of heterogeneity and regulatory ignorance of the basic
elements of who and what is supposed to be regulated are highlighted by
the con tamination of groundwater from the rapid growth of microelectron-
ics, led by the mushrooming of many small firms [33]. These discard small
volumes of new, highly toxic chemicals, (e.g., as surface cleaning or etching
agents), but they are often too small to carry in-house chemical expertise,
and they produce batches of waste possibly too small and variable to be
worth collection for recycling.
The question of industrial structure is important because it strongly
affects the strength of self-regulatory and external regulatory supervision.
Uncertainty about industrial structure also makes it difficult to evaluate the
assertion that production threshold exemptions exclude a vast number of
generators, but only a small proportion of wastes, from regulation. Claims
on this vary. 0 ECD and EPA data [34] contradict the view of others that
the larger proportion of hazardous wastes falls outside of regulation by this
loophole. The great difficulty is that "special" or hazardous wastes are a
(variable) subset of a much larger population of wastes, which cannot all be
regulated just in case they contain hazards. The lack of a clear-cut techni-
calor organizational basis for distinction leaves a pervasive insecurity as to
what proportion of what should be controlled is, in fact, left uncontrolled.
The extreme heterogeneity amplifies this institutional uncertainty. What-
ever the real scale of the problem, policymakers have indicated that the
countless, unknown small generators are the greater source of regulatory
anxiety. In this regard, it may also be relevant that some countries or
states, such as Denmark and Bavaria, are making strenuous efforts to estab-
lish effective, regulated collection and treatment of even domestic hazardous
wastes, which begin at each household as small volumes of highly toxic
materials, but may end up on municipal sites in large volumes. In Britain it
is now estimated that cases of soil pollution by mercury and cadmium
(amongst other things) from domestic waste sites may be as bad as from
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industrial waste sites [35]. It is also necessary to remember that the reas-
surance of small volumes per se in aggregated figures may be misleading if
legally uncontrolled small volumes of highly toxic waste are locally concen-
trated in human exposures.
A question raised earlier is whether there is, in fact, a unitary regula-
tory field. Can standardized regulatory approaches based on this assump-
tion realistically tackle the issue? Is the same regulatory framework as
appropriate for a transient "firm" of two or three individuals stripping and
disposing of asbestos wastes, as it is for a major international chemicals
company? Even between established and respectable companies the
differences are very wide. Small firms, by definition, have less control over
their economic and social environment, and are likely to be less concerned
with the long term pay-off or side effects of present decisions. Large com-
panies may be more secure, but with greater forward commitments at risk;
they have more control over their immediate environment, and may have a
national image and international trade to nurture and protect. They are
likely to have a longer term planning and decision-making horizon, and will
also want consistency and predictability across a wider horizontal area.
These cultural aspects of decision making, and various organizational and
economic factors, such as how internal accounting and responsibilities are
allocated, affect hazardous waste regulatory relationships. They are highly
variable.
Regulatory bureaucracies tend toward fragmentation into necessary
specialist competences and approaches, dictated partly by the innate
differentiations in a given issue [36]. The heterogeneity of hazardous wastes
accentuates these tendencies as does the legacy of its origins in fragmented
local municipal waste disposal. Another factor is the multipolar character
of the hazardous waste "life-cycle", which contains different nodes of possi-
ble risk control.
3.3.2. Waste life-cycles
A defining characteristic of hazardous waste is that it is not dispersed and
diluted in the environment. It is concentrated and needs handling and
treatment before eventual destruction, containment, and/or dispersal. The
immediate significance of this is given by Figure 3.l.
In order to emphasize the contrasts between hazardous waste and con-
ventional environmental regulation, we can outline the possible stages in the
life-cycle of any single "packaged" waste:
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Figure 9.1. Differences in terms of potential emissions and risks between packaged
hazardous wastes as in (a) and conventional dispersive pollution as in (b).
(1) In-plant process generation.
(2) Mixing with other in-plant process streams.
(3) Factory-gate arisings, "pacKaged" into transport consignments.
(4) Collection and transport.
(5) "Interim" storage (notorious as de facto deposition sites).
(6) Mixing, repackaging, and reloading at a transfer station.
(7) Treatment and transformation (deliberate or inadvertent) - new by-
product wastes.
(8) Further collection and transport.
(9) "Final" treatment or preparation for disposal (e.g., for incineration or
landfill) .
(10) "Final" disposal - destruction; abandonment; monitored but irretriev-
able deposition; retrievable deposition (e.g., in an ex salt mine).
Through these stages a single waste may also change several times, not only
in composition, form, and value, but also in ownership or control; and its
defined nature and status may thus change, in risk, economic, legal, and
other terms, as it moves from one agent to another, especially across
different regulatory systems. Indeed, since wastes are often mixed or
transformed at transfer stations, and treatment processes produce concen-
trated residues which begin life as a new waste, life-cycles are more accu-
rately described as branching networks rather than discrete linear chains.
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Consider, for example, the case where a producer transfers a waste to
a broker, paying for T&D. The broker may see opportunities for recovery of
constituents, say silver residues in photographic wastes. He therefore sells it
to a reclamation company. The "waste" is transformed into a "good" whilst
remaining chemically the same, and exits from regulation. If a handler dehy-
drates a sludge to reduce transport costs, he may unwittingly create a
hazardous waste from an unregulated one, by reducing the flashpoint if it
contains flammables. Another difficulty concerns wastes that have several
toxic constituents, e.g., an acid containing heavy metals. The waste should
rationally be defined as acid for the transport phase, but heavy metals for
final disposal, reflecting the most important hazard at different stages of the
life-cycle, even if the material stays chemically the same.
These properties of indeterminacy and chemical or institutional
transformation create severe difficulties for "cradle-to-grave" documentary
systems of notification, which are supposed to be a central means of waste
control.
When combined with the aspects of heterogeneity and diffuseness
already outlined, these complex institutional life-cycles of wastes have
several important consequences, especially upon the relationship between
regulation and implementation and the interaction of technical and institu-
tional uncertainties.
Conventional pollution regulation involves the dispersion of potentially
hazardous materials directly from the source plant into the relevant
environmental medium. Assessment has thus been of the relevant natural
transport and transformation mechanisms by which the material returns to
damage people or significant media. Control has thus usually been exercised
by specifying ambient environmental standards or discharge limits, which
industry has to meet by its own means. But hazardous waste leaves the
plant on a wagon, under the ownership of an economic agent, who may mix
it with other wastes for convenient and economic transport, or storage,
trade it as a good, pass it on to other transport, storage, or treatment, and
so on, until final disposal by destruction, containment, and dispersal eventu-
ally occurs. These final dispositions, such as incineration or landfill, as well
as intermediate storage, transport, etc., even if licensed and controlled, still
also involve conventional environmental dispersal (e.g., flue gases from
incineration, or groundwater from landfill leaching), and possible natural
reconcentration. All the usual uncertainties of natural mechanisms are
therefore still involved, but with a qualitatively new dimension between
waste production and eventual natural dispersion.
The important extra dimension of uncertainty for hazardous waste is
the complex and indeterminate behavioral arena between source and final
disposition. It is, for example, because it is not dispersed, but packaged and
handled, that the ambiguity exists as to whether hazardous waste is a waste
or a (recyclable) resource. This distinction cannot possibly be defined by
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central authorities because it is a legitimate and necessary factor of enter-
prise, innovation, and thus trade between free industrial actors. On
grounds of overall efficiency they have to be given latitude to define a
"waste" as a "good" from within. Yet this is a major loophole in hazardous
waste regulation. This intrinsic ambiguity is analyzed further in Chapter 9.
The more direct and extensive regulation of behavior inevitably
implies more conflict between industry and regulator, because, being pack-
aged, the waste being transformed and transferred is, in principle at least,
more traceable to its source. If it is found to be in the wrong hands or
wrong place at the wrong time, the original waste producer may be liable,
even if acting in good faith he was let down by an incompetent or illegal
operator further down the life-cycle. Unlike, say, 1010 anonymous molecules
of sulfuric acid found to be acidifying a Scandinavian lake, a container of
acid residues with Punters Chemicals Ltd. printed on it that is being care-
lessly stored when it should have been neutralized and carefully disposed of,
will get Punters into trouble .. Specific cases like this (in addition to
Hoffman-LaRoche's notorious Seveso wastes) have been experienced, and
have also caused sharp reaction. It is because of the significance and com-
plexity of these networks of actors in hazardous waste life-cycles that legal
liability issues have been a focus of regulatory concern, so far without
resolution.
The intractability of controlling specific behavior within waste life-
cycles (as well as emissions at final disposal points, as in normal environ-
mental legislation) is illustrated by looking at one part of the system. At
the international level, for example, recall that in 1983 there were about
100000 border crossings of hazardous wastes consignments within the EC,
or one every five minutes. This is only at international transfer points. The
transaction costs of rigorous supervision of all movements (within as well as
between national systems) would be so enormous that it could not be done,
except by adding extra restrictions that preempt some of the heterogeneity,
such as limiting allowed border crossing points, or reducing the population
of transport firms to a few large organizations. But such interventions more
closely interfere with industry's autonomy and costs in ways that are more
pervasive and less finely tuned to individual cases than conventional disper-
sive pollution controls. They also still have to be enforced.
There is also an important implication for public reactions created by
the complex institutional dimension in the life-cycles of hazardous wastes,
especially cross-border hazardous waste flows. The conventional cross-
border pollution issues, such as acid deposition, involve diffuse, mainly
atmospheric (or oceanic) natural processes. They cannot be switched on or
off by political fiat. There is thus a relatively uniform, slowly changing
deposition of pollutants over large areas, and this occurs via natural
processes. The issue of acid rain has been gradually rising to policy status
for some time, and whilst its public recognition may have been triggered by
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specific local observations, its general growth as an issue has been evident
for several years.
Indeed the same point of difference applies within borders too. There
has, for example, been no equivalent for conventional, dispersive pollution
to the regulatory decision to buy up a whole town in Times Beach, USA,
which had been totally contaminated by dioxin sprayed in waste oil onto
dust roads all over the town. Acid deposition and other dispersive pollution
occur more evenly, and (once dispersed) by natural processes not human
action.
Hazardous waste is different for several reasons:
(1) Since it is concentrated, it can cause more intense local damage.
Dispersive pollution can sometimes naturally reconcentrate, but haz-
ardous waste is already usually concentrated, in human hands.
(2) Since it is moved directly by human agents it is:
(a) More likely to be subject to unpredictable movement and disposi-
tion.
(b) More likely to occasion sharp and dramatic negative perception.
(c) More able to be rapidly stopped (e.g., if political will is exercised)
with consequent sudden disruptions.
All of the factors in (2) played a role when the 41 barrels of waste contain-
ing dioxin from the Seveso plant were lost in early 1983. This incident and
its effect upon public perceptions has led to restrictions on the cros~-border
movement of hazardous wastes. It has also led to changes of policy that
posed a sudden and dramatic threat to systems dependent on export. Thus,
the region of Wallonia in Belgium announced a decree in June 1983 banning
imports of foreign waste. The EC's 1984 transfrontier directive, galvanized
into being after the Seveso barrels episode, is regarded by some as a hastily
conceived, backward step toward restriction of the free international move-
ment of wastes within the EC, and the controversial FRG ban on exports
and imports, which has had direct ramifications in other countries, was a
result of the Green Party's growing influence upon decision making.
The perception of the severity of events, such as the Seveso barrels,
may be multiplied by the fact that they are directly under human responsi-
bility (and hence perhaps more threatening), whereas, sulfur deposition, for
example, is indirect in that the operator at the coal plant source did not
actually direct its emitted sulfur to a given deposition point. Thus, the
political/regulatory and economic impact of an incident with hazardous
waste, especially if it is a transborder incident, is likely to be more severe
and unpredictable than the impact in conventional transborder pollution.
Furthermore, sanctions are more concrete. Transborder traffic in air pollu-
tion is difficult to stop by the importing nation, but far less difficult with
trucks or freight cars importing hazardous wastes. These factors are
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multiplied by the fact that wastes are inherently more likely to go astray
than hazardous goods; and they are probably enhanced by previous experi-
ence of uncontrolled hazardous waste dumps. That is, past human practices
in hazardous waste disposal are concretely experienced, unlike, say, past lax-
ity in aerial emissions discharges. As a policy issue, therefore, the ampli-
tudes of unpredictability and risk perception in hazardous waste manage-
ment are intrinsically greater than those of otherwise parallel issues: this is
also a function of its strong behavioral as well as natural life-cycles.
3.3.3. Intrinsic versus situational risks
The multistage life-cycle for hazardous wastes means that there are multiple
points at which the life (and thus hazard) of the waste can be more or less
independently affected. This suggests a need for coordinated, multiple, but
distributed, regulatory interventions and for a framework of risk analysis to
match this institutional reality. However, the most basic point of attention
remains the first phase of the waste life-cycle, namely hazardous waste aris-
ings. At this point data are needed on what is being produced, where, and
by whom. Also needed is a universally applied precise identification
mechanism for defining hazardous wastes, as a prerequisite for obtaining
meaningful (i.e., centrally consistent) data and material control.
However, centrally collected knowledge of waste arisings may not be
an inevitable necessity for regulation, given other foci of intervention that
may offer the chance of effective control. It is essential for reassurance, and
also for centralized, standardized modes of regulation, but the point is to
explore institutional options and implications. This question becomes espe-
cially germane as the accuracy to be expected of such data diminishes the
closer one approaches it.
The attempt to classify hazardous wastes definitively at their point of
generation is undermined by the fact that there are several technical options
for classification, as analyzed in Chapter 5. It is also limited by industrial
secrecy, and by the uncontrolled variability of the physical and chemical
(and thus hazard) properties of many waste streams from day to day, even
within accepted production parameters. However, even more significant
than these difficulties of defining the "intrinsic" hazards of wastes at their
point of production is the downstream indeterminacy of the life-cycle of any
given waste. The physical and chemical fate of a particular waste is
influenced by independent actors, rationalities, and interactions, some of
which cross-cut the rationality of ideal central management. Through these
situational changes, the "downstream" hazard of a waste may change,
perhaps radically; for example, if a transporter dewaters a sludge to reduce
transport costs and so inadvertently reduces the flashpoint to below a safe
threshold. In other words, the variation of risk within the life-cycle of a
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waste may be greater than the distinctions of hazard between wastes as gen-
erated. This point is depicted schematically in Figure 9.~.
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Figure 9.2. Possible risk variations for hazardous waste (schematic); "intrinsic"
and "situational" risks.
We draw an important distinction between intrinsic risks, which are
those associated with given wastes as produced - defined by toxicity of com-
ponents, etc. - and situational risks, which are those created by the various
situations, such as physical and chemical condition, environmental state,
form of containment, etc., through which a waste will pass during its life-
cycle.
Strictly speaking, all risks are situational; intrinsic risk measurements
and specified tests still embody - usually implicitly - conditions and criteria
of damage, exposure, etc., that imply a standard situation and act as a base-
line for comparing measured risks reproducibly. For example, an intrinsic
risk test that specifies a concentration threshold for an aqueous leachate
assumes groundwater contamination from landfill as its critical scenario.
Intrinsic risk approaches are equivalent to a heavy regulatory dependence
upon the data and classification of hazardous waste arisings. Based on a
standard scenario or situation, they imply a behavioral standardization in
the risk-generating system that is equivalent to projecting the risk discrimi-
nations made at A (Figure 9.~) rigidly down the whole life-cycle.
Hazardous Waste - What Kind of Issue? 67
Conventional approaches to environmental regulation extended to hazard-
ous wastes may be unrealistic about the feasibility of this projection,
because they normally have little or no such life-cycle dimension to reckon
with.
This tension between managing intrinsic or situational risks is an
important cross-roads of technical approaches and institutional structures
in regulation, and is dealt with at length in Chapters 9 and 10. It is a spe-
cial case of the more general point that the hazardous waste life-cycle allows
different regulatory foci and approaches; these imply different institutional
relationships, which in turn need different kinds of technical risk assess-
ment. For example, an ideal system would be able to decentralize risk
analysis and management to such a degree that an optimally efficient bal-
ance between costs and an accepted level of environmental protection could
be achieved. If however, central institutions cannot trust local actors (regu-
lators or regulated) to analyze and optimize in this way, they must impose
more standardized risk frameworks, such as by banning landfill rather than
saying that in some local circumstances (to be determined by local actors) it
is acceptably safe. The technical risk frameworks in regulation embody
assumptions and prescriptions about these institutional relationships, and a
parallel balance between "intrinsic" (standardized) and situational (flexible)
risk analysis and management. In Chapter 5 we outline technical methods
of hazard classification of wastes. One of these - defining characteristics
(e.g., toxicity tests) has potential flexibility toward unforeseen situational
variations (e.g., by including analysis of exposures), whereas the others (e.g.,
defining constituents or waste streams) do not. But even the "characteris-
tics" method embodies assumptions about risk situations that need strong
local institutional frameworks for effective use.
3.3.4. Multiple possible decision levels
A direct consequence of the complex life-cycles of hazardous wastes is that
there are several major, different points in the system where regulatory
intervention can be made. This is shown in Table 3.1 (see also Figure 3.1).
The first point of direct control is where the wastes are actually produced.
The aim of most existing regulatory frameworks is to control hazardous
wastes "from cradle to grave", that is, all the way through their life-cycles
to their final resting place.
Note that this can mean anything from merely trying to track wastes,
so as to see where they go, to controlling their movements, e.g., by designat-
ing forms and operators of transport, specific T&D sites, or techniques, etc.
The ultimate aim is the latter and, indeed, this happens for very special
wastes, such as PCBs; but practical achievement is qualified by what is
actually feasible. Where systems of regulatory authority do not have
comprehensive data on industrial waste arisings, and have little or no
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sovereignty across the full waste life-cycle, tracking may be all that is feasi-
ble, and may be challenge enough. However, regulation may include con-
tracting and radically simplifying the possible life-cycles to within the
national system's own sovereignty, by imposing restrictions on export out of
the waste production region. Further simplification may be effected by
creating a public monopoly responsible for all wastes in a region. Trends
have been toward more designation and restriction. For example, the origi-
nal ambitions within Europe were confined to waste tracking, but FRG ini-
tiatives go beyond this, such as by requiring that for permitted exports (for
which special exemption must be justified) the receiving T&D facilities must
be at least as good as domestic ones.
A risk assessment scheme for chemical wastes could begin far
"upstream" from normal regulatory points of application, at the stage of
industrial process design (see Figure 3.1). This is recognized as the ultimate
regulatory ideal, and is also accepted by some [371 as in industry's best
interest, since it might prevent some hazardous materials (e.g., PCBs or
2,4,5-T) from ever becoming downstream "wastes", where they later
engender regulatory reactions, which threaten established production com-
mitments. In Hungary (see Chapter 8) the government regularly analyzes
"internal" industrial data, but in less centrally planned economies industry
strongly resists even external information gathering, let alone external direc-
tion of plant and process decisions.
The main problem with a regulatory strategy at this upstream point is
that there is so much ignorance about the passage from conceptual design
and early risk indicators to eventual waste situations and effects. The
chances are, therefore, that only rather crude and extreme signals from
downstream (e.g., threats of public opposition or steeply rising unavoidable
costs) will appear back upstream, through all the intervening uncertainties,
as sufficiently clear to warrant or enforce action. The credibility of techni-
cal analysis alone is likely to be very limited.
Quite apart from confidentiality problems, industrial processes usually
produce multiple waste streams, and even within regular daily operating
conditions the waste composition of a process will fluctuate quite
significantly ("some waste streams go into and out of the hazardous
category several times per shift" [38]). Therefore, the specificity and
accountability of this level of analysis is always likely to be limited.
The usual starting point for regulation is waste arisings. The aim is to
determine the "intrinsic" properties of the waste as it stands, and match its
hazards to the cheapest effective technical option to reduce those hazards to
acceptable levels. The situational variations downstream make risk analysis
at this point uncertain, unless those degrees of freedom are reduced, not
only by technical norms, but by institutional innovations too.
The US EPA regulation has attempted to develop an integrated risk-
analytic model for this stage. It attempts to match and optimize
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combinations of waste-environment-technology (WET model) for different
risk-cost objective functions using linear programming [39/. The developers
recognize that in aggregating many factors (for example, to score all possi-
ble human health effects for an initial 140 different chemicals on a single
scale), this risk assessment model is a very crude cut. Nevertheless it is
intended that it will systematically identify combinations of wastes, environ-
ments, and technologies where regulation should increase or decrease in
resolution and, at the limits, where total prohibitions or nonregulation
should occur. As "a broad policy planning tool ... incapable of developing
and revising specific regulations" [40/, the WET model is essentially the
first, crude step of a step-wise regulatory strategy to establish where analyt-
ical attention should be focused when regulatory attention and resources are
far outstripped by the magnitude and complexity of the available problems.
In principle, WET matching should optimize the situational conditions
(treatment, transformation and disposal, containment, isolation, etc.) and
hazards from the intrinsic hazards of a given waste, thus refining the
risk-cost trade off. Because many of the risk-varying factors are detailed (ad
hoc situational realities) using the model as a surrogate for such local
behavioral and scientific knowledge in a decision is impossible. Most regula-
tory systems have responded to inadequate implementation by attempting
more intervention in choices of T&D for given wastes, via the use of such
models or equivalent frameworks.
Whereas WET might be used, ideally, for planning a T&D infrastruc-
ture or at least issuing principles for T&D, a more realistic decision situa-
tion is one where the waste producer is faced with a range of facilities of
different kinds at different distances and costs (including in-house treatment
and disposal and export options). There may be some T&D facilities whose
legal receipt of the waste in question is uncertain, as the license conditions
and their enforcement are vague (see Chapter 7 for example). There are also
often intermediate handlers who collect wastes from firms for a fee, then
decide themselves what to do with them, so that the producers may not
know what happens to them beyond the handler. Assuming that the pro-
ducer or handler is a responsible one, there may still be large differences
between legal disposal options, and transport to appropriate facilities also
has to be considered. In the UK, for example, the closure of a high-
temperature incinerator in Scotland left nearby producers of special wastes
unfit for landfill with the option of transport to an incinerator in the south
of England, at 1500 pounds sterling per wagon load. An in-house special
incinerator is now being built by one such company instead.
It is generally true that decision makers in the waste life-cycle make
risk decisions only indirectly. They make decisions based upon competing
costs. These ought to reflect (inter alia) considered risk estimates, but the
less direct this is, in a multiactor, badly defined life-cycle, the less controlled
are the "risk estimates" that shape decisions. A combination of front-end
Hazardous Waste - What Kind of Issue? 71
waste arisings classifications, producer and handler commercial decisions,
and T &D site-licensing restrictions creates certain broad networks with
branching options, through which waste can move, be transformed, and
eventually be disposed of. The overall balance of application and tightness
of regulatory effort can vary greatly between systems, even when they may
appear to have similar regulations.
Thus, regulatory approaches have attempted to establish accepted
frameworks for evaluating wastes for their intrinsic hazard, then control
their routing toward hazard-limiting T&D options. But this can be done in
various ways, and to very different levels of determinism or specificity. The
variables are not only technical, but also institutional. One option is to
allow complete freedom of choice for the operator to dispose of his wastes
once classified as hazardous, but only within a given menu of licensed
handlers, transporters, T&D options, and operators. This approach would
involve emphasis on risk control from the T&D site licensing end (the very
back end), with a minimal "intrinsic" hazard classification of wastes from
the generator end (the front end) and a large mediating middle ground of
free enterprise. Insurance against the effects of front-end regulator ignorance
of waste arisings is attempted by placing control emphasis at another,
decentralized, downstream regulatory node. Risk analysis here is essentially
a complex mix of minimal conditions at each end of the match - initial
waste and final T&D - but allowing for normal commercial processes in
between to optimize for all other factors that an ideal risk management
decision would include. This is the least deterministic form of regulation. In
putting regulatory emphasis on T&D plant licensing but not upon what
wastes arise, it is also institutionally most distant from production process
innovation, and least able to influence that phase. This kind of balance is, in
principle, most nearly approximated by the UK, which has probably the
least elaborated hazard classification for wastes, and the most strongly
expressed dependence upon T&D site facility licensing, even if in reality this
is highly variable in quality - see Chapter 7.
This balance can be changed by more elaborate front-end attempts to
classify and direct hazardous wastes, as mentioned earlier. This is being
tried in Austria and in the FRG. (In effect it is partly established already in
Bavaria and Hessen.) A weaker version is being considered in the UK. It
has also been introduc~d in the USA (1984) reauthorization and strengthen-
ing of the 1976 RCRA. Licensing waste producers and enforcement of full
registration of all waste arisings, including that disposed of in-house, licenc-
ing intermediate waste handlers and transporters, and centralizing licensing
of T &D facilities to be more specific in the wastes they are allowed to treat,
are all supplementary methods of reducing behavioral uncertainty in waste
life-cycles. The US EPA began in 1978 by considering that it would issue
centralized criteria for T&D plant design and performance, but had to relax
these in 1981 to "best engineering judgment" in a case-by-case manner,
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requmng operators to perform justifying risk assessments [41]. The uncer-
tainty of this approach for operators caused the EPA to retreat to general
standards, this time for environmental performance of T&D facilities. The
reauthorization has returned to stricter controls.
Such regulatory moves push the front and back ends of waste Iife-
cycles together, and structure the ill-defined middle. In theory this
increases determinism, control, and effective regulation. In practice, how-
ever, if carried too far, it may reduce the coordination of the system, which
may be only viable if a large degree of freedom, thus regulatory indetermin-
ism and uncertainty, is allowed to private enterprise in matching specific
wastes to specific end-points. The best balance may also depend upon the
overall size of the economic-industrial network that is to be regulated.
In practice, countries differ widely in their choices with respect to
these factors. Some require producers to register but not transporters, oth-
ers require transporters to be licensed. Nearly all systems require registra-
tion of defined wastes "from cradle to grave" - the so-called trip-ticket
notification system - but the definitions of waste differ and so do detailed
ways of operating the registration procedures.
Some regulatory bodies, such as those in the UK, feel that hazard lists
and classification schemes are only necessary for the transport phase -
although they have not taken steps to license hazardous waste transport
operators [421. Trip-ticket notification systems for every waste consignment
that leaves the factory gate are supposed to aid regulation, but it is widely
accepted in practice that the sheer volume of paperwork and coordination
necessary, the dislocations between brief, unit paper descriptions and real
world transport arrangements (e.g., "season tickets" aggregating many
loads into one recorded consignment), and the time lag between actual
transport and receipt of all copies of the paperwork by an agency, all mean
that trip-ticket systems can at the very best be only a retrospective infor
mation gathering exercise, and not a form of real-time regulation (see
Chapter 7).
The actual management of hazardous wastes goes through several dis-
tinct phases, the exact combination varying in each case. Each of these
phases offers different opportunities for regulation, but regulates different
actors, activities, and relationships, and requires very different kinds of risk
analysis. For example, transport risks stress different criteria and define
different materials as hazardous compared to, say, final disposal. Also, the
degree of refinement needed (or possible) of risk analyses or regulatory
instruments may differ at different points of the life-cycle. It may not matter
to a waste producer or transporter, for instance, if the heavy metal concen-
tration in an organic sludge is above a certain threshold. Yet this may
make it unsatisfactory for high-temperature incineration, where aerial emis-
sion of heavy metals can be a hazard. All the five main phases listed in
Table 9.1 need some kind of classification of a hazardous waste in order to
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invoke controls. The question of how this classification is made, and also
how it is used once defined, is very important, down to a much finer level of
practice than normally recognized. The opportunities for both formally and
informally inconsistent practical meanings and usages are endless as al-
ready intimated in this chapter. Appropriate technical methods can only be
defined in relation to institutional parameters including their uncertainties.
3.3.5. Professionalism
The foregoing points about the fragmentation of hazardous waste life-cycles
and the earlier contrast with nuclear waste throws into relief another
significant aspect of the chemical waste issue, namely its historical lack of
professionalism. This strongly affects the social structure and potential
effectiveness of different regulatory strategies and arrangements. In the
nuclear case, whether w~ are talking about radiation protection or the
engineering safety of nuclear power plants, there has always been a well
developed professional cadre of experts, highly funded and with a strong
basis in fundamental research as well as more applied analysis. As Serwer
has shown in the case of radiation protection [43], these cadres early on
evolved a strong sense of professional self-regulation, even when this regula-
tion was extended from radiology into industrial areas. This affected stan-
dards of vigilance, expertise, and quality control, which helped to maintain
public credibility and acceptable regulatory standards, even when the
"regulatory" experts were formally part of the industry.
Ensuing institutional structures of regulation were, at least, well
developed and financed, coherent, and highly professionalized, with a strong
ethos of enlightened self-interest (self-protection via preemption of public
hostility through protecting public health). Furthermore, there was a con-
tinuous bridge - even an identity - between the government regulators and
the regulated industry. The regulators were recruited from the industry and
shared a common professional background, somewhat aloof from either the
governmental or industrial context. This arrangement has drawbacks, but
also important benefits. There is no doubt that it is far better than no regu-
lation at all, which was the case for a long time with hazardous chemical
waste. The point is that the risk source in the nuclear case was actually a
prior professional activity (radiology), which generated professional bodies
of regulation that later formed the basis of coherent regulatory bodies as the
nuclear industry developed.
Similar kinds of highly professional, regulatory arrangements have
developed in other fields. There is also a significant connection with the
heterogeneity factor, because it is the relatively unitary nature of the
nuclear industry as a later risk source that has allowed its regulatory cadres
to be drawn from unitary technical disciplines {radiation biology and
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physics; nuclear engineering) and so enhance a technically strong (if institu-
tionally sometimes "co-opted" professional identity.
The social structure of regulatory bodies is also an important factor in
public perceptions and reactions. The hazards of nuclear processes and
materials focus only upon radiation damage. Although this, in itself,
involves an extensive differentiation of specialist topics within the field, it is
nevertheless under a singular, professional discipline. The resultant social
coherence of the expert community has meant that many questions about
uncertainties and alternative techniques of analysis, etc., could, until recent
years, be retained largely within the specialist community, away from the
public regulatory agenda. In the case of hazardous wastes, with a more frag-
mentary array of technical issues and relevant specialties (even within toxi-
cology alone), this expert privatization of uncertainty has been more
difficult. Because of this lack of a coherent social containment insulating the
public regulatory arena from esoteric specialist concerns, many technical
uncertainties have been more easily drawn into the public policy /regulatory
domain, leading to greater confusion in the setting and implementation of
standards. The reasons why this has not yet led to public anxiety on the
scale of the nuclear issue (except perhaps in the USA) lie elsewhere, in the
perceived familiarity of chemical waste disposal institutions, and in different
histories. The technical risk uncertainties of toxic chemicals overall dwarf
those of radiation risk.
Biotechnology also provides an interesting comparison in relation to
professionalism and self-regulation, because the emergence of regulation
bears some hallmarks of the development of professional self-regulation of
radiologists in the 1920s and 1930s and of its institutionalization in govern-
ment regulatory arrangements. Thus, molecular biologists themselves
effectively alerted public concern to the risk associated with their work in
the famous Asilomar declaration of 1974 [441. Although there was later a
retreat from this position, the US National Institutes of Health Committee
set up to "regulate" this field was not only not an executive agency, but was
staffed by largely the same corpus of experts who had first expressed the
need for systematic risk assessment and regulation of their own activities.
Thus, the same kind of bridging, highly expert, cadre-structured regulatory
developments occurred here as in the nuclear case. Professional self-
regulation has been the norm in biotechnology.
Now, interestingly, the field of biotechnology, which started with
scientists organizing self-regulation, has industrialized very rapidly under
essentially the same regulatory arrangements, but in a diffuse, decentralized
way very different from the nuclear case, so that this area of regulation
bears some characteristics of both the nuclear and (in its industrial struc-
ture) the chemical waste regulation cases. Indeed, the industrial end falls
under existing chemical waste arrangements, though with apparent confu-
sion as to the nature of its wastes.
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Because hazardous chemical wastes emerged as an issue from ordinary
waste arrangements and perceptions, except in the largest chemical com-
panies there was no professional status, no systematic attention, nor were
resources given to deal with these wastes. Thus, many hazardous waste
arrangements and regulatory personnel in governments and industries were
originally of low qualification and status. Relevant personnel had no coher-
ing sense of sound standards, professional identity, or reputation to defend.
They were usually only organized, if at all, at diffuse and uncoordinated
local plant and municipality levels. One of the repeated comments about
the early days of the EPA Office of Solid Waste's dealing with RCRA, for
example, concerned their lack of qualification for dealing with the complex
problems of risk management and regulation that swept through and
transformed their established, more mundane concerns about ordinary gar-
bage [45]. Whereas the source of regulatory recruitment in the nuclear and
biotechnology fields has been clear-cut and highly trained, recruitment to
regulatory bodies for hazardous waste management seems to have been far
more disparate and fragmentary, with corresponding difficulties in establish-
ing an effective, professional identity that bridges regulators and all reaches
of the industry, out to its smallest, most esoteric corners. A senior regulator
in the UK, for example, could think of fewer than 12 people in the whole
country qualified for the post of chief inspector in the Hazardous Wastes
Inspectorate created in 1984. There are no higher degrees or chairs in waste
management. Typical recruitment to hazardous waste regulatory positions
appears to vary widely. In Britain, the government regulatory body is proud
of the large number of man-years of industrial experience its staff has. In
other countries recruitment seems to be mainly of engineers, ecologists, or
chemists with no industrial experience [461.
The heterogeneity factor also enters here. The kind of regulation
described above is inevitably highly interventionist, which is a major reason
for the difficulties experienced in implementation. But it is intervention in a
wide variety of different industries, plants, processes, and conditions. It
implies a need for a very wide range of specific industrial expertises. Not
surprisingly, compared with the experts in any given industry, the experts
in such a regulatory body will probably be nonexperts, and conflict is highly
likely, not just on specific points but, more corrosively, over competence and
credibility in general.
Compare this situation with the nuclear case again. Here there is usu-
ally only one central decision-making frame [471, and the institutional struc-
ture of regulation outlined before means that the regulators are an
integrated part of the industrial design, planning, and decision-making pro-
cess anyway. Nuclear plant design, for example, is carried out in detailed
consultation with regulatory experts to assess design features of requisite
safety standards. Nuclear waste processing and transport are likewise
designed and conducted with regulators as part of the decision-making
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process. The dividing line between regulation and industrial planning is
nearly broken down altogether. Thus, the "interference" of regulators, due
to the fact that nuclear waste is also packaged, is a nonissue because they
are already integrated in the decision making anyway, and in a monopoly
industry there is not the same extreme cutting edge of competition and
ever-vulnerable profit margins that requires keeping regulators and their
impact as distant as possible.
Another side effect of the same structural property is that, because the
nuclear industry is virtually only one industry, there is no real ambiguity as
to the "wastes-resources" boundary. There is, of course, one such conflict
cleaving the whole area, namely the proper role of plutonium created in and
extracted from spent thermal reactor fuels. The point is that for nuclear
materials these conflicting options and definitions are dealt with by whole
policy systems, and are uniformly applied, without ambiguity to the actors,
within a given system once an option has been decided. There may be
misleading signals given to the public, but that is a different issue. Unlike
hazardous chemicals, these elements are not subject to variable definition
and dynamic choice by a polycentric network of autonomous enterprises,
interacting with diverse interests and perceptions within the regulatory sys-
tem itself. Thus, one more major source of intrinsic confusion and limitation
to effective implementation in hazardous waste regulation is essentially
absent from the nuclear case.
This history of low status, institutional and technical fragmentation,
lack of technical expertise and professionalism, and neglect of hazardous
waste, combined with the extreme heterogeneity of the area, has given the
field a very particular institutional structure of regulation. However, there
has existed the requisite professional expertise, resources, and awareness for
self-regulation in the specialist chemical companies, and trade associations
have made important advances in levels of professionalism. Although there
are national modifying factors, the overall ethos and implementation of
hazardous waste regulation is deeply influenced by this general history of
institutional development.
3.3.6. Inverse materials-cash exchange relations
Let us start by viewing hazardous waste T&D as just any other complex
industry, regulated by conventional operating emission standards to air,
water, and soil. The T&D industry has resources inputs - other industries'
wastes - from whose industrial "conversion" it makes (or hopes to make) a
profit. The only difference - and it is crucial - is that its resources inputs
are of negative value. The T&D industry does not pay for its "resources"; it
is paid specifically for taking them away and dealing with them, and it is
paid before it converts its "resources" into final "products". This means
that the T&D industry receives the money as well as the input materials.
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Yet - unlike a conventional industry, which pays for its inputs - it is only
really concerned to receive the former. Although a material goes in one
direction, it is the (T&D) service that is central. This flows the other way,
and is delivered to the customer once the material is removed from his site,
not when (if) it is properly and finally disposed of. The item of risk interest
is the material. Notice the extra complication that if the T&D service con-
tractor sees the waste as recyclable, the whole framework is turned upside
down! The relationships are represented in Figure 9.9.
Waste Goods (as raw materials)
Generatorr Icustom.,ll r Gene"Wl
Cash Material Material Cash
T&D operator
(contractor)
.._"i~j Recoverable ~'!':~+
materials?
User
(customer)
Figure 3.3. Materials-cash exchange relationships: hazardous waste and conven-
tional materials. For waste, (a) the cash buys a service, not materials, and (b) the
service is invisible to its buyers. (I am grateful to E. Finnecy for the original point
from which this is developed.)
The regulatory situation is fundamentally affected by this structural
property and can be summarized in four points:
(1) For waste, the cash buys a serv,'ce, not materials. The service is the
removal of materials, which is not identical to their proper disposal.
(2) The service is invisible to its buyer, who therefore does not know if it
has been fully performed. Therefore, the servicer or carrier (T&D
operator), who has already been paid, has no incentive to carry out the
service (i.e., receive the hazardous wastes, or treat them properly once
received) because this costs the servicer. This is a strong practical rea-
son for avoiding arrangements where intermediate handlers are paid
directly for collecting wastes.
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(3) Because of the lack of value in the waste from the generator's point of
view, it is not subject to any kind of "quality control" , thus, its chemi-
cal composition, mixing, and even physical form may vary more or less
uncontrollably. Yet this radically affects the feasibility of treatment, in
which somebody has to invest resources. Such uncontrolled variation
is a major problem for T &D operation and thus a key obstacle to more
investment in T&D.
(4) For wastes containing valuable resources that could be extracted, the
same variability problem arises. But, in principle, there may come a
point where the value of extractable materials makes the "waste"
worth paying for by the T &D industry rather than being paid to take
it away. In terms of Figure 9.9, the value shifts from left to right,
merely by fiat of the handler. However, this not only makes more
incentive for quality control ("no quality, no pay" clauses), it also con-
verts the "waste" into "not waste", and thus automatically exempts it
from hazardous waste regulation. This is a major loophole because
there are so many wastes, and the transition of each is open to diverse
and fluctuating definition, as mentioned earlier.
3.4. Conclusions: Ignorance, Indeterminacy, and the
Limitations of Risk Analysis
As suggested before, the hazardous waste problem is in important respects
underripe for systematic risk management approaches, because the area is
characterized by ignorance and indeterminacy in basic, elementary proper-
ties and parameters. Crucially, these are institutional or behavioral, of a
different order to those definable technical uncertainties in damage-
generating processes and substances. Thus, for example, although he felt it
to be a flawed Act, the Dutch Environment Minister, L. Ginjaar, decided in
1979 to go ahead with the Chemical Waste Act because it, at least, con-
tained registration requirements that would eventually produce information
(at that time completely lacking) about the producers, volumes, composi-
tions, and movements of the large variety of industrial wastes [48]; that is,
about the activities of a whole network of agents concerned with hazardous
wastes. In his view, only when this information was compiled and analyzed
could a better Act be designed and proper research carried out to define
risks and help choose better regulatory instruments and standards. Perhaps
indicating the extent and intractability of this ignorance, although Ginjaar
thought such revisions could be made in three years, the information was
eventually published in 1985 and, although a T&D infrastructure is now at
least planned, the envisaged tightening of the regulations is not yet in sight.
This situation, where regulation is nearly reduced to a passive
information-gathering exercise, again derives from the issue-specific
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structural properties - the extremely poorly defined, dispersed, and
behaviorally dependent nature of the regulatory issues.
Risk analysis of environmental exposure pathways, as opposed to risk
analysis of release mechanisms, is recognized to be a field in its infancy com-
pared with the questions confronting it. Hazardous wastes pose all of those
release and environmental risk analysis problems in great diversity, but they
pose the further problem of defining a dispersed and partly indeterminate
behavioral-technical risk system. Implementation of regulation and sup-
porting analysis are tangled together more closely, having to define risks of
variable situations in a waste's life-cycle, and assume or negotiate what
behavioral degrees of freedom exist in reality to influence the risks and the
uncertainties. These degrees of freedom include the freedom to define the
key terms, and hence the structure of the field, in different ways.
Practical management first requires the creation of an industrial
infrastructure, which involves protection from close regulation, and rela-
tively crude and flexible risk discriminations. To organize this industrial and
trading activity in wastes into the appropriate T&D option is, as noted,
inevitably more directive than is conventional environmental regulation.
Since hazardous waste is concentrated and moved by human agents, it has a
greater potential for dramatic impact on public perceptions. The practical
influences that affect controls over waste production and movement are
likely to be based as much upon unstable and badly understood processes of
public perception and reaction as upon sophisticated risk analyses. The
structural uncertainties outlined in the previous sections both reduce the
relevance and meaningfulness of such analyses and increase the instability
and effects of public perception processes.
The above observations of the underripeness of hazardous waste policy
for formal risk assessment may be analytically valid; but the lack of struc-
ture in the risk-generating system is arguably a major reason for the fickle-
ness of public reactions. Public reactions and pressures for justification are
therefore creating an apparently irresistible demand for the issue to be
defined more elaborately and formally, in terms of risk analysis. The grad-
ual ordering of some of the extreme behavioral uncertainties in the system
requires forms of risk analysis tailored to these poorly defined structural
realities, and aimed at incremental situational improvements rather than
idealized (e.g., standardized) situations. One of the observations of our
research was that national systems vary in the extent of the distance they
embody between the implicit standardized assumptions made about risk
situations in the formal risk assessments and the variety of real situations of
implementation that actually exist. Bringing the former nearer to the latter
implies that stronger institutional resources are needed at local levels in
order to integrate the local knowledge available only to them with the more
general principles and system requirements. But the use of more centralized
and standardized scientific language to reassure the public tends in the
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opposite direction. The way in which regulatory bodies treat intrinsic
ignorance and institutional uncertainty in framing risk analysis will reflect a
combination of universal pressures, such as the generally increased impor-
tance of credibility, the heterogeneity of waste life-cycles, and local pressures
arising from the particular cultural context.
Also crucial will be the responses of policy to the conflict between the
need to create and maintain a new industry as part of regulation, and the
increasing need to subject it to formal regulatory controls before its
existence is even secured. It seems increasingly dubious whether free
market forces alone are adequate to cope with this dilemma, though
significant elements of self-regulation have to be encouraged and allowed. In
any case, it is clear that the risk management dimensions ultimately inter-
connect with basic institutional questions not only "internal" to hazardous
wastes, but more broadly, of industrial investment, public financing, and
economic management generally.
In Chapter 4 we describe a case study in which the conflicting overall
ways of defining the hazardous waste issue, as outlined in this chapter, are
evident, and in which local institutional realities exacerbated these intrinsic
tensions in handling the issue. We also see from this case study how deep
are the interactions between technical risk management frameworks and
behavioral factors in the regulatory arena, an insight that is developed in
later chapters.
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CHAPTER 4
The Rationalities of Problem Definition:
The Netherlands and Hazardous
Waste Management
Brian Wynne and Dick Hortensius
4.1. Introduction
Any attempt to improve regulation must begin from an understanding of
the problem structure that regulation .confronts. As indicated in Chapter 3
there are certain properties of the hazardous waste issue that exist wherever
it is regulated. One of these properties is the severely poorly structured and
behavioral nature of the "system" of waste generation, handling, transfor-
mation, and eventual disposal. Within a single regulatory arena there are
many interacting problem definitions being developed by actors with vary-
ing involvement and interest in wastes and their adequate management.
The pattern of problem definition interactions varies according to the state
of evolution of an issue, the particulars of specific subissues, and the institu-
tional structures of the overall regulatory system. Whilst this pluralism and
lack of clear structure is universal, its effect upon the optimality - even via-
bility - of policies is not. The particular political culture and institutional
milieu in which the issue is being managed affect the point in the waste sys-
tem at which, and the degree to which, contradictory perceptions and
interests confront one another or are "smoothed" so as to suspend or dissi-
pate potential dislocation.
Plural problem definitions exist in any policy issue, even ones struc-
tured by strong technical content. A key point from the introductory
chapters is that for hazardous wastes this pluralism extends to the technical
heart of the issue, namely the terms hazard, waste, and risk; coherence will
'ThL Rationalities 0/ Problem Definition 85
not be achieved by more intense technical effort to find precision, but from
institutional mechanisms. In this chapter we focus upon a particular coun-
try, the Netherlands, whose institutional features have made the issue
appear nearer to paralysis. This important case demonstrates the institu-
tional complexities of achieving regulatory problem definitions that are
sufficiently related to a broad enough set of key institutional actors to be
practically viable. It is the minimum-feasible institutional consensus that
defines the parameters of useable knowledge. This, in turn, suggests certain,
more general practical conclusions about the best forms and focus of regula-
tory effort.
There are two interrelated points that are drawn from this analysis
and developed in later chapters:
(1) The depth and substance of the diverse frameworks of rationality that
thread through the overall hazardous waste issue - even in the formal
institutional settings, let alone amongst less recognized actors - forces
a reconsideration of approaches to risk management and regulation,
which normally assume a singular problem definition and uniform
frameworks of information. This, in turn, forces more careful con-
sideration of the proper balance between centralized and decentralized
structures of regulation in this issue.
(2) The Dutch use of precise and inflexible concentration thresholds for
legally defining and ranking hazardous wastes is relatively unusual
internationally. It is interesting because of the evident contradictions
- more extreme in the Netherlands than elsewhere - between such an
elaborate and precise normative technical framework of regulation,
and the severe shortfall of adequate domestic industrial facilities to
actually treat and dispose of wastes within this theoretical framework.
Analysis of this discrepancy supports our general interpretation of the
relationships between institutional uncertainties and technical frame-
works. It also suggests the significance of indirect, symbolic roles of
credibility and legitimation played by scientific language. A wider
interpretation is offered, based on features of Dutch political culture
and of processes of legitimation through symbolic action. It is a con-
crete example of the tension, outlined in Chapter 2 and elaborated
upon later, between the direct and symbolic roles of risk analysis.
We treat problem definition as a "deep structure" underlying the
specific interests, values, and arguments of relevant groups or organizations
("actors"). Their problem focus may not necessarily be primarily on
hazar(lous wastes, yet their ensuing actions or perceptions may be relevant
to its management.
It is also important to follow through from the early stages of issue
emergence to formal legislation, and enactment in regulations and
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implementation and/or enforcement mechanisms. Some factors, such as the
interests of certain actors, remain stable throughout this cycle; others, such
as the patterns of interaction and the focus and language of action, may
change. In this case we see the impetus for explicit regulation emerging
from the local level, being adopted and shaped at national level, to return
transformed in various ways, via the provinces, back to local levels. Trac-
ing this process through its several incarnations is valuable in underlining
the point made by, e.g., Lindblom [1], that policy problems are not natural
or self-evident, but are socially shaped by the traditions, experiences, and
values of their authors.
Here we focus on the taken-for-granted problem definitions of different
actors: this involves more than identifying the diverse interacting values of
those actors, because "values" suggests diverse preferences focusing on a
common problem definition. The diversity of presumptions as to what is
the problem being addressed is a more fundamental form of heterogeneity,
yet it has some institutional pattern. Of central interest to this kind of
analysis is the form of interaction between the physical-technical charac-
teristics of the hazardous waste issue and the institutional context of poli-
cymaking and implementation. We offer a tentative analysis of the
influence of Dutch political culture on the use of technical norms, and the
ability of the system to implement regulatory policies which - in the nature
of the issue ~ have to be coordinated and followed through across several
widely separate points of application in the overall waste life-cycle.
4.2. Hazardous Waste Management - An Outline
A 1985 compilation from registration data by the Ministry of Environment
[21 gave estimates (Table 4.1) for the total amounts of chemical wastes
disposed of in the Netherlands in 1983. Before this survey the unknown
volumes of waste disposed of privately on-site by generators had been the
source of large discrepancies between estimates of waste generation arising
and what was notified for regulated disposal. The main feature of the
Dutch system has been the severe shortage of any significant treatment and
disposal (T&D) infrastructure, despite early legislative action and relatively
precise and rigorous formal regulations. The basis of the Chemical Waste
Act's implementing regulations is the Ministry of Environment's Substances
and Processes Decree (1981). In this, a list is given of 41 compound waste
categories (e.g., "metal carbonyls") and nine composite industrial process
categories (e.g., "production of caustic soda"). The compounds are ranked
in classes A to D, each one given a precise concentration threshold which, if
exceeded in a waste, automatically legally defines it as a chemical, i.e., regu-
lated, waste. The thresholds are (mg/kg or parts per million): Class A, 50;
Class B, 5000; Class C, 20000; and Class D, 50000.
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Table 4.1 Reported chemical waste disposals in the Netherlands, 1983.
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II
III
IV
Disposed of on-site by generator
(exempt from Chemical Waste Act)
Notified and disposed of under
Chemical Waste Act
Disposed of otherwise by known
methods (e.g., export)
Unknown disposal (rough estimates:
20% dumping, 10% recycling, 70%
water discharge
530000 tonnes
251 400 tonnes
130000 tonnes
100000 tonnes
Various norms about weighting for specified toxic elements in com-
pounds or mixtures are given to elaborate these rigid decision rules still
furt.her. For all their precision and inflexibility, however, and their sharp
consequences, these norms are rather arbitrary, being related to attempts to
ident.ify "natural background" levels of the chemicals listed. They have the
compensating advantage in an administratively fragmented system of at
least being clear-cut - everyone knows where they stand (assuming, that is,
that sampling and analysis are clear-cut, which they are not).
The norms have draconian consequences in principle. The slightest
excess over a threshold and a waste cannot legally be landfilled in the Neth-
erlands; it must be notified and subject to "controlled" T&D, or "disposed
of' on site. In practice, given the dearth of actual domestic facilities, con-
trolled T&D has often meant export (though a more recent requirement. is
that export will only be permitted to facilities which meet Dutch domestic
T&D standards).
The various methods of disposal of notified wastes are given in Table
4.2. They show a large dependence upon foreign "facilities". If we include
sea disposal, foreign disposal accounts for more than 60% of official Dutch
hazardous waste management. This large and vulnerable dependence upon
foreign receipt of wastes (and risks) should eventually be reduced by the
enactment of a policy announced in March 1985, to have a joint
government-industry investment in a secure, fully engineered containment
landfill and in new high-temperature incinerators. The government will
provide 100 million guilders. Investment in such an industrial infrastruc-
ture had previously been stalled for a decade, despite the recommendations
of two government commissions, legislation to control wastes, private indus-
try initiative, and various scandals highlighting the damaging lack of
proper, legal T&D facilities. Government expectations that private indus-
try would engage in commercially profitable T&D once controlled wastes
were legislated into being have proved false. The earlier emergence of the
issue onto the legislative agenda partly helps to explain this state of affairs.
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Table 4.2. Reported disposal methods for notified wastes
in the Netherlands, 1982-1983.
Treatment (% of total)
Total
Method (x 103 tonnes) National Foreign
Overall 252 40 60
Distillation 10 27 73
Physical-chemical 28 45 55
treatment
Dehydration 24 96 4
Incineration (land) 98 69 31
Incineration (sea) 18 81 19
Sea disposal 5 100 0
Dumping 68 18 82
Other 3 52 48
4.3. Hazardous Wastes - The Process of Issue Formation
As we have already noted, the informal issue agendas of different groups
vary in policy, and the "official" agenda of policy issues, as measured, e.g.,
by legislative attention, is a complex, not very stable function of these
inter~ctions and conflicts. Not only is there interaction between competing
problem definitions of the "same" problem, but parallel problems intersect
and boundary definitions are also open to change.
Hazardous wastes became a public policy issue in the Netherlands
before being a matter of widespread or urgent public concern. The latter
has only arisen in the 1980s following the discovery of previous toxic waste
dumps in residential areas such as Lekkerkerk, Gouderak, and Dordrecht.
Whereas in other countries the issue has developed from municipal waste
disposal, in the Netherlands its origins also lay in a long-standing national
preoccupation with soil pollution. Legislation to regulate dangerous sub-
stances, such as explosives, has existed since the late nineteenth century.
Other environmental risks have been regulated (in theory) under the Nui-
sance Act of 1875 (revised in 1952) [31. Recognizing the hazards presented
specifically by chemicals, the Dangerous Substances Act was passed in 1963
[41, which, in accordance with a recent EC directive, will be replaced by the
Toxic Substances Act and the Transport of Dangerous Substances Act [5].
A general national law to prevent soil pollution does not yet exist, although
a fragmented array of rules govern the use of soil and waste management on
the national, provincial, and local levels. As early as 1904 the Inspector of
Health reported several hundred cases of air, surface water, drinking water,
and soil pollution; however, it was not until the 1970s that national regula-
tion in these areas was established. Local provincial authorities could, and
did, make their own statutory orders for environmental protection (VIC As),
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but without coordination with national criteria an effective, preventive pol-
icy on air, water, and soil pollution did not result.
This fragmentation of policy prompted a comprehensive national bill
on soil pollution in 1971, which even today has still not passed Parliament.
The speed of developments over hazardous waste overtook the original
approach toward legislation on soil pollution. The complexities of the bill
would have stalled any action with lengthy parliamentary debates, so the
Government abandoned its plans for comprehensive soil pollution legislation
and, instead, introduced four separate bills: The Ground Water Act [61, the
Waste Act [7], the Chemical Waste Act [8], and the Soil Protection Act [9].
The latter two Acts, which govern chemical wastes and soil pollution, are
the most relevant for our purposes.
Before turning to a discussion of the Chemical Waste Act, which was
passed in 1976, it should be mentioned that once again a general law on soil
protection was thwarted by events. The new Soil Protection Bill, intro-
duced into Parliament in 1980, was already facing an uphill battle when the
first major soil pollution scandal shook the Netherlands. A new housing
development at Lekkerkerk was found to be built on seriously contaminated
soil. Excavating under 270 houses, at a cost to the Government of 170 mil-
lion guilders, became front-page international news. The magnitude of the
national soil contamination problem became apparent following Lekkerkerk,
when an urgent, rough inventory of suspected sites listed more than 4000,
including even more serious cases than Lekkerkerk. The public anxiety and
incredible expense of cleaning up these sites motivated political pressure
groups and Parliament to force the Government to abandon the Soil Protec-
tion Bill and introduce the emergency Soil Clean-Up (Interim) Measures
[10], preceding the Soil Clean-Up Act [11].
Although the two most important national laws governing chemical
waste are thus now the Chemical Waste Act (1976) and the Soil Clean-Up
Act (1983), an understanding of this legislation alone would not encompass
the complex system of rules and laws at the national, provincial, and local
levels that govern waste management generally, and chemical waste
management in particular. The Nuisance Act still governs certain activities
and the Chemical Waste Act does not include substances regulated by the
long-standing Dangerous Substances Act, the Nuclear Power Act [12], and
the Animal Waste and Pesticides Act [13]. Most provinces have separate
rules governing soil and groundwater pollution, and many municipalities
experiment with separate collection systems for specialized, and sometimes
hazardous, wastes. There is, therefore, much scope for local variation in the
stand';rds of formal regulation (let alone enforcement).
The inventory of 4000 contaminated sites (later increased to 5000) fol-
lowing the 1980 Lekkerkerk events showed the need for a legal and financial
framework to effect remedial action. The existing Soil Protection Bill (sub-
mitted in 1980) was inadequate for the emergency since it would take
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several years to pass Parliament and, anyway, hardly dealt with remedial
actions. The Soil Clean-Up Act was therefore drafted and submitted in
May 1982, passed in December 1982, and mostly enacted in January 1983.
In anticipation of the Act, remedial measures were begun urgently in 1981
based on the systematic approach laid down in the bill. In 1981, 60 million
guilders (roughly 15 million US dollars) wpre allocated for these measures,
rising to 195 million in 1982. Under this so-called interim policy, the pro-
vinces drew up one-year programs for 1981 and 1982 and received financial
support for projects, including orientation surveys, methodological investi-
gations, clean-up operations, and inspection. To apply for central funds it
was necessary to undertake extensive investigations into the nature and
scale of the contamination and to ascertain the best clean-up methods.
Implementation of the emergency interim measures revealed a number
of problems only some of which were solved by the full introduction of the
Soil Clean-Up Act. Intractable issues included refusal on the part of the
owner of the contaminated site to cooperate voluntarily in clean-up opera-
tions; finding temporary storage space for contaminated soil; adapting to
new and uncertain clean-up techniques; and finding criteria to establish
when "cleaned up" soil could be considered adequately clean. These imple-
mentation difficulties - related to technical uncertainties about "acceptable
risk" - caused serious delays in spending the allocated amounts of money.
The delays were exacerbated by institutional fragmentation between central
and local government.
The Soil Clean-Up Act provided a framework for dealing in the short
term with those cases of soil contamination where the soil pollution or
potential pollution posed a serious threat to health or the environment. The
Act was supposed to operate for five years, at which time it was assumed
that the Soil Protection Act would be approved by Parliament, and the Soil
Clean-Up Act would then be integrated into it. The Soil Protection Act
would include preventive measures, and would regulate all necessary clean-
up operations. It is indicative of unforeseen uncertainties that it is now
planned to extend the so-called "interim" Soil Clean-Up Act to 1996.
The shaping of the hazardous waste issue as a policy problem cannot
be understood without looking at institutional interactions at the time.
Probably the first awareness of a problem of some kind developed amongst
the very few existing provincial environmental inspectors and the municipal
health authorities, who became concerned about municipal waste disposal,
especially domestic landfill siting and safety. Fearing that chemical wastes
were being dumped with domestic garbage, and in the absence of central
government interest, some provinces in the early 1970s introduced local
regulations, embodying a rudimentary waste notification and site-licensing
system. These so-called VICAs were eventually elaborated and incor-
porated in the 1979 regulations enacting the Chemical Waste Act. How-
ever, these are now issued by the Ministry of the Environment.
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Central government interest coincided with the creation of the new
Ministry of Public Health and Environmental Protection in 1971. However,
central-local fragmentation was exacerbated by ensuing processes, because
the new ministry, in its need to create standing for itself in existing central
government interactions, felt the need to take and control new initiatives.
One of its first measures was to begin formulating the Chemical Waste Act,
but, obsessed by its own standing in the adversarial context of central
government, it did so with little consultation with local authorities. The
ensuing lack of collaboration in shaping the Act may have contributed to
later fragmentation between central and local government agencies over
Induval and UNISER (see below) attempts to site T&D facilities, and other
implementation problems.
The present system of legislation is, therefore, a mixture of frame-
works, at times overlapping and competing, and with somewhat arbitrary
boundaries defined as much by surprise events, evolving institutional rela-
tionships, and urgent reactions, as by any more consistent strategic princi-
ples. In addition, legislation in some "dispersive" areas (e.g., water and air
purification) simply created more and more toxic filter sludges, etc., throw-
ing the burden onto concentrated hazardous wastes instead. At the same
time as the original provisional Chemical Waste Bill of 1973 was being
reviewed, industry's options were being reduced by tightened controls on
sea and land dumping. At this time (indicating the great uncertainties) the
prevailing official estimates of the scale of the annua.l chemical waste dispos-
al problem were about 2 million tonnes (mt). Only a few years later this
estimate was reduced to 1 mt.
4.3.1. Local~centralrelations: the Induval plan
Unlike the branches of government, Dutch industry organized itself into a
very coherent lobby on the chemical waste issue, and had its interests
strongly represented by the Ministry of Economic Affairs. This resulted, for
example, in forceful arguments demonstrating the extreme costs of tight
regulation in this area and that industrial generators as commercial traders
should be allowed to define what was waste. Seeing that legislation was
inevitable, industry decided that the key need to comply happily with the
emerging framework was a national, controlled dumping site. To achieve
this aim, a number of large private chemical firms, such as Akzo, Unilever,
and Dow created the coalition Induval foundation in 1973.
The initial plan contained a technical description of a controlled
landfill and, by 1976, confidential investigation of four potential sites in the
province of North Brabant had been conducted. The Ministries of
Economic Affairs and Environment gave the go-ahead for the plan to be
submitted to the local councils. At the same time, the plan's existence was
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leaked (by a government agency antagonistic toward cheap landfill disposal)
to the national environmentalist group, Foundation Nature and Environ-
ment, which also strenuously opposed the idea of landfilling toxic wastes.
They believed it would provide a cheap and convenient diversion from pres-
sure that should be exerted on industry to seek cleaner production methods
and better processing technologies.
The sudden exposure of the secret plan generated so much hostility in
North Brabant that the local councils would no longer entertain Induval,
despite pressure from the national government that the plan complied with
the existing Chemical Waste Bill. Further tightening of the plan was con-
ducted by Induval and the government, and in August 1977 a second ver-
sion was presented with the express support of central government, but
with no site named. By the spring of 1978, the provinces that had been
approached - Overijssel, Gelderland, North Brabant, and Limburg - had all
flatly rejected it. Their official reasons were: concern about leakage; that
the actual wastes to be dumped were not specified accurately; and that it
had not been shown whether such wastes could be processed by other, more
acceptable means. By now the councils were also strongly influenced by
local public hostility.
Following this emphatic provincial rebuff, Induval was abandoned. It
is interesting to note that, at the time when local authorities began
attempts to regulate via the VICA system, and even when the new Ministry
of Health and Environmental Protection began to formulate a national
Chemical Waste Act, the issue was not one of widespread public concern,
and no environmentalist groups had taken it up. In this sense, the Induval
plan's exposure and demise was a watershed. The whole problem of
hazardous wastes was thereby broadened from a "management" problem
under a relatively unified (though artificially restricted) set of values and
interests, into one involving competing groups and conflicting problem per-
ceptions and objectives, with the very authority of government thrown into
question on this issue.
Amidst inter-Ministry recriminations over the failure of Induval, the
Minister of Health and Environmental Protection set up the Hofman Com-
mission [141 to review and establish policy on the storage and disposal of
nonprocessable chemical wastes. The commission was composed of
representatives of industry, and central and regional government, but not of
the environmentalist movement until a second phase, when the proposals
for permanent storage sites made in the first phase were being developed
into detailed designs. Predictably enough, Foundation Nature and Environ-
ment rejected these designs in a minority report, because they involved non-
retrievable disposal.
The lack of controlled domestic landfill facilities was a major
bottleneck to chemical waste disposal, but it was exacerbated by problems
elsewhere in the system. The only significant commercial waste incinerator
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(AVR) nearly closed down in 1980 and had to be rescued by subsidies.
Furthermore, the national-scale waste processing company, UNISER, was
involved in a massive scandal, successfully prosecuted, and closed in 1981;
this further undermined attempts to establish an industrial T &D infrastruc-
ture and to implement the 1979 Chemical Waste Act regulations.
The deepening paralysis was amplified by the decreasing willingness of
local authorities to apply under the Chemical Waste Act for government
dispensation for waste dumping, which they had previously condoned. Yet
another commission was set up, the Kolfschoten Commission [151, with a
more comprehensive brief than that of Hofman, to examine the best form of
organization of a national waste disposal system with several integrated
functions, not merely landfiIIing.
In retrospect, the Kolfschoten Commission can be seen to have marked
a change in government thinking about the regulation problem. Up to
about 1981 it had believed steadfastly that the problem was to create a
"market" of wastes for: controlled disposal, allowing free enterprise to see
the opportunities for profit in private investment in T &D facilities. By the
time Kolfschoten reported in April 1982, it was clear that the private route
was failing and that government stimulation of joint investment, via a large
leading stake in new T&D facilities, was on the agenda. Not only did such
government capital investment encourage industry to participate, but also,
if written off as proposed, it meant cheaper (and possibly internationally
competitive) prices for T&D to waste generators. This last factor is impor-
tant as a means of competing with the export of waste to countries with
legal and cheap landfill, such as the UK. In fact, Foundation Nature and
Environment and the government specialist Institute for Waste Research
(IVA) separately proposed something akin to the "Bavarian solution" (see
Chapter 6) for this problem of drainage of T&D business into cheap exports
and away from domestic facilities. This would have involved introducing a
legal obligation on waste generators to supply their wastes to the domestic
facilities. Although this institutional mechanism has worked in Denmark,
Bavaria, and Hessen, it has become problematic in the EC context due to
the EC's commitment to free trade. In the Netherlands the industry lobby
was far too strong for it to become a realistic policy option and, indeed, the
government body whose scientists proposed it was vigorously taken to task
by other, pro-industrial, branches of government for allegedly overstepping
its allocated role.
The UNISER scandal was important as a further nail in the coffin of
the original policy strategy of depending upon free enterprise to create a
controlled T &D infrastructure. It also indicates dimensions of Dutch
central-local authority relationships that are of more general interest. A
brief account of that episode, and a parallel one involving the Booy Clean
firm in Rotterdam harbor, is therefore in order.
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The waste treatment firm Exploitatie Maatschappij Krimpen Ltd (EMK)
operated from 1970 to 1980, when it was taken over by UNISER, the big-
gest waste treatment firm in the Netherlands.
In 1981 it was disclosed that UNISER was operating illegally: wastes
supposedly for treatment were being discharged or dumped illegally
throughout the Netherlands, and hazardous wastes were being sold as oil
and, after mixing with coal, as solid fuel. This scandal eventually led to the
prosecution of the top management of UNISER, in the biggest environmen-
tal court case in Dutch history.
In 1970 EMK settled on the former site of the Chemical Industry
Uithoorn Ltd (CINDU) in Krimpen aan de Ijssel. CINDU had been pro-
cessing tar and tar products under a 1965 Nuisance Act license. EMK
described itself as a trading company for regenerating, reconditioning, and
processing oils and fats. When EMK took over the site and premises, the
CINDU Nuisance Act license was passed on and covered EMK activities
provided the original terms were complied with.
From the outset EMK provoked complaints about severe smell and,
after the Rijnmond Environmental Control Body, DCMR, had reported
negatively on the situation, the Court of Mayor and Aldermen of Krimpen
acted in August 1970. They requested that EMK apply for a new Nuisance
Act license for their entire organization since, according to the DCMR, the
old CINDU license did not cover all their activities. EMK repeatedly failed
to provide a complete application. It took a number of deadlines from the
municipality, as well as the threat of closure, before a complete application
was finally submitted in August 1971. During this year there were continu-
ing complaints. Despite the lack of a license for it, several shipments of the
toxic compound Resinformer were landed at the EMK site, and in
November 1970 a ship carrying about 530 tonnes of Resinformer sank at the
EMK jetty. The municipality repeatedly threatened to close down (part of)
EMK if the landings and related processing were not halted, but in Sep-
tember 1971 barrels of toxic chemicals, including Resinformer, were still
being stored at the site.
From the summer of 1971 onward, several individuals and institutions
reported to the Krimpen authorities on the deplorable situation at EMK
and their possible infringement of numerous regulations. In a (then
confidential) report from DCMR it was stated that:
A vast part of the site is covered with a tar-like substance. A nearby
ditch is filled with the same kind of substance. Since a pipe from one
of the tanks empties itself in the ditch one gets the impression that the
state of the ditch is not being improved.... One can state that here
practically every regulation is being violated [161.
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In spite of this devastating DCMR report, the Court of Mayor and
Aldermen took no action, though they did increase inspection of EMK in
close cooperation with the Control Body for Hazardous Substances and the
Central Report and Adjustment (Regulation) Office, Rijnmond.
In November 1971, EMK was installing a number of storage tanks,
although the municipality had forbidden their use without the necessary
building and Nuisance Act licenses. The Krimpen municipality, with the
help of the police, this time stopped EMK. In response an EMK director
confidently announced that he would ask other government agencies to
intervene. The same day officers from the Regional Environmental Inspec-
torate and the Rijnmond Authority contacted the municipality of Krimpen,
asking whether such extreme measures were really necessary. The Inspec-
torate emphasized the importance of industrial removal, discharge, and pro-
cessing of chemical waste and waste oils.
By this time (late 1971) the municipality had already been waiting
several months for an answer from the national Ministry of Health and
Environmental Protection to another problem, apparently created by the
Ministry's allocation of part of EMK's site for the storage of barrels of
hazardous waste awaiting ocean dumping. The lack of reply from the min-
istry, combined with pressure from the Inspectorate over EMK's tank
installation, caused the Krimpen municipality to feel they had been aban-
doned by higher authorities.
The conflict between central and regional government and the Krim-
pen local authority reflected the central government's overriding concern to
cultivate an industrial infrastructure for hazardous waste treatment. At
that time it was preparing the Chemical Waste Act, a crucial point of which
was to encourage and create such an industry. The already fragile attrac-
tion to private investments would be destroyed by too much regulatory zeal.
The regional inspectorate was at that time concerned with the dumping of
container rubbish, which frequently contained industrial and chemical
waste, around Krimpen; however unsatisfactory, EMK at least seemed to
offer a reduction in the openly illegal dumping of chemical waste.
After the storage tanks incident municipal control activities were
intensified. Daily inspections were made of the EMK site, but they were
not very effective because, as became evident later, the official in charge was
unaware of the Nuisance Act license conditions. Nevertheless, substances
stored on the EMK site were regularly sampled and analyzed.
At that time the engineering consultants, DHV, the municipality's
adviser in the slow crawl toward a new Nuisance Act license, concluded that
the EMK application still did not meet the requirements. The municipality
decided not to grant a new license and instead sought an opportunity to
shut down EMK. That opportunity occurred when analyses showed that
EMK were storing substances not covered by their Nuisance Act license. In
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May 1972 the municipality decided to order the immediate closure of EMK
on the basis of severe health risks.
EMK lodged an appeal with the Crown and instituted a lawsuit
against the municipality. This led to a settlement by agreement, suggested
·by the judge. The compromise was that the old Nuisance Act license from
1965 would remain valid with the addition of a number of new conditions
that limited the kind of substances allowed to be stored and processed. It
was also agreed that EMK would submit a new application for a license.
In subsequent years, the Papendrecht affair in early 1977 revealed that
EMK had buried a number of barrels containing arsenic compounds on a
dumping site in Papendrecht. For this the EMK director was prosecuted
and sentenced to a fine and suspended imprisonment, which caused him to
resign his membership of the national advisory committee on used oil, a
statutory advisory body to the Ministry of Health and Environmental Pro-
tection. The fact that he had retained membership of the committee until
that time can be seen as an indication of the importance attached by the
Ministry to private initiative in treating chemical waste, without noticeable
concern over the extensive local problems EMK had caused.
The granting of a new Nuisance Act license to EMK took a long time,
partly because again the application still needed amplification. After the
license was finally granted in August 1977 the Rijnmond Authority took
over all tasks and responsibilities concerning the Nuisance Act in order to
ensure better coordination of environmental protection at the regional level.
For EMK a large number of conditions in the new license were unac-
ceptable so they again lodged an appeal with the Crown. By the end of
1977 EMK announced the transfer of its activities to the town of Moerdijk,
so that the Rijnmond Authority agreed to a gradual renovation of EMK at
Krimpen. Then EMK started the old game of moving the renovation plan
deadlines, until they announced in early 1980 the closure of all activities in
Krimpen, since it had become evident to them that doing business within
the frame of the Nuisance Act was impossible. This had taken nearly ten
years of local "control", undermined by central government.
In the meantime EMK had caused continuing complaints about the
stench and numerous infringements of the Nuisance Act, all laid down in a
so-called "black file" (complaint book) by the environmental protection
agency of Rijnmond. When the final dismantling of the EMK site began, a
true catastrophe was revealed. The ground turned out to be very heavily
polluted to a great depth with oil, aromatic, and phenolic compounds.
Enormous amounts of chemical waste were also found on the site in tanks
and storage cellars, as well as in a moored boat. The first Dutch T&D facil-
ity turned out to be one of the worst pollution cases.
After leaving Krimpen, the illegal activities of EMK continued at
Moerdijk, where they had already established the RTM (Recycling Termi-
nal Moerdijk) in 1976 in a joint venture with Drisolco, a chemical trading
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and processing firm. EMK, RTM, and Drisolco were merged into one hold-
ing company, UNISER, at the end of 1977, which succeeded in suggesting
that they were the waste processing company in the Netherlands.
The waste flow from numerous (chemical) companies to UNISER
began to grow and in 1979 it received and processed some 100000 tonnes of
waste (probably over half the total "processed" in the Netherlands). In
commercial publications UNISER advertised a division of labor between its
companies: EMK took care of transport, Drisolco of storage, and RTM of
processing waste oils and chemical wastes. But the actual situation was so
different that the public prosecutor in the later court case against the
UNISER management called its conduct of business "a great fake show".
The fake was exposed, however, when a suspicious leak from a storage
tanker hired by Drisolco was discovered in early 1980, and judicial investi-
gations led eventually to the arrest of UNISER managers in August 1981.
The ensuing court case resulted in their imprisonment for periods of seven
months to 2.5 years.
In Krimpen, all attention was given to the enforcement of the Nui-
sance Act, rather than other available regulations, such as the Surface
Water Pollution Act [17] and the Provincial Regulations on Chemical
Wastes. The aim of the Nuisance Act is to prevent "danger, damage or nui-
sance by appliances" to their surroundings. Dating from 1875, this Act is
considered to be the oldest environmental law in the Netherlands, although
it was not primarily intended for the environment. It is administered
through licensing at the municipal level. Until 1979 the Nuisance Act con-
tained only one administrative sanction: closure of the firm, preceded by a
notice of proposed closure.
At first sight the Nuisance Act is a well prepared law providing for the
necessary protection of surroundings against industrial activities, but in
practice it is weak. Severe pollution could not be prevented in the Krimpen,
nor indeed elsewhere. This was initially due to a weak attitude of the local
authorities, but once the municipality did show a resolute attitude, it was
undermined by strong pressure from central government to relax its stance.
After the Rijnmond authorities took over responsibility from the
Krimpen municipality the Nuisance Act was enforced more rigorously. In
fact, pollution did not end until EMK itself decided to take refuge at Moer-
dijk. The Nuisance Act was not very effective in controlling EMK; its
enforcement needed central government support, which was lacking. One
may wonder why the Surface Water Pollution Act was not invoked, because
the damning DCMR report in 1970 gave reason enough to suspect EMK of
severely polluting surface waters. But because the Act was rather new and
the authorities had little experience in implementing it, it was too uncertain
as an institutional resource.
It is clear from the EMK/UNISER case that different levels and agen-
cies of government held fundamentally different perceptions of the main
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problem confronting them. This uncertainty and lack of coordination ren-
dered formally available regulations and sanctions moribund. The case of
Booy Clean underlines this picture.
The tanker cleaning firm Booy Clean operates in the Rotterdam har-
bor area, cleaning tanks and collecting cargo remnants and slobs (remnants
mixed with washing water) from ships and fixed land installations. From
1970, local newspapers reported complaints of residents and environmental-
ist groups about the smell and illegal discharges. In 1973 an environmental-
ist group began a lawsuit against Booy Clean, in which a former employee
declared that "poison, oil and chemicals were regularly discharged into the
Oude Maas." But the judge acquitted Booy Clean because "there was no
conclusive evidence that the declarations of the witnesses were based on
facts observed by themselves" 118]. At that time, Booy Clean did not have
a Nuisance Act license because it did not have to comply with the Nuisance
Order, being bound instead by the Harbor Regulations [19]. Nevertheless,
harbor inspectors had drawn up some 20 warrants against Booy Clean in
the period 1971-1973 for infringement of the regulations [20], and in a 1983
report prepared by local authorities in Rotterdam it is stated that the river
police alone issued no less than 60 warrants, among other things because of
infringements of the Chemical Waste Act and the Pollution Act. Thus, civil
servants in Rotterdam certainly knew of the pollution being caused by Booy
Clean.
After the Surface Water Pollution Act was enacted, Booy Clean was a
"fictive licensee" because it had discharged before the enforcement. Booy
Clean had submitted an application for a discharge license in November
1979, which was granted in September 1980 under several conditions that
restricted the substances to be discharged, plus a demand for a reconstruc-
tion plan involving a purification plant, within a year. The plan was sub-
mitted in March 1980 and deliberations with Rijkswaterstaat (the national
water authority responsible for enforcing Booy Clean's compliance with the
discharge license) were begun.
In August 1981 Rijkswaterstaat evaluated Booy Clean's observance of
its license and concluded that the situation was intolerable. They initiated
a coordinated action with the river police, harbor service, and the DCMR in
order to force Booy Clean to observe the discharge license and to effect the
reconstruction plan [21]. Booy Clean denied any of the infringements
claimed by Rijkswaterstaat. In autumn 1981 the waste water of Booy Clean
was frequently inspected and forbidden substances were again found in it.
At that time it also became clear that the sludge in Geul harbor, where
Booy Clean had operated since 1976, was very severely polluted with,
amongst other substances, chlorinated hydrocarbons, discharge of which
was forbidden.
By the end of 1981 a judicial inquiry was mounted into alleged
environmental offences committed by Booy Clean, such as infringements of
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the Chemical Waste Act. In March 1983, the director and manager of Booy
Clean were taken into temporary custody on suspicion of forgery and fraud.
In early 1984 Booy Clean's discharge license was finally withdrawn by the
Ministry, after several years of vain effort by local authorities to control the
firm via various formally available instruments. The Rijkswaterstaat laid
claim on the installations, buildings, and capital of Booy Clean to ensure
that the firm would contribute to the cost of cleaning up Geul harbor.
In summer 1984 these measures were revoked by the State Council
(the highest appeal court in the Netherlands) [22], according to whom there
was lack of evidence that Booy Clean had caused the pollution in the Geul
harbor. Shortly thereafter Booy Clean paid half a million guilders to escape
further lawsuits and announced that it would make a comeback as a waste
treatment firm in combination with other firms.
4.4. Chemical Waste - Problem Definitions and
Institutional Fragmentation
As in the EMK/UNISER case, local regulatory authorities in the Booy
Clean case (here, the DCMR again) found themselves unable to enforce the
environmental control legislation for which they were supposed to be the
statutory agent. In both cases legally adequate evidence proved extremely
difficult to mount - in the Booy Clean case, impossible - despite endless
reports, monitoring tests, etc., that indicated illegal discharges. Further-
more, the local regulators needed central government back-up in order to be
effective, and central government was mainly busy trying to undermine
them, because it had a fundamentally different view of the problem (the
exception was the Rijkswaterstaat in the Booy Clean case). In the Booy
Clean case, also, there was a specific and major local economic interest - the
economic viability of the Port of Rotterdam - in maintaining the company,
even if it was cutting corners. Thus, the Rotterdam Alderman van de Dun-
nen also reflected the view of central government when he observed that:
Our harbor is visited by 40 000 vessels every year, and they bring in
everything which God has forbidden. So there must be a firm to treat
that rubbish. If not, ships with waste will take it to the open sea and
discharge it anyway [23].
When Booy Clean was eventually prosecuted, even the public prosecu-
tor was very restrained, observing that with some adjustments the company
could fulfill an important function in the harbor.
The pragmatic restraint on the part of central government and other
actors was part of an overall assumption that the central problem was to
nurture the growth of a free-enterprise hazardous waste T&D industry.
Ironically, "regulation" was turning into a form of determined "protection",
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even when that new industry was repeatedly contravening regulations. This
general problem was outlined in Chapter 3. Furthermore, in the face of this
institutional conflict of perspective, technical evidence was ineffective no
matter how clear-cut and elaborate.
EMK/UNISER and Booy Clean were seen to be central to the creation
of a new industrial sector of waste treatment and disposal, without which
proper hazardous waste management would be impossible, no matter how
elegant a framework of standards and registration was theoretically in place.
The cases of these companies are also good examples of the administrative
fragmentation that severely undermined effective enforcement of existing
environmental legislation embodied in the Chemical Waste Act and other
laws. In these cases, where local perceptions first provoked local regulatory
reactions, it was mainly central government's divergent response that
paralyzed effective action. Whilst one set of actors (central government)
was urgently trying to nurture a whole new industrial sector into viable
economic existence - and an inherently brittle one at that - local govern-
ment and other parts of the center were trying to regulate this emergent
industry in conventional, pollution risk control terms.
In the above cases, existing firms were the center of these contradic-
tory forces. In the Induval case and in related attempts to establish new
facilities, it was central government that was (along with industry) trying to
take the initiative. Here, the fragmented structure of Dutch administration
was even more prominent, in two respects:
(1) The adversarial nature of much of central government itself meant
that interests within it who were hostile to landfill ensured that the
secret Induval plan was leaked and, predictably, torpedoed.
(2) Local government had sufficient autonomous power to be able to
refuse outright such facilities. With UNISER and Booy Clean, central
government paralyzed local government initiatives; with Induval, local
government paralyzed a central initiative. In other countries - the UK
for example - they would have less power to refuse, and more respon-
sibility for the provision of necessary facilities in their area in the first
place. In both dimensions together - exclusion from policy responsi-
bility, yet autonomous powers of refusal - the Dutch local authorities
are formally structured to play an essentially negative, adversarial and
interventionist role not wholly unlike that of a conventional "sectist"
environmentalist group. Indeed, this loose analogy is underscored by
the openness of Dutch local government (and, relative to other coun-
tries, central government) to public interest lobbying.
Overall it seems that the chemical waste issue was perceived to require
central management and control, yet this management foundered on the
fragmentary structure of government and its relative openness to plural
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external interests. There was little institutional "smoothing" of those
interests into effective compromises. As a result, and its formal elegance
and precision notwithstanding, the Chemical Waste Act was a weak one,
passed largely only to gain information in the hope of supporting stronger
legislation in the future. This observation is especially interesting in a com-
parative light because of the very similar formal structure of the Dutch
legislation to that of other countries. The real driving forces lie not in the
technical wording of formal programs, but in the informal infrastructures
and institutions that underlie their formulation and implementation.
4.5. The Soil Clean-Up Issue
The Chemical Waste Act was developed as a legislative program before
there was any widespread public concern. It was the exposure of the Indu-
val plan - then a private part of the legislative agenda - that sparked off
public attention and suspicion. Once in the public eye, it demanded - and
received - more urgent attention than the slowly developing, all-embracing
Soil Protection Bill, which was soon to be dismembered.
The Soil Clean-Up Act of 1983 was a very different matter. It cut
sharply across and into all existing frameworks - including the Chemical
Waste Act - and was hurriedly created in the crisis atmosphere following
the 1980 Lekkerkerk episode, which precipitated the discovery of a major
national problem of uncontrolled past dumps of toxic wastes, many of
which, like Lekkerkerk, were situated in residential areas. Yet, although in
its dramatic arrival as a policy problem it was very different from normal
chemical waste problems, in other respects some identical processes were
also at work:
(1) There was the establishment of a formal system of precise, technical
regulatory norms before the practical realities of implementation
(including even the existence of necessary techniques and storage or
disposal sites) had been fully considered.
(2) There were severe ambiguities buried in the apparent precision of the
technical norms. Technical uncertainties were brought into sharper
profile by the need for (inflexible) precision to compensate for extreme
institutional uncertainties in what was a dramatically new, unstruc-
tured, but urgent policy situation foisted onto an already fragmented
political culture.
(3) There were fundamental structural differences in the perceptions and
rationalities of different parts of government (though not perhaps so
sharp as for the Chemical Waste Act), which strongly affected the
technical interpretations and implementability of regulations.
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The unexpectedness of the wide extent of contamination in past toxic
waste dumps is indicated by the fact that neither the earlier Soil Protection
Bill nor the Chemical Waste Act mentioned this possibility [24]. Yet only a
few years later, a major part of the whole Dutch environment budget was
devoted to the problem. In 1983 this was 115 million guilders, rising to 200
million guilders in 1984. Even so, the estimated scale of the required reme-
dial action program is between the 1 to 2 billion guilders of government
figures, and the 17 billion guilders of other political parties and environmen-
talist groups. Costs based on real experience have turned out to be far
higher than these estimates, and the government figures include only the
most serious threats to public health. What was intended as a five-year
program has now been extended to 1996.
The Soil Clean-Up Act is devoted to remedial action to reduce the
health and environmental risks from past dumps. This normally means
cleaning up or removing the toxic soil and inhibiting migration of toxic
materials. The Act's main lever is to finance any party - normally local
government - required to undertake such action. There are several major
areas where institutional uncertainties created by a totally unexpected need
for interaction between different government levels and bodies, have
amplified technical uncertainties, which in turn have paralyzed those insti-
tutional processes still further. The technical uncertainties included
ignorance of the scale and distribution of the problem; unknown cost
effectiveness and availability of different technical options for decontaminat-
ing sites; ambiguity as to what actually constitutes a site that needs clean-
ing; and at what levels of residual contamination can a site be regarded as
being cleaned up?
We see again in this issue, as for the Chemical Waste Act, that rather
precise technical regulatory norms were elaborated, effectively as if to try to
fill an institutional void of fragmentation, unpredictability, and behavioral
uncertainties. But in the absence of social consensus and informal trust, the
technical ambiguities, e.g., as to what constitutes a "natural" background
level of contamination, were even more sharply exposed.
4.5.1. The emergence of the issue
In 1979, soil contamination was discovered in Wierden, but it was seen as
an incidental case and the minister did not become involved. In 1980, how-
ever, the whole country was shaken by the discovery of serious contamina-
tion at Lekkerkerk, which followed complaints of sickness from residents.
This incident became headline news and the government, expecting that
this was the worst of only a few isolated cases, decided to take immediate
and strong action. A special law was passed enabling the government to
buy all the affected property and 270 families were relocated in mobile
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homes in order to start clean-up activities. Not seeing its own commitments
as the precedent for a large number of cases, the government assumed full
responsibility and committed large sums to the sanitation effort. Lekkerk-
erk in the Netherlands, as did Love Canal in the USA, transformed the soil
contamination problem into a highly visible and controversial public issue.
As a follow-up to Lekkerkerk, environmentalist groups (such as
Poison-Free Netherlands) applied pressure on Minister Ginjaar to request
that provincial and municipal authorities submit a list of confirmed or
suspected contaminated sites. Within just three days the regional inspec-
torate of the province of South Holland located 141 suspected sites, and by
the end of 1980 this first national inventory contained more than 4000 sites.
Soil pollution gathered momentum as a public issue and a major political
item; it became daily front-page news.
By late 1980 there was convincing evidence that soil pollution in the
Netherlands was not restricted to a few incidental cases, but was a serious,
widespread problem that demanded a large-scale approach. Far from being
an isolated worst case, Lekkerkerk was beginning to look quite mild. With
little political debate, all the parties involved - municipalities, provinces,
the Inspectorate, national government, ministries, and environmentalist
groups, as well as the public - agreed upon the need for a special bill to
cover remedial actions as soon as possible and to implement an immediate
interim policy. However, there was far less agreement with respect to
actual procedures and the unprecedented nature of the problem bred
further mutual uncertainty amongst the institutions involved.
Since enactment of the Chemical Waste Act, the general economic
situation had declined dramatically by late 1980. The Ministry of Social
Affairs was confronted with increasing unemployment, the Ministry of
Economic Affairs with falling investment and economic growth, and the
Ministry of Finance with an increased budget deficit. Municipalities saw
national subventions as more difficult - but more valuable - to obtain for
local services and jobs. The huge expenses that would be incurred in reme-
dial actions would not be well received. The Ministries of Finance and of
Economic Affairs, as well as industrial interests, thus questioned the size
and the speed of a sanitation program. Scientific uncertainty with respect
to the number, size, and risks of contaminated sites, as well as with respect
to the development of cheaper sanitation techniques in the future, were
arguments for reducing the amount of money allocated to the sanitation
program from the 1 billion guilders announced by Minister Ginjaar.
Environmentalists, however, argued that more detailed surveys would cer-
tainly increase the number of sites as well as the average size of a site's
threat to health or the environment. This was largely borne out by later
experience, but at this stage the perceived scale and severity of the problem
oscillated wildly. For example, the Ministry of Health and Environmental
Protection had first designated 350 sites for action from the mushrooming
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lists of over 4000 candidates discovered during 1980. Although this number
soon grew to over 1000, the average costs of sanitation per site up to 1983
were, in fact, less than envisaged - about 1 million instead of 3 million
guilders. This was because the worst (and thus more expensive) cases were
ironically being delayed by further site investigation prior to action.
Indeed, the percentage of sites needing further investigation before action
(usually implying a worst case) turned out to be much higher than
expected. This was partly because the nature of these sites changed, from
actual dumps to sites of past industrial activity later re-used in ignorance of
the toxic wastes left behind, but it was also due to the inherent delay built
into the Act by the institutional processes that it required (see below).
Soil sanitation was a totally new activity for all the parties concerned.
The ministry, as well as the provinces, had to reorganize in order to carry it
out and the activities to be undertaken were also new. The proposed regu-
latory system was unusual in that it was rather centralized, and did not
allow for public scrutiny. Neither, as became evident later, was it based on
knowledge of the size and type of contamination, or on the possibilities,
techniques, and total costs of future remedial actions. The first draft of the
bill resulted in opposition from nearly all the parties involved. Under pres-
sure from environmentalist groups, parliament decided to include a pro-
cedure for public scru tiny, despite objections of the ministry that this would
extend procedures. Environmentalists also advocated that the program be
financed by those responsible for the production of the wastes, Le., mainly
industrial firms. Municipalities disputed the financial provisions of the Soil
Clean-Up Act, which were part of a broader context of contradictory organ-
izational rationalities.
4.5.2. Divergent rationalities
The municipal contribution to the costs of cleaning up a designated site
consisted of a basic amount, plus 10% of the remaining costs. The basic
amount depended on the population of the municipality - 10 guilders per
person, with a ceiling of 200000 guilders. The government pays the rest,
with a (remote) theoretical possibility of recovering the money from the ori-
ginal polluters, if they could be identified and successfully prosecuted in the
courts.
Under this arrangement, municipalities were in a quandary. On the
one hand, they were pressed directly by resident and environmentalist
groups to find, report, and have sites cleaned up. On the other hand, they
could incur large (and open-ended) financial burdens by too zealously
reporting sites for government designation. This specific financial strain
was multiplied by the institutional structure of local government, as
explained below.
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The procedures envisaged that local authorities would identify con-
taminated sites, and then the provinces would rank them for their risk
characteristics, and thus for priority in the overstretched program budget.
This identification and ranking was to be performed, in theory, according to
precise technical criteria (see below). The ranking was then to be given, via
provincial governments, to central government, who would decide which
sites would actually be funded for remedial sanitation. In formal terms,
therefore, local government played a very subordinate role, and it was
effectively left to central (and, partly, provincial) government to determine
which sites would suffer disruption and what financial burdens local author-
ities would incur. In practice, there was some room for municipal authori-
ties to maneuver informally in reinterpreting the centrally imposed site
ranking criteria - and there was more reason for them to want to do so.
The specific financial relationship between central and local govern-
ment embodied in the soil clean-up program was complicated by the general
financial system. At any given time, a single municipal authority might be
receiving over 100 various subsidies from central government for various
local activities, such as building programs for schools, leisure facilities,
houses, hospitals, sewers, roads, etc. Many of these projects are site-specific
and would be suspended indefinitely if a nearby (or even, as happened, the
same) site were recognized to be contaminated and subjected to the major
physical disruption of a clean-up program. In this event, the facility, the
local jobs in its construction development or repair, and the local injection
of central finance, all disappeared. Most suspected sites were much less
clearly risky than Dordrecht, Gouderak, or Lekkerkerk (and even this was
later claimed to have been exaggerated), so that there was ample opportu-
nity as well as incentive for municipal authorities to avoid identifying sites
that, if designated for clean-up, might lose them substantial existing reve-
nues in addition to incurring their share of the (open-ended) clean-up costs.
The formal criteria that a local authority was supposed to use in iden-
tifying and ranking a site were, on the surface, quite precise and technical:
(1) The nature and degree of contamination (as measured by the concen-
trations of about 50 toxic chemicals and families of chemicals similar
to those on the Chemical Waste Act hazard list) is evaluated by a
"test framework" for distinct soil phases, solid and fluid, at three lev-
els, A, B, and C. Level A concentrations are supposed to reflect the
natural occurrence in soils, or the detection limit. Levels Band C
were apparently derived from level A by a multiplication factor based
mainly upon the scientific judgment of government experts concerned
with drafting the act. Level B acts as a threshold for priority site
investigation. Exceeding level C triggers immediate investigation of
the best remedial techniques and urgent execution of sanitation. Level
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A then acts as the criterion for determining whether sanitation has
been adequately performed.
The "test framework" is acknowledged to be somewhat tentative,
yet it is very precisely formulated. As such its role is evidently to
reduce the severe institutional uncertainties experienced between the
va~ious agencies and branches of government involved in the
identification of risky sites, financial allocations, technical clean-up
choices, and triggering the full gamut of ramifying social effects
created by such decisions.
(2) The local contamination situation is then assessed in terms of the pos-
sibilities for diffusion of the hazardous materials, in nearby water-
courses, soil types, aerosols, etc. Conventional environmental transfer
models could be developed and used to assess this dimension.
(3) The use and function of the affected soil is then evaluated, e.g., the
proximity or exposure of human populations in residential sites,
schools, and hospitals. Recreational areas (e.g., parks), water sup-
plies, and building sites should be given priority.
These criteria are quite elaborate, yet there are ambiguities even
before one considers the relation of the local authorities to other policy
actors. Leaving aside the scientific origins of the standards, the accuracy of
measurement of contamination levels (especially in bulk soil in heterogene-
ous sites) is notoriously very low, and the precise sampling of a site has a
crucial effect upon its measured level of contamination.
In practice it has been found that the scientific uncertainties concern-
ing the validity of the actual A, B, and C norms return to influence the
judgment as to how contaminated a site is. In other words, the administra-
tive aim has been to categorize in precise, inflexible numerical standards the
broader policy risk evaluation (acceptable risk) problem from the supposedly
more objective and confined local implementation problem of measurement
of contamination levels, allowing the latter to determine day-to-day deci-
sions on clean-up action or inaction. In practice, the measurement allows
evaluative stances to be embedded within it. This embodiment of institu-
tional interests in "objective" technical knowledge undermines the
attempted institutional division of control designed into the technical frame-
work of test criteria. This problem was also observed in the cases studied
by van Eijndhoven [251.
However, the most significant difficulty arose through the different
objective situations in which local and central government agencies found
themselves. Faced with a major crisis of public confidence, central govern-
ment had to create a regulatory framework that was centrally controlled,
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technically precise, uniform, and apparently coherent, with clear decision
rules and action thresholds. Inevitably, this implied reducing the scope of
local authority discretion.
To local authorities, on the other hand, the clean-up procedures and
formal site ranking criteria meant that if a suspected site were near, say, a
building site or a school development, it should be given priority. Yet the
real effect of this would be to lose the extra jobs, services, and central funds
for those activities. Thus, at the local level, the rationale was almost
directly opposite to that of the central government regulatory criteria, espe-
cially given that the health effects were often nebulous. The municipalities
had problems, pressures, and reference groups to consider that were not
recognized by central government, whose precise, formal technical frame-
work of norms were artificially stripped of any such social context. This
local divergence from central expectations was exacerbated by a further
requirement of the soils clean-up policy.
The Act required that provincial authorities clean up sites, yet the
techniques to do this were simply not available. Thus, the only action pos-
sible in many cases would be to excavate the polluted soil and store or
dump it somewhere else. Some soil was incinerated, but the large volumes
involved, the lack of facilities, and the mixed results made this a relatively
minor option. Thus, the very problem that beset the Chemical Waste Act -
safe landfill sites - returned to haunt municipalities and provinces in the
form of a proposed remedy for past, unsafe toxic dumps. These sites were
vigorously resisted nearly everywhere. In some cases, local residents alleged
that municipalities were dumping excavated soil that would have been
defined as hazardous under the Chemical Waste Act, and which would thus
be legally banned from landfill, on municipal refuse tips!
These difficulties for local authorities were made worse by the long
delays in the decision procedure, exacerbated by lengthy site investigations.
The passage of proposed sites up through provincial to central government
for review meant a concentration and bottleneck at central government
level, often leaving two or more years for local uncertainty and conflict to
proliferate at the expense of the local authorities' credibility. This unusual
degree of centralization was brought about by the need for a symbolic indi-
cation to a restive public of the seriousness of the national government's
response, but it was especially inappropriate for the large number of rela-
tively small cases that dominated the decisions numerically. Provinces
argued that they should be allowed to make their own decisions within cer-
tain central guidelines and advice, financed from a central budget levied
from industry. After a delay they partly succeeded, and now have their own
budget (centrally provided) of 10 million guilders for cleaning up smaller
cases.
108 Risk Management and Hazardous Waste
4.5.3. Risk management in and out of context
Overall, local authorities operated under pressures and interests that were
not just very different from those of central government, but were also
largely unrecognized by central government. Local government has had to
shape its responses in ad hoc fashion, so as to retain credibility with local
residents and other interests, to avoid unknown financial obligations, and,
as far as possible, to reduce central government control, decision delays, and
associated uncertainties. The cases given by van Eijndhoven et al. show the
very different pressures and rationalities at local level [26]. Despite the
tight technical framework, therefore, local authorities, who in this issue
were the targets of regulation, were forced to exercise a cross-cutting
rationality in accordance with these local realities; their interpretations of
the technical norms were thus very different from those the center may have
envisaged. As an overall result, the main practical thresholds that deter-
mine whether or not a particular soil pollution case will be taken up are:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Whether "techniques" exist (i.e., usually, publicly acceptable landfill
sites) for the site clean-up.
Whether substantial, indirect local finances and other activities are
not too badly undercut by the direct site disruption and decision time
involved.
Whether the site contamination is small enough not to threaten a
major, open-ended local expense, and small enough to avoid the need
for further research and the associated long delays and uncertainties.
In addition, of course, the environmental context as outlined in the
test framework is relevant (e.g., the proximity of housing), but even
here it is evident that those areas in which strong institutional
arrangements exist effectively impose the criteria of evaluation. Thus,
since the water authorities are very powerful and established across
the central-local divide, potential water contamination is often the
strongest trigger to action. This was the case with Lekkerkerk, where
in May 1980 the pollution of an emergency drinking water supply pre-
cipitated the regional public health inspector to recommend evacua-
tion; residence on the site and health complaints alone were
insufficient to force evacuation.
The local authorities exercised "risk management" , in the full sense, of
optimizing their position on a broad and shifting range of agendas cutting
through and incorporating the soil clean-up issue. The specific result of this
kind of contextual rationality overall was to list sites with a different profile
from that envisaged in central government's "optimal" risk management
and rationality (which reflected its own institutional context).
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To summarize the soil clean-up aspect of the Dutch hazardous waste issue,
therefore:
(1) The Dutch regulatory system was already fragmented institutionally
and under pressure from existing chemical waste problems.
(2) Into this milieu burst the sudden crisis of the discovery of numerous
past toxic dumps, of unknown risks, often in the heart of urban areas.
(3) The extreme institutional insecurity created by these two factors com-
bined, and the crisis of national government credibility, engendered an
elaborate, centrally controlled, and apparently technically precise deci-
sion framework. This was necessary to define the peripheral
behavioral roles and criteria in a highly uncertain context, and to
demonstrate symbolically that the problem was being taken very seri-
ously.
(4) Technical uncertainties in establishing risk decision norms to identify
and analyze situational risks have been made to appear even greater
by institutional uncertainties, which have created a need for compen-
sating (artificial and symbolic) technical "certainties
(5) Because of the widely different, often unrecognized, institutional reali-
ties of peripheral actors (local authorities), the technical test frame-
work was creatively reshaped in the local process of identifying the
sites that required remedial action.
(6) The overall result has been not only a very different framework of
actual risk management from that envisaged, but has also created
delays that have tended to multiply uncertainties, which in this con-
text produced further delays, tending toward a self-confirming spiral.
4.6. Conclusions
From the many wider issues generated by the empirical research of this
chapter, we emphasize those that coincide with the themes of other
chapters.
The first point to be underlined is just how historically accidental are
the frameworks of legislation, institutions, and technical approaches that
end up as the regulatory imprint upon a given issue, shaping interrelations
with overlapping issues, specific problem definitions, options, and instru-
ments. Thus, superbly rational approaches to localized implementation
decisions may be undermined because the definition of the original decision
problem itself may not have coalesced sufficient institutional interests to
carry implementation through the recurrence of underlying value conflicts.
Hazardous waste legislation must be seen in a broader context, especially
because it came after, and was thus shaped by, previous environmental con-
trol commitments. The general rise of environmental concern in the 1960s
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exposed the limitations of old, diffuse laws like the Nuisance Act, and also
enforced a greater national government role, extending to full crisis manage-
ment in the 1980s. A rational approach originally appeared to be to focus
control legislation according to environmental media - water, workplaces,
air, and soil - with their different properties. However, institutional reali-
ties, especially the existing levels of competence, interests,· and reference
groups of the various ministries, were the most powerful influences on the
basic shaping of the legislative and regulatory frameworks. Agriculture took
the Pesticides and Fertilizers Acts; Transport and Water Management the
Water Pollution Act; and Economic Affairs the Nuclear Energy Act. For
similar reasons the (concentrated) waste issue was split into two separate
Acts, leaving chemical waste bereft of any practical disposal implementation
infrastructure (which the other half of the Waste Act did have) reaching
into local government.
Arguably, hazardous wastes were treated separately because a new
ministry needed a specific crusade, and anyway Dutch political culture,
being more fragmented and openly adversarial, tends to be more "reactive"
than most of its European counterparts (see Chapter 12). Notice the stark
contrast with the UK, where hazardous waste is legislatively and institu-
tionally managed within the local government framework of domestic waste
disposal. Thus, the Chemical Waste Act's elegant, formal regulatory struc-
ture was divorced of any practical means of implementation - and, possibly,
also of its main avenue of legitimation.
This interpretation is strengthened by the later observations of
Environment Minister Ginjaar, who was responsible for the 1979 regula-
tions. He noted that he was faced with the dilemma of either waiting
indefinitely whilst the fragmented interests of government were negotiated
into some rough approach to coalition on the issue, or of doing something
immediately, as was being vociferously demanded. Since he was more or
less forced to do the latter, the regulations were precise, but also inevitably
weak and expressly provisional (though they have still not been revised).
The notification and licensing system was a compromise between the
industry's intransigent belief in the freedom to make its own decisions and
environmentalist demands that government should intervene to encourage
less waste-producing technologies. The substances and processes decree -
the hazardous waste classification system - for all its precision, was
scientifically arbitrary and limited in scope. The provinces and environmen-
talist groups saw the ensuing framework as a formalized restriction of the
authority of government on hazardous wastes.
Thus, a second point emphasized by the Dutch case is the relative
unimportance of refined technical risk assessment as a regulatory resource,
at least until certain more basic institutional requirements have been estab-
lished. The technical frameworks were elaborated as a surrogate for the
lacking sense of institutional order and predictability. It was not that prior
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technical uncertainty created institutional uncertainty, but that institutional
uncertainty created a need for a high degree of technical certainty.
The development in the Netherlands of an industrial waste T&D sec-
tor under a private market strategy was paralyzed by various fragmentary
properties of the government administrative structure (though it has to be
a-dmitted that free market strategies are also in trouble elsewhere - see
later), leaving a largely symbolic framework of precise regulatory standards
and definitions, which in practice could deal with only about 10% of the
total chemical wastes being generated.
A further aspect of the progression from issue emergence, to its formal
definition in legislation, to implementing regulations, to enforcement, is that
the underlying structure of conflicting interests and perceptions hardly
alters through the various phases, even though the principal actors and
terms evolve. Various political and other demands combine to generate a
need for legislation, and from this certain technical standards (in the Dutch
case, very precise and, on the face of it, inflexible ones) are defined. How-
ever, even at the "back-end" implementation stage of the policy cycle, the
political interests are able to pursue their conflicts right into the heart of
the technical domain. They can exploit intractable ambiguities in hazard
classification, and even in chemical sampling and analysis, to defend their
own interests and perceptions.
Even the technical domain is thus to be seen as yet another arena
where divergent economic, administrative, and policy concerns are pursued,
albeit within the confines of. technical language. This way of perceiving a
symbiotic relationship between institutional contexts and technical
knowledge is of importance throughout this book. In this chapter the rela-
tionship is developed by the argument that a culture of adversarial competi-
tion and fragmentation dominates government institutions in the Nether-
lands ~ the so-called "pillared" political culture - and, as a result, under-
standings and approaches to issues cannot be left implicit, informal, and
flexible to further negotiation or discretion. Parties need to have more
explicit, formal, "legalistic" statements of norms and mutual responsibilities
in order to reduce institutional uncertainties if possible. Precise scientific
statements appear to give such guarantees. This atmosphere naturally per-
vades regulatory relationships with industry and other organizations and is
especially acute in new issues such as the soil clean-up program - and
where, as a result, no stable relationships and patterns of expected behavior
between parties have emerged. Technical "certainty" is required in propor-
tion to the degree of institutional uncertainty. In this respect the contrast
with the UK is striking (see Chapter 7). There the same basic relationship
is demonstrated, but at the opposite end of the scale. Interinstitutional
confidence is manifested in a lack of concern for precise, technical norms
and a trust in the flexible use of discretionary judgment. Furthermore, in
the UK there was no felt need to symbolically isolate "hazardous" wastes as
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a supposedly clear population of nasty materials, and thus established insti-
tutional mechanisms for "ordinary" wastes down to local levels could be
used and developed.
In this chapter on the Netherlands, therefore, we have seen some
important elements of the general relationship between technical regulatory
instruments and their institutional settings. The form of such technical
instruments is, indeed, a coded statement of behavioral relationships
between key parties, blending both future-oriented, normative requirements
and a memory of past institutional experience.
In Chapter 5 we focus directly upon what is usually regarded as the
major regulatory instrument and a major problem in harmonizing regula-
tory approaches - hazard classification of wastes. By examining the
development of such classification schemes and their variations in several
countries, we will be in a better position to analyze the options and limita-
tions in international standardization, and the implications of this for
national systems themselves.
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CHAPTER 5
The Listing and Classifying
of Hazardous Wastes
Michael Dowling and Joanne Linnerooth
5.1. Introduction
Central to any regulatory program designed to manage the disposal of
hazardous wastes is the development of a system for defining and distin-
guishing hazardous wastes from the plethora of nonhazardous wastes. As
discussed in Chapter 3, a definitive discrimination between hazardous and
nonhazardous wastes at the point of waste production is strictly impossible,
because situational changes in waste life-cycles change their hazardousness.
Nevertheless, some kind of initial classification would seem to be a crucial
prerequisite of any attempt to control them into an acceptable life-cycle and
"grave". In fact, as we shall see, one of the reasons why no single univer-
sally true hazard classification scheme can be constructed is because
classification requires assumptions about what downstream freedoms are
allowed, and this legitimately varies with institutional setting.
A classification system involves both defining the concept of waste in
general and distinguishing the subset of wastes that is considered "hazard-
ous" and thus requires special control. This process would seem to be
straightforward, involving the appropriate scientific expertise to identify
which wastes are potentially harmful to health or the environment, and list-
ing and classifying them in some logical way. Economic efficiency arguments
would suggest that this process would include developing a "degree-of-
hazard" system, i.e., identifying those wastes that are most hazardous, less
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hazardous, etc., so that resources could be efficiently allocated to control the
most hazardous wastes more stringently.
In reality, this process has not been straightforward at all, for reasons
which have already been explained in previous chapters. In the variety of
industrialized countries that have attempted to deal with the problem,
attempts to define and classify hazardous wastes have been characterized by
(1) Multiplicity of technical options for classification of chemical wastes.
(2) Lack of information
(3) Scientific uncertainty.
(4) Differences in legal versus administrative or scientific definitions.
(5) Trade-offs between comprehensiveness, precision, and implementabil-
ity.
(6) Considerations of environmental protection and costs to industry.
(7) Problems in balancing between standardization and the need for flexi-
bility.
(8) Wide differences in the political cultures that affect responses to all of
these difficulties.
As a result, definition and classification schemes vary significantly
between countries and even between states or regions within countries.
They are designed to meet different administrative purposes and institu-
tional constraints. Indeed, even within a single regulatory system, different
classification schemes exist for different parts of the waste life-cycle, creat-
ing potential confusion and loopholes. Although strong pressure toward
international harmonization has resulted in the development of a cross-
referencing system for the purpose of eventually harmonizing national lists
to control cross-border shipments of hazardous wastes in OECD countries
[11, coordinating bodies have tried but failed to develop an internationally
accepted, practically usable list. An example of the curious results of multi-
ple classification schemes is the current version of the EC directive on the
transfrontier movement of toxic and dangerous wastes as operated in the
UK. The UK Special Wastes regulations to control hazardous waste ship-
ments from UK generators include waste solvents. The EC transfrontier
directive excludes them (a separate directive is planned for them eventually)
so that two loads of exactly the same waste, (say, of benzene or tri-
chloroethylene) could be traveling around and being traded in the UK, one
regulated the other not. In theory, both would still be controlled by yet
another, different but overlapping classification system which is supposed to
come into play in disposal site licensing. In reality, this site licensing
classification system fragments into many different ones according to the
way license conditions are written and used in daily practice.
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In 1981, the late Dr. Berndt Wolbeck, one of the FRG's leading
hazardous waste experts remarked:
During the past ten years, the political and regulatory discussion has
intensively focused on the question of what constitutes a hazardous
waste. Despite these efforts, an international consensus could not be
achieved on the issue. One of the primary reasons for this seems to me
that the question has often been posed without indicating clearly
enough the legal requirements which the definition and classification
were to satisfy [2].
A British hazardous waste expert has observed that, in addition to formal
legal requirements, hazardous waste classification schemes depend upon a
complex structure of regulatory and administrative purposes that may vary
significantly between countries [3]. We would go even further, to say that
elements of local political culture determine central features of hazard
classification systems and technical definitions.
Understanding how these variations arose and how explicit or implicit
criteria for listing and classifying wastes were chosen reveals much about
the general interaction between institutional constraints and science in
developing environmental control regulations. From this understanding,
two things of particular importance emerge.
First, there is a heavy reliance upon, and sometimes a wholesale
transfer from, existing regulatory "knowledge" in other areas of environ-
mental concern and in other countries. Second, defining and listing hazard-
ous wastes is inevitably a political process since choices of method and cri-
teria depend on local economic, administrative, and institutional needs, as
well as upon scientific and technical factors. This means that any attempts
to standardize definitions and lists of hazardous wastes must inter alia con-
front the same social, political, and legal interests that shaped the national
lists in the first place.
In this chapter, we examine these forces that shape the hazardous
waste classification systems in two key countries, the USA and the FRG .
These countries were two of the first to develop hazardous waste regulation
systems, both of which have served as models for other countries. For com-
parative insights, we also briefly describe the classification schemes of Aus-
tria, where the extent of government-industry cooperation make the pro-
cedure leading to a listing scheme somewhat unique, and the UK, where the
main listing and classification scheme itself is of comparative interest.
Finally, we discuss the general issues that emerge from our case studies,
showing the scientific and institutional uncertainties that surround
definitions and classification systems, and how the outcomes of an
apparently technical problem ultimately reflect social, political, and legal
factors.
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Before turning to our case studies that show the history of hazard
classification in specific countries, it is necessary to outline the various kinds
of systems that can be used to define hazardous waste. Essentially, it is pos-
sible to designate a waste as hazardous by describing its general characteris-
tics, such as flammability, toxicity, etc., or by noting the presence of desig-
nated hazardous constituents, or by simply determining what specific waste
types are hazardous and listing them [41.
5.2.1. Hazardous waste characteristics
According to what has become known as the "characteristics approach",
general hazardous waste properties, such as flammability, corrosivity, toxi-
city, etc., are identified and test procedures are specified to determine
whether a waste exhibits any of these characteristics. For example, with
regard to flammability a threshold flashpoint temperature is given, below
which a waste is considered hazardous. Notice that, in principle, if test
requirements were fulfilled at every stage, this approach may be sensitive to
situational changes in a waste's condition, which offers a more refined risk-
analytic framework. However, this could be too refined (e.g., a drummed
volatile waste may have zero vapor pressure, but who would assume the
drum is unbreachable?), and anyway implies a daunting frequency of
testing.
5.2.2. Hazardous constituents
The "hazardous constituents approach" identifies the presence of specific
toxic chemical constituents, possibly above a certain concentration, which
then define a waste as hazardous. Wastes must be tested for the presence of
such constituents. These constituents may also be listed (for example, the
UK list consists primarily of chemical constituents), but the listing may be
elaborated into individual compounds (e.g., "mercuric chloride, mercuric
nitrate", etc.) or in constituent families (e.g., "mercury, mercury-containing
compounds") .
5.2.3. Hazardous waste lists
The most common approach to waste classification is the listing of specific
(category) wastes identified as hazardous, for which no testing (except for
its presence) is required. If the waste is on the list, it is automatically
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legally regulated. Several types of waste list can be used, which is rather
imprecise, but has great advantages of simplicity.
(1)
(2)
(3)
Lists of generic hazardous wastes, Le., wastes arising in many different
industries or from many sources. Examples are "waste lubricating
oils" and "halogenated organic solvents" .
Lists of industry-specific wastes, such as pickling liquor from steel
manufacturing.
Lists of specific chemical products, which, if discarded, are to be con-
sidered hazardous, such as DDT or chlordane.
If the lists, whether of wastes or constituents, include the materials to
be controlled, it is an inclusive list - anything not listed is unregulated (but
see below). Another approach, which was adopted by the UK in its initial
hazardous waste regulations, is the exclusive list. An exclusive list describes
wastes that are not hazardous, and therefore not regulated. Note that an
exclusive list "fails safe" in the event of incompleteness. Another "fail-safe"
approach is to back up a waste" and/or constituents-inclusive list with a
requirement to test all un-listed wastes for defined characteristics. In the
cases that follow, we examine how classification schemes using different
combinations of these methods were developed and used in various coun-
tries. Notice also that even the same method can be used differently (in
terms of what it contains, whether it uses concentration limits, etc.), and
can be applied to different parts of the waste life-cycle. Different levels of
discretionary freedom to interpret rules are also allowed.
5.3. The USA
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976, reauthor-
ized to strengthen it in 1983, is the formal legislation for controlling hazard-
ous wastes in the USA. This legislation replaced the previous Solid Waste
Disposal Act of 1965 and placed more emphasis on "resource recovery" or
the recycling of waste components, such as glass, metal, aluminum, etc.
Subtitle C of RCRA focuses on the control of hazardous waste, which at the
time of its passage was viewed as the least significant section of the law.
Coming nearly two years before the widely publicized Love Canal episode,
government, industry, and environmentalist groups generally did not view
the problem of hazardous wastes as a separate and distinct issue from the
more general problem of handling and recycling solid industrial and munici-
pal waste. Therefore, the Act was passed virtually unopposed by industry
and unnoticed by environmentalist groups. Its passage, to a large extent,
resulted from the efforts of a few individual Congressmen who felt that a
law concerning solid wastes was the one unfinished piece of environmental
The Li$ting and Clauifying of Hazardow WO$te$ 119
protection legislation, after the passage of the Clean Air and Clean Water
Acts in the early 1970s. Ironically, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EP A) had little involvement in the preparation and passage of the RCRA
legislation, yet it was later charged with the task of developing and imple-
menting the elaborate regulatory system outlined in it [5].
Subtitle C of RCRA lays out a broad framework for the comprehen-
sive control of hazardous wastes with five major elements:
(1) A federal classification system.
(2) A trip-ticket control system.
(3) Federal standards for generators, transporters, and disposal facilities.
(4) A permitting program.
(5) The authorization of state programs as substitutes for the federal pro-
gram [6].
The details of the framework were developed within the EPA and promul-
gated as regulations on May 19, 1980. The 1983 reauthorization extended
the controls, especially under 1,3, and 4 above, and introduced greater pre-
cision, for example, by laying down concentration thresholds for permissible
landfilling of toxic wastes.
5.3.1. The US definition of hazardous waste
Material cannot be classified as "hazardous waste" unless it first qualifies as
a "waste" or, more specifically, as a "solid waste", defined in Section
1004(27) of RCRA as:
... any garbage, refuse sludge '" and other material including solid,
liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous material resulting from indus-
trial, commercial, mining and agricultural operations, and from com-
munity activities [71.
Interestingly, the US definition of solid waste includes liquid and gas-
eous wastes, but by solid the act means "packageable wastes" as opposed to
those discharged by dispersal into the air and water, which are regulated
under the Clean Air and Water Acts. Hazardous waste is defined in Section
1004(5) of RCRA as:
... a solid waste, or combinations of solid wastes, which because of its
quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious attributes
may:
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(a) cause, or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an
increase in serious irreversible or incapacitating illness, or
(b) pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the
environment when improperly treated, stored, transported or disposed
of, or otherwise managed [8].
Section 3001 of RCRA directed the EPA to develop criteria for identifying
the characteristics of hazardous waste and criteria for their listing. In
adopting these criteria, Section 3001 required the EPA to take account of
"toxicity, persistence and degradability in nature, potential for accumula-
tion in tissue, and other related factors such as flammability, corrosiveness,
and other hazardous characteristics." In response, the EPA specified a two-
tiered system: a waste generator determines whether a waste is hazardous
by checking if the waste appears on one of the EPA's published lists or, if
the waste is not listed, by testing the waste for four designated characteris-
tics of hazardousness. We discuss each of these tiers in turn.
5.3.2. The first tier: The hazardous waste lists
The EPA selected two sets of criteria for listing hazardous waste: criteria
for wastes that are acutely hazardous and criteria for other toxic wastes.
The criteria for listing acutely hazardous wastes were intended by the EPA
to meet Part A of the statutory definition, i.e., to identify wastes that may
"cause or significantly contribute to an increase in serious irreversible or
incapacitating illness." The EP A defined these wastes to be either:
(1) Fatal to humans in low doses.
(2) Have animal toxicities of oral LD50 (lethal dose for 50% of the animals
tested) of less than 50 mg/kg in rats, inhalation LD50 of less than
2000 mg/m3 in rats, or dermal LD50 of less than 200 mg/kg in rab-
bits.
These animal toxicities were equivalent to US Department of Transporta-
tion, Consumer Product Safety Commission, and National Academy of Sci-
ences definitions for poisonous or acutely toxic substances [9].
Other wastes that were not acutely toxic were to be listed if they were
carcinogenic, mutagenic, teratogenic, phytotoxic, or toxic to aquatic species.
Using these characteristics, the EPA identified over 380 chemical substances
that, if present in a waste, would make it hazardous, unless it could be
shown that the waste was not hazardous after consideration of 11 factors.
The factors included, for instance, the nature of the toxicity of the consti-
tuent, the concentration of the constituent in the waste, the quantity of
waste generated, and "such other factors as may be appropriate" [10]. As a
result, formally speaking at least (i.e., discounting the constricting effects of
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litigation, lobbying etc), the Administrator of the EP A had a large measure
of discretion in deciding whether a waste must be listed or not. Although
any of these 11 factors could be used to justify not listing a waste, the
actual process was described by the EPA as follows. If a waste contained
one of the 380 constituents identified as hazardous, it was then analyzed to
see if the ·constituent or constituents were present in significant concentra-
tions. If so, the waste was most likely listed, unless there was "a very strong
likelihood that the constituents were incapable of migrating even if improp-
erly managed" [11]. The burden of proof for delisting lies on the waste
producer.
The actual compilation of the hazardous waste list thus began with
the identification of toxic constituents. However, toxicity testing, especially
for carcinogens, is a complicated, costly procedure. Tests must be carried
out under carefully controlled laboratory conditions and at best produce
results that usually require judgment as to their significance. Fortunately
for the EP A, other environmental legislation had already required that
many toxic constituents be identified. The EPA relied almost exclusively on
these lists developed for other environmental regulations to compile its list
of 380 toxic constituents for RCRA. Specifically, it took approximately 300
entries from the list prepared for the Clean Water Program, six or so from
the Clean Air Program, approximately 20 from the EPA List of Toxic Sub-
stances, and approximately 20 from those identified by the EPA Cancer
Assessment Group [12].
Since data from the Clean Water Program were used so extensively, it
is interesting to note how this list was compiled. Its history can be traced
back to 1974 when environmentalist groups sued the EPA for not imple-
menting Section 307 of the Clean Water Act, which required the EPA to
identify and regulate specific toxic water contaminants. In reaching a
compromise with environmentalist groups, the EPA hastily compiled an ini-
tial list from reviews of the scientific literature. One source provided the
bulk of the information, a book entitled Water Quality Criteria, edited by
McKee and Wolf. It was first published in 1952 and has been repeatedly
revised up to its last edition in 1971. The book contains a survey of poten-
tial toxic contaminants of water with reference to the US and foreign litera-
ture, giving general information on the effects on aquatic life (not humans
or other mammals) [13].
With the help of these identified hazardous constituents, the EPA
developed its list of hazardous wastes. In this list, the EPA described wastes
in two ways. First, it listed a large number of wastes from standard
manufacturing or industrial processing operations known to contain toxic
constituents. Second, the EPA also listed hazardous commercial products
that became wastes when discarded. These lists were developed by examin-
ing some 200 studies of industrial wastes that had been compiled for other
pollution control at the EPA prior to the RCRA legislation. From these
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studies approximately 125 wastes were identified as hazardous [14]. How-
ever, the EPA estimated that there were over 10000 major industrial waste
processes, of which only 200 had been examined; therefore, the identified
wastes did not begin to encompass the full gamut of hazardous wastes.
Recognizing the severely limited scope of the hazardous waste lists, the
EPA decided to require generators to test their wastes if they were not
listed, a procedure that is unique to the US system. For this purpose, the
EPA developed testing procedures for four designated characteristics of
hazardousness (see below).
Industrial studies are continuing at the EPA and since the promulga-
tion of the 1980 regulations some 10-12 additional wastes had been
identified by 1985. According to one EPA staff member, however, the pro-
gram can never hope to cover the dynamic universe of wastes produced.
Indeed, some EP A staff members feel that the lists should be dispensed with
and that the regulations should rely exclusively on the characteristic
approach [15], which can be effected independently of knowledge about
what wastes are produced.
The EPA lists included all three types of inclusive list explained in
Section 5.2, i.e., generic lists of wastes arising in many industries, industry-
specific waste streams, and a list of chemical products to be considered
hazardous if discarded. Specifically, the lists comprise 13 hazardous wastes
resulting from nonspecific sources (generic wastes) including various spent
solvents, sludges, and similar material; 76 hazardous waste streams from
specific industrial sources, such as wastewater treatment of sludge from the
production of chrome yellow and orange pigments (K003); and more than
400 hazardous chemical products, such as acetaldehyde (P023). Such chem-
ical products become controllable wastes only if discarded. Of these pro-
ducts, 196 were listed as acutely hazardous and over 200 classified as simply
hazardous.
The acutely hazardous wastes are subject to much tighter controls
based on a quantity exclusion level, which was a singular and limited
attempt by the EPA to impose a degree-of-hazard system. Under the RCRA
regulations, a hazardous waste was to be regulated only if a generator pro-
duces more than 1000 kg of the waste per month. This was reduced to 100
kg in the 1983 reauthorization. However, those wastes listed as acutely
hazardous (Section 261.33e) must be regulated if more than 1 kg per month
is produced. By introducing this distinction the EPA recognized that some
wastes are more dangerous than others and should be subject to tighter con-
trol. The EP A also considered more detailed degree of hazard classification
systems including:
(l) Using a threshold quantity for hazardous constituents of a waste to
determine whether regulation is required, i.e., a concentration level for
particular constituents that must be exceeded before the waste is con-
sidered hazardous.
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(2) Developing degree-of-hazard categories for particular wastes based on
their characteristics.
The EPA rejected these and other suggestions for degree-of-hazard
systems, explaining that:
. " given current knowledge and information these assessments cannot
be made for most wastes with sufficient precision to determine the
specific quantities which represent a threshold for finding a waste
hazardous. The Agency must, therefore, consider all quantities of any
waste listed as hazardous [16].
This introduced something of an imbalance between listed wastes and
those incorporated as hazardous by characteristics test, since the central
"elutriate procedure" (EP) tests do embody a concentration threshold. (In
fact, the 1983 reauthorization did introduce threshold concentrations of con-
stituents to define wastes banned from landfill. This limited use of thresh-
olds borrowed the already established Californian values.)
The detailed justification for listing each waste in the regulations was
contained in background documents. The documents included:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
A summary of the administrator's basis for listing each waste.
A brief description of the specific industry.
A description of the manufacturing process.
An identification of waste composition, constituent concentration, and
annual quantity generated.
A discussion of the basis for listing each waste stream.
A summary of the diverse health effects of each of the constituents of
concern [17].
Despite this elaborate justification, the EPA admitted that decisions to list
a waste were often based on qualitative judgments, generally involving
expert assumptions rather than precise scientific knowledge or field
measurement [18].
The original waste list was subjected first to internal EP A review and
then, according to US administrative law, was published for public com-
ment in 1978. Although this procedure generated many comments from
industry, the content of the list was not substantially revised and only six or
seven wastes were removed as a result [19].
Finally, the regulations also provided a procedure by which any person
can petition the EPA to have a listed waste "delisted" . This challenge can
be based on:
(1) The contention that the EPA reached an erroneous conclusion in its
evaluation of the scientific grounds for listing.
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(2) The assertion that the waste of the petitioner differs from the material
on which the EPA focused in listing the waste as hazardous [20].
The first approach is significantly more difficult since it requires the
petitioner to present scientific evidence to rebut the conclusions reached by
the EPA [21].
5.3.3. The second tier: The characteristics approach
The EPA felt that its listing procedure would not cover the entire range of
hazardous wastes. To fill this gap, it required generators to test those
wastes that did not appear on the lists to determine whether they exhibited
certain hazardous characteristics. The USA is the only country to have
adopted this characteristics approach as a supplement to more administra-
tively straightforward lists of wastes, waste processes, etc. The draft regu-
lations originally proposed eight characteristics that required testing, but
these were reduced to four in the final regulations. They include:
(1) Ignitability - liquids with a flash point of less than 60°C and flamm-
able solids or semi-solids.
(2) Corrosivity - wastes that have a pH of 2 or less, or of 12.5 or more; or
wastes that corrode steel at a rate greater than 6.35 mm per year.
(3) Toxicity - wastes that cause acute or chronic adverse health effects in
persons exposed.
(4) Reactivity - wastes that react when compounds/solutions are mixed
or initially interact.
The toxicity characteristic was by far the most controversial, mainly
because the EPA encountered great difficulty in trying to develop testing
procedures to measure toxicity [22]. The EPA finally promulgated an Elutri-
ate Procedure Test that specified the laboratory steps to be followed in
analyzing representative samples of each waste for 14 contaminants listed in
the US National Drinking Water Standards. If these contaminants were
present in an aqueous leachate extracted from the waste at levels 100 times
or greater than the concentrations allowed in drinking water, then the waste
is considered hazardous. The factor of 100 is regarded as an "attenuation
coefficient" to take into account the fact that pure leachate from a landfill
will be attenuated and diluted in reality before it reaches groundwater, and
further diluted before it reaches water supplies. This factor was originally
only 10 (meaning a lO-times stricter criterion), until it was discovered that
nearly all sewage would qualify as hazardous waste on that basis. This test
and the "100 times" standard have been subjected to heavy criticism due to
the large scientific uncertainty involved [23].
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The regulatory system developed by the EPA to implement the RCRA
legislation represents, in the words of a former deputy administrator of the
EPA, "one of the most intricate and bewildering regulatory frameworks that
exist in any area of federal law" [24]. It is an attempt to devise a complete
control system and in developing its multilevel classification and listing
scheme, the EPA tried to cover the universe of hazardous wastes being pro-
duced throughout the USA. The system included all three types of
classification schemes mentioned earlier: waste lists, characteristics, and
constituents lists. There was no direct mention, however, of specific concen-
tration levels. Given its complexity, multiplicity, and attempted
comprehensiveness, this approach presented formidable implementation
challenges not only to federal authorities, but also to state authorities if
they chose to take over the management of hazardous wastes in their states.
The 1983 reauthorization is effectively recognition of the intrinsic infeasibil-
ity of such an ambitious technical control framework, after repeated failure
to meet Congressional deadlines and reportedly widespread lapses of imple-
mentation, even of regulations that had been established.
5.4. The FRG
The FRG, one of the first countries in Europe to deal with the hazardous
waste problem, was also one of the first to grapple with classifying and list-
ing hazardous wastes. The history of hazardous waste classification and list-
ing begins with the Waste Act of 1972, amended in 1976 and 1984 (for a
more detailed description see Chapter 6). The Federal Waste Act was
designed to deal with the disposal of all wastes. After its enactment a series
of scandals occurred concerning industrial hazardous wastes, and the
Lander responded by pressuring the federal government to change the Act
so that it would deal more specifically with industrial wastes. On June 21,
1976, the Act was amended with a revised definition of hazardous wastes
and the introduction of specific control measures, including rules for siting
treatment and disposal facilities; requirements for disposal facilities to
appoint plant waste supervisors; and a strengthening of penalties for viola-
tions [25].
5.4.1. Two definitions
In the FRG (as in the UK, though with different meaning) the term "special
waste" is used rather than "hazardous waste". In the amendments to the
Waste Act, two related but somewhat different definitions of special wastes
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were given. The first definition was a technical one defining certain wastes
from industrial sources that:
... because of their nature, composition, or quantity are especially
dangerous to health, air, or water quality, are explosive, flammable or
could promote infectious diseases, and therefore special requirements
for their control are necessary [26].
The second definition was a more administrative one, stating that certain
wastes:
... because of their nature and quantity should be excluded from dispo-
sal with household wastes [27].
Negotiations between the federal government and the Lander took place
prior to the passage of the 1976 amendments, during which the Lander
expressed concern that the term "hazardous" might cause unnecessary pub-
lic alarm. The term "special" did not include the wastes covered by the
second definition, which are really "excludable" wastes. In the end, both the
words "special" and "hazardous" were left out of the Act. The term "spe-
cial" is still used, but its meaning is somewhat ambiguous. In general, "spe-
cial wastes" are those referred to by the aforementioned first definition
found in Section 2, Paragraph 2 of the Waste Act [28]. However, the term
special is still used by some authorities to mean any waste (e.g., snow from
road clearing) excluded from qisposal with household wastes. This confusion
has yet to be cleared up, though efforts to do so are underway and are dis-
cussed below.
5.4.2. LAGA and the waste catalog
Following passage of the 1972 Waste Act requiring the Lander to develop
waste disposal plans [291, the state governments cooperated to develop a
nomenclature system for all wastes from which a list of special wastes
requiring more stringent controls could be derived [301. The forum for this
cooperation was an organization called the Landerarbeitsgemeinschaft Abfall
(LAGA, the State Working Group on Wastes). LAGA is an organization
of the various environmental ministries responsible for waste disposal from
the 11 Lander within the FRG and also includes representatives from the
federal government. It has no legislative or executive functions, but serves
mainly as an advisory body to the federal government, providing an oppor-
tunity for the Lander governments to meet and establish common positions
on issues regarding waste law and policy. LAGA meets twice a year in
plenary session, but often forms smaller working committees on particular
issues [31].
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In 1974, LAGA formed a working group for special wastes. The com-
mittee consisted of approximately 12 representatives from the Lander, the
Ministry of Interior, and the Federal Environment Agency (Umweltbun-
desamt, UBA). The committee was charged with making the concept of
"special waste" more concrete. It thus first organized categories of wastes
into a coherent and comprehensive system so that the subset of special
wastes could be more easily defined. As the chairman of the committee put
it, "The catalog was really a by-product of our main objective; however, it
has proven to be the more lasting contribution" [32].
The basis of the catalog was a comprehensive survey of waste produc-
ers in one of the Lander, Baden-Wiirttemburg, conducted from 1970-1973.
This survey collected detailed data on waste types, amounts, and disposal
practices. The LAGA committee took the typology developed in the survey
and refined it with the help of the Federal Statistics Agency. Wastes were
divided into five major groups divided into subgroups, and finally listed as
individual waste types identified with a five-digit number. The nomencla-
ture system was a mixture of chemical compounds and generic industrial
process descriptions. For example:
(1) Waste Number 55315: Methanol
(2) Waste Number 31103: Oven ash from metal processing
The five major categories were:
(1) Plant and animal waste.
(2) Mineral waste.
(3) Chemical waste from processed and synthetic products.
(4) Radioactive wastes.
(5) Municipal wastes.
Over 600 individual waste types were listed [33].
From this list of wastes, the LAGA group developed a smaller
inclusive list of "special wastes" which, in their opinion, required special
handling and disposal. This special waste list served as the basis for indivi-
dual Lander regulations. These efforts were soon overshadowed, however, by
a federal initiative to adopt a list of special wastes on the basis of the 1976
amendments to the Waste Act. The federal initiative related to the
development of proposals for an EC directive on hazardous wastes (the
eventual 1978 directive).
5.4.3. The federal regulations
In the 1976 amendments to the 1972 Waste Act, the definition of special
wastes (without calling them that) in Section 2, Paragraph 2, also author-
ized the federal government to issue regulations that listed wastes to be
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included in the trip-ticket control system. These regulations, listing some 86
waste types, were promulgated on May 24, 1977.
The preparatory work for these regulations began at the UBA in Ber-
lin, when the Minister of the Interior asked the UBA to develop a set of
draft regulations. The in-house experts at the UBA were forced from the
beginning to choose between two strategies. They could either develop an
inclusive waste list based on the LAGA catalog, or put together a list of
toxic constituents that, if present in a waste, would subject the waste to
regulation. They also considered fixing concentration levels for these
hazardous constituents in order for a waste to be controlled by the system.
In the end, however, they decided to adopt the system developed by LAGA.
There were a number of reasons for this: sampling and analysis are time-
consuming and expensive, and scientific analysis was not advanced enough
to make the testing of concentration levels very practical; it would be too
easy to circumvent the regulations by simply diluting or mixing wastes; the
Lander had already developed regulations based on the LAGA catalog and a
new system would have been very difficult to implement.
The UBA scientists chose wastes for their list based on the following
criteria:
(1) Source of the waste.
(2) Composition.
(3) Amounts produced.
(4) Disposal practices.
(5) Environmental dangers.
These criteria were not weighted in any quantified manner, but one of the
compilers of the list felt that emphasis was placed on the environmental
dangers of the substances in the wastes [34]. The UBA considered the lists
of other countries (the Netherlands, Denmark, and Canada) and the list
proposed for the promulgated EC directive on hazardous wastes. This pro-
cess led to a rather long list of wastes that was then shown to Lander
authorities and industrial associations for comment. The Lander protested
against the length of the list and felt that the federal regulations should only
include those wastes that were produced in all of the Lander [35].
Finally, a much smaller list was submitted by the UBA and adopted
by the Ministry of the Interior. This list as it emerged was not meant to be
a comprehensive description of the most problematic wastes that should be
controlled by all of the Lander [36]. There was no procedure given for
adding or subtracting wastes from this list, but Lander governments had the
authority to require trip-ticket regulation for other wastes and some did
increase the number of regulated wastes substantially (see the discussion of
Bavaria and Hessen below). The federal regulations contained no explicit
production quantity cut-offs, as did the US regulations for the wastes listed.
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More subtly, the FRG chose to embody quantity considerations in the listed
description of the source of the waste. Whereas the USA separated the
hazard definition from questions of quantity produced, the FRG combined
their judgments of the latter in their hazard definitions. This was done as
shown in Table 5.1. Column 1 of the list gives the generic name of the
waste, column 2 gives the chemical name and the waste number, and
column 3 lists the industrial source of the waste.
Table 5.1. Example of FRG hazard definitions.
Column 1
Halogen-containing
organic solvents
Column 2
Chlorobenzene 55202
Chloroform 55203
Column 3
From the chemical
industry I gas works,
pharmaceuticals
In listing the sources in column 3, the UBA listed only those industries or
production processes that they considered as producing significant quanti-
ties of the listed waste. So, a waste comes under the regulations if it is
listed in columns 1 and 2, and column 3, i.e., is produced by one of the
industries or as a result of one of the processes listed in column 3. The same
waste produced by an industry not given in column 3 is not covered by the
federal regulations [37].
In contrast with the EPA in the USA, the UBA relied only on the list-
ing method for classifying hazardous wastes and did not adopt the charac-
teristics approach for identifying hazardous wastes not covered by the lists.
The scientific analyses required for testing waste characteristics, it was felt,
were both difficult to standardize and would place unacceptable cost bur-
dens on industry. It is interesting that this attitude prevailed before formal
consultation with industry, suggesting that the regulators already had a
fairly well developed sense of industry's perspectives and practicalities.
Notice that the FRG method also requires institutional confidence that con-
sultation with Liinder and industry will identify all significant wastes and
sources.
5.4.4. Lander lists - Bavaria and Hessen
In addition to the 86 wastes that must be controlled under the federal regu-
lations, environmental Lander authorities are free to require consignment
notes and other controls for additional wastes. The two Lander that became
most actively involved in hazardous waste regulation were Bavaria and
Hessen. It is interesting to compare their waste lists with the federal one.
Bavaria had developed its own waste list before the federal regulation.
This list was also based on the LAGA catalog, but included quantity cut-
offs for four classes of waste. For each category, there was a minimum
amount that had to be produced in order to trigger regulation (Table 5.2).
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Table 5.2. Triggers for Bavaria's
initial waste categories
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Waste class
Class I
Class II
Class III
Class IV
Cut-off (tonnes/year)
1
10
100
1000
This was, in effect, a degree-of-hazard system with the wastes in class I
being the most hazardous, those in class II less so, etc. It was put together
by scientists within the Bavarian Ministry of Land Development and
Environment with some consultation with industry experts. Since Bavaria
had financed and constructed treatment and disposal facilities very early on
(see Chapter 6), it had gained a good idea of the amounts and nature of
wastes being produced in the Land. Its regulatory system had to be aban-
doned, however, when the federal regulations were adopted, since it did not
conform. Bavarian authorities expressed frustration at having developed a
control system too early and then having to change it at considerable
cost [38].
Bavaria finally promulgated new regulations with a hazardous waste
list that incorporated the federal one plus those wastes that it wanted to
regulate in addition. They printed the entire LAGA catalog in their regula-
tions and distinguished four types of wastes (Table 5.S). In addition to the
86 wastes covered by federal law, Bavaria added 153 wastes to its list for a
total of 239 wastes under its regulatory system [39].
Table 5.3. Bavaria's four waste types.
Marking
x
N
Bold print
No marking
Explanation
Wastes that should generally not, or only under
certain conditions, be disposed of with household
wastes, but do not require a trip-ticket
Wastes that require a trip-ticket and special disposal
Wastes that under federal regulations
require a trip-ticket and special disposal
Wastes that can be disposed of with household
wastes
Hessen also began to regulate hazardous wastes early, a result of some
highly publicized scandals in the early 1970s, which led to public pressure
for more active government control. The organization of the central Hessen
authority for hazardous waste disposal, HIM (see Chapter 6), and Land
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regulations resulted from this public concern. The waste list developed by
Hessen was also based on the LAGA catalog. Again, in-house scientists
advised the Environment Ministry in Hessen as to which wastes to regulate.
Hessen divided the wastes listed in the LAGA catalog into three categories,
based not on quantity cut-offs, but on the kind of disposal best suited to a
particular waste. The three categories are:
(1) Category 1: Wastes that generally can be disposed of with household
wastes.
(2) Category II: Industrial wastes that cannot be disposed of with house-
hold wastes and must be disposed of in special waste facilities, such as
secure landfills.
(3) Category III: Industrial wastes that are especially hazardous and
require special disposal techniques in special waste facilities, such as
incineration or deposition [40].
These categories, in effect, produced a degree of hazard classification system
based not on quantity cut-offs, as in the USA, but on guidelines on how to
dispose of particular wastes. Such a system reflects the degree of hazard if
one assumes that treatment categories are ranked according to risk. There
are exceptions; for example, heavy metal wastes might be disposed of more
safely in a secure landfill (category II) than by incineration (category III).
The Hessen classification system reflected the existence of HIM, which could
give direct effect to the distinctions in treatment and disposal (T&D)
methods designated.
In developing this system, the authorities in Hessen consulted with
industrial trade associations on the make-up of the list. At first, industry
resisted the proposed system and many joint meetings and conferences were
held by the State Environment Ministry. In the end, the authorities per-
suaded industrial representatives that the system would be simpler, reduc-
ing both analysis costs and the time required to process wastes [41].
The final Hessen list included 312 waste types in categories II and III,
including the 86 wastes in the federal regulations. Hessen, therefore, listed
over 70 more wastes to be regulated than did Bavaria. Ironically, these two
Lander, who had pushed for a short federal list, went on to develop consid-
erably longer lists on their own, and significantly different systems of
classification. These differences led to problems in tracking cross-border
shipments of hazardous wastes, and has led to pressure for the development
of a more comprehensive federal system [42].
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5.4.5. Proposed changes in the federal regulation.
The difficulties presented by the differing waste lists of the Lander, and
local public opposition to Lander facilities, have inspired efforts to develop a
more comprehensive, unified federal list for all of the states. The work is
being conducted by the LAGA, again by a smaller working group.
This group is currently revising the LAGA waste catalog with the
intent of publishing a "special waste" catalog, i.e., listing only those wastes
that should not be disposed of with household wastes. (This was also the
goal of the earlier LAGA working group.) This new catalog would categorize
special wastes by the preferred disposal method, similar to the Hessen
three-category system, but also reflecting some refinements made by Austria
(see below) in developing its hazardous waste regulations. The LAGA
hopes that this special waste catalog will be promulgated by federal govern-
ment as binding for all the Lander, greatly enlarging the current federal
waste list [43]. Since LAGA enjoys representation of all the Lander, and is
a consensual negotiating body, the acceptance of the enlarged list should be
uncomplicated once promulgated. Again, consultation with industry is
planned before a final list is developed. Industrial trade associations will not
participate directly in development of the list, but LAGA plans to discuss
all drafts of the list with industry. The LAGA working group also plans to
conduct discussions with some environmentalist groups in the FRG, who
are beginning to take an active interest in hazardous waste management.
The FRG's somewhat pioneering work on the listing of hazardous
wastes has served as a model for other countries in Europe. For example,
Hungary, in its hazardous waste legislation, adopted the catalog originally
published by LAG A and refined by Hessen. Austria, which is discussed
below, has also made extensive use of the FRG catalog in developing its
own hazardous waste regulations.
5.5. Austria
Austria began relatively late to develop a hazardous waste control system.
As in other industrialized countries, several well publicized scandals con-
cerning illegal dumping and poor management of wastes spurred regulatory
action. Austria passed its Special Waste Act to deal with the problem in
March 1983, and it went into effect in January 1984. In identifying the
universe of wastes to be controlled, the Austrian authorities took advantage
of their late start to observe the experiences of other countries. The pro-
cedures by which the authorities then developed their waste list are unique
in the extent of cooperation between industry and government, and the
merging of technical and social criteria.
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The task of developing a waste list in Austria was given to the Oster-
reichishes Normungsinstitut, the Austrian Standards Institute, a nongovern-
mental, technical standard-setting body that advises the government on a
variety of standards - from fire extinguishers to the size of trash cans. Its
work is conducted by a number of Fachnormenausschusse (FNA), Expert
Standard Committees. These committees are divided into smaller working
groups on particular subjects. The membership of the FNAs includes
representatives from federal, state, and local governments, scientific experts
from the academic community, and industrial representatives, usually from
industrial trade associations and trade unions. When the FN As divide into
working groups they also may invite experts from outside the FN A to assist
them [44].
The Standards Institute's FNA-157 for Waste Disposal was given
responsibility for developing a waste list by the federal Ministry for Health
and Environment. As a first step the FNA defined the term special wastes
for Austria:
Special wastes are solid or liquid wastes which because of their compo-
sition or quantity cannot be disposed of with municipal waste, ie.,
household garbage, without special preparation [45].
This was an administrative definition similar to that used in the FRG. On
the basis of this definition the FNA developed a special waste catalog that
was patterned after the FRG catalog and used the same five-digit number-
ing system. But it contained only special - not all - wastes, listing over 400
waste types. And rather than specifying the source of the listed waste, the
catalog specified the treatment methods best suited for disposal of each of
the wastes, in a similar manner to the system developed in Hessen. The
methods included:
(1) Municipal landfill.
(2) Special waste landfill.
(3) Municipal incinerator.
(4) Special waste incinerator.
(5) Composting.
For each waste the recommended treatment method was indicated by a
numbering system that indicated whether the method was:
(1) Suitable.
(2) Suitable under certain conditions.
(3) Not suitable.
This system effectively resulted in a degree-of-hazard classification sys-
tem. For example, waste number 55315, methanol, was listed as not
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suitable for a municipal landfill, conditionally suitable for a municipal
incinerator, and suitable for either a special waste landfill or special
incinerator [46].
The development of the catalog was relatively uncontroversial initially,
since it was then legally nonbinding, making only recommendations. Con-
troversy arose, however, when the Ministry of Environment asked the FNA
to develop from the catalog a list of hazardous special wastes, to be regu-
lated under the Austrian trip-ticket system required by its new legislation.
The ministry agreed to accept the list of the FNA with compromises with
the industries it involved. However, if the FNA failed to find a compromise
list, the ministry threatened that it would develop its own, perhaps stricter
list.
The anticipated perils in putting together a list of hazardous special
wastes prompted the special waste working group of FNA-157 to expand its
membership to a record 120. The majority of the members were industry
representatives from trade associations and firms, but also included federal,
state, and local government officials, and a few scientific experts from
universities.
Because of the unique interest in the issue, the FNA decided in this
case to accept any industry representative who requested participation (usu-
ally only selected representatives are chosen by the FNA). However, an
environmentalist group called Critical Chemistry was denied participation
on the stated grounds that "there were already enough chemists on the
committee" [47], which implied that they were not an interest group, only
supplementary neutral expertise. The FNA changed its rules again and
allowed the entire working group and the members of the FNA to vote on
the final list of wastes. The working group formed a smaller subgroup of 15
members to make an initial selection of wastes for the list, which began by
listing those wastes in the special waste catalog that were designated as
requiring the most stringent disposal methods. This subgroup also examined
the hazardous wastes lists of other countries, most notably the FRG and
Switzerland. Their draft list contained some 160 wastes, which was then
reduced in a negotiation process within the full working group.
The rules of the Standards Institute require that working groups reach
decisions unanimously. A potential deadlock in reaching consensus on the
list could have resulted by representatives from particular industries vetoing
inclusion of their wastes. But there was strong pressure to compromise,
since the Ministry of Health and Environment had threatened to produce its
own list if agreement was not reached. One representative claimed that
members were most often persuaded by health effects arguments made by
the scientific experts. In addition, the earlier nonbinding classification sys-
tem developed for the special waste catalog, which was put together with
the help of industry, gave clear guidelines for which wastes to include. It
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was very difficult for industry representatives, who had accepted that cata-
log, to argue for changes in its principles [48].
A compromise list of 148 "special wastes requiring supervision" was
agreed upon and published by the Standards Institute for public comment.
This terminology was used instead of "hazardous special wastes", sup-
posedly to avoid public alarm. About 25 objections were submitted,
reviewed by the FNA, and rejected. The list was published in final form on
December 1, 1983 [49], and several months later the Ministry of Health and
Environment issued regulations that declared the list binding and intro-
duced a manifest system for all listed wastes. The ministry also introduced
quantity production cut-off levels similar to those in the USA. Nine waste
types are regulated if more than 20 kg/year are produced; all other wastes
listed are regulated only if more than 200 kg/year are produced [50].
In summary, the Austrian system, like that of the FRG, relies on an
inclusive hazardous waste list and does not consider hazardous waste
characteristics or constituents. Quantity cut-offs are set, introducing an
informal degree-of-hazard system as in the USA, and recommendations are
given concerning the appropriate disposal method, similar to Hessen's
three-category list. The most interesting and unique aspect of Austria's list
is the process by which it was developed, especially the degree of industry's
early participation in the process. In comparison, especially with the USA
and, to a lesser extent, with the FRG, the Austrians relied very little on
scientists and scientific justification for the entries on the list, but relied
heavily on industry's expertise and cooperation, building such values into
the hazard classification itself, rather than having these exercised in its
separate practical operation.
5.6. The UK
This section gives a summary of the more detailed information analyzed in
Chapter 7. In the area of hazardous waste management the British are in
many respects nonconformers. Not only is the practice of co-disposal, or
disposing of hazardous wastes in landfill with municipal household garbage,
widely practiced and endorsed by the authorities, but also the definition and
classification of hazardous wastes has been, in many respects, unique. When
other nations were deciding what is hazardous, the British were deciding
what is not hazardous; when most nations were defining hazard in such a
way that their control system could be standardized and streamlined from
"cradle-to-grave" control, the British were decentralizing, giving more dis-
cretion to local authorities and facility operators. In so doing the UK dev-
ised two sets of definitions, one for the road "to the grave" , and the other
"at the grave"; when some authorities were setting testing procedures to
catch those wastes that were not explicitly listed but nonetheless could be
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hazardous, the UK authorities were setting testing procedures to catch
those wastes that were listed but possibly not hazardous. These and other
anomalies of the British system render it an intriguing and challenging
source for comparison with the USA, the FRG, and Austria.
The 1972 UK legislation, the Deposit of Poisonous Wastes Act, man-
dated a regulatory regime that was especially comprehensive regarding the
scope of what was to be considered hazardous for the purpose of regulation.
A list was drawn up and all wastes that were not on the list were to be con-
sidered hazardous, i.e., the exclusive list system. In other words, this was a
list of safe wastes, and if a waste generator did not find his waste on the
published list, then his waste was legally hazardous and subject to the
regulations.
This system, it seems, could only err on the side of safety, but, as we
have pointed out in the previous case studies, the definition and
classification of hazard serves not only the (artificial) purpose of
differentiating the safe wastes from the hazardous ones, which would be a
singularly difficult scientific exercise, but also serves the purpose of bound-
ing or limiting the scope of the regulatory problem to dimensions that are
institutionally and economically manageable. In the case of the UK's
exclusive list, the large numbers of wastes that were thereby reported to the
authorities overwhelmed the regulatory capacity of the small staffs of the
local authorities.
[n 1974, the Control of Pollution Act was passed. Under section 17 of
this Act the Special Waste 'Regulations were drawn up in 1980 and came
into force in March 1981. The purpose of the new regulations was to nar-
row and clarify the scope of control, to apply it to a less diffuse category of
risk, and to simplify the notification system. Accordingly, a far narrower
concept of hazardous waste was developed in an inclusive list which was
very similar to that of the 1978 EC Directive, to replace the exclusive list,
which had operated since 1972. Indeed, the new system was presented as
implementation of the EC Directive.
5.6.1. UK definitions of "hazardous" waste
"Hazardous waste" is not a legally used term in the UK. According to the
Control of Pollution (Special Waste) Regulations 1980, a special waste is
defined as any controlled waste that:
Consists of or contains any of 31 presently listed substances and by reason of
the presence of such substance,
(i) is dangerous to life, or
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(ii) has a flashpoint of 21 degrees Celsius or less, or
(iii) is a prescription, medicinal product.
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The and (italicized above) is highly significant, as it means criteria (i)-(iii)
are delisting properties, which the producer can interpret, leaving the local
authority to prove otherwise. A waste is to be regarded as dangerous to life
for the purposes of the regulations if:
(1) A single dose of not more than 5 cm3 would be likely to cause death or
serious tissue damage if ingested by a child of body weight 20 kg.
(b) Exposure to it for 15 minutes or less would be likely to cause serious
damage to human tissue by inhalation, skin contact, or eye contact.
This definition, like the US one, is a two-tiered system of evaluation,
but is entirely the opposite way round. Whereas the US characteristics sup-
plement their constituents list, the UK defined characteristics subtract from
the UK list. (These tests are given in Figure 5.1). Another important point
of contrast is that the UK toxicity characteristic is based upon the "worst-
case" scenario of a child eating waste, or skin contact on an uncontrolled
landfill (it was such an event that sparked off the early legislation). The US
toxicity test (the EP test) models potential human exposure via leaching
and contamination of drinking water. The 1978 EC Directive defined "toxic
and dangerous waste" to mean any waste containing or contaminated by
one or more of the 27 categories of waste constituents listed in the annex to
the Directive, in such quantities or concentrations as to present a risk to
human health and the environment [511. The Directive did not specify any
concentration limits. In the UK, the authorities adopted the EC list of 27
constituent categories with the addition of four categories. In fact the UK
list is a hybrid of chemical constituents and industry-specific wastes.
According to the listing procedure set out above no specific concentra-
tion limits are given for determining whether the hazardous constituents
contained in the waste are sufficiently concentrated to qualify the waste for
regulation, except for the 1% carcinogen limit. Rather than checking the
concentration, the generator can check whether the waste exhibits anyone
or more of four characteristics, as shown in Table 7.4: ignitability, carcino-
genity, corrosivity, and toxicity.
The UK Government Waste Management Paper No. 23 [52] gives
rather detailed descriptions of testing procedures for determining the four
characteristics used in the UK - ignitability, carcinogenity, corrosivity, and
toxicity. In addition, this technical guide - advisory only - expands the gen-
eric lists of 31 constituents to include over 1500 specific constituents, with
data on the characteristics of each. Choosing one entry, for example acrylic
acid, we find that it has a flash point greater than 21 0 C, that the LD50 in
rats is 340 mg/kg- 1, that it is not a known carcinogen, and that 15 minutes
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Does waste comprise or does it contain Yes
: SPECIAL WASTE Iprescription-only medicines?
1No
j4-- Does waste comprise or does it contain
substances listed in Schedule 1, Part 1?
!Yes
Does waste have a flashpoint Yes
: SPECIAL WASTE I
of 21°C or less?
lNO
Does waste contain known or probable Yes
: SPECIAL WASTE Ihuman carcinogen(s) a~ a concentration
of 1% (w/w) or more?
lNO
Is waste likely to cause serious tissue Yes
: SPECIAL WASTE Idamage on exposure for a period of
up to 15 minutes?
INO
Is ingestion of up to 5 cm3 of waste likely~ Ito cause death or serious tissue damage SPECIAL WASTEto a 20 kg child?
1No
- NOT SPECIAL WASTE I
Figure 5.1. UK Assessment procedure for Special Wastes. This represents a logical
approach to the assessment of a waste's status according to the defined criteria.
The order in which the questions appear does not imply any grading of importance,
but will usually provide the quickest reasoned decision.
of human skin contact will have a tissue damage of 10%. If a waste con-
tains large amounts of this acid, its corrosivity would qualify it as special; if
the concentrations are low, then the generator must test the waste to deter-
mine its overall corrosivity. There is some substantial room for discretion,
depending on how the waste is sampled for testing and on how scientific
data and tests are interpreted. In fact, there is plenty of scope for discretion
and disagreement with regard to each testing procedure, even if the test
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models an appropriate real-world exposure scenario - an equally open ques-
tion (see Chapter 7).
Ironically, a major concern with the new UK regulations and
definitions of special wastes, which were meant to limit the scope of regula-
tory control, is that the scope is now too narrow to protect the environment
adequately. The local authority associations estimate that about two thirds
of the substances controlled under the 1972 Act are now outside the scope
of the present regulations. The resulting loss of notification of waste
transfers presents a significant handicap in their view in managing wastes
liable to cause environmental harm other than danger to human life, a con-
cern that is not explicitly addressed in the definition of special wastes [53].
Indeed, they and others also argue that the criteria used to define "danger
to human life" are too limited and too vague to be legally enforceable.
This rather complicated classification system thus allows the genera-
tors considerable discretion in judging whether their wastes contain the
right quantities and mixes of hazardous constituents to qualify them as spe-
cial. The system was designed within traditional UK assumptions of infor-
mal collaboration, of regulation as a private partnership between industry
and government at all levels. Hence regulations and definitions are impre-
cise, and often advisory only.
It is of considerable interest that this classification system is relevant
only for the notification required for transporting special wastes from the
producers to the handlers, or "up to the grave". How wastes are controlled
"at the grave" is a separate matter for which a different system of
classification is relevant, as described below. The main system of control as
mandated by the Control of Pollution Regulations is the licensing of treat-
ment and disposal facilities and, formally speaking, this part of the regula-
tory regime makes no use of the classification scheme described above.
5.6.2. UK "at-the-grave" definition of hazardous waste
The 1974 Control of Pollution Act provides for a system whereby all waste
disposal facilities must be licensed by the relevant local Waste Disposal
Authorities (WDAs). Basically, the WDAs, in conjunction with the Water
Authorities and River Purification Boards, have to decide which wastes can
safely be land disposed or treated at a given facility, and which conditions
are appropriate.
Nowhere in the system of regulations are there standard rules
prescribing how specific wastes must be handled, for example, deposited in
a secure landfill, incinerated, etc. (specific guidelines are being considered).
Essentially, the facility operator and the local WDA have full discretion and
responsibility for these prescriptions based upon certain conditions sug-
gested by the government in Waste Management Paper No.4, The Licens-
ing of Waste Disposal Sites [54].
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The decisive question is whether a hazard could be caused by the
treatment or deposit of the waste. The list of constituents, as discussed
above, does not comprehend wastes that may cause environmental damage,
only danger to life, and is thus not an appropriate guide for licensing condi-
tions. For land disposal, which is the predominant handling method in the
UK, along with a "dilute and disperse" philosophy, a variety of factors are
important to consider, including the physical form of the waste, its concen-
tration and amount, and also the circumstances of the land disposal site.
Properties that are likely to influence water pollution include solubility in
water; acidity or alkalinity; chemical reactivity; and capacity for absorption,
adsorption, biological breakdown, and natural ion-exchange processes that
may occur in the various materials encountered down the water table or
surface water sources.
A WDA may wish to impose conditions relating to the records kept of
disposal, treatment, or transfer operation at a licensed site. For hazardous
wastes, possible additional types of information may be required, such as
the disposal contractor involved, the physical form of the waste, the final
location of the waste on a landfill site, etc. Officially, only for purposes of
record keeping, therefore, there is a need to define and classify hazardous
wastes so as to distinguish them from nonhazardous wastes. For this pur-
pose, Waste Management Paper No.4 contains in Appendix 4 a list of
wastes and industry-specific wastes that are called "difficult". On this
second, "difficult" list, which is made up of waste streams and not waste
constituents, there are around 150 entries classified into some 19 categories.
In general, difficult wastes are those that were considered notifiable by the
previous (1972) DOPW system.
5.7. The Institutional Framing of Hazard
The case studies of the development of hazardous waste classification sys-
tems in the USA, the FRG, Austria, and the UK illustrate how both science
and institutional needs shaped the regulatory programs that were con-
structed. In developing classification systems for hazardous wastes,
administrators were confronted with highly uncertain knowledge regarding
the various actual situations in which wastes occur, and regarding the toxic
effect of chemicals even when tested in highly controlled laboratory situa-
tions. In many countries the regulatory agency relied heavily on expertise
from other countries. Yet the rules adopted in each country, and therefore
the outcomes of an apparently technical problem, ultimately reflected the
political and legal frameworks in that country. The systems adopted were
shaped to a large extent by social and administrative factors, even down to
fine levels of technical detail, and this explains the difficulties encountered
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by international organizations in attempting to develop standardized
classification systems.
5. 'T.1. Dealing with scientific uncertainty
One of the most important constraints in hazardous waste control concerns
the scientific information regarding the hazards actually associated with the
wastes, which is either uncertain, unknown, or unknowable (see Chapters 9
and 10). The uncertain role of science is illustrated by the deliberations
over using degree-of-hazard systems for classifying wastes. Both the FRG
and the USA have seriously considered, but decided against, developing
such systems for their regulatory control programs, including establishing
concentration levels for hazardous constituents in a waste to serve as cut-off
points for control.
Few dispute the theoretical advantages of classifying wastes by
different levels of risks, so that the control systems could be designed and
resources allocated accordingly. Unfortunately, the information needed for
such classification is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain. The "hazard" of a
waste depends on a variety of factors, including physical form, composition,
concentration of constituents, toxicity of constituents, method of disposal,
etc. All of these factors are impossible to measure rigorously and to stand-
ardize in some form of classifi~ationsystem. As discussed in Chapters 3 and
10, they are not only imprecise, but indeterminate. Toxicity testing, for
example, is filled with uncertainty concerning dose~response relationships,
extrapolating animal models to humans, and the lack of standardized test-
ing procedures. The fate of a waste can vary, depending on how it is
traded, the properties of the waste, i.e., solubility, volatility, pH, etc., and
the conditions of disposal, i.e., soil conditions, geology, etc. [551. Such
uncertainties led the EPA to conclude:
The agency does not believe any of the degree of hazard systems sug-
gested by commentators (or any the Agency could itself conceive) are
capable of actually distinguishing different degrees of hazard among the
myriad hazardous wastes and also relating management standards to
the degrees in a technically and legally defensible way.
Yet the EP A did respond to political and economic pressure by introducing
a limited degree-of-hazard system with its distinction of small quantity cut-
offs for some acutely hazardous wastes. Federal authorities in the FRG also
rejected the idea of introducing a formal degree-of-hazard system in their
regulations, but the Lander have not been so reluctant. Hessen, with its
three categories of wastes, has used a simple degree-of-hazard system. Also,
in the USA, several states have adopted degree-of-hazard systems in
developing their own regulations to implement the RCRA program [561.
Given the life-cycle (including human-behavioral) determinants of hazard
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(see Chapter 3), it may be more feasible to design degree-of-hazard frame-
works at local regulatory levels. However, in the larger system this creates
inconsistencies that could only be avoided by reducing waste movements
between local regulatory areas.
An interesting comparative example is the Netherlands. As we saw in
Chapter 4, under its Chemical Waste Act the Netherlands differentiated
between four classes of hazardous wastes and determined differential con-
centration limits of chemical constituents for wastes to be considered
hazardous [57]. These were precise, but rather arbitrarily fixed by negotia-
tion between the Ministry of Economic Affairs, representing industrial
interests, and government waste disposal experts. Other countries have
expressed an interest in, and industries have lobbied heavily for, using such
concentration limits in hazardous waste regulation, but outside the Nether-
lands this has been rejected as impractical for several reasons. First, it is
very difficult and time consuming to sample and test wastes to determine
the concentrations of particular substances. Second, as the UK demon-
strates, the spirit of the regulations can easily be circumvented simply by
diluting or mixing wastes so that hazardous constituent concentrations are
below the cut-off point.
The notion of classifying hazardous wastes on the basis of degree of
hazard is so compelling that pressure for the adoption of such systems will
undoubtedly increase. But regulators faced with developing such systems,
and limited by scarce resources, will have to carefully consider whether
complicated, precise classifications are possible given the fundamental
uncertainty of the scientific information on hazardous wastes. For example,
as Majone has pointed out:
... even in the United States with its enormous scientific, technical,
and financial resources- no more than 500 chemicals can be tested
each year because of the limited availability of trained toxicologists,
laboratory facilities, and test animals. This is barely sufficient to keep
up with the flow of new chemicals, let alone to investigate the existing
stock of well over 50 000 chemicals in commercial use. International
cooperation in toxicological testing would have obvious benefits; but
serious (if ill-understood) differences in methodology, risk philosophies,
and regulatory approaches make cooperation difficult, and even reduce
the value of the limited amount of information that is available [58].
It should be mentioned that the EEC, the USA and the OECD have
been relatively successful in developing international protocols for testing
toxic goods. Wastes, however, are much more difficult to test because of
their heterogeneous nature and complicated life-cycles. Hazardous goods
are often tested by agreed laboratory protocols, which ensure scientific qual-
ity control, but there is little incentive for such testing of wastes.
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5.7.2. Political objectives
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It is tempting to say that the observed variation in hazardous waste
classification is a result of the large scientific uncertainty, which allows local
political goals and administrative factors to "bias" the ensuing technical
framework. However, as discussed in Chapters 9 and 10, this betrays a false
assumption that "the" regulatory problem for which the classification sys-
tem is developed presents itself in the same institutional form in the
different countries. The technical hazard classification system is only a
prism that refracts behavioral prescriptions between parties and relevant
factors from the institutional system. For example, in the UK elaborate
legal specifications for every chemical compound that could be toxic, and
inflexible, precise hazard criteria, are felt to contradict the social relation-
ships in regulation already established between industry and government.
In the USA the opposite is true. This difference is not the result of
"scientific uncertainty", but of different administrative and regulatory styles
or political cultures (see Chapters 2 and 12). Of course, scientific uncertain-
ties are very real and aggravate the institutional uncertainties and disloca-
tions embedded within the "technical" hazard classification frameworks of
different regulatory systems. However, the primary factor is that the basic
problem is not a scientific one, but an integrated behavioral-technical one,
and it therefore arises in different forms in different regulatory jurisdictions
that have characteristic decision-making styles and institutional structures.
In the USA, the original goals of the RCRA program were to control
all hazardous wastes generated in the USA. This comprehensive system was
clearly mandated by Congress because it felt that a uniform system was
necessary in order to ensure that some states would not become "dumping
grounds" for others [591. Later, as the EPA began to develop its regulations,
the legal, economic, and logistical constraints of a total control system
began to be recognized and ad hoc compromises in the philosophy of total
control were introduced. These included a reduction in the number of
hazardous characteristics to be tested, the introduction of a procedure for
delisting wastes, the exclusion of small-quantity generators from the regula-
tions, narrower definitions of treatment, storage, and disposal centers, etc.
In the FRG, the purpose of federal regulation never was to develop
national all-inclusive standards. As with other types of regulation, the
responsibility for implementing hazardous waste control was handed to the
Lander. Federal regulations identified only those hazardous wastes that
were common to all Lander, and the Lander were allowed to develop and
greatly expand their own classification systems. The decision not to adopt a
constituent list approach in the federal regulations was also based, in part,
on the fact that Land governments had already developed their systems
from the LAGA catalog. This deference to Land authority and the tradi-
tional role of the UBA as a technical advisor, not as regulator and
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supervisor (the role of the EPA in the USA), is reflected in the hazardous
waste control system that was developed. The disadvantage of the system,
namely that decentralized control can lead to wide disparities between the
different Land regulations and make cross-border transport more difficult,
has now led to pressure for a more centralized classification system and
standards.
In Austria, the implementation of the system was thought to be
impossible without the consent and cooperation of industry. The traditional
spirit of social partnership holds that all social and economic problems can
be dealt with through negotiation and cooperation between government,
industry, and labor unions [601. This belief led to a process that, from the
very beginning, involved both industry and government in developing a
compromise list of wastes, with the more or less explicit recognition that the
definition of hazard was politically constructed. Inclusions on the waste list
were voted on by representatives from industry, government, and academia.
Finally, how classification systems are shaped and influenced by politi-
cal and institutional needs is demonstrated most clearly by the UK. The ori-
ginal "exclusive" list, which was reportedly constructed to encompass all
wastes that might be hazardous, recognizing the uncertainty of the scientific
knowledge, swamped the institutional capacity of the enforcement agents
and placed allegedly large overheads on industry. The "scientific" pendu-
lum then swung in the other direction, and hazard (for the purposes of
transport) was defined very narrowly, creating a regulatory problem of more
manageable dimensions. The bounds of the "scientific" problem were thus
changed radically to meet political and institutional needs. More basically
still, the dual system of hazard definitions, including a second one for
disposal-site licensing, reflected the long-standing UK dependence on plan-
ning consents and licensing as an all-round means of industrial develop-
ment, control, and regulation.
5.7.3. Scientific justification
In addition to the different political goals and attitudes that influenced the
processes of hazard classification in the countries studied, there were
differences in the amount and kind of scientific evidence presented to sup-
port the inclusion of certain wastes on the lists. In the USA, each listed
waste was supported by a background document giving detailed
justification. Such detail is supplied, in part, as a precaution against future
legal challenges. As Brickman et ai. 161 j have pointed out in their com-
parison of carcinogen regulations in four countries, the courts in the USA
play a much broader role in reviewing administrative action than those in
Europe. For example, they point out that public interest groups and indus-
try enjoy a much more liberal access to the courts in the USA than in the
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UK, FRG, or Austria, where rules governing access to courts are much
more restrictive. In addition, US law offers comparatively clearer
definitions of agency responsibilities and statutory deadlines, which have
allowed environmental groups and industry over the last 15 years to chal-
lenge (or compel) agency actions. Finally, US courts have gone beyond pro-
cedural scrutiny to review the substantive basis for agency decisions, while
European courts have been much more deferential to agency findings of
"fact" .
More active judicial review in the USA, in part, led the EPA to pro-
vide elaborate justifications for listing wastes, while no such detailed
justifications were deemed necessary in the FRG, Austria, or the UK. But,
in addition to such legal differences, European approaches to regulation
reflect long-standing traditions in most of Europe (though see chapters 3
and 12) that rigid, statutory regulations are less effective than standards
and codes developed in cooperation with industry (621. In contrast, US
approaches to environmental regulation have been more adversarial in
nature, where industry is generally forced to comply with rules that protect
the public health and the environment. Even if agencies are reluctant to
take on such adversarial roles, they are often compelled to do so by pressure
from public interest groups and/or judicial action.
5.7.4. Political legitimacy
These differences in the handling of scientific uncertainty, political goals,
and scientific justification all reflect cultural differences inherent in the
approaches of the different regulatory agencies in legitimating their actions.
In the USA, the regulatory philosophy that guided the development of the
hazardous waste regulations was adversarial and characterized by central-
ized expertise and control. Interest groups were only allowed to comment on
published draft regulations, not participate in their development. In the
FRG, expertise and control were more decentralized, with regulatory
responsibility in the Lander and the federal agencies mainly playing an
advisory role. Consensus on regulatory objectives was sought - indeed,
expected by the force of tradition - through the LAGA, between levels of
government, not between government and interest groups. Discussions with
interest groups were held, often after regulatory strategies had been chosen,
but before the regulations were finalized and published. In the UK, infor-
mal consultation with interested parties is always sought before legislation
or the issue of regulations, but the lobbying of industry is normally far
stronger, more organized, and at least partly embedded in the administra-
tive organs of government by strong social networks and even personnel
exchanges. The distinction between scientific and other judgments is
blurred. Austria explicitly involved government and industry at an early
146 Risk Management and Hazardous Waste
stage (although it excluded environmentalists) in a process that reflected
traditional values of cooperation through social partnership. Although this
process ensured acceptability among the industrial interest groups, it did
leave the government open to harsh criticism from environmentalists and
the media [63]. These countries represent a continuum of adversarial versus
cooperative philosophies of regulation. Similar differences have been
observed in the area of carcinogen regulations and the setting of occupa-
tional health standards [64].
This diversity in regulatory practice explains, to a large extent, the
difficulties in developing international hazardous waste classification sys-
tems. However, some limited consensus has been achieved. The EC has
issued a Directive on Toxic and Dangerous Wastes that lists 27 waste
categories to be regulated by the member nations [65]. A NATO study
identified 38 waste types that are regulated in three or more NATO coun-
tries [66]. The OECD has developed a means of cross-referencing a waste
listed in one country to the list of another [67]. This scientific consensus has
not, however, led to standardization. Achieving any degree of harmony will
undoubtedly be frustrated by the fact that the many varied national lists
reflect not only differences in the interpretation of scientific data, but, to a
far greater extent, differences in political and institutional needs, which the
lists were developed to meet.
5.8. Conclusions
The case studies clearly show that what appears a straightforwardly
scientific exercise, namely the definition and classification of hazardous
wastes, is not primarily technical. Rather, the definition of hazards ulti-
mately depends on the political and institutional frameworks and objectives
for which the definition is being developed. Scientific information, character-
ized by large uncertainties, can legitimately be molded to fit other needs.
This analysis suggests that more attention must be given to defining realis-
tic goals for hazardous waste definition and classification in the light of
institutional and political constraints, so that these goals can have a reason-
able chance of being achieved.
The widespread assumption is that the main problem is to define
"hazardous waste" more rigorously, which will automatically lead to precise
standardized definitions. This will then, it is believed, lead to closure of
regulatory loopholes. In this chapter we demonstrate that this set of beliefs,
enshrined in policy and analysis, is founded on false premises about the
basic nature of regulatory problems in this area and about the role and
nature of technical knowledge in relation to institutional factors. It is salu-
tory to see that, even when hazard classification schemes are identical, or
nearly so, they are different in practice, so their regulatory use must be
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examined as well. These differences are significant, and belie the apparent
similarity of technical frameworks. This underlines the importance of our
chosen analytical focus in the other case study chapters - implementation.
In the next three chapters we look at widely different institutional settings
before returning to develop this point more generally.
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CHAPTER 6
Government Responsibility for Risk:
The Bavarian and Hessian Hazardous
Waste Disposal Systems
Joanne Linnerooth and Gary Davis
6.1. Introduction
Most Western, industrialized nations have passed legislation to identify
hazardous waste streams, track their transport, and control and monitor
their disposal. Despite the ambition of this legislation and its implementa-
tion, there is concern on the part of government officials, industry, and the
public that severe problems continue to exist in controlling the hazardous
waste life-cycle from its "cradle" to its "grave". In other chapters, a serious
gap is identified between formal regulatory systems and the general compli-
ance with these systems; in many countries, this gap can be attributed, in
part, to the lack of a comprehensive industrial and economic infrastructure
for handling the large volumes of hazardous wastes generated, even before
considering whether wastes are processed through this infrastructure.
A whole spectrum of options exist for the management of hazardous
wastes, including: comprehensive, integrated facilities that offer a full range
of disposal and treatment methods or smaller, specialized operations;
different combinations of government and private ownership of the waste
handling facilities; public and private financing with or without subsidized
prices to the users; and other pricing schemes coupled with incentives to
encourage compliance.
The type of system that develops will depend ultimately on the politi-
cal and regulatory culture of the country, but will also hinge on perceptions
of hazardous waste as an industrial risk problem, or the ways in which the
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problem is defined and redefined by the many actors involved. For
instance, the issue may be framed by some groups as a problem of the ille-
gal dumping of wastes, in which case government ownership and subsidiza-
tion of the facilities may encourage legal disposal by lowering disposal costs
to the generators. Alternatively, for other groups the issue may emerge
from environmental concerns over the large and increasing volumes of
hazardous wastes being generated, in which case an aggressive policy of
high prices will encourage waste reduction - as well as illegal dumping.
This tension between encouraging the legal disposal of wastes and promot-
ing the reduction of wastes is one of many issues to consider in making
investment and financial choices for waste handling facilities. In analyzing
these choices, it is instructive to examine the accumulated experiences of
those countries with established and functioning infrastructures for the
management of their hazardous wastes.
Two of the Lander {states} in the FRG, Hessen and Bavaria, along
with the Scandinavian countries, have developed a unique system of public
and industrial financing and ownership of integrated hazardous waste
management facilities, which has effectively condensed the diffuse, multiac-
tor hazardous waste life-cycle into a relatively comprehensive
regulatory-management organization. These Lander have large, integrated
facilities for the storage, treatment, and incineration of wastes, which are
for the most part equipped with up-to-date environmental technology;
furthermore, the facility managers have control over the waste from the fac-
tory gate. As a result, compared with other countries relatively little of the
hazardous waste generated in Hessen and Bavaria is deposited directly in
landfills; rather it is first pretreated or incinerated at high temperatures.
In this chapter we describe the history and operation of the Hessian
and Bavarian systems, contrasting these systems with the more market-
oriented approaches found, for example, in neighboring North Rhine-
Westfalia, as well as in the USA. Our analysis of these contrasting manage-
ment styles forms the basis for a discussion of the merits and drawbacks of
public ownership, integrated facilities, monopoly markets, and subsidized
pricing schemes. We also contrast how organizations have dealt with the
inherent conflicts between promoting a market for capital-intensive facilities
and motivating generators to reduce their wastes.
Since the management systems in Bavaria and Hessen cannot be
directly transplanted to other countries, we view these experiences within
the general political, institutional, and economic context in which they have
evolved and are expected to work. Even if no "transplant" is envisaged,
much of value to other systems can be learned from this kind of contextual,
institutional analysis of risk management. We suggest in this chapter that a
major, and hitherto unrecognized, benefit of the public, integrated manage-
ment strategy is its reduction of the behavioral and physical uncertainties
and indeterminacies throughout waste life-cycles.
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6.2. Technical Options for Handling Hazardous Wastes
The predominant method for dealing with hazardous wastes in most indus-
trialized countries remains land disposal. This includes landfill, where
hazardous wastes are placed in or on the ground; surface impoundment or
ponding, where liquid wastes are contained in natural or man-made depres-
sions; land spreading or farming, where wastes are tilled into the topsoil for
biological degradation; and deep well injection, where liquid wastes are
pumped below groundwater in formations thought to be sealed off from
above. In the USA, for example, deep well injection, surface impound-
ments, and landfills account for an estimated 90% of the disposal of indus-
trial hazardous wastes [1]. Many other industrial countries report roughly
similar figures; for example, in Europe the estimate is almost 70%. The
land disposal of hazardous waste may be as a "secure" concentrate and in
contained landfills that are designed to prevent contamination of groundwa-
ter, such as those with a natural or synthetic liner, and with a leachate col-
lection system, with groundwater monitoring and a cover to prevent
infiltration. Alternatively, landfill may involve "dispersal and dilution",
aided by natural transformation processes in the ground, which can be
beneficial. The trend has been toward containment landfill where no alter-
natives exist, though the UK continues to maintain that "dilute and
disperse", landfill actively reduces the hazards over time, whereas contain-
ment leaves the same concentrated hazard, which will possibly have to be
dealt with in the future.
Despite the engineered features, containment landfills can present two
main types of environmental problems: contamination of surface- and
ground-waters, and fires and explosions producing air pollution. There is a
growing consensus that even state-of-the-art landfills are not appropriate for
certain wastes (e.g., liquid organic solvents and inorganic acids), and gen-
erally too little is understood about the synergistic effects of chemical mix-
ing or the reliability of natural or synthetic liners to guarantee proper long-
term containment of hazardous substances [2].
Increased documentation of the risks from land disposal has led to a
growing interest in the development and promotion of the numerous techno-
logical alternatives available. Based on evidence of the risks to the environ-
ment, the following technological hierarchy has been proposed as desirable
management strategy [3]:
(1) Waste reduction or recycling: Preempting the generation of hazardous
wastes by process changes and reuse of valuable chemicals.
(2) Physical, chemical, and biological treatment: These include physical
processes, such as mechanical filtering, chemical processes, by which
the molecular structure of the waste is changed, and biological
processes that rely on microorganisms to treat organic materials.
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These treatment techniques can render wastes innocuous or reduce
their toxicity.
(3) Thermal destruction: Controlled thermal treatment, such as high-
temperature incineration, destroys or renders organic wastes less
hazardous and can be used to recover energy. High-temperature
incineration is generally considered one of the safest methods for treat-
ing organic wastes. Recent concern about incomplete destruction of
halogenated organic compounds has led to processes in which pyrolysis
precedes incineration.
(4) Solidification and/or stabilization of remaining residuals before
landfill: This method consists of various techniques to "solidify" or
encapsulate wastes to make them less likely to migrate when placed in
landfills.
Any management hierarchy for hazardous wastes is necessarily based
on generalizations about the relative risks, which can be inadequate and
uncertain in specific cases. for instance, high-temperature incineration is
widely considered as a relatively safe method of destroying organic wastes,
yet there is concern about the emission of dioxins when chlorinated organics
are burned. Little is known about the chemistry of incineration, especially
what happens with particular mixtures of hazardous wastes, even for those
cases in which the breakdown characteristics are understood.
Furthermore, management hierarchies, such as that listed above, fol-
low primarily from technical considerations of the environmental risks and
are based to a far lesser extent on institutional considerations involved in
implementation. This is true for landfill, which relies on the site operator's
diligence and knowledge of mixing wastes (e.g., the UK defends "sensible"
landfill codisposal, but unfortunately has not carefully analyzed what is
practically involved and whether it is widely feasible and enforceable). The
same is also true for high-temperature incineration, which relies on fairly
narrow optimal conditions to ensure the complete combustion of wastes and
the minimization of toxic emissions. Incineration of some wastes may be
the best risk option in theory, but worse than landfill if performed at less
than optimal conditions. Given the manifold technical and operational
uncertainties, it is important to develop a management system, including
the institutional base for implementing it, that is resilient to human factors
and to changes in scientific knowledge.
Hessen and Bavaria stand out as having been apparently successful in
implementing this preferred technical management hierarchy, reportedly
placing few hazardous wastes directly into landfills. This stands in contrast
to other nations, such as the USA, the Netherlands, where an estimated
88% of hazardous wastes is sent to domestic and foreign landfills [4], and
the UK, which disposes 75% of its hazardous wastes in landfills [5].
Differences in definitions and the reporting of hazardous wastes make it
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difficult to compare these figures across countries. It is reported, however,
that in the FRG as a whole there is more reliance on direct land disposal for
hazardous waste management than in Bavaria and Hessen [6].
6.3. Hazardous Waste Legislation in the FRG
6.3.1. Background
The constitution (Grundgesetz) of 1949 established the FRG as a federation
of what are currently 11 autonomous states, called Lander. Most regulatory
power is distributed between the federal government and the Lander; how-
ever, in contrast to the USA, the FRG constitution vests in the Lander the
primary responsibility for implementing and enforcing laws enacted by the
federal parliament. The Lander, therefore, enjoy a more powerful position
in relation to the federal government than do their US counterparts.
Political decision making in the FRG cannot be understood adequately
unless one also takes into account attributes of the parliamentary system.
In contrast to the US system, which fosters a unique competition between
the executive and legislative branches (often represented by different par-
ties), in most European countries the legislative majority party and the exe-
cutive are the same, and thus the the powerful ties of party membership
greatly reduce the likelihood of discord. In chapters 3 and 12 Wynne
analyzes the implications of this difference of political cultures for environ-
mental policy analysis; in addition, frorri an analysis of recent chemical con-
trol legislation, Brickman et al. have also concluded that many of the sys-
tematic divergences between US and European environmental laws can be
attributed to this difference in executive-legislative relations and to the
different underlying political cultures [7].
In the FRG, the federal ministries and Land representatives generally
prepare the legislative details of a bill before its formal consideration in par-
liament. This institutionalized cooperation mirrors a more general coopera-
tive ideology between the federal government and the Lander. For example,
there is no federal environmental regulatory agency in the FRG and, in
addition to direct regulatory responsibilities, Land agencies also cooperate
in the development of standards that may ultimately be adopted by the
federal government. The practices of each of the Lander, however, vary
considerably [8).
Implementation of environmental legislation is the full responsibility of
the Lander; it is usual for government authorities to work closely with
industry and possibly other interested or influential parties in formulating
policy. At this level, Land and local officials generally have significant dis-
cretion in developing "workable" regulations and standards with industry.
This historical partnership between government and industry, in addition to
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the power that the Lander enjoy in implementing federal legislation, forms
the basis for the close government and industry cooperation in the manage-
ment of hazardous wastes in Hessen and Bavaria.
6.3.2. The Federal Waste Disposal Act
Hazardous waste in the FRG is regulated under the Federal Waste Disposal
Act (Ab/a/lbeseitigungsgesetz) of 1972, as amended in 1976, 1980, 1982, and
1985. As in other countries, the legislation was designed to cope with waste
in general, not only hazardous waste. Certain types of waste are regulated
separately and excluded from the Waste Disposal Act, such as waste oil,
nuclear waste, waste water, military wastes, and wastes from mining.
Dumping at sea is regulated by the Dumping at Sea Act of 1977.
The Waste Disposal Act and its accompanying Administrative Orders
were formulated at the federal level and implemented by the Lander in
cooperation with counties (Kreise) and municipalities (Gemeinde). Con-
sistent with FRG regulatory tradition, this legislation lays out a framework
which the Lander are obliged to follow, but which is general enough to allow
them a great deal of discretion in choosing how the statutory goals will be
met.
The federal legislation requires each generator to cede his wastes to
the competent county or municipal (Kreise or Kreis/reie Stiidte) authorities
for treatment or disposal. At the same time, it assigns responsibility to the
local authorities by obliging them to handle the wastes generated in their
region by providing adequate facilities. With the consent of the respective
Land authorities, these local bodies can be relieved of their obligation to
handle hazardous wastes, however, and most local bodies have followed this
course.
In an Administrative Order of 1977, 86 specific waste types were listed
as hazardous ("special") wastes (see Chapter 5). No procedure was specified
for adding to or subtracting from this list; however, the Lander have the
right to supplement it in their own waste plans.
The Waste Disposal Act also lays out a "cradle-to-grave" control sys-
tem, where a mandatory trip-ticket procedure traces the path of each
hazardous waste from its generation to its place of disposal. In addition,
operators of certain facilities that handle hazardous wastes are required to
appoint a waste disposal agent, protected from dismissal by law, who moni-
tors the production, transport, and ultimate disposal of wastes.
A waste disposal plan must be drawn up by each Land, and is binding
for local and district authorities. In principle, wastes may only be treated,
stored, or deposited in approved installations and transported by certified
operators. Waste disposal plants are generally licensed via regional plan-
ning permission proceedings, involving public comment and public hearings.
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From this brief outline the FRG appears to have a relatively
comprehensive legislative system, at least formally, for regulating hazardous
wastes. Commentators and regulators, however, point to a number of weak
points in the system. First, the effectiveness of the regulatory framework to
"protect the well-being of the general public" depends crucially on whether
all the wastes that are, in fact, hazardous are included in the universe of
regulated wastes or the 86 wastes defined (a decade or more ago) as poten-
tially dangerous. Some Lander, notably Hessen, have greatly expanded this
list. Ways of legally evading the system also exist. A serious loophole
appears to be the exemption of used oil, since used oil can legally contain a
certain amount of hazardous substances, and has sometimes been sold as
heating oil for apartment buildings and houses. A second, equally impor-
tant loophole is the universal one concerning the recycling of waste; genera-
tors may declare their waste as an economic good if they can claim a willing
buyer, and in so doing are not required to enter it in the notification system.
A general clause allows the Minister of Defense to exempt military wastes
from the Waste Disposal Act and the corresponding administrative orders.
In addition, in the federal framework the legal possibility exists for genera-
tors to export their wastes to other Lander or countries with less stringent
requirements. Bavaria and Hessen, however, have imposed their own
export restrictions in order to protect the market of wastes for their own
public facilities. This principle may be extended to all Lander.
These loopholes are considered to be serious, and attempts to close
them by amending the Waste Disposal Act are currently underway. A 1984
amendment to the Act was intended to discourage the export of hazardous
wastes from the FRG and to control imports. Discussions are also under-
way on how to deal with contaminated waste oil; it is likely that a testing
requirement will be imposed and that certain waste oil will be regulated as
hazardous waste.
A main concern in this chapter is the strategic and organizational
difference between those states that have publicly owned or publicly sup-
ported integrated facilities and those that rely on a larger number of
privately owned and decentralized facilities. Figure 6.1 [91 shows how
Hessen and Bavaria have organized waste disposal around a few comprehen-
sive facilities. These are partially or fully owned by the local or Land
authorities, compared, for example, with North Rhine- Westfalia, which
operates with numerous private waste enterprises and a recently built (but
underutilized) public facility. These differences go beyond organization,
since the outcomes of the systems, themselves, are very different. As men-
tioned above, Hessen and Bavaria place a relatively small proportion of
their wastes directly in landfills in comparison with other Lander. In the
next two sections, we describe in some detail the Hessian and Bavarian
waste management systems, including the ways in which these Lander have
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defined hazardous wastes, the technologies employed, and their economic,
legal, and institutional context.
6.4 Hazardous Waste Practices in Bavaria
Bavaria is considered by many waste authorities in industrial countries to
have one of the more successful systems for managing hazardous wastes.
This is due principally to its modern integrated treatment, storage, and
disposal facilities, as well as to its general performance record with respect
to the way in which wastes are managed.
Bavaria is the largest of the FRG Lander, with an area of 70,500 km2
and nearly 11 million inhabitants. Yet it is not highly industrialized, pro-
ducing less hazardous waste than, for example, Hessen or North Rhine-
Westfalia. Currently, a total of 239 wastes requiring regulation are listed in
Bavaria (for more detail, see Chapter 5). Around 417,000 tons of industrial
and commercial waste were produced in 1983, 118,000 of which were con-
sidered hazardous wastes as defined by the list. It is therefore a relatively
dispersed system of waste production, with approximately 6 000 hazardous
waste generators and around 120 000 shipments of hazardous waste per
year [10].
Bavaria is of special interest because it recognized the hazardous waste
problem very early on and became a forerunner in hazardous waste prac-
tices, even shaping the federal legislation. As early as 1966, the district of
Mittelfranken founded a municipal cooperative [Mittelfranken Cooperative
for Special Waste Management (ZVSMM)] responsible for the disposal of
special wastes, and in 1970 a semi-public organization [The Association for
the Management of Special Wastes in Bavaria (GSB)] was created to handle
special wastes for the rest of Bavaria. In both instances, central facilities
were built for treating, depositing, and incinerating hazardous wastes.
In 1983, 228000 metric tons and 11 7 000 metric tons of industrial and
commercial wastes were managed by the GSB and the ZVSMM, respec-
tively. The proportion of these wastes that were incinerated, treated by
chemical or physical methods, and deposited in secure landfills (mostly
treatment residues) is shown in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1. Waste disposal in Bavaria [11].
Incineration
Chemical/physical treatment
Landfill
GSB
53000 t
97000 t
55000 t
29%
45%
26%
ZVSMAr
18000 t 14%
45000 t 34%
70000 t 53%
aThe relatively large amount of wastes sent to landfills is principally due to one generator
who disposes of large quantities of wastes containing vanadium and chromium, which
cannot be treated profitably.
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Figure 6.1. Location of hazardous waste treatment and disposal facilities in the
Federal Republic of Germany.
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In addition, unknown amounts of hazardous waste are managed at approxi-
mately 20 industrial facilities where the generators have been given permis-
sion to handle their own wastes.
The Bavarian law echoes the framework legislation of the Federal
Waste Disposal Act of 1972. More detailed provisions that govern special
waste management are contained in the Bavarian Waste Plan, adopted in
1977. Waste generators must notify the Bureau of Environmental Protec-
tion (Landesamt fUr Umweltschutz) of the Bavarian Ministry for Land
Development and Environment of the types and quantities 6f wastes they
produce. The Bureau then decides whether these wastes should be
managed as hazardous wastes and in which category they belong.
The export of hazardous wastes from Bavaria is prohibited without
permission from the Bureau (exemptions from this prohibition can be
secured for those wastes that cannot be burned, treated, or deposited safely
in Bavaria; or, permission to export may be justified by the ability of a large
company to treat wastes at its own facility in another state), and generators
of hazardous wastes must obtain permission from the Bureau to manage
their wastes on-site. Very large chemical companies, such as Hoechst, burn
their own wastes. This practice, however, is generally discouraged and
often stricter environmental standards are applied to on-site facilities than
to the GSB and ZVSMM plants. In 1983, approximately 9200 tonnes of
industrial wastes were exported to other Lander in the FRG [121.
6.4.1. ZVSMM
Concern about groundwater contamination from the dumping of hazardous
wastes in municipal waste dump sites inspired politicians in the district of
Mittelfranken to form the ZVSMM in 1966, at which time there was no
effective legislation in the FRG for dealing with the disposal of hazardous
wastes. In 1968, the organization designed and constructed what was prob-
ably the first "secure" landfill, with a clay liner and leachate collection sys-
tem. The management soon recognized, however, that not all hazardous
wastes were suitable for landfilling and so began construction of treatment
facilities in 1969 [13).
The ZVSMM is of special interest in that it is a fully public enterprise,
in contrast to the joint government-industry owned facilities in Hessen and
the rest of Bavaria. The operation of the ZVSMM is the responsibility of
six different state, county, and municipal authorities [14].
Today, the ZVSMM owns and operates the Schwabach facility, which
consists of a rotary-kiln incinerator for organic wastes, a physical and chem-
ical treatment plant, a wastewater purification plant, and a clay-lined
hazardous waste landfill (which includes leachate collection and treatment).
ZVSMM has also recently opened another landfill site at Raindorf,
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approximately 20 km from Schwabach. These facilities serve, in addition to
Mittelfranken, other parts of Bavaria and Baden-Wiirttemberg, a total area
of 21000 km2 (about 10% of the area of the FRG), 3.7 million inhabitants,
and approximately 4000 industrial companies.
The Schwabach facilities are financed by the ZVSMM with assistance
from the Bavarian state government. As of 1985, a total of DM 44.5 million
had been invested in the facilities. The members of ZVSMM - five large
towns, seven county districts, and seven small towns - raised DM 400 000 of
the original capital investment of DM 5 million. The Bavarian government
added approximately DM 2 million in the form of a grant, and the remain-
ing funds came from loans (including a DM 1 million low-interest loan from
the Marshall Fund). Subsequent construction has received a 30-50% sub-
sidy from the Bavarian government, which will not have to be repaid [15].
The state government, therefore, subsidizes the ZVSMM facilities
directly by contributing to the capital investment. The fees charged to gen-
erators for the management of wastes at Schwabach cover the remaining
costs, including the unsubsidized capital costs, operating expenses, and
interest payments. ZVSMM operates on a nonprofit basis, and prices are
set at the end of the year to reflect the anticipated costs for the next year.
Prices for 1985 ranged as in Table 6.2.
Table 6.2. ZVSMM prices for waste management in 1985 [16].
Price
Method
Landfill
Treatment
Incineration
DM per tonne
65-195
70-550
80-580
$ per tonne
22-65
23-183
27-193
At the direction of the district of Mittelfranken, ZVSMM is currently instal-
ling a flue gas scrubber for the incinerator, which will result in a price
increase of approximately DM lOa/tonne for incineration.
6.4.2. The GSB
The GSB manages hazardous wastes in the remainder of Bavaria. All spe-
cial wastes other than those handled by the ZVSMM must be delivered to
the GSB, unless permission is granted for on-site disposal or export. The
GSB has four facilities and seven transfer stations in Bavaria, which consoli-
date wastes for shipment to these facilities. These transfer stations also
dewater sludges and oil-water emulsions and perform some acid-base neu-
tralization to reduce volumes before shipment.
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The Ebenhausen plant, about 50 km from Munich, includes two
rotary-kiln incinerators, a physical and chemical treatment plant, and a
wastewater treatment plant. The Schweinfurt disposal plant consists of an
incinerator for certain industrial wastes, such as paper contaminated with
oil, that can be incinerated with domestic refuse. GSB also operates a sol-
vent recycling facility near Munich and a large landfill at Gallenbach.
These facilities have been described in detail elsewhere [17]. For our pur-
poses, it is important to note that most hazardous wastes containing organic
compounds are incinerated, and most toxic inorganic wastes are treated to
reduce toxicity and mobility. The landfill sites do not generally accept
liquid wastes or any wastes that have not been pretreated.
The original capital stock for the GSB facilities of DM 1 million was
raised by 76 hazardous waste generators (30%), the Bavarian government
(40%), and member communities (30%). The original DM 1 million of GSB
member stocks had risen to a total of DM 21 million as of 1980. Bavaria
now has an interest of 78%, industry 14%, and the municipalities 8%. The
remaining outlays have been financed by a combination of direct govern-
ment subsidies, indirect subsidies of low-interest government loans, and user
fees. GSB prices for hazardous waste management in 1985 ranged as in
Table 6.3.
Table 6.3. eBB prices for waste management in 1985 [18].
Price
Method
Landfill
Treatment
Incineration
DM per tonne
64-195
70-490
5-620
$ per tonne
(28-84)
(30-211)
(50-267)
6.5. Hazardous Waste Practices in Hessen
Hessen is also considered to have a successful hazardous waste management
system. Emphasis is put on waste reduction; most hazardous wastes are
incinerated or treated, and few hazardous wastes are deposited in landfills.
According to the Hessian Ministry for Land Planning, Environment and
Forestry, approximately 300000 tonnes per year of hazardous waste are
currently generated in Hessen and sent off-site for management [19j.
Hessen has devised a degree-of-hazard system for the management of
all the wastes in its waste catalog and has greatly increased the number of
waste types requiring treatment as hazardous wastes. Wastes are divided
into three categories, each with a specified management method:
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I. Industrial wastes that are similar to municipal garbage and can gen-
erally be treated as such.
II. Industrial wastes that are hazardous and cannot be disposed of with
household wastes, and thus require special handling, such as treat-
ment, incineration, or deposition in a secure landfill.
III. Industrial wastes that are especially hazardous and require treatment
under "special technical conditions", Le., salt mine deposition or high-
temperature incineration.
Categories II and III can be regarded as hazardous wastes, where
category III wastes are special priority or especially hazardous [20]. From
the 563 waste types listed in the LAGA catalog (see Chapter 5), 262 are
identified as category II, and 37 as category III. This is compared with 86
hazardous wastes on the federal list.
For the approximately 300000 tons of hazardous wastes in categories
II and III, the breakdown in Table 6.4. shows how they were managed in
1983.
Table 6.4. Management of waste categories II and III [21].
Method
Incineration
Chemical-physical treatment
Landfill
Underground deposit
Amount in
tonnes
43000
100000
136000
13000
Percentage
(15%)
(34%)
(47%)
(4%)
Much of the waste deposited in secure landfills was comprised of residues
from incineration and physical-chemical treatment, and a large portion of
the wastes were sent to other Lander for disposal, since Hessen lacks landfill
capacity.
6.5.1. The legal and institutional framework
The organization of hazardous waste management in Hessen is legally based
on the Federal Waste Disposal Act and Special Waste Order, the Hessian
Waste Law (1978), and the Hessian Waste Management Plan, particularly
the partial plan "Special Wastes from Industry and Firms" (1976). This
plan assigns full responsibility for special wastes to the Hessian
Industriemiill GmbH (HIM), which was established in 1974. The HIM is
currently jointly owned by the Hessian government (26%) and a consortium
of 25 Hessian waste-producing industries (74%). The Hessian government
has three votes on the board of HIM, compared with industry's eight. Ori-
ginally, the HIM was a private waste management company financed by
hazardous waste generators, but when it encountered financial difficulties
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the Hessian government rescued and assumed joint responsibility for the
facilities. Along with this public responsibility, the government also estab-
lished central control of wastes by restricting export and competition in
order to protect the economic viability of the management infrastructure.
Government authorities in Hessen, thus, exert a direct influence over
hazardous waste management through their part ownership of HIM, and an
indirect control through regulation. The responsible agency is the Hessian
Ministry for Development, Environment, Agriculture, and Forestry, which
categorizes wastes, specifies how they will be managed, and promulgates
standards for emissions from industrial facilities. The Hessian authorities
require that all industries deliver their special wastes to the HIM, the so-
called Benutzungszwang or "compulsory use". The regional authorities are
primarily responsible for monitoring and regulating the transportation of
wastes, as well as the actual operation of waste facilities.
6.5.2. The facilities
The HIM operates four hazardous waste facilities in Hessen. The most
recent is the Biebesheim incineration facility, completed in 1981, which is
considered by authorities to be the state-of-the-art in hazardous waste
incineration. Two chemical-physical treatment plants are in operation in
Frankfurt and Kassel, and a small landfill exists for the district of Marburg.
A large landfill has been planned for Mainflingen, but has encountered
extensive public and political opposition, and will probably not be con-
structed as planned [22]. In addition to these HIM facilities, Kali and Salz
AG operates an underground salt mine deposit near Herfa-Neurode.
Transfer stations for special wastes do not exist in Hessen, yet several
are planned and the HIM has been testing a waste pick-up service for small
generators to encourage the safe disposal of small quantities of special
wastes. Industrial customers that generate less than 500 kg/year can deliver
their wastes to a special truck and pay only DM 1 per kg. Citizens bringing
household toxic wastes may do so free. The system is financed by a tax on
waste production, its level depending on the quantity and type of waste
produced.
The Biebesheim incineration facility consists of two rotary kilns, after
burners, heat recovery, and a novel scrubbing system for the exhaust gases
[23]. The chemical-physical treatment plants at Frankfurt and Kassel use
standard technologies for cyanide destruction, neutralization, and precipita-
tion. Only solids or dewatered sludges, usually treatment residues, are per-
mitted in landfills in Hessen. Lacking landfill capacity, HIM exports most of
the treatment residues and other wastes for landfill to neighboring Liinder
(Baden-Wiirttemberg, Bavaria, Lower Saxony, and North Rhine-Westfalia).
Only the most toxic and persistent wastes, which cannot be easily treated,
are sent to the salt mines at Herfa-Neuroda. Until recently, wastes were
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imported to the salt mines from all states in the FRG without restriction,
but the Hessian government now restricts some wastes, particularly those
containing dioxin. Foreign wastes have been accepted on the condition that
the foreign authorities agree to cooperate with the FRG in other types of
waste management, such as nuclear waste disposal, but this practice is now
discouraged by the Hessian government.
Hazardous wastes may be treated, incinerated, or disposed of on-site
by the generator only with special permission from HIM; statistics on the
amounts handled on-site are not available. Existing disposal facilities may
continue to operate, but no new facilities, with the exception of waste water
treatment, will be permitted. Firms handling their own wastes are not per-
mitted to accept wastes from other generators.
In Hessen, regional authorities, which have licensing authority for all
industrial facilities, are encouraging waste reduction by requiring documen-
tation of waste reduction and recycling measures by those seeking permis-
sion from the planning authorities to construct new industrial facilities and
to expand existing ones. The authorities can deny this permission if the
facility owner does not include up-to-date measures for pollution reduction
and recycling processes. Owing to public scrutiny of new industrial facili-
ties, some facility owners have had to produce extensive documentation con-
cerning their efforts to reduce pollution and have been compelled to make
modifications in their processes [24].
6.5.3. The financial arrangements
The original industry owners of HIM financed the first facilities, but cost
difficulties forced the government of Hessen to become increasingly involved,
first by supplying low-interest loans, and later by directly subsidizing
investment expenditures. The Hessian government paid most of the capital
costs for the Biebesheim facility (DM 100 million) and recently, contributed
an additional subsidy of DM 9 million. The prices per tonne for disposing
of hazardous wastes by the HIM in 1981 were as in Table 6.5.
Table 6.5. Disposal of hazardous wastes in 1981 by HIM [25].
Cost
Method
Landfill
Chemical-physical treatment
Incineration on land
Disposal in salt mines
DM per tonne
120-360
60-660
400-3000
180
$ per tonne
(52-155)
(26-284)
(172-1290)
(81 )
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These prices do not reflect the full costs of disposal, but are increasingly
subsidized by the Hessian government. The subsidies are not passed on in
full to the facility users in price increases. One reason for this is that the
Hessian authorities are becoming concerned about underutilization of the
facilities, especially at Biebesheim. In order to fully utilize its 60 000
tonne/year capacity, about 17000 tonnes of waste per year are imported
from other Lander, such as Baden-Wiirttemberg, as well as from other
countries. In addition, 20000 tonnes per year are imported to the Herfa-
Neuroda salt mines [26].
Disposal prices in Hessen are higher than those in neighboring states
with less stringent regulations, as well as in other countries, e.g., the Ger-
man Democratic Republic, so there is a strong economic motivation for pro-
ducers to export their wastes. Except with special permission, the export of
hazardous wastes from Hessen is forbidden, and export of wastes to landfills
outside Hessen is performed only by HIM. This compulsory use of the facil-
ities, which effectively creates a statutory monopoly, is crucial for their
economic viability. This will be discussed in more detail in Section 6.8.
6.6 Policy Strategies for a Management Infrastructure
Bavaria and Hessen have built technologically advanced, integrated facilities
for the storage, treatment, and disposal of hazardous wastes with a steadily
rising investment of public funds. A high priority has been placed on rela-
tively expensive treatment and incineration technologies with relatively lit-
tle direct land disposal, and a statutory monopoly has been created by
requiring that firms within the Lander deliver their wastes to the facilities,
the costs being shared between industry and the taxpayer. This "public
monopoly" strategy stands in direct contrast, for example, to states in the
USA which rely on the private market to provide a network of usually spe-
cialized facilities, with an emphasis on land disposal and generally with no
public subsidies. In between these two contrasting systems are many
diverse economic and institutional possibilities for creating a management
infrastructure. The four key variables are:
(1) The extent of public versus private ownership and control.
(2) A monopolized versus competitive market.
(3) Integrated, comprehensive facilities versus segregated, specialized facil-
ities or on-site management.
(4) Cost allocation between industry and the public purse.
In the following, we examine the merits and drawbacks of each of
these four policy variables in light of the Bavarian and Hessian experiences,
as well as those of another German Land, North Rhine- Westfalia, and the
166 Risk Management and Hazardous Waste
USA. We discuss other organizational models with different combinations
of public ownership, physical and economic organization, and public subsid-
ization. This type of analysis, or any policy analysis, requires some notion
of the policy objectives, so our discussion begins with an elaboration of the
environmental objectives presented in Section 6.2, so as to include imple-
mentation and allocative considerations.
6.6.1. Policy objectives
The disposal of hazardous wastes in an environmentally acceptable way,
with minimum direct land disposal, a cautious use of incineration, and a
first priority on the reduction or recycling of wastes, is the environmental
goal for hazardous waste management that is generally agreed upon by
governments, environmentalist groups, and industry. Yet, inherent in even
this seemingly straightforward technical hierarchy is a fundamental stra-
tegic conflict: policies that encourage generators to reduce their wastes by
making disposal difficult and expensive will simultaneously and inevitably
lead generators to find loopholes in the regulations and possibly even to
dispose of their wastes illegally. Especially where voluntary compliance is
so important, many argue for the co-option of industry through economic
incentives or lower prices. Others argue that industry should pay the full
social costs of their polluting behavior, and the taxpayer should not subsi-
dize the management of hazardous wastes.
The tension between prom~ting the eventual reduction of hazardous
wastes and their more immediate "safe" treatment and disposal is compli-
cated by a second contradiction, which arises from the need to create a
guaranteed waste market to sustain the capital-intensive treatment and
disposal (T&D) investments. The high costs of these investments, if passed
on to the generator, will ultimately force the reduction of wastes (or their
diversion to cheaper alternatives) and consequently undermine the financial
viability of the facilities. Private investors are understandably reluctant to
enter a declining market. In sum, the long-term reduction of hazardous
wastes, which is the most environmentally sound waste management stra-
tegy, is in some ways incompatible with shorter term needs to create and
maintain a capital-intensive, expensive T&D infrastructure to handle the
large amounts of wastes presently generated.
This dialectic leads to the following four conflicting management goals,
where (1) and (2) condense the environmental objectives stated above and
(3) and (4) expand them by including the need for general compliance with
the system and for an equitable allocation of the costs:
(1) Management of currently generated hazardous wastes in the most
environmentally sound ways by promulgating a comprehensive control
system and establishing a technical and economic infrastructure.
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(2) The (long-term) reduction of hazardous wastes.
(3) Promotion of full compliance with the system by eliminating illegal
practices.
(4) Allocation of the full costs of hazardous waste management to the
generators.
Most national regulatory systems primarily address the first and third
of these goals by setting up a control system to track wastes from their
"cradle" to their "grave" and ensuring that the wastes are then properly
handled by licensed facilities. The success of this control system rests on
the existence of a network of facilities with sufficient capacity, a functioning
transportation system, and an adequate number of knowledgeable personnel
with sufficient resources to detect and stop illegal practices. Policies for
establishing this infrastructure, the topic of this chapter, range from full
government support in financing and operation of the requisite facilities to
more laissez faire strategies, which depend on the initiative of private
entrepreneurs. The second goal of reducing the quantity of hazardous
wastes can be promoted through various policy measures, including high
prices (even artificially high) for the treatment and disposal of wastes and
other economic incentives, such as a tax on wastes (waste-end tax) or subsi-
dies for recycling wastes, the financing and operation of a waste exchange,
government-supported innovation to find alternative production processes,
or an outright ban on the generation of certain very hazardous wastes.
Voluntary compliance with the system, (or the third goal) might be
promoted through lowered prices to the generators made possible by public
subsidies, or by other economic policies, such as an assessed tax on industry
and a refund on wastes delivered to the facilities (the bottle deposit con-
cept), or by making the generators clearly responsible or liable for any dam-
age resulting from their wastes. Alternatively, the authorities could force
compliance with more frequent inspections and other enforcement measures
combined with formidable sanctions. The fourth objective of allocating the
full costs of hazardous waste management to the producers of the wastes
(i.e., adherence to the polluter-pays principle) would mean eliminating any
public subsidies that are passed on as lower prices to the generators. It
would also require measures to guarantee that industry pay the full social
cost of unexpected pollution, such as implementing an industry-financed
post-closure fund for hazardous waste facilities and other funds to cover pol-
lution damages, as well as compulsory insurance or other proof of financial
means.
The above goals could be elaborated still further by including institu-
tional and procedural concerns, such as maintaining trust and confidence in
the public institutions responsible for hazardous waste management and
ensuring equitable procedures for implementation and oversight. These
concerns are addressed elsewhere in this book; for our purposes the above
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list serves to illustrate the types of policy trade-off in which we are most
interested.
Bavaria and Hessen have chosen to place the highest priority on the
first goal, but also to promote the second and third goals by supposedly set-
ting the price of disposal high enough to encourage waste reduction, but not
so high as to create a large illegal trade. This balancing act between the
need for both high and low prices has been explicitly addressed by the
Bavarian and Hessian governments in trying to compromise between the
demands of environmentalists to reduce wastes and the demands of facility
operators to ensure a waste market. It appears that wastes have been sub-
stantially reduced, but there are huge uncertainties in any estimates of the
extent of illegal dumping and exports. The fourth goal has received the
lowest priority, and Bavarian and Hessian taxpayers assume a large and
increasing share of the T &D costs.
In the remainder of this chapter, we focus on policy choices for estab-
lishing an economic and institutional infrastructure for the treatment and
disposal of currently generated 'hazardous wastes in an environmentally
acceptable way, or the implementation of the first goal. A detailed discus-
sion of the range of policies for fulfilling the other three goals is beyond the
scope of this chapter; yet, the inevitable compromises that will be made by
pursuing anyone goal must be addressed and consequently reference will
frequently be made to policies that promote the other three management
objectives.
6.6.2. Organizational options for a physical and
economic infrastructure
There are four fundamental policy questions related to the types of physical
T&D facilities and their economic organization, which are illustrated by the
"policy tree" shown in Figure 6.2. The most basic question concerns the
extent to which the government assumes responsibility for hazardous waste
disposal, through such means as public ownership or subsidization. A
related question concerns the economic organization of the facilities; the
possibilities exist for creating and sustaining a public or private monopoly
by restricting entry of other firms and assuring a waste catchment market
through such means as export controls. A third branch of the "policy tree"
represents the choice between integrated and specialized facilities, with the
caveat that the distinction is not clearly demarcated nor is the choice for or
against integrated facilities wholly separate from the choice for or against a
monopoly investment venture. The primary distinction between integrated
and specialized facilities is not so much the physical layout, since even
integrated facilities may have specialized units not physically together, but
is operational and concerns who, in the chain of hazardous waste handlers,
decides on the treatment and disposal method for a particular waste. For
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integrated facilities, all (or almost all) wastes are handed over to the facility
operators where the technology (landfill, incineration, etc.) for their disposal
is internally decided; alternatively, for specialized, segregated facilities this
choice is made by the generators and/or transporters in deciding where to
deliver their wastes. A fourth choice or branch on the "policy tree", again
not wholly separate from the other choices, concerns who ultimately pays
the costs of hazardous waste disposal - industry or the taxpayer. The
government can subsidize treatment and disposal facilities through such
means as investment credits, lowered interest rates on capital investments,
tax breaks, or more straightforward grants to cover capital costs and
operating expenses.
As shown in Figure 6.2 various combinations of these policy variables
can lead to some 13 different forms of economic and physical organizations
for a treatment and disposal infrastructure. The two extremes of govern-
ment intervention are represented by the Bavarian and Hessian systems and
to those operating in most US states. Bavaria and Hessen have publicly
owned, monopoly facilities, which are integrated and operate with large
public subsidies, in contrast with states in the USA with privately owned,
competitive, and specialized facilities, which generally operate with no pub-
lic money. As illustrated, the Bavarian and Hessian systems are a subgroup
of four possible variations that we call the Public-Monopoly Model, depend-
ing on the extent of integration and public subsidy. The US model is one of
four variations that we call the Private-Competitive Model. In between, we
find different combinations of private and regulated monopolies, which we
call here the Public Utility Model. We could also imagine hybrids, where
countries or regions operate with both private and public T &D facilities, in
the same way that some economies incorporate mixed nationalized and
private firms. It must be emphasized again that this "policy tree" does not
represent a sequence of decisions in the traditional decision-analytical sense,
but serves only to dissect the three models into four interrelated policy vari-
ables. This dissection is useful in keeping separate discussions of, for exam-
ple, the merits and pitfalls of public ownership from the merits and pitfalls
of public subsidies, where often the two are intertwined. As shown in Fig-
ure 6.2, even private firms can operate with public subsidies. Also, the sys-
tem of regulation has to be overlaid upon this economic-institutional pic-
ture, though the two dimensions interact considerably.
The success of any hazardous waste management system will depend
ultimately on its compatibility with the economic, institutional, and politi-
cal culture in which it is expected to work. Even seemingly independent
parts of the system, such as the technologies employed, cannot be assumed
transferable to other countries without sometimes substantial changes in the
technology itself or in the institutions that have responsibility for its opera-
tion. In what follows, we examine the more important "policy branches"
within the general context of the Hessian and Bavarian hazardous waste
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Figure 6.2. A "policy tree" for the management of hazardous wastes.
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management systems and as constrained and influenced by the economic
and political context of these Lander. Because of the different management
philosophy in the state of North Rhine-Westfalia, and generally in the USA,
we highlight these systems as comparative examples.
6.7. Public versus Private Ownership: The First Branch
of the Policy Tree
6.7.1. The USA and the FRG
The most striking and significant feature of the Bavarian and Hessian sys-
tems, especially in comparison with other countries and other Lander, is the
extent of public ownership of the waste disposal facilities. By financing cap-
ital investments and taking responsibility for operations, the Land and local
governments have, in effect, assumed responsibility for the risks of hazard-
ous waste management. The liability and responsibility of the generator for
the long-term disposal of hazardous wastes ends once they have been ceded
to the public authorities. This contrasts with the principle of generator
responsibility in many other countries.
In the USA, for example, the strong tradition of private ownership has
led to a predominant "stick" philosophy of government regulation. Almost
without exception, hazardous wastes are collected and handled by private
entrepreneurs, and a large percentage of wastes are handled on-site. The
private networks of generators, transporters, and facility operators are regu-
lated under the 1976 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), its
accompanying Administrative Orders, and the 1983 Reauthorization.
RCRA lays out a broad framework for the comprehensive control of hazard-
ous wastes, where the details of this framework have been developed within
the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and promulgated as
regulations on May 19, 1980. Under Section 7003 of RCRA, the EPA can
bring legal action against anyone who handles wastes in a way that presents
an imminent hazard, so site operators, landowners, transporters, and even
generators are all potentially liable.
The FRG, in contrast, has less severe sanctions for non-compliance
with hazardous waste regulations and virtually no concept of generator lia-
bility for environmental or public health damages. The stronger emphasis
in the FRG on the "carrots" versus the US emphasis on the "sticks" is
firmly rooted in the political cultures of these two countries. In the FRG, as
in many other European countries, there is a tradition of
government-industry cooperation in formulating and implementing regula-
tions (for a discussion of this point in the context of the preparation of the
hazardous waste lists, see Chapter 5). In general, European governments
have a relatively large role in supporting and sometimes subsidizing indus-
trial development. In contrast, US government-industry relations are far
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more formally distant and adversarial, especially with regard to environ-
mental issues, as shown most strongly by the lack of consultation with
industry, at least in the early stages of developing environmental standards
and regulations.
Irrespective of this contrast, the FRG and the USA share a "market"
ideology, and the respective governments are reluctant to provide services
that can be accommodated by private enterprise. This philosophy is
reflected, for example, by the the FRG Council of Environmental Advisors,
which has advised against the substitution of private waste disposal firms
by municipal projects in government programs for the construction of new
waste disposal plants [27]. It seems, therefore, that in some respects public
or quasi-public hazardous waste facilities in Bavaria and Hessen are as
much an anomaly in the FRG as they would be in the USA. Their present
existence can be better understood by looking at the historical conditions
under which they were created.
The HIM facilities in Hessen began wholly as a private venture on the
part of Hessian industries to exploit a market for waste disposal; similarly,
the GSB facilities in Bavaria were created by the initiative of private indus-
try with only a small amount of government financial support. Since there
did not exist at that time a well-defined or well-organized group of smaller
private firms that handled wastes in these Lander, the individual govern-
ments did not meet with political opposition from a waste-handling industry
when they increased subsidies to, and effectively took over, the HIM and
GSB operations. In fact, the government was supporting the interests of
private enterprise - not that of the waste disposers, but that of the waste
generators. The ZVSMM has a different history, being from the start a
fully public enterprise; for this reason it is an exceptional case even in the
FRG. In contrast, the USA supports a powerful and growing industry of
small waste handlers that could strongly oppose the creation of government
facilities.
The entry of the Hessian and Bavarian authorities into what had been
the clear domain of the private, commercial sector (as in the USA) switched
the terms of the hazardous waste problem from the regulation and control
of the private facilities to the management or "absorption" of the environ-
mental risks presented by hazardous wastes (for a discussion of these prob-
lem definitions, see Chapter 3). The Lander appear to have identified them-
selves as "risk managers" with priority on preventing public health or
environmental damage, as evidenced by their continuing efforts to support
the facilities financially, to participate in their management, and, at the
same time, to encourage the reduction of wastes.
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The arguments for and against public ownership of T&D facilities are so
intertwined with those for and against a monopolized market, integrated
facilities, and public financing, that a complete separation is artificial. In
theory, smaller, specialized facilities could also be publicly owned [(3) and
(4) in Figure 6.2], but the advantages of this organization are not so clear.
From the Bavarian and Hessian experiences, we find that public involve-
ment was necessary both to finance the large capital investments needed for
the rotary-kiln incineration facility and the secure landfills (ZVSMM), and
to cover the losses these facilities incurred once in operation (GSB and
HIM). Since financial subsidies were deemed essential, the public authori-
ties tied these subsidies to ever-increasing public management and control.
The gradual slide toward public ownership of the GSB and HIM facili-
ties in a country with a strong market ideology was viewed positively by the
Lander for promoting their environmental objectives. Public management
(and public subsidies) would allow greater attention to be given to meeting
environmental needs and still provide T&D services to industry at
"affordable" prices. This argument for public ownership is tied to public
subsidies, and from Figure 6.2 it is apparent that many institutional
arrangements can be coupled with public support to keep the prices (in this
case) competitive with out-of-state management alternatives.
The rationale for greater public control of the T&D facilities in
Bavaria and Hessen, however, went beyond that of transferring some of the
disposal costs to the taxpayer through public subsidies. Among many Land
officials there is a deeply entrenched mistrust of private enterprise in the
hazardous waste business, rooted in a history of bad experiences [28]. Mis-
givings about the ability of the private market to handle wastes in the most
environmentally correct way and to assure the long-term security of hazard-
ous waste land disposal motivated the authorities to opt for public owner-
ship. Furthermore, as seen in the ZVSMM case in Bavaria, public owner-
ship actually pushed the development of more environmentally acceptable
management technologies.
Another argument for public ownership and control, which was part
and parcel of the underlying philosophy that hazardous waste management
exists for environmental control and not as a profit-oriented enterprise, was
the obligation on the part of the public authorities to accept all wastes
delivered to the facilities, not simply select those with the highest economic
value. Authorities feared that the private market would not have the flexi-
bility and breadth to serve the whole range of waste generators, including
those producing "dirty" wastes with little or no fuel value for incineration.
A public enterprise with the philisophy "environment before profit" could
take these wastes and spread the losses incurred. Besides serving only part
of the waste handling needs, the Bavarian and Hessian authorities also had
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reservations about the ability or will of private enterprise to ensure the
long-term security of hazardous waste land disposal. A public authority, it
was thought, would have a longer term interest in the continuing measures
necessary to protect future generations.
These reservations expressed by the Lander about private enterprise
serving environmental needs can, in theory, be countered by appropriate
regulatory measures, such as requiring post-closure funds to cover the costs
of long-term maintenance for land disposal facilities. The "dirty" wastes
could also, in theory, be accommodated by private enterprise, although at
substantially higher prices, which might create greater temptations for ille-
gal disposal.
While a regulatory program may, in theory, serve the same environ-
mental needs, experience in many countries has shown the difficulties in
planning, permitting, and monitoring private disposal facilities, which are
complicated by a lack of funds for hiring the requisite personnel and the
general nonavailability of trained personnel. A central, public, or quasi-
public facility concentrates expertise on the surveillance and control of a
comprehensive management facility, where the management decisions can
be made with environmental goals as a priority. On the other side, the
absence of competition and the profit motive in waste management may
also lead to the well-known tendency for public operations to increase their
bureaucracy and operate inefficiently.
The choice between private and public facilities thus appears to be
viewed as a trade-off between the almost inevitable inefficiencies of public
enterprise and the sometimes substantial difficulties in monitoring private
facilities to assure that environmental objectives are met. The assumption
underlying this trade-off, however, is that public authorities and public
managers are themselves environmentally conscious or that they have the
will and ability to promote the environmental objectives discussed above.
This appears to have been the case in Bavaria and Hessen, but cannot be
assumed to be universal. In the UK, for example, local authority disposal
sites are allegedly worse managed and less supervised than their privately
run counterparts. Public enterprises generally cannot claim to be
forerunners in environmental innovation, and a mismanaged public enter-
prise can be environmentally more damaging since public industries are
notoriously subject to less inspection and control from other governmental
authorities. As an official in North Rhine-Westfalia has pointed out, a
private facility can be threatened with closure [29]. The lack of regulatory
scrutiny may be seriously compounded by the fact that citizens generally
have more limited recourse to challenge or receive compensation against
actions of government than against actions of private firms. This may be
most serious in the USA, where liability on the part of waste handlers has
become a strong motivation for environmental protection.
Bavarian and Hessian Hazardous Waste Disposal Systems 175
In sum, the environmental advantages of a public waste-management
enterprise hinge critically on the experience and consciousness of the civil
servants in charge, especially since they are subject to few external checks.
The lack of direct public liability may lead to considering combined public
and industrial financing and control. Industrial cooperation in the manage-
ment of hazardous waste facilities might serve as a valuable policing
influence within the community of generators, especially if the waste genera-
tors retain some joint liability for the quality of disposal. Firms that prac-
tice careful management will then have a strong stake in ensuring that other
users do not expose them to liability charges or a bad press. In addition,
many problems encountered in gaining the cooperation of the large indus-
trial firms can be avoided if they become partners in the disposal venture.
A waste expert from the Bavarian Bureau of Environmental Protection sees
this cooperation as the essential ingredient in creating regional facilities,
and even more difficult to establish than the financial base. The good
cooperation between industry and government in Bavaria allowed a con-
sensus regarding a hazardous waste management system to be reached
quickly, and the GSB was founded after only a little more than a year of
negotiations [30].
Alternatively, this close partnership between government and indus-
try, which is more typical of European than US regulatory practices, can
effectively diffuse control through co-option of the regulators. Advocates of
more cooperative forms of environmental practices argue that this
disadvantage is overcome by the implementation advantages of collabora-
tion and compromise between industry and government [31, 32]. A more
adversarial system must also reach such compromises, but this is usually
accomplished through lengthy and expensive court proceedings, often in a
climate of bad faith.
A closely related alternative to both the public enterprise and the
hybrid public-private enterprise is the public utility model shown in Figure
6.2. Here the T&D facilities are privately owned, but closely regulated, and
their market is assured. We discuss this model below within the context of
monopoly strategies.
6.8. Monopoly versus Competition: The Second Branch of
the Policy Tree
Bavaria and Hessen have created systems for disposing of hazardous wastes
which, by emphasizing treatment and incineration over direct land disposal,
have reduced the environmental risks of hazardous wastes below those of
neighboring Lander and countries. This system has its price and, although
the costs are spread between the citizens of the state and industry,
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hazardous waste disposal is still more expensive in these Lander. Even con-
sidering transportation costs, it would often pay generators to ship their
wastes across the borders for land disposal rather than send them to the
regional facilities within Hessen and Bavaria for incineration. To counter
this prqblem the Land authorities have passed legislation forbidding the
export of hazardous wastes without special permission and requiring all gen-
erators who ship their wastes off-site to deliver these wastes to the Land
facilities. This Benutzungszwang, or compulsory-use clause, has been one of
the most crucial, and most controversial, measures taken by the Land leg-
islatures in their support of the waste management system. The importance
of creating a monopoly for the public facilities can be appreciated by exam-
ining the near failure of a similar facility in the neighboring Land of North
Rhine- Westfalia.
6.8.1. Experience in North Rhine-Westfalia
North Rhine- Westfalia offers a useful contrast to its neighboring Lander,
Hessen and Bavaria, in that it has attempted a mixture of private and pub-
lic facilities for hazardous waste management. North Rhine-Westfalia is the
FRG's major hazardous waste producing Land, generating nearly twice as
much hazardous wastes as the other ten Lander combined [33]. The highly
industrialized and densely populated Ruhr region of North Rhine- Westfalia,
which is organized administrativery into autonomous cities and counties,
has instituted a regional structure, the Kommuna/verband Ruhrgebiet
(KVR), to deal with common problems such as hazardous waste manage-
ment. Recognizing a need for facilities with higher environmental standards
than those offered by private entrepreneurs, the KVR has planned and par-
tially carried out the construction of a central incineration facility (Herten),
central multicomponent and special-waste land disposal facilities, and four
collection centers. This system is fully financed by the KVR.
This plan for an independent public system to supplement the private
waste-handling sector has not been fully successful. The incineration facil-
ity at Herten has experienced serious financial problems, due partly to
unanticipated technical difficulties, but more importantly to, until recently,
a lack of financial or regulatory assistance from the Land government. The
highly priced services offered at Herten could not compete with less
advanced alternatives offered by the private market and by other Lander.
For example, a generator of varnish residue could legally choose whether to
pay DM450/tonne for incineration at Herten, DM200/tonne for its storage
at the Herfa-Neuroda underground deposit, DM80/tonne for its deposit in a
special waste land disposal facility, or, after mixing it with sand,
DM5/tonne for its deposit in a construction rubble landfill [34]. Even strict
standardization and regulation at the Land level would not prevent
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generators from taking advantage of laxer regulations in other Lander,
unless an export ban was also successfully imposed.
The crucial difference between the Herten operation and those in
Hessen and Bavaria has been the lack of compulsory use (Benutzungszwang)
of the public or semi-public facilities. The problem has been partly admin-
istrative in that the KVR has no legal authority to impose restrictions, and
the Land authorities have not passed supporting legislation to create an
effective public monopoly at the expense of the many smaller private
handlers. Subsidies from the Land government, which reduce the Herten
prices to competitive levels, were the only remaining option to keep the
facility in operation, and this option has been recently taken. The current
price subsidies do not, however, result in competitive prices with other legal
management possibilities. For this reason, the government has appealed to
hazardous waste generators and collectors to send a proportion of their
wastes to Herten or risk the possibility of stronger legislation requiring full
use of the facility.
The experience in North Rhine- Westfalia underscores the importance
of the historical conditions in which the relatively successful waste manage-
ment systems in Hessen and Bavaria were put into place. A desire on the
part of public authorities to finance an environmentally comprehensive sys-
tem of management facilities, combined with the explicit cooperation of
waste generators and little political opposition from the initially nonexistent
private waste-disposal industry, were important, though not entirely
sufficient. In addition, the Land authorities needed the legal authority to
assure a market for their facilities, which is also proving critical in North
Rhine- Westfalia. In the absence of standardized regulations across the
Lander, as was the explicit goal of the US Congress in passing the RCRA
legislation (and is now planned for the Lander), it is essential for a state sys-
tem to exclude waste exports as competition for its facilities. The legal
power of Hessen and Bavaria in establishing compulsory use, though contr-
oversial in the FRG and in Europe generally, reflects the greater powers of
the Lander compared with their US counterparts. In the USA, a
compulsory-use clause would violate the interstate commerce clause of the
constitution, which was recently upheld in a famous case involving New Jer-
sey and Philadelphia.
eSB, HIM, and ZVSMM have, therefore, operated as statutory mono-
polies. With the free-market ideology in the FRG, it is not surprising that
the Benutzungszwang, and especially the export restrictions, has come under
attack both within the FRG and from the outside. The European Com-
munity (EC), in keeping with its mandate to promote free trade among
member countries, is presently issuing a legal challenge to the Bavarian and
Hessian export controls. This could be one of the first cases in which a
country or region will not be allowed to keep its pollution within its own
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borders, and shows a direct conflict between the aims of the free market and
environmental concerns.
The FRG is responding to pressures to allow interstate transfers of
hazardous wastes by changing the system and, in so doing, promoting uni-
formity between the Lander. As planned, the hazardous waste lists will be
revised such that a management method is mandated for each listed waste.
Insofar as the hazardous waste lists conform, this will eliminate the current
cost advantages found in exporting wastes to other Lander with less
stringent requirements. Under this revised system, relaxation of the
Benutzungszwang is not likely to create out-of-state competition for the
Bavarian and Hessian facilities, given their subsidized prices. However, the
prospect of sending wastes out of the country, especially to the GDR where
disposal prices are considerably lower, would remain problematic.
6.8.2. A natural monopoly?
An important question arises whether the cost advantage of one large
integrated system, such as HIM, GSB, or ZVSMM, would effectively result
in a monopoly if lower cost disposal methods were disallowed, i.e., if the
new listing system in the FRG went into effect, and if prices were not subsi-
dized. In other words, are the economies of scale sufficiently great to create
a natural monopoly? Some recent evidence suggests that there are only
small economies of scale with respect to incineration, indicating that several
smaller facilities might operate with the same average costs as one large
facility [35]. If this is indeed the case, there are no economic grounds for
operating on a large scale, although there may be compelling institutional
reasons, which are discussed below. This also means that if the government
did not intervene with capital subsidies, etc., yet did require expensive
incineration, treatment, and secure land disposal of hazardous wastes, then
a configuration of smaller scale, competing facilities would likely develop to
meet this demand.
If there are no economies of scale in the treatment and disposal of
hazardous wastes in an environmentally acceptable manner, then there are
no economic grounds for the government to subsidize the starting capital
necessary for large-scale operations or to regulate the monopoly prices. If,
alternatively, significant economies of scale can be shown to exist or if there
are other reasons for operating as a monopoly, then the government could,
as shown in Figure 6.2, opt to finance and operate the integrated facilities
as a public venture [(1) and (2)] or alternatively as a privately owned and
operated monopoly regulated by government [(6) and (7)].
This latter "public utility model" has a long history and precedent in
providing such goods as electricity, water, gas, and other public utilities.
Generally, these privately owned firms are profit maximizers, but their
prices (and other practices) are closely regulated by the public authorities.
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In many respects, it appears that the management of hazardous industrial
wastes would fit naturally into this model, and the wealth of experience and
tradition with regulated public monopolies in many countries would greatly
facilitate acceptance of this type of organization for hazardous waste
management. However, experience with public utilities regarding environ-
mental protection is mixed, and more research would be needed to ascertain
the conditions under which this operating model would best serve the public
interest. Alternatively, the system could be organized into several, segre-
gated facilities specializing in the treatment of particular wastes, where
these facilities are each assured a collection area in a similar way as oil is
collected in the FRG [(3), (4), (8), and (9)1. These "monopolies on a
smaller scale" would operate in the absence of competition with the ensuing
inefficiencies, but might create some advantages of an assured market and
of government oversight.
Ultimately, the question of a monopolized hazardous waste system
versus a competitive one hinges on both the economies-of-scale question (yet
to be definitively resolved) and on the question of organization - whether
there are inherent disadvantages in the competitive multiple-actor model for
hazardous wastes life-cycles. Here we cannot easily divorce the arguments
from a related concept of "economies of scope" across the disposal and
treatment of several related hazardous materials. There may be compelling
reasons to centralize the location and management of hazardous wastes
unrelated to the technical economies of scale. The key to these economies of
scope lies in the economic and political costs of siting hazardous waste facili-
ties and in the governance of the ongoing waste disposal activity. These
important considerations are discussed below.
6.9. Integrated versus Segregated Facilities: The Third
Branch of the Policy Tree
6.9.1. The general problem
An important choice facing many regional or Land authorities is whether to
encourage the construction of regional, integrated facilities to serve a
diverse clientele of hazardous waste generators or whether, instead, to
encourage a greater number of more specialized facilities. The distinction,
however, is not entirely clear-cut, since specialized facilities may serve a
large number of generators, and regional systems may not be integrated but
consist of several more specialized facilities. Nor is the choice unrelated to
the question of public financing and ownership since, as we have pointed out
above, the large capital investment in regional facilities will probably,
though not inevitably, require public financial support as well as
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government intervention to assure the operation of the monopoly. Special-
ized facilities may either operate competitively or as monopolies with an
assured area of operation or waste catchment region.
Arguably, the most important differentiating characteristic of an
integrated facility concerns the point in the waste life-cycle at which the
decision is made as to how the waste will be handled: whether incinerated at
high temperatures, treated and disposed of on land, mixed with other
wastes, etc. Where the facilities include all or most of the possible handling
techniques integrated under one management, this decision is logically made
internally; if the facilities are specialized, the choice is logically made by the
generator and/or transporter in deciding where to ship the waste (although
clearly it can be shipped only to facilities licensed to take it). This distinc-
tion becomes important when considering the extreme complexity of a
waste-handling system made up of thousands of autonomous generators,
transfer station operators, and transporters with sometimes limited
knowledge of the properties of their wastes or the full treatment network
available. It may be that the most important element of control is then
simplification, and an integrated facility, where the only rule is that the
generators deliver their wastes, significantly reducing the system's complex-
ity. An integrated waste management facility, by condensing the hazardous
waste life cycle into a relatively comprehensive regulatory-management
organization, significantly reduces waste life-cycle indeterminacies (see
chapter 3), thus enhancing effective control. The authorities can better
oversee the operation of a small number of facilities, which operate with a
staff large enough to include environmental experts, than a multitude of
smaller operations. The technical staff may also be better equipped to cope
with any novel problems that may arise.
Another very cogent argument for concentrating facilities at one loca-
tion is the increasing difficulties encountered in siting hazardous waste facil-
ities [36]. There may be significant costs in obtaining permission for and in
legitimizing the decision for a site. According to many observers, the siting
of new disposal facilities is the most urgent problem in the area of hazar-
dous waste management. Even in the FRG, with present overcapacity in
some states, projections of hazardous waste generation and the lead time
necessary for capital-intensive facilities continue to make the siting problem
salient. Obtaining public approval to site waste facilities may be the most
difficult obstacle in implementing the preferred waste management
hierarchy.
While central facilities may be better equipped and easier to monitor,
they have some drawbacks. One important problem concerns the distances
that transporters must haul wastes, with the consequent increase in trans-
portation costs and risks (the relative additional costs are considered to be
fairly insignificant, but the risks may be substantial) [37]. The surveillance
of waste transfers is perhaps the most difficult element to manage with
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regard to the requisite manpower and individual checks [38]. Increasing the
hazardous waste traffic will undoubtedly raise significant administrative
difficulties.
A second disadvantage of larger facilities is the potential dangers of
dealing. with wastes in large quantities. The bureaucracy of the facility
becomes more enmeshed in administrative detail as waste traffic increases,
especially at that point where there is no longer an identifiable and stable
relationship between the handler and his clientele. In other words, small
specialized firms have the advantage of a relatively constant stream of
wastes, which they are experienced in handling and of which they are gen-
erally clear about the composition.
6.9.2. Experience in the USA
In 1974, the EPA prepared a report for the US Congress which advocated
regional, centralized processing facilities for hazardous wastes [39]. No
suggestion was made that the government might actually build or run these
facilities, but it might give assistance by creating a franchise system with
territorial limits [variations (6) and (7) of the public utility model].
Although hazardous waste legislation was subsequently passed and is now
being implemented, there exist to date no integrated facilities in the USA of
a kind similar to those existing in Hessen and Bavaria. The hazardous
waste industry remains in private hands [variation (13) of the private com-
petitive model], and neither private entrepreneurs nor public officials have
sensed a secure market for large, regional facilities sufficient to justify the
substantial capital investments necessary. This does not mean that there
are no large operations, however. By 1980, four major firms took nearly
half the sales revenue of the entire industry. [40] Chemical Waste Manage-
ment, Inc., for instance, has an estimated 40% share of the US market and
provides a variety of treatment, disposal, and storage facilities; yet, it
largely offers land disposal and consequently has not invested the large
sums of capital necessary for more incineration and treatment technologies.
Large-scale, rotary-kiln incinerators do exist, but they usually serve a fixed
and identifiable number of industries requiring a specific service, especially
the incineration of PCB wastes.
There have been continuing attempts to establish privately financed,
regional processing facilities. Rollins Environmental Services (RES), which
began operations in 1969 in New Jersey, planned in the early 1970s a
national network of 25 integrated facilities, as well as extensive on-site
efforts to reduce waste-stream volumes at the source [variation (11) of the
private competitive model]. From the start RES favored incineration,
though it offered (and offers) other methods. Its ambitious plans for
comprehensive and environmentally superior facilities were not realized,
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since it became apparent from the lack of government interference that
there was not a market for expensive treatment and incineration of hazard-
ous wastes.
More recently, the California-based IT Corporation received the neces-
sary permits to build a major integrated processing facility that offered land
disposal, chemical and physical treatment, and rotary-kiln incineration in
Louisiana, with a large initial capital investment of approximately $100 mil-
lion [variation (11) of the private competitive model]. IT recognized that
this was a high-risk venture, but believed the relatively strict hazardous
waste regulations in Louisiana would create a market for its comprehensive
and expensive services, including advisory services to industries to help
them reduce their wastes. After vocal and organized public opposition,
however, IT has indefinitely postponed the project.
Experience in Bavaria, Hessen, and North Rhine- Westfalia gives rea-
son to be pessimistic about the commercial chances of ventures such as IT's,
unless the state governments offer strong regulatory (and financial) support.
It may prove necessary to give franchise rights to establish a private mono-
poly l?y restricting the entry of smaller firms that could capture specialized
niches of the market. A ban on landfill for priority wastes would assure a
certain market for an incineration facility. Yet, in the absence of standard-
ized practices in neighboring states, these measures would be of little help if
the state cannot restrict exports of wastes. Finally, the long-term prospects
for a large, integrated facility with many wastes being incinerated at high
costs appear limited by the capacity shown in Hessen and Bavaria for gen-
erators to reduce their wastes.
The future of comprehensive, regional facilities in the USA, thus,
depends, on the developing role of government regulation. Since it is
unlikely that state or local governments will provide large subsidies, there
must be a predictable market for private investors to exploit. The most
recent amendments to RCRA will eventually ban land disposal of a
significant number of hazardous wastes, and will thus promote more expen-
sive technologies with reduced environmental risks. The new regulations, if
enforced uniformly across states, coupled with an industrial structure
characterized by many smaller heterogeneous generators, may provide such
a market. For other industrial structures, we can expect increased invest-
ment in on-site facilities as well as smaller entrepreneurs capturing the
market offered by the many developing niches of hazardous waste streams.
6.10. Allocation of Costs: The Fourth Branch
of the Policy Tree
At the core of any hazardous-waste management system is the question of
who pays the costs. Despite agreements in the OECD [41] that industrial
Bavarian and Hessian Hazar-dous Waste Disposal Systems 183
polluters should pay the full cost of their pollution, in Europe there IS a
strong tradition of the government picking up the tab for environmental
protection, in contrast, for example, to the USA, where the government
hesitates to aid industry directly. In the Netherlands, for instance, govern-
ment officials generally agree that it would be politically untenable to insti-
tute a "superfund" tax on industry as a way of paying the clean-up costs for
polluting dump sites [see Chapter 4].
In the FRG, there was an early reluctance on the part of the Hessian
and Bavarian authorities to provide public subsidies to the hazardous waste
facilities. The early intentions of HIM, ZVSMM, and GSB were to operate
as nonprofit enterprises, but to charge industry the full cost of disposal.
The incineration of wastes, however, proved so costly in comparison with
land disposal that it was politically difficult to require the firms in these two
states to pay significantly higher disposal costs than in the rest of the FRG.
Subsidies from the public purse were not, however, in the spirit of allowing
industry a "free ride" since treatm~nt prices remain relatively high in these
two Lander as compared with disposal costs elsewhere.
As emphasized above, passing large disposal costs on to the genera-
tors, which may have the very positive environmental effect of reducing the
generation of wastes, will create a dilemma to the facility investors by
reducing their market of wastes and a dilemma to enforcement agents by
encouraging generators or handlers to dispose of their wastes illegally.
There is a very delicate balance between financial viability, incentives for
waste reduction, and enforcement. We now discuss each of these problems
in turn.
6.10.1. The declining waste market
The GSB and HIM facilities, and to a lesser extent the ZVSMM, are trou-
bled with serious overcapacity. Predictions of waste generation that formed
the basis for construction of the plants greatly overestimated the quantities
of wastes to be generated, which have remained constant for the past
several years. Although stricter air pollution and water pollution controls
have resulted in the generation of more solid wastes, waste reductions due
to the higher management costs and slow economic growth have combined
to counteract any increase in the waste generation rate. The shortfall in
waste delivered to the facilities is further aggravated by the fact that the
wastes delivered are becoming dirtier. The high cost of treatment and
incineration is prompting firms to find their own uses for the cleaner wastes
and to utilize more efficient recycling technologies.
From the waste-reduction perspective, a measure of success of a high-
priced facility is how quickly it manages to put itself out of business. But
this strategy presents an obvious dilemma to the public authorities and
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underscores the conflicting institutional objectives. From the point of view
of a government agency trying to raise funds for a large capital investment,
the prospect of medium- or long-term bankruptcy of the operation is less
than helpful. It is not surprising that in the Netherlands, where the author-
ities are trying to promote privately financed, integrated facilities, there is a
great deal of ministerial interest in creating and sustaining a "waste indus-
try", in direct conflict with the stated aims of environmentalist groups for
reducing wastes. In contrast, the Hessian government has encouraged
regional planning authorities to take direct measures to reduce pollution at
the source by making it a condition that new industrial facilities or
modifications incorporate the best available technologies to reduce pollution
and wastes. This ministerial policy has aggravated the serious problem of
overcapacity of the existing facilities and (illegal) export to other Lander,
which has resulted primarily from cost differences in different Lander.
According to the prestigious Federal Council of Environmental Advisors,
there is a significant difference in price structure between the older and
newer facilities, which is one reason why the advanced installations are
underused, while a "special waste traffic" to inadequate waste disposal facil-
ities is in full swing [42].
There are some partially effective stop-gap measures to the dilemma of
waste reduction facility maintenance, as illustrated by the following meas-
ures taken by Hessen and Bavaria to offset decreasing supplies of hazardous
wastes:
(1) Expansion of the universe of hazardous wastes by adding wastes to the
list.
(2) Restriction of the amount of wastes that are exported by requiring all
wastes, unless officially exempted, to be brought to the public facilities
(Benutzungszwang or "compulsory use").
(3) Restriction of on-site disposal.
(4) Importing wastes from other states and countries.
These measures represent a compromise between the conflicting objectives
of reducing wastes and sustaining the capital-intensive facilities. Yet, they
will not suffice in the long term if the costs to the waste producers remain
high [43].
The opposing institutional objectives prescribed by sustaining highly
qualified facilities and, at the same time, reducing hazardous waste genera-
tion are even further complicated, since any price incentive for reducing
wastes is also an incentive to dispose of wastes illegally. Inevitably, high
prices for waste disposal encourage both activities. The success of an
environmentally adequate, but costly, management system depends ulti-
mately on whether it encourages more legitimate recycling and reduction
measures while controlling illegitimate dumping, burning, or exporting.
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With thousands of diffuse firms producing and transporting hazardous
wastes and the easily accessible opportunities for evasion, full control is
impossible, especially considering the limited funds available in state budg-
ets for this purpose. As we have spelled out, a serious disparity arises
between the legislative efforts to control hazardous wastes and the imple-
mentation of this legislation; this has been referred to as the "enforcement
gap" [44] or "executive deficit" [45].
The most important regulatory "stick" for enforcing compliance with
the hazardous waste laws are fines which, in the FRG, can be as high as
DM 100000 (US$44000); however, this may not be high enough to dissuade
some generators from profitably abusing the law. In the FRG, there are no
criminal penalties. The Waste Disposal Act does not explicitly address
questions of liability for environmental damages resulting from improper
waste disposal practices. Violation of the waste regulations is, however, a
violation of civil law, which may result in liability for damages. Special
regulations apply to accidents during the transport of waste which assign
strict liability, i.e., it is not necessary to prove the fault of the driver. In
addition, the law requires that transporters and disposers be insured against
possible accidents.
In the USA, the "sticks" available to the EPA and the states to
enforce the regulators are of two types: punishment and liability. The
RCRA provides rather stringent civil and criminal penalties; for example, a
company or individual found to be criminally violating the regulations is
subject to penalties of up to $50000 per day and imprisonment for up to
two years. More effective even than the threat of civil or criminal punish-
ment is the strict liability that RCRA imposes on generators, transporters,
and facility operators. Recent actions taken by the government in cleaning
up past dumping sites have alerted the business community to the huge
sums of money required and the possibility of their liability. In addition,
large established firms are concerned about the damage that a civil or crimi-
nal law suit would do to their public image. Many observers of the imple-
mentation of RCRA feel that these sanctions, coupled with strict liability,
are motivating firms, especially the larger ones, to comply with the
regulations [46].
In both the USA and the FRG, however, the difficulties are so great in
policing the complex system of waste management that regulators repeat-
edly stress the importance of information dissemination and moral persua-
sion in encouraging industry to comply [47]. Indeed, figures show that the
cost of control may be a significant portion (20-40%) of overall disposal
costs [48]. With limited financial resources for enforcement, the regulators
can at most inspect and monitor the large generators. In the USA, the larg-
est 5% of hazardous waste generators produce approximately 98% of the
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wastes [49]. But this may be where efforts are least needed since, as a regu-
lator at the FRG's Federal Environment Ministry, UBA, has pointed out,
the large firms are nowadays highly sensitive to hazardous waste problems,
having made substantial investments in their management, and can gen-
erally be trusted to comply with regulations [50]. The director of the
ZVSMM makes a similar point. The economic incentive created by high
prices tends to encourage large companies to invest in low-waste technolo-
gies and recycling; however, this economic lever is not so effective for small
business, such as paint shops or gas stations, which have the (illegal) option
of mixing their toxic waste with household waste.
As might be expected, there are opposing opinions on the extent of
illegal disposal practices in Bavaria and Hessen. Officials at the Land and
local levels have expressed the opinion that illegal disposal practices, as
opposed to semi-legal practices, are no longer a significant concern; the
problem of "midnight dumping", they claim, is a problem of the past [51].
Alternatively, civil servants at UBA are not so sanguine about Land prac-
tices, in general, stating that the extent of illegal practices could be any-
where from 10 to 90%, or highly uncertain [521. Yet the general perception
on the part of most officials is that the high disposal prices in Hessen and
Bavaria have not increased the amount of illegal midnight dumping. The
extent of these practices cannot be readily estimated, but many experts feel
that illegal disposal is generally less of a problem in the FRG than in other
EC countries [53].
The more serious problem, it seems, is the transport of hazardous
wastes over the Land or national borders to less-qualified facilities. In
theory, a waste management firm in another Land should not accept wastes
that are transported without permission from Hessen or Bavaria. In prac-
tice, officials state that it is not difficult for generators to find out-of-state
firms willing to take their wastes. There is also a lucrative waste traffic to
the GDR.
Waste experts at the Land and federal level are also in agreement that
there is a large "gray area" , which is not strictly illegal, yet is not entirely in
the spirit of the law. Schenkel, from the UBA, compares hazardous waste
regulations in the FRG with tax regulation where, in both cases, elaborate
formal rules and bureaucracy exist, but because these rules are systemati-
cally scrutinized for loopholes the regulations are only partially effective
[54]. One such problem is the declaration of a waste as an economic good,
relieving the entrepreneur of his obligation to register the waste, which may
eventually be sold or burned in facilities that lack the necessary environ-
mental equipment. This practice does not come under the direct control of
the Lander. Generators may also mix their wastes with used oil or
discharge their wastes as wastewater. Additionally, it is important to recall
that a large amount of hazardous wastes are disposed of on-site and, for rea-
sons that may be other than intentional abuses, these practices may be
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insufficiently controlled and result in environmental pollution. For this rea-
son, Hessian and Bavarian authorities are attempting to curtail on-site
disposal of hazardous wastes.
Hucke [55] has shown, in connection with enforcing air pollution con-
trols, that under the surface of relatively clear regulatory standards the
actual practice of implementation involves a significant amount of bargain-
ing between regulators and firms, rather than the command and compliance
usually assumed. One important reason for this is the separation of func-
tion between state officials, who have the better technical knowledge, and
local officials, who in the case of air pollution are charged with issuing the
licenses and sanctions for non-compliance. Waste management officials
have the same, if not more, discretionary powers as regulators of air emis-
sions. There exist precise lists of hazardous wastes; yet, officials have to use
their judgment in determining whether a firm's waste is equivalent to the
waste listed with respect to chemical composition, concentration levels, and
so forth. Similarly, judgment comes to bear in the process of licensing pub-
lic facilities and transporters, in approving on-site facilities, and even in
allocating the time of the limited number of inspectors. As in other areas of
environmental regulation, the process of bargaining between regulators and
firms in the FRG is ever present, and significantly extends the "gray area"
of hazardous waste practices.
6.10.3. Reducing hazardous wastes
A theme through this chapter has been the inevitable dilemma presented by
a pricing policy aimed at providing incentives for the safe disposal of waste
(thus reducing illegal practices), and which, at the same time, encourages
producers to reduce wastes. Lowered costs to the producers of wastes can
only be supported if coupled with other measures for waste reduction. Cost
or price incentives, though proved as being effective, are not the only option
for promoting the reduction or recycling of hazardous wastes. Governments
might, for instance, tie tax advantages or low-cost financing to firms that
take initiatives in reducing wastes. Or, the government might reduce costs
to firms that invest in new capital equipment by offering low-cost financing,
higher depreciation allowances, and direct government assistance and
advice. The UBA in the FRG finances research for this purpose and
directly advises firms about the technical possibilities for recycling waste
reduction. As another example, mentioned earlier, the Hessian government
is tying construction permits for new facilities to a demonstration that the
firm is using the best available technology for waste reduction.
The USA, alternatively, almost exclusively relies on price incentives to
promote waste reduction and recycling. A private initiative in this respect
was taken by Dow Chemicals in the mid-1960s, when it began charging its
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plant managers $100 for each drum of hazardous waste deposited on land,
which led to more intensive recycling efforts. An important initiative, how-
ever, now being considered by the federal government and already in place
in 11 states, is the waste-end tax, or a tax placed directly on waste genera-
tors. This tax may be used to replace or supplement the feedstock tax that
presently finances state and federal "superfunds", since the tax serves the
second purpose of reducing wastes [56]. It is too early to judge fully the
experience of the states with this tax, but there appears to be a major draw-
back. The tax has generally failed to raise the funds anticipated, and an
unexpectedly large drop in reported waste volumes (a 28% decline in Cali-
fornia within one year) resulted. This decline, which was too rapid to be
explained by waste reduction and recycling, appeared to result largely from
under-reporting and possibly even illegal practices [57].
6.11. Concluding Remarks
Any country or region intent upon shifting hazardous waste practices from
land disposal to more environmentally acceptable treatment and incinera-
tion methods, as well as waste reduction generally, must give serious con-
sideration to choosing and promoting a physical and economic infrastruc-
ture that promotes these alternatives. The choices are not easy since they
involve difficult trade-offs between what have been identified in this chapter
as the goals of a waste management system:
(1) The promotion of environmentally sound treatment and disposal
practices.
(2) The support of the longer term reduction of wastes.
(3) The assurance of full compliance with the system.
(4) The allocation of the full costs of hazardous waste management
to the generators.
These system objectives are conflicting since, for example, promoting the
first goal using more costly and environmentally superior methods calls for
a sacrifice in the fourth goal (by allowing government subsidies) or in the
third goal (since generators will attempt to evade the significant rise in
disposal costs). None of the German or US systems examined here have
been successful in fulfilling all four of these objectives.
Hessen and Bavaria have placed a high priority on the first objective
by constructing expensive treatment and incineration technologies with rela-
tively little direct land disposal, but at the expense of the fourth objective,
since the capital-intensive facilities have been built with a steadily rising
investment of public funds. The authorities have assured a market for this
high-cost system by requiring that all wastes treated off-site are delivered to
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these facilities, thus creating a public monopoly to discourage the illicit
disposal and export of hazardous wastes with a significant portion of the
costs being borne by the taxpayers. This public monopoly model stands in
sharp contrast to the private competitive model found in other FRG Lander
and in the USA, where scattered and usually specialized facilities are owned
and operated by private entrepreneurs with little or no direct government
subsidization. The USA, with its emphasis on generator responsibility and
liability, has placed high priority on the fourth management goal, but with
a serious sacrifice in the first objective, as shown by the large percentage of
wastes that are disposed of on land.
An important conclusion of this chapter is that the private competitive
model cannot be expected to fulfill the first goal by providing the infrastruc-
ture for the higher cost treatment and incineration technologies for a large
number of regulated wastes, even if government regulation requires this
type of management. The reason for this is the anticipated decline in the
market for the higher cost methods, which ensues from the export of wastes
to those countries or regions with less stringent regulations, as well as from
the remarkable capacity for generators to reduce their wastes (as witnessed
in Bavaria and Hessen). For the market to be attractive to private inves-
tors, direct government intervention and support will be called for by res-
tricting the export of regulated wastes as well as covering the financial
losses due to the reduction and recycling of wastes. Price subsidies to the
generators may also be indispensable as a means of discouraging the illicit
disposal of wastes, which aggravates further the declining waste market.
Hessen and Bavaria have responded to the failure of the private sector
by sliding toward the public ownership and financial support of large,
integrated waste-handling facilities; the authorities have thus "absorbed"
the risks and the public has to some extent "absorbed" the costs. The suc-
cess of this model, which mayor may not be feasible or desirable in other
regions or countries, must be viewed in the historical and political context
in which it emerged and operates. The evolution of a publicly financed
monopoly to accommodate a market that is generally in private hands is as
much an anomaly in the FRG, which stands committed to competitive
enterprise, as in other capitalist, market economies. Historically, the Hes-
sian and Bavarian systems (with the exception of Mittelfranken) were set up
by consortia of private industries with little competition from the almost
nonexistent private waste-handling sector. The financial failure of these
early initiatives, combined with a pervasive mistrust on the part of Land
officials of private entrepreneurs for handling hazardous wastes, led to
government intervention with the full support of the waste-generating
industry.
Direct government subsidies were consistent with the FRG tradition of
public support for environmental protection. In addition, the importance of
restricting both the export of waste and on-site disposal, and of legislating
190 Risk Management and Hazardous Waste
the compulsory use of central facilities, cannot be over-emphasized, as the
near failure of the Herten incineration facility in North Rhine- Westfalia
illustrates. The choice of dedicated and environmentally concerned public
managers is also an important prerequisite. Finally, the construction of
integrated, comprehensive facilities proved appropriate for the Hessian and
Bavarian states, with their heterogeneous industrial structures (including
many middle-sized or small generators), but may be less appropriate for
regions with larger firms that are better prepared to treat their own wastes.
The apparent success of the Hessian and Bavarian systems, therefore,
hinged on several factors:
(1) The absence of a private waste-management industry to resist
increasing public support of the central facilities.
(2) The ability of the government to restrict exports and on-site
management, and to require compulsory use.
(3) The traditional public acceptance of taxpayer support for environmen-
tal measures.
(4) The presence of environmentally committed civil servants to manage
the facilities.
(5) The existence of a heterogeneous industrial structure of waste
generators.
Where one or more of these conditions is lacking, this public monopoly
model may be dismally inappropriate. In the USA, for example, any
attempts to create a public monopoly would probably meet strong resis-
tance from the increasingly powerful private waste-management sector, and
the restriction of exports to other states might be deemed unconstitutional.
US industry has traditionally been held to be responsible for environmental
costs, and the financing of facilities with public funds may meet strong pol-
itical obstacles. Also, the importance of appointing good and motivated
public managers is critical; a badly managed public enterprise can be more
damaging from an environmental perspective than its private counterpart,
since it is less accountable to other government agencies and to the public
through requirements of strict liability and the possibilities of legal damage
suits. For these reasons, direct responsibility or "absorption" of the risks
by the government may not be feasible or desirable in the US political
culture.
With the possible failure of the private competitive model in providing
a long-term and comprehensive alternative to land disposal and the ques-
tionable feasibility or desirability of the public monopoly model, what
options remain for promoting environmentally sound treatment and dispo-
sal practices? One possibility for consideration is the hybrid public utility
model, which combines private ownership with government control. In the
face of disparate national regulations, a market for the expensive and
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comprehensive treatment and disposal offered by an integrated, public util-
ity might be assured by providing low-priced services. The losses incurred
might then be covered through a general industrial waste tax. This model
has the advantage of providing comprehensive treatment and disposal,
which condenses the waste management decisions to one geographic loca-
tion and, in so doing, reduces the possibility of intentional or unintentional
errors, and retains the responsibility and liability in private hands. The
low-priced services would discourage illegal practices, and the general waste
tax would assure full absorption of the costs by industry. Many questions
concerning this model, of course, remain unanswered; the challenge ahead is
to explore this and other options for providing an economic and physical
infrastructure that meets all the goals of an environmentally sound and
equitable waste management system [58].
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CHAPTER 7
Decentralized Regulation and
Technical Discretion: The UK
Eryl Miidel and Brian Wynne
7.1 Introduction
The previous chapter examined two cases in which public regulatory
authorities not only finance facilities, but also manage the treatment and
disposal of wastes. These authorities were at an intermediate level between
national and local government. This contrasted with the Netherlands, where
enforcement at the local and provincial government level takes place against
standardized, precise, central norms, with a mainly private treatment and
disposal (T&D) industry. According to experience in the FRG, the recent
Dutch moves to establish a joint public-private T&D infrastructure will be
threatened by the high levels of export of wastes from the Netherlands to
cheaper alternatives.
In this chapter we examine yet a different combination of overall insti-
tutional elements in the UK. Here the responsibility for regulatory policy is
highly decentralized and, indeed, focuses mainly upon a different part of the
hazardous waste life-cycle. Central government enacts framework legisla-
tion with deliberately imprecise norms, leaving local authorities, at a far
greater degree of decentralization than the German Lander, to convert these
into practical regulatory standards and practices. In addition, the actual
management of hazardous wastes is nearly totally (ca. 98%) in the hands of
private industry, regulated by the local authorities through a combination
of site licensing, inspection, waste registration, and legal enforcement
mechanisms. The idealized model of the UK system is that technical impre-
cision allows flexibility and local discretion. This is reflected in the idea of
harmonious collaboration between government and industry, with local
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government being allowed, as is usual in the UK, to "optimize" regulation
to fit local circumstances:
The framework for hazardous waste disposal is thus a joint venture
between the private and public sectors, with considerable cooperation
between the two, in which the private sector provides the service and
the public sector provides the control [IJ.
It may therefore reasonably be said that the national policy for the
disposal of all controlled waste - including hazardous waste - is a sum-
mation of the policies of the individual waste disposal authorities
developed within the legal framework and on the basis of technical and
administrative advice provided by the Department of Environment [2J.
The British system has seen a flurry of major inquiries and official
reports in recent years [3], with sharp expressions of public protest ironi-
cally affecting mainly the high-technology and "cleanest" end of the T&D
spectrum. Against the official ideal, one eminent inquiry Chairman referred
to the UK system as "Ramshackle and antediluvian", and the criticisms
from the new Hazardous Waste Inspectorate have indicated a degree of
impatience and conflict within central government, over alleged compla-
cency. Prominent in this public debate have been questions about the local
authority network's heavy responsibilities for risk assessment and regula-
tion, and differences of perspective between the local authorities and most
other parties. Also of recurrent and growing concern is, for certain hazard-
ous wastes, the heavy reliance on landfill codisposal with domestic refuse as
part of official UK strategies.
Underlying this uncertain climate are questions about the realism of
leaving a highly flexible, discretionary framework to be implemented by an
extremely decentralized and uneven network of mainly small, local govern-
ment agencies that have to regulate a fully privatized, very ill-defined
private commercial T&D sector. What is in principle a sound and defensible
policy (flexibility and technical imprecision) may be a bad one if the condi-
tions of its proper implementation are not being fulfilled (and may, indeed,
be incapable of fulfillment in present circumstances). This general issue is
focused in the UK on landfill codisposal, where what may be a sound policy
under ideal conditions of site selection, licensing, and management, may be
unsound if the practical local social realities of implementation are nowhere
near such idealized assumptions.
In this chapter we provide another example of the relationships
between risk assessment, technical regulatory definitions, uncertainties, and
the institutional and cultural setting of regulation. To achieve this, we first
describe the main features of the formal regulatory fr;tmework. Following
this we point out several features of the formal framework that are
significant in implementation, especially the interaction between the way
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technical norms and methods are formulated, and the institutional roles and
relationships in regulation. The main focus of attention in this respect are
the implications of the UK approach to listing and classifying wastes, as
already outlined in Chapter 5, and of the UK regulatory focus upon site
licensing of T&D facilities as the main mechanism of overall control in the
hazardous waste life-cycle. These considerations lead us finally to examine
the problems of practical enforcement and the resilience or otherwise of the
whole system toward possible future developments when seen in a compara-
tive perspective.
An important factor in the UK, which links technical T&D practices
with institutional frameworks, is the strong dependence on landfill, espe-
cially codisposal of "special" wastes with domestic wastes. The practice of
codisposal creates a natural connection between local authorities, with their
traditional responsibility for domestic wastes, and the regulation of hazard-
ous wastes. The espousal of controlled landfill in UK policy therefore
automatically implies regulatory dependence on the local authority, as does
the strong regulatory role of local planning control (in site licensing).
Furthermore, whilst nearly all systems elsewhere are attempting to reduce
landfill dependency, in the UK this sector seems to be developing at the
expense of the (more expensive) high-technology end of the T&D industry,
which is not in a healthy condition. We also ask whether this might be
related to the institutional mechanisms of UK regulation.
7.1.1. Current practices in the UK
Unlike other countries, the UK operates with two different schemes for
defining hazardous wastes. Control of a broader population, including those
considered dangerous to the environment, is exercised at the very back end
of the life-cycle, by the selection and licensing of T&D sites, which is the
responsibility of local authorities. For this purpose there is an advisory list
of "difficult" wastes containing about 200 items, produced by central
government. This is said to be "for record-keeping purposes." A smaller
population is defined as "special wastes", namely those thought harmful to
human health. This definition follows closely the EC's list of "toxic and
dangerous" wastes and is intended to control transportation of wastes in a
cradle-to-grave notification system, so as to control their consignment only
to licensed and "safe" sites. This control is retrospective.
Figures and definitions for waste in the UK are, as usual, highly
approximate. In addition to the two classification systems noted above,
several different but overlapping terms are in common usage; these are of
different legal, practical, or historical standing. The Public Health Act
(1936) [4] uses the descriptions house and trade refuse. The Refuse Disposal
Act (1978) [5] uses two classifications, of business and residential waste.
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The term notifiable waste of the now-superseded 1972 Deposit of Poisonous
Wastes Act (DPW) [6] is still widely used in practice. DPW's successor,
the Control of Pollution Act (COP A) (1974) [71, distinguishes household,
commercial, and industrial wastes, collectively known as controlled wastes.
Its Section 17 Regulations (implemented in 1981) also define special wastes.
The government advisory paper on site licensing (introduced in 1976) gives
a list of wastes called difficult [8]. In practice, also, many operators use the
trade association's classification scheme of black, gray, and white wastes [9].
The term hazardous wastes is also in common practical usage; e.g., in the
name of the government Hazardous Waste Inspectorate (HWI) set up in
1983. In these circumstances, and with the usual problems surrounding
even single definitions, the following data are rough guides only.
Excluding sewage and in-house disposal, total UK wastes are thought
to amount to nearly 450 million tonnes per year (mte/year), of which nearly
60% is agricultural. Mining and related wastes provide a further 20% or
more (nearly 100 mte/year). Industrial wastes, excluding mining, etc., are
about 50 mte/year (12%) and domestic and commercial about half of this
[10]. Notice that much of the agricultural and mining wastes, as well as
household wastes, can be hazardous, and in the nature of their life-cycles
may have more potential for giving exposures than do industrial wastes. As
emphasized in Chapter 3, the boundary of the regulated problem is highly
uncertain.
Of the 50 mte/year or so of industrial wastes, about 3.5 mte/year are
estimated by Hawkins and Bailey [11] to be hazardous waste according to
the terms of notifiability as understood under DPW, but about 4.5 mte/year
according to HWI estimates [12]. According to the HWI, also, "special"
wastes under COPA Section 17 register about 40% of those wastes origi-
nally notified (until 1981) under the DPW [13]. In other words, UK special
wastes amount to about 1.7 mte/year. To emphasize the uncertainties, the
government Review of the Section 17 Regulations reached an equivalent esti-
mate for 1981 of 0.7 mte/year [141. The 1985 Royal Commission Report
[15], although quoting similar figures, reminds us baldly that "the quantity
of industrial wastes generated in the UK in any year is not known."
There are 68 waste disposal authorities (WDAs) in England, 37 in
Wales, and 58 in Scotland. Yet an indication of the degree of unevenness in
the system is that about 75% of the total hazardous ("notifiable") wastes in
1983 was generated or disposed of within only 12 WDA areas. There are
some 5000 waste T&D facilities overall (the vast majority being landfills), of
which anywhere between 500 and 1700 are thought to be licensed to receive
special wastes; but more than 90% of the total hazardous waste arisings
were taken by only about 100 of them [16]. Of these 5000 sites many are
municipal waste landfills, where the codisposal of certain hazardous wastes
with municipal refuse is allowed. This is based on the understanding that
properly managed domestic waste can help to transform and attenuate the
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hazardous wastes more than in a concentrated "containment" hazardous
waste landfill. We come to the landfill question later. Table 7.1 gives a
summary of the rough proportions of hazardous waste that go to the
different T&D options.
Table 7.1. Approximate UK T&:D routes for ha-
zardous wastes by percentage (figures rounded to
nearest half-unit). a
T&D route
Landfill
Mineshafts
Solidification
Sea disposal
(incl. incineration at sea)
Chemical treatment
Incineration
Percentage
85
2.5
3
5
3.5
1.5
aTotal, 4.5 mte/year: for comparison, "Reclama-
tion", which is excluded from the hazardous
waste total, is estimated to treat about 1
mte/year of material [17].
In addition to the very significant geographical unevenness, which is
related to the inconsistency of regulatory practices and prices (as well as to
geological factors), a further uncertainty in the figures for the high-
technology options is whether they signify available capacity or actual
usage. Bailey and Hawkins, for example, give figures for incineration and
chemical treatment of 0.4 mte/year out of their total of 3.5 mte/year, i.e.,
about 11% of the total [18]. The first HWI Report of 1984, from which
Table 7.1 is derived, gives only 5%. The larger estimate appears to
represent available capacity, not actual use.
In fact, the health of the higher technology range of the T&D industry
in the UK is a matter of some concern. There is barely enough high-
temperature incineration capacity (61000 te/Year) to meet the existing
"market demand" (56000 te/year). This demand is recognized to be
artificially depressed by lax landfill site licensing, and is expected to grow
"as improved landfill practices are achieved [191." The last ten years or so
have seen the closure of five UK high-temperature incinerators for commer-
cial reasons. Another closed because of planning consent renewal problems.
The chemical treatment industry has also suffered sharp reductions in
demand (way beyond the industrial recession), which are also attributed to
the development of new and cheaper landfill competition. The incinerator
closure at Bonnybridge, Scotland, in 1984 left no such commercial facility
available north of Liverpool.
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7.1.2. The landfill problem
A major consequence of the closure of the Bonnybridge plant is that indus-
try in the north of Britain faces great problems in disposing of waste that
should not be landfilled. Two of the remaining incinerators have already
increased their prices, although the supply of wastes to both facilities is still
high, with the result that there is a queue several months long. Apart from
actual disposal costs, transport costs are becoming so high as to be a
significant part of investment plans for companies, especially for some firms
in the north of Britain, who send to the south loads in the region of 4000
gallons every two days, at a unit cost of 1500 pounds sterling.
One of the outcomes of this is that firms are naturally tending to
invest in their own incinerators, e.g., Fine Organics is building an incinera-
tor near Durham. It is estimated that this will cost 150000 pounds sterling
and will initially burn 2000 gallons of mixed organic waste daily. With the
high transport costs, as indicated above, the initial capital outlay would be
covered in a very short time span, so long as operating and maintenance
costs do not spiral, which is a significant uncertainty.
The other major, and possibly more worrying, outcome of incinerator
closure is that some firms have now been landfilling wastes that were previ-
ously incinerated, diluting them first to acceptable levels. Aware of these
problems, the HWI noted that "following the closure of the facility at Bon-
nybridge, there are already certain hazardous waste arisings for which there
is no environmentally acceptable disposal route available: these are PCB-
contaminated capacitors and transformer carcases." The HWI report went
on to say that as a consequence of the reduction in available incinerator
capacity, "perhaps inevitably the first cases of landfilling of these wastes
are coming to light [20]".
Progressive T &D options in the UK are in difficulty, and under-
developed. The blame is laid at the door of the easy availability of cheap
landfill and the inadequate site selection and licensing control exercised by
a significant number of WDAs. 1984 discount prices for landfill ranged
from 2.80 pounds sterling per tonne for solid hazardous waste, to 8.00
pounds sterling per tonne for liquid hazardous wastes. In Table 7.2 we
indicate the estimated amounts of waste disposed of by various methods
and the cost per tonne.
From Table 7.2 it can be seen at a glance why industry prefers landfill
to other disposal methods. Furthermore, lax WDA control and the cod-
isposal commitment allows landfill to develop its competitive advantage
legally:
The wide variation in standards and practices adopted by disposal
authorities has had a profound effect on the economics of hazardous
waste management. Intense competition among disposal companies
has meant that the economic viability of the individual disposal
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facility can be significantly influenced by the attitude of the disposal
authority. Our impression is that some major operators, who gen-
erally try to adopt current best practice, are steadily losing business to
other operators who are able to exploit variations in standards and
enforcement. Major operators are known to be substantially discount-
ing disposal charges to retain even a reduced level of business. While
'fair competition is desirable in the waste disposal industry, the current
situation does not always allow for this. Neither are the current level
of charges sufficient, in our opinion, to sustain good practice.
We have identified two principal reasons for this situation.
Firstly the last few years have seen the proliferation of new landfill
sites licensed for hazardous wastes and located in areas of the country
where the disposal authority has failed to specify and enforce adequate
standards. Secondly, the influence of the relatively recent public sec-
tor move towards co-disposal of wastes at their own sites, has been to
force prices down. The most notable example of this was the pricing
decision of one English disposal authority to halve the prices charged
for wastes at one of their sites which grossly distorted the market: in
May 1982 this disposal authority reduced its price for acids from 11 to
5 per tonne pounds sterling [21].
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Table 7.2. Estimate of amount/cost of waste disposed of by the major disposal
methods.
Method of disposal
Landfill
Incineration
Treatment
Sea disposal
Amount (mte)
2.7
0.4
0.4
Price charged for disposal
(pounds sterling/tonne)
(excludes transportation costs)
2.50-35
40-900
10-390
2-95
The UK system has reached a point where its Inspectorate can worry that
some crucial, high-technology T&D options are inadequately available.
In addition to a system that encourages cheap landfill, the virtually
100% private commercial structure of the UK T&D industry leaves no
financial and institutional support for more capital-intensive T&D options.
7.2. The Regulatory Framework
7.2.1. The main legislative framework
The general UK approach to regulation was summed up by a DOE official
as follows:
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Because the effects of pollution are usually experienced first within the
confines of particular localities, one of the principles followed by suc-
cessive Governments has been that the primary responsibility for deal-
ing with pollution problems should rest, as far as is practicable, with
authorities operating at a local or regional level, principally local
authorities and the water authorities. Thus, central Government lays
down the statutory framework for pollution control, but implementa-
tion is delegated to a large extent to local level. Authorities may in
many areas exercise a considerable degree of discretion as to the limi-
tation they impose on the release of local pollutants, so that account
may be taken of local resources and social priorities, the uses to which
surrounding areas are put, and the capacity of the environment to
absorb pollutants, although in practice they often work to fairly uni-
form standards or widely accepted limits [22].
This philosophy is also practiced for hazardous wastes, even to the
extent that different parts of the hazardous waste life-cycle are controlled
by different "sectoral" regulatory traditions. The main legislative frame-
work is COP A, passed in 1974 and enacted in several stages, some of which
are still awaited. The Act invests legal responsibility for waste disposal in
WDAs. In England these are the county and borough councils, in Wales
and Scotland the district councils, and elsewhere the island councils. Thus,
hazardous waste disposal, legally called special waste, but also variably
entitled "notifiable", "controlled", or "difficult" waste (as explained before),
is institutionally an extension and adaptation of municipal waste disposal
responsibilities defined in the Public Health Act of 1936. The major
difference is that, although WDAs are responsible for the collection of
domestic waste, they are not obliged to collect industrial waste. In addition
to COP A, the 1970 Town and Country Planning Act (updating long-
standing traditions in land-use planning law) controls the location of dispo-
sal sites through the requirement for local planning permission for all new
uses of land.
The relevant sections of COPA relevant are briefly summarized here:
(1) Section 1 (not yet implemented) requires WDAs to ensure that ade-
quate arrangements exist in their areas for the disposal of controlled
wastes.
(2) Section 2 (implemented in 1978) requires WDAs to investigate what
arrangements are needed for the purpose of disposing of controlled
waste in their areas. In addition, they have to prepare and periodi-
cally revise a waste disposal plan.
(3) Sections 3-11 (implemented in 1976) define the site licensing system.
Site licensing is the most fundamental regulatory instrument for con-
trolled waste disposal in the UK ~ all sites that receive controlled
wastes must be licensed by the WDAs. Site licenses, which should
specify allowed waste types and operating conditions for the disposal
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sites, are issued by the WDAs after consultation with the Health and
Safety Executive (HSE), the Regional Water Authority (which has the
power of veto over the license if it is thought that there is any risk of
polluting the water supply), and (in England), the local district coun-
cil (for planning permission).
(4) Section 17 (implemented in 1976) provides for the introduction of
regulations that apply controls to the more difficult wastes and their
disposal, i.e., "special" wastes as defined by an inclusive list combined
with certain excluding characteristics and definitions (a switch from
the exclusive list under DPW), as laid down in Part I, Regulation 2
(see Table 7.3). The Control of Pollution (Special Waste) Regulations
(1980) were drawn up in 1980, but came into force on 16 March 1981.
At the same time the 1972 Deposit of Poisonous Waste Act (discussed
below) was repealed.
These regulations were intended to fulfill the UK obligations under the
1978 European Economic Community (EEC) Council Directive on Toxic
and Dangerous Wastes [23] by providing for tighter controls over the tran-
sportation of dangerous wastes. The purpose of the regulations was to:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Maintain a registration system for the disposal of special wastes.
Institute a consignment note system for the disposal of these wastes,
giving a "cradle-to-grave" record for each waste transfer, treatment,
and disposal life-cycle.
Require the keeping of records at landfill disposal sites showing the
location of special wastes deposited there.
Give an emergency reserve power to the Secretary of State enabling
him to direct a consignment of special waste to a specific site.
"Special" waste is defined in Regulation 2, part II [24] (see Table 7.4).
It is important to note that in the UK the definition of special wastes
relates to the .potential risks of diversion during transport, because the list
only applies to the coordination of consignment notes between dispatch and
disposal. Thus, definition and listing of hazardous wastes, viewed in many
countries as a first step toward designating the best T&D options from the
point of waste arisings, has been regarded very differently - in particular,
as much less of a directive measure - in the UK. This may change with the
gradual introduction of the concept of the best practicable environmental
option (BPEO) as a more defined means of designating T&D sites for given
wastes.
The remaining sections of COP A are not directly relevant to the
present discussion.
In summary, the two main provisions of COPA are the licensing of
T&D facilities and tighter controls on transportation via the definition of
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Table 7.3. UK inclusive list under COPA (1974).
Acids and alkalis
Antimony and antimony compounds
Arsenic compounds
Asbestos (all chemical forms)
Barium compounmds
Beryllium and beryllium compounds
Biocides and phytopharmaceutical substances
Boron compounds
Cadmium and cadmium compounds
Copper compounds
Heterocyclic organic compounds containing oxygen, nitrogen or sulfur
Hexavalent chromium compounds
Hydrocarbons and their oxygen, nitrogen and sulfur compounds
Inorganic cyanides
Inorganic halogen-containing compounds
Inorganic sulfur-containing compounds
Laboratory chemicals
Lead compounds
Mercury compounds
Nickel and nickel compounds
Oganic halogen compounds, excluding inert polymeric materials
Peroxides, chlorates, perchlorates and azides
Pharmaceutical and veterinary compounds
Phosphorus and its compounds
Selenium and selenium compounds
Silver compounds
Tarry materials from refining and tar residues from distilling
Tellurium and tellurium compounds
Thallium and thallium compounds
Vanadium compounds
Zinc compounds
special wastes. These aspects, some of the many subtleties of their opera-
tion, and enforcement problems that arise for WDAs are discussed in the
following sections.
Other relevant pieces of UK legislation are The Dumping at Sea Act
(1974) [25], The Health and Safety at Work Act (1974), [26], and Alkali,
etc. Works Regulation Act (1906) [27]. Dumping at sea is governed by the
London and Oslo Conventions (1971) and is implemented in the UK
through the Dumping at Sea Act of 1974. Under this Act it is an offense to
dump waste in UK waters or for British ships to dump waste in other sea-
waters without a license. The licensing authorities are the Ministry of
Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food (MAFF), the Welsh Office, and the
Department of Environment (DOE) in Scotland and Northern Ireland.
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Table 7.4. Definition of "special" waste under Section 17 Regulations.
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MEANING OF "DANGEROUS TO LIFE"
1. Waste is to be regarded as dangerous to life for the purposes of these regula-
tions if -
(a) a single dose of not more than five cubic centimeters would be likely to
cause death or serious damage to tissue if ingested by a child of 20 kilo-
grams' body weight or
(b) exposure to it for fifteen minutes or less would be likely to cause serious
damage to human tissue by inhalation, skin contact or eye contact.
Assessing effect of ingestion
2. (1) The likely effect of ingestion is to be assessed by the use of reliable toxi-
city data in the following order of preference:
Class 1: information about the effect of oral ingestion by children;
Class 2: data derived by extrapolation from information about the
effects of oral ingestion by adults;
Class 9: other information about human toxicity;
Class 4: information about animal toxicity;
Class 5: information about the toxicity of analogous chemicals.
(2) Where conclusive information falling within one of the classes set out in
sub-paragraph (1) is available no regard shall be paid to information
falling within a class bearing a higher number, and the reference to us-
ing data in an order of preference is to be understood accordingly.
3. Where the waste is in such a form that -
(a) the ingestion of less than five cubic centimeters is not possible, or
(b) there is no risk that a toxic constituent could be assimilated if the waste
were to be ingested.
then it is not to be regarded as dangerous to life by reason of sub-paragraph
1(a) of this schedule.
Mixed waste: samples
4. Waste is to be regarded as dangerous to life if a sample of five cubic centime-
ters taken from any part of a consignment falls within either of the descrip-
tions in paragraph 1 of this schedule.
The major consideration before the granting of a sea dumping license
is the protection of the marine environment, especially shellfish and other
inshore fisheries and breeding grounds. Currently, there are 13 licensed
sites for the sea disposal of industrial waste. The other criterion that is sup-
posed to operate is whether an alternative land T&D method has been con-
sidered. The amount of waste officially dumped at sea is approximately 5%
of the total hazardous waste disposed of, though some WDAs rely on it
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very heavily. Therefore, this method does playa significant part in overall
UK waste disposal.
The Health and Safety at Work Act is, as its name suggests, related
to any risks to the health and safety of employees and comes under the con-
trol of the Health and Safety Executive. The Alkali, etc., Works Regula-
tio~ Act [amended by the Alkali, etc., Works Order (1966) and (1971) and
Health and Safety Regulations (1983)1 requires all works to be registered by
the Industrial Air Pollution Inspectorate.
The UK planning control system is important in the regulation of
hazardous wastes. This broader framework of land-use planning and
development control overlaps with the particular issue of hazardous wastes
and licensing for T&D sites, under Sections 3-11 of COPA. The Town and
County Planning Act (1947) [28], amended in 1970, requires local authority
planning consent for the development of facilities. Consent can be refused,
but appeal can be made by the developer to the Secretary of State for the
Environment, who may hold a local public inquiry into the case. As part of
the planning consent, the authority can insert conditions (also appealable),
which may include specific restrictions and exclusions on certain waste
types, or required management practices to control their risks. In the case
of Sections 3-11 of COPA, implemented in 1976, WDAs are required to
license all T&D sites. The advisory Waste Management Paper (WMP4),
The Licensing of Waste Disposal Sites, was issued by the government in
1976, and contains an illustrative list of nearly 200 "difficult" wastes [29j.
As usual for the UK, however, neither this list nor the other principles
expressed in WMP4 have legal standing. In fact, this list is officially "for
record-keeping purposes only", not for the control of disposal [30]. As we
see later, the dependence on T&D site licensing without attention to points
further upstream in the hazardous waste life-cycle have had important
consequences for UK hazardous waste management.
7.2.2. Other policy actors
At central government level, responsibility for hazardous waste lies with
the Land Wastes Division of the DOE in England, the Scottish Department
in Scotland, and the Welsh Office in Wales. Legal responsibility for proper
regulation and waste control falls on the waste producer and the WDAs.
The role of central government is indirect, falling into three categories:
(1) To provide a general oversight and framework of waste disposal
legislation.
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(2)
(3)
To adjudicate on appeals against refusal of site license applications
and on planning appeals involving waste disposal sites.
To provide administrative and technical advice to disposal authorities
- this is largely carried out via a series of advisory Waste Manage-
ment Papers (WMPs) [31], by informal consultation, and by commis-
sioning research.
A general sense of rapport with industry is based on a long-standing rela-
tionship within the general philosophy of collaboration that has evolved
over many decades. It has, in fact, been argued that it began with the
Alkali Acts of 1863 [32]. In addition, Harwell operate a Waste Manage-
ment Information Bureau, which is mostly funded by the DOE.
In 1984, following the recommendations of the Gregson Committee,
the HWI was set up within the DOE. Its first annual report in June 1985,
was unusually frank and critical of various aspects of UK regulation, espe-
cially the uneven and inadequate nature of much local authority licensing
and inspection.
The regional water authorities and the Scottish River Purification
Boards are responsible for controlling water pollution, and have a right of
veto over T&D site license applications if they can show a direct risk to
water supplies. This is also subject to appeal to the Secretary of State. His-
torically, the protection of water supply has been one of the strongest areas
of environmental protection, and the water authorities have built up a high
level of technical expertise.
The private sector accounts for 98% of all industrial waste disposal,
half of this being conducted "in-house" at the site of production. Such sites
still require a license from the local WDA. The waste T&D industry is in
the hands of several large and many small companies, whose trade associa-
tion is the National Association of Waste Disposal Contractors (NAWDC),
which includes about 75% of the T&D industrial sector. Members sub-
scribe to a code of practice aimed at raising the standards of the industry.
NA WDC also has its own classification of waste: white wastes (least hazard-
ous with characteristics similar to those of domestic refuse leachate); black
wastes (extremely hazardous and generally not acceptable for landfill); gray
wastes (which do not fall into the more clear-cut categories) [33].
7.2.3. The development of UK regulation
By the early 1970s the laws governing hazardous wastes were no longer
specific nor rigorous enough to deal adequately with the growing problems.
Attention was devoted to the general problem of waste disposal in the early
1960s, with the setting up of two committees - the Ministry of Housing and
Local Government Technical Committee, whose report Pollution of Water
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by Tipped Refuse was published in 1961 [34), and the Technical Committee
on the Disposal of Solid Toxic Wastes (the Key Committee) [35]. For
nearly a decade the efforts of these committees were greeted with apathy
from the government and public alike, until events overtook the authorities
and enforced a hurried, official acknowledgment in legislation. The follow-
ing account of events that led up to the first specific legislation on hazard-
ous waste disposal was given by Lord Ashby [36]:
The Key Committee was set up in 1964 as a result of an incident in
1963 when some animals died because of a fluoroacetamide leak from
rusty drums which had been dumped by a local pesticide factory. The
committee worked in a leisurely not to say glacial manner and it did
not report for six years, not until 1970, and only had 20 meetings in
the whole of the six years suggesting that little governmental pressure
was being exerted. However, the findings of the committee were
disquieting and it listed 17 serious incidents where toxic wastes had
been dumped and caused damage. The Committee made 38 recom-
mendations but received .little' attention from the Press and none at all
from the Government; despite the fact that this was the beginning of
the period when public opinion was being aroused about the environ-
ment.
At the same time the Standing Royal Commission on Environ-
mental Pollution was set up and produced its report one year later in
1971 [37] expressing concern that nothing had been done to implement
the recommendations of the Key Report. The Government's response
was that it was preparing to reorganize local government.
The Royal Commission repeatedly approached the Secretary of
State on the need for legislation to curb the indiscriminate dumping of
toxic wastes and to have some type of control similar to that for air
and water. The response was that more information was needed by
the Department of Environment (DOE). The Royal Commission pro-
vided the information giving seven cases of dangerous handling of
toxic waste - and this by a nationally known firm of waste contrac-
tors. There was still no response from the Government.
In 1971 the Royal Commission drafted another report strongly
criticizing the Government for lack of action - the Government's reply
this time was that there was no parliamentary time for more legisla-
tion. But in January 1972, the Birmingham Sunday Mercury revealed
that employees of the same nationally known firm of waste contractors
were dumping wet waste and drums containing cyanide, phenols, caus-
tic soda and other materials - some of the drums were accompanied by
a delivery ticket describing them as innocuous. This was disclosed by
the Conservation Society. On February 22, 1972 a member of the
Conservation Society visited parliament to try and get some action on
the part of the Government. However, two days later on 24 February,
there were headlines about drums of cyanide with labels being
scratched off being found on waste land in Nuneaton where children
played. One week after this was disclosed, a Bill was hurriedly pushed
through Parliament - i.e., the 1972 Deposit of Poisonous Waste Act
[38J.
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In an explanation of the relevance of the above story, Lord Ashby went on
to relate a comment that appeared in an editorial in The Times under the
headline "How to move a Government":
It is instructive to note what did and did not prompt the Government
to squeeze a Bill ... into an already crowded legislative program. The
urgent representations of an official commission ... moved by the "dis-
turbing cases which have come to our knowledge" , did not. Headlines
about drums of cyanide waste on derelict land in the Midlands did
[39].
According to informal Whitehall lore, the DPW act was written over
a weekend, so urgent was action now perceived to be. Not surprisingly,
perhaps, it has often been called a holding operation only. In reality it
became something more than this, despite being superseded within a few
years. The main provisions of the act were:
(1) A prohibition on the tipping of poisonous, noxious, or polluting waste
where it was liable to give rise to an environmental hazard. An
environmental hazard was defined as subjecting persons or animals to
material risk of death, injury, or impairment of health, or threatening
the pollution or contamination of any water supply.
(2) A requirement that local and river authorities be notified before the
removal or deposition of wastes. All wastes had to be prenotified at
least three clear working days before removal or deposit, unless they
were specifically exempted from the regulations. In other words,
there was an exclusive list system, which failed safe in the case of
ignorance. The regulations provided a schedule of non-hazardous
wastes, and if a particular waste was included in the schedule and did
not contain any hazardous quantity or hazardous concentration of a
poisonous, noxious, or polluting substance, then it was exempted from
the regulations. Notice that these criteria were qualitative, involving
no quantitative definitions or tests.
This act was not meant to be more than an emergency measure; in
1974 COPA was passed, partially repealing certain DPW sections. The
DPW was finally repealed by the COPA Section 17 Regulations in 1981.
The main contrasts between DPW and COPA are given in Table 7.5.
Although it was a shotgun affair, and did not live long, DPW has had con-
tinuing effects, not least upon the approaches of the central actors in regu-
lation - the local authorities.
The classification method for "notifiable" wastes under DPW defined
a larger population of wastes than the Section 17 Regulations of COPA. In
fact, COPA distinguishes household, commercial, and industrial wastes, cal-
ling them collectively "controlled" wastes, but only "special" wastes are
subject to the regulations.
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Table 7.5. Major differences between DPW 1972 and COPA 1974.
DPW 1972
No site licensing
Prenotification of disposal
Exclusive list
Qualitative definitions
Local authority and
regional water authority
joint responsibility
Environmental and human
hazard define notifiable waste
COPA 197./
Site licensing (implemented 1976)
Consignment note system (implemented 1981)
Inclusive list
Quantitative definitions (implemented 1981)
Local authority has
sole responsibility
Human hazard only defines "special" waste
The DPW exclusive list was an understandable way of dealing with
what had been allowed to slide into an urgent need for a classifying
mechanism of notifiable wastes. If the job had to be done so hastily it was
safer to list what could be excluded than to try to be accurate about what
should be included. However, industry was dissatisfied with the ensuing
need, borne of uncertainty, to notify larger amounts of waste than were
hazardous by more "accurate" criteria. When COPA was formulated,
therefore, a much shorter inclusive list was established (in 1981). A major
reason for this was to cut down on unnecessary paperwork dealing with the
large number of marginal wastes. However, a further reason was that the
list and registration was no longer seen by national officials as a means of
control, except via post hoc information. The DOE thought the new
approach would cut the notifiable waste population - and associated docu-
mentation - by 70%. In reality it has not done anything like this. Accord-
ing to one government official, industry continues to err on the side of cau-
tion - "notifiable and special are synonymous in the waste producers' eyes"
[40] - even though the burden of proof lies with a WDA to demonstrate
that a waste is special.
WDA perspectives on hazard have also been shaped by DPW. They
resisted the reduction of the population of regulated waste (from
"notifiable" to "special") because, they argued, the exemption of a large
population of uncertain wastes would only reduce the overall standards of
management. Waste T&D contractors, who admittedly have an interest in
retaining a larger population of controlled waste, have also asserted that in
their experience hazardous waste has been lost to the system by narrowing
the regulated list. This was despite the government's argument that the
reduction would allow them to cut paperwork and focus (scarce) attention
on the more limited amount of hazardous wastes, their producers, and
handlers.
Thus DPW controlled a larger population of wastes than COPA on at
least three grounds, before considering finer points in the definitions:
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(1) The list was exclusive, that is, fail-safe.
(2) Even something on the list of excluded wastes had to be controlled if
it met criteria of public health risk or water pollution. COPA
dropped the water pollution restriction, but also allowed for the exclu-
s'ion of any waste on the list that did not fulfill defined hazard criteria.
(3) DPW expressly incorporated the synergy principle, that a waste be
deemed hazardous if it could "by itself or cumulatively with other
deposits of the same or different substances," pose a risk to water or
health.
This reduction of the hazardous wastes list was accompanied by a change
in the registration system and its role. In 1976 site licensing was intro-
duced as the main organ of overall control, and this had its own (advisory)
list of "difficult" wastes. Thus, the new COPA Section 17 list was not only
officially reduced in size, but also in its role, against the perception of its
implementing agents. The burden of regulation was placed instead on
T&D site licensing, which was said to end the need for prenotification. The
new hazardous waste notification under Section 17 of COPA was only ever
intended to apply to the post hoc tallying of outgoing transport consign-
ments with registered receipts at (domestic) T&D facilities.
To summarize, specific regulation of hazardous wastes in the UK was
shaped by a political crisis over uncontrolled toxic-waste dumping. This
was soon followed by a radical change in the regulatory framework
(COP A), which sharply reduced 'the population of controlled wastes, des-
troyed the regulatory effect of DPW's prenotification of waste movement to
T&D, and placed the control burden on the very back-end of the waste
life-cycle, namely T &D site licensing. Since this site licensing framework
was said to control hazardous waste T&D, the only requirement of the 1978
EEC Directive that needed to be fulfilled was the control of the transport
phase, with a "cradle-to-grave" notification system. It was for this purpose
only that the main UK hazard classification (Section 17 of COPA) was
brought in, with a waste list similar to the EEC list.
As we see below, both site licensing and controlled waste registration
in the UK have been severely criticized, calling into question the combina-
tion of free market T &D and highly dispersed regulatory responsibility.
Before we move to these issues, however, we first examine the way in which
the technical criteria for defining special waste in the Section 17 Regula-
tions increase other uncertainties and influence the overall climate of
enforcement.
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7.3. Hazardous Waste Definitions and Criteria-
Their Structure and Role
The UK method of legally defining hazardous wastes is compared in
Chapter 5 with that of the USA, the FRG, the Netherlands, and Austria.
The main points are therefore only. summarized here, the purpose being to
analyze their role and implications in the UK context.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
An inclusive list of 31 waste types defines a population of wastes that
prima facie may be special wastes.
Special waste is confined to that waste which is listed and "as a result
of its presence is dangerous to life." The crucial "and", indicates that
the UK, although using a lists-plus-characteristics approach, does not
use characteristics to supplement the list, but to shed wastes from
control. Low concentration could be one such characteristic, and con-
centration limits do enter the framework, though in a very particular,
indirect, and flexible way.
The interpretation of the key definitions of special waste is the respon-
sibility of the waste producer, T&D contractor, and local WDA in
mutual consultation. However, where differences of view exist, pro-
ducers are free to define their waste as not special according to their
interpretation of the criteria, and it is then up to the WDA to prove
otherwise in court. Thus, the technical clarity or otherwise of the
legal definitions is important. This burden of proof problem is impor-
tant in implementation, as discussed below. In the voluntaristic UK
regulatory climate, the autonomy and acknowledged variability of
WDA practices and the free market movement of wastes between
WDA areas and T&D contractors are very significant. Apart from
the economics of transport, there is freedom for a producer or handler
to "shop around" for a weak WDA and a "flexible" T&D contractor
and site.
The lack of front-end control of waste arisings and the freedoms
within the system are justified by reference to the compensating inno-
vation of site licensing of T&D facilities by WDAs. Thus, site licens-
ing is crucial.
The "dangerous to life" criterion of Section 17 is defined by four
criteria. These are given below with an indication of some practical
ambiguities:
(1) Does the waste have a flash point of 21"C or less? The use of a flash
point criterion means all wastes that are petroleum spirits or low flash
point solvents are special wastes (unless, of course, they are defined as
for recycling). Difficulties arise when these materials are mixed with
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varying amounts of other compounds, which could raise the flash
point above 21 ·C. For example, mixtures of acetone and water may
or may not have a flash point of less than 21 ·C depending upon the
relative concentration in the mixture. It would be quite possible for a
producer to decide that normally the flash point is above 21 ·C and,
therefore, the waste is not special. It is then up to the WDA to prove
that the material is a special waste if it wishes to take enforcement
action.
(2) Does the waste contain known or probable human carcinogen{s} at a
concentration of 1% or more? There is enormous dispute about the
carcinogenicity of many chemicals. Although there is central advice,
WDAs may ignore it; e.g., two WDAs have excluded asbestos as non-
carcinogenic. It is also difficult to measure definitively whether the
concentration at which the material is present is in excess of 1%.
(3) Is the waste likely to cause serious tissue damage on exposure for a
period of up to 15 minutes? The only guidance available refers to
injury of sufficient sever~ty to threaten life or cause permanent physi-
cal impairment or disfigurement. This requirement is difficult to
quantify in terms of attack on the eyes, which are by far the most sen-
sitive organs quoted. In some cases even water can cause more dam-
age than a special waste. The 15-minute exposure rule, individuals'
differing reactions to chemicals, and "serious", are also very difficult
to quantify; Le., there is again plenty of scope for discretion and
disagreement. The key term "likely" is also subject to uncontrolled
assumptions not only about physical processes but human behavior,
e.g., is a drummed waste "likely" to be broken open? [41].
(4) Is ingestion of 5 emS of waste likely to cause death or serious tissue
damage to a 20 kg child? Use of the explicit reference to a child in this
criterion has been criticized; yet it is defensible. The regulations were
drafted with the critical scenario in mind that children playing on
open land might ingest waste that had been wrongly dumped there;
5 cm3 was regarded as a typical mouthful.
There are several points to note about these toxicity definitions:
(1) They are based on a postulated exposure scenario that is different
from that of any other country; in fact, each country is different.
(2) Unlike other countries, the UK scenario involves a single, acute expo-
sure. There is no explicit provision in the special waste regulations
for long-term harm from multiple exposures or for chronic low-dose
exposure (as, for example, from contaminated water). Indeed, this
has been expressly rejected by the Section 17 Review Committee [421.
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(3) As suggested in (2), the scenario, like any other, inevitably generates
problems as to what it excludes. A topical example in the UK con-
cerns drummed wastes. The regulations stipulate that to be defined
as special a waste must be in a condition that could create exposure.
But if the scenario is acute exposure from ingestion, drummed toxic
waste may be exempt, even if the drums may in future burst or cor-
rode. Examples of this practice being allowed have caused demand to
tighten the regulatory definitions.
A problem for producer and WDA is to obtain toxicity data that are
reliable enough to be credible and of clear relevance to the waste in a given
situation. Indeed, much of the "intrinsic" data necessary to determine
acute toxicity of chemicals to humans, let alone small children, is simply
not available. It is always necessary to extrapolate from animal data,
which itself is usually scanty and conflicting (see Chapter 10). The DOE
advice ranks different kinds of evidence and gives worked examples, but, as
usual, these are expressly only illustrative, and have no legal standing. It
should be emphasized how much these technical definitions are open to
variable interpretation in real cases, and that the burden of precision and
proof rests with the WDA, because these definitions are for excluding
wastes prima facie on the hazardous waste list.
In addition to these limitations and discretionary freedoms, there is a
major problem of implementation for WDAs - that the definitions are only
legally enforceable at the moment of deposition of a waste. In other words,
if an inspector finds a waste deposited in an unlicensed site and can prove
the depositor, he or she still has to prove the waste was special at the
moment of deposition. In practice, this is tantamount to a requirement to
catch depositors red-handed (and still prove that their waste is technically
a special waste).
7.3.1. The burden of proof and technical clarity
Given that scientific risk analysis and its application in specific cases are
uncertain, when there is disagreement who should have the burden of proof
in defining whether a waste is to be included or excluded under regulatory
controls? The Association of County Councils, representing the WDAs,
who shoulder the burden of proof, understandably find the lack of clarity
objectionable:
... the theoretical foundation of the calculations remains highly unsa-
tisfactory ... The reliability of human toxicity data is extremely poor
. .. Extrapolation from figures for a rat or rabbit to a 20 kg child is
impossible [43].
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... waste disposal authorities will have the greatest difficulty in prov-
ing in court that certain wastes are special [44].
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This combines objection to both the "intrinsic" risk uncertainty and
the uncertainty of projection into real situations. The regulatory options
toward these uncertainties are either to build in discretion so as to intro-
duce them into the routine decision-making process, or to "short-circuit" or
"suppress" them by the expedient of fixing simpler, more clear-cut decision
rules, such as precise concentration limits for listed chemical constituents -
the Dutch method.
The Gregson Report noted that the UK Section 17 Regulations do not
cal1 for a "pass" or "fail" toxicity test, but a toxic hazard assessment, and
any prosecution relating to a disputed waste wil1 have to be judged on the
basis of professional opinions about the likely effects of ingestion or expo-
sure [45]." (It might also have added the phrase "about the likelihood of
ingestion or exposure.")
Others, in evidence to the Gregson Committee, described the discre-
tionary license of the UK regulatory criteria as offering "a field-day for
lawyers" [46J in the endless legal argument that imprecise definitions entail.
Thus, the "dangerous to life" criterion is regarded as especial1y open
to endless conflict of interpretation in practical cases. The flexibility which
is supposed to be an asset of the UK system in tailoring risk management
to real situations, thus entails a corresponding cost in terms of enforcement
problems. Legally speaking, the responsibility for deciding whether a waste
is special lies with its producer, and it is no defence to claim ignorance,
unless "due diligence" has been shown in the determination of a waste's
status. However, the crucial point about the UK role of characteristic
definitions is that they are delisting tests; therefore, the burden of proof in
listing a waste lies with the regulator, the local WDA, and not on the pro-
ducer to delist it, as is the case in the USA. The WDAs evidently find the
technical uncertainty of regulatory criteria unacceptable, because they do
not have the institutional resources to negotiate acceptable practical solu-
tions with industry.
At present, if a case is brought to court the prosecution must estab-
lish a prima facie case, then prove it "beyond reasonable doubt." Thus, the
clarity of the definition of special wastes may become crucial (though in
cases involving site licenses, the license conditions may also stipulate the
legal responsibility). Although the waste producer may have to take on the
burden of proof of showing that he or she did operate with due diligence,
this is on the lesser test, of balance of probabilities. The evidence of local
authorities to the Gregson Committee and their stance in the Review of the
Section 17 Regulations [47], was that prosecution has been repeatedly
undermined by the vagueness of the toxicity criterion in the regulations.
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The burden of proof issue is entangled in broader considerations of
consistency with natural justice, that parties be innocent until proved
guilty. Proposals by the local authorities to shift the onus of proof on to
the disposer or producer of wastes have therefore been rejected in the Sec-
tion 17 Review. Yet there is an important principle underlying the debate,
involving the interactions of technical uncertainties and institutional reali-
ties.
7.3.2. The burden of proof and ideal-world assumptions
Precedents for placing the burden of proof on the defendant (here a waste
producer) concern cases where the defendant has exclusive knowledge, that
is, those where the plaintiff could not be expected "to prove an objectively
ascertainable fact". The local authorities assert that the "exclusive
knowledge" criterion is fulfilled in the case of producers and wastes. Pro-
ducers argue that this is not true, because local authority officers can
legally enter premises to analyze wastes whenever they see fit: they there-
fore share in the knowledge and the attendant responsibility. In the pro-
ducers' view, the status of wastes is therefore "an objectively ascertainable
fact" .
This conflict of legal principles reflects two opposed views as to the
status of ideal and real, or formal and informal, institutional relationships.
In practice the local authorities do not have access to the requisite indus-
trial knowledge to make the status of wastes an objectively ascertainable
fact (quite apart from any technical disagreement over interpreting toxicity
and exposure information into actual cases of wastes). But producers can
legally benefit from the disparity between the ideal situation and the real
one, by claiming that formal access equals real availability of knowledge.
Thus, unrealistic assumptions about ideal worlds are built into the regula-
tions and enforcement arrangements.
The same factors that cause WDAs to wish for more precise technical
criteria for the enforcement process, namely their lack of expertise and
other resources, and the lack of institutional control of the prevailing uncer-
tainties, also causes them to seek less discretion and flexibility in the risk
management, decision-making process. What is useful knowledge to them
is very different from that of other actors in the system. Thus, curiously, in
the UK a flexible, discretionary technical system is least favored at the very
points in the system where it should be exercised if its theoretical benefits
are to be realized.
As noted before, however, the restrictions of the formal hazardous
waste classification framework are defended on the grounds that T&D site
licensing is the main control mechanism.
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7.4. Site Licensing and the Landfill Dimension
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Given that the vast majority of T&D sites are landfills, UK site licensing
really means the selection and control, through explicit licence conditions,
of the use of landfills - e.g., what wastes are to be excluded altogether?
What treatment or volume restrictions and required management practices
should be stipulated for others, etc.? In theory, a sophisticated situational
"degree-of-hazard" risk management framework is possible here, especially
if proper landfill control also sustains "high-technology" T&D options for
certain wastes. However, it depends utterly upon the rigor of the initial
site selection process, and upon the quality of specific controls and practices
at a multitude of sites that cannot possibly all be directly, independently,
and professionally supervised. Since landfill and the site licensing system
interpenetrate so heavily in the UK, we examine the landfill situation, then
look at site licensing, before returning to general WDA enforcement
questions.
7.4.1. Landfill
About 85% of all notifiable ("hazardous") wastes are disposed of by landfill,
of which 50% are landfilled in-house. According to the DOE, apart from
being the cheapest method of disposal, "sensible landfill is realistic, and an
ultracautious approach to landfill of hazardous and other types of wastes is
unjustified [48]." This conclusion is based on the results of a study carried
out from 1973 to 1977 on 19 landfill sites, which were supposed to represent
the main geological types found in the UK. The UK is said to be lucky
with its geology in this respect, as there are many clay areas and much of
the country, especially in the North and West, uses water from runoff
rather than from groundwater systems.
In general, there are two broad methods of land disposal:
(1) Concentrate and contain.
(2) Dilute and disperse or codispose with "ordinary" municipal waste.
"Concentrate and contain" may refer to fully engineered "landfill", of the
kind specified in the USA, and envisaged in the Netherlands, where the
containment physically isolates the wastes from surrounding land. This is
indistinguishable from permanent storage. It may also refer to the use of
natural liners, such as clay strata, which is a cheaper and much more com-
mon practice. Plastic liners are also used, sometimes to enhance natural
properties. "Concentrate and contain" does nothing to actually reduce the
inherent toxicity of deposited materials, so if containment is accidentally
ruptured at some future point, the hazards are still there to be released in
218 Risk Management and Hazardous Waste
concentrated form. Artificial liners have had limited use, and thus no
experience of their long-term behavior exists. Clay and other naturally
"lined" landfills merge into the "dilute and disperse" category, since some
permeability may occur, allowing percolation away of diluted and, thus,
less toxic materials. Codisposal with domestic refuse is thought to actually
encourage chemical and biochemical degradation and transformation of
some toxic materials into less toxic products, and (in properly chosen and
operated sites) to allow only acceptably transformed or diluted materials to
leach away, diluting even more as they go.
The DOE report concluded that "extensive experience in the UK over
a long period of time has shown that very few documented cases of
significant groundwater contamination due to landfills have occurred, thus
indicating that the controlled disposal of wastes by landfill is acceptable
[49]."
Even with the official unpopularity of landfill in other countries, there
is pretty much a consensus' in the UK on the acceptability of co-disposal
landfill, so long as "sensibly" operated. However, the conditions of "sensi-
ble" practice are pregnant with question marks, and beneath the consensual
style and language of the UK system, suitably encoded criticisms of the
lack of control over "licensed" practice, and of the lack of central pressure
to improve standards, can be traced back over several years.
The Environmental Safety Group at Harwell, for example, in their
evidence to the Gregson Committee [SOl qualified their remarks on the mer-
its of landfill. They argued that:
... for certain hazardous wastes their limited codisposal in a controlled
fashion would result in no serious pollution hazard over and above
that presented by domestic and light industrial waste on the site [but]
it is imperative for the DOE to produce guidelines on the extent to
which the codisposal of given toxic wastes was considered to be an
environmentally safe practice... For some materials codisposal is not
considered advisable and alternative technological approaches are
advocated. For others the data is still somewhat imprecise and
research is still in progress to provide improved guideline data ...
Since the Landfill Research Programme was initiated in 1973 there has
been a considerable change in the structure of the waste disposal
industry and in waste disposal technology. The investigations carried
out then showed how certain types of wastes such as heavy metal
sludges and cyanides behaved in both landfill sites and lysimeter type
experiments. Since then the guidelines on the best disposal practice
for most, but not all, of the major groups of compounds have been
produced.
Despite such differences as to emphasis or pace, Harwell joins with
the DOE in supporting sensible codisposal, on the recommendation that
more work be carried out on landfill. In addition, the Gregson Committee,
found landfill codisposal acceptable, but not without qualms:
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The safety of landfill, including codisposal depends vitally on good
management. The scope for abuse is considerable and the waste dispo-
sal industry has sometimes been skating on thin ice ... Accordingly
landfill must not be used in marginal cases just because it is cheap -
the "cheapest tolerable means" approach - and all hazardous waste
disposal must be subject to rigorous control [51].
219
These explicit questions as to whether "sensible" operation of landfill
codisposal is practically achievable were underlined by the HWI's first
highly critical oversight of the situation in 1985. This was joined by
findings of groundwater contamination in the UK, presumed due to
landfills, and by open criticisms of the scientific quality of the 1970s
research program by which the UK landfill codisposal commitment is
justified [52].
Especially with the growing international policy interaction on
hazardous waste management, the UK is in a somewhat embattled position,
as reflected in the observations of a DOE official:
Landfill means all things to all nations. It may be to a carefully
selected, well-engineered and properly managed facility, either for cod-
isposal with other wastes or solely for hazardous waste, or it may be
to an uncontrolled dump. As improved control measures are imple-
mented the uncontrolled dump is gradually disappearing in most Euro-
pean countries; in England it has disappeared [emphasis added]. There
are also national differences in the concept of controlled landfill: the
UK, based on its research findings, promotes a landfill philosophy
which acknowledges and utilizes the beneficial effects of codisposal and
the natural mechanisms of degradation, attenuation and dispersion.
An entirely opposite view prevails in much of continental Europe,
where controlled landfill disposal for hazardous waste means the con-
centration of such wastes in sites wherein they are contained, either
naturally or by artificial liners, and where all leachate produced is col-
lected and removed for treatment.
The international perception of the UK's attitude to hazardous
waste management is interesting. Whilst acknowledging the degree of
control achieved, the expertise applied and the relative lack of prob-
lems experienced by the UK, our European partners are nevertheless
critical of what they see as the indiscriminate consignment of wastes
to landfill, simply on the grounds of its relative cheapness. The facts
are very different: the UK may fairly be said to have achieved high
standards in respect of environmental protection and public health
related to waste management long before most of the other European
nations. Hazardous waste disposal has been specifically regulated
since 1972, all disposal sites for controlled wastes have been subject to
licensing since 1976 and codes of practice covering a wide range of
hazardous waste have been published by the DOE, commencing in
L974. It is ironic in the criticism received to reflect that in the UK
there is little evidence of the inheritance of problem sites reported by
some of our European neighbours [53].
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As we saw in Chapter 4, the Dutch could not site a national landfill
and expressly banned it as an option for chemical wastes. Other countries
in less special positions than the Netherlands are trying to move away from
landfill except, perhaps, for other waste treatment and destruction residues.
The FRG environmental agency has explained, for example, why it is mov-
ing away from codisposal:
The FRG tends towards separate treatment even though this method
is clearly more expensive than the former (codisposal). The motive ...
is undoubtedly the principle of prevention [54].
John Lehman, a former Director of the Solid Waste Program of the US
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), said that:
Our philosophy, as the land protection group within EPA, is to
minimize hazardous waste disposal to land. Consequently we strongly
support hazardous waste recycling or detoxification treatment prior to
land disposal wherever possible [55].
Lehman and others indicate that US policy is directed ultimately at no
landfill anywhere at any cost, i.e., landfill is made difficult and costly.
Where it is allowed, it will be in containment landfills engineered to precise,
legislated specifications.
The US attitude to landfill codisposal appears to reflect a significantly
different response to natural uncertainties from that of the UK (see
Chapter 12), where the uncertainties of codisposal are recognized but not
treated as automatically negative. UK officials argue, against international
coolness toward their policy, that many countries are just as dependent on
landfill as the UK, even if their official figures and policies say otherwise,
because, for example, treatment residues that go to landfill may be
accounted against the treatment method, not against landfill.
However, the arguments for or against landfill, or codisposal in partic-
ular, tend to be carried out with little attention to the crucial questions of
implementation and the worlds of real practice which are hidden away in
cryptic qualifications such as "sensible landfill is acceptable". The UK
approach to landfill as a control strategy reflects a principle (even if it does
not fulfill it) of fine-tuning regulation to situational variations and
differential risks. In doing so it may assume too much of a local fine-tuning
capability in implementation. In this case a theoretically sound policy may
be in practice questionable, because it asks too much of implementation.
Straightforward bans on landfill codisposal, whilst in some cases overcau-
tious, may be more realistic because institutionally simpler to implement in
the field.
In the UK (as elsewhere) the crux of the landfill issue is not so much
whether or not landfill in principle is good or bad, but what conditions
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control its use, including especially what is allowed to be landfilled at all,
and in what forms. This leads directly to the question of T&D site licens-
ing, since in the decentralized and private market system of the UK this is
the designated key mechanism for controlling the routing of wastes to par-
ticular T&D options and for managing their risks satisfactorily, once there.
7.4.2. Site licensing
The sections dealing with site licensing under COPA were brought into
force in 1976. Waste Management Paper No.4, The Licensing of Waste
Disposal Sites [56], lays down the general policy:
(1) To ensure that waste treatment and disposal are carried out with no
unacceptable risk to the environment and to public health, safety, and
amenity.
(2) To place at a suitable local level the responsibility for deciding what
conditions should be imposed at a given site, so that local cir-
cumstances can be fully accounted for.
(3) To ensure that changing patterns of waste disposal do not prejudice
objective (1) and, equally, that those responsible for waste treatment
and disposal take proper advantage of technical progress.
(4) To give waste disposers a clear idea of what operating standards are
required of them.
(5) As a result of (4), to secure the provision of sufficient facilities for the
treatment and disposal of waste.
(6) To ensure that sufficient information is available to the responsible
authorities to enable them to fulfill their statutory duties.
Until the creation of the HWI in 1984 there was no central scrutiny of
local licensing. Occasional ad hoc scrutiny took place when WDA decisions
were appealed to the Secretary of State.
Once a site has planning permission a WDA can only refuse a landfill
license on the grounds of (a) water pollution or (b) danger to public health.
It therefore has the burden of proving why, if it refuses a license. The con-
ditions in licenses are restricted to certain aspects and are also, to some
extent, governed by the T&D operator's license application, i.e., type of
waste, amount, choice of disposal method, etc.
There are two aspects to site licensing as a regulatory mechanism: the
quality of the license conditions themselves and the quality of their enforce-
ment. The Waste Disposal Engineers Association conducted its own survey
of T&D licensing by English WDAs in 1982 and concluded that "site
license conditions are fairly standard throughout England [but] their
enforcement and interpretation varies considerably [57]." This is a fairly
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common picture, implying that the licensing mechanism is sound, but for
the lack of proper policing. Yet the HWI's scrutiny produced a disquieting
picture of the quality of licenses too, not merely their enforcement. This
was graphically illustrated in the HWI's attempt to create a register of all
UK T&D facilities, public and private, in each region, with a classification
of sites according to the waste they received. The results revealed an
unsuspected mess:
Realization of this objective proved impossible. As data from site
licences was accumulated it rapidly became apparent that any mean-
ingful classification of sites by waste types would be extremely
difficult. The primary reason for this was the vast array of descriptive
nomenclatures used by WDAs in their site licences. The list of group
names found (not specific waste types) encompassed 385 entries.
Names assigned to waste types were often such as to defy anyone,
other than the WDA that wrote the licence, from identifying what
types of waste were included, either because of the general nature of
the description given, e.g. sites licensed solely for "controlled waste",
or because of the use of meaningless descriptive terms, a prime exam-
ple being "industrial semi-inert". The only way to resolve this would
have been to go back to the WDAs with a series of questions on hun-
dreds of sites and this would have taken very much longer than the six
months it took to collect, analyze and collate the information from site
licences [58].
The overall conclusion was that:
Regrettably, what the preparation of this register has clearly and un-
equivocally demonstrated is the extensive disparity between site
licenses issued by different WDAs in England and Wales [59].
In fact, the inital impression of HWI from those sites that the inspec-
tors themselves visited was that the site licenses are:
... in general unhelpful documents which do not provide sufficient gui-
dance to the operators. Many of the licences seen place too much reli-
ance on the operator, giving him an enviably free hand as far as
operations are concerned, but fail to place sufficient emphasis on the
standards to be achieved or the practices necessary to achieve them
[60].
Adequate enforcement is thus preempted by inadequate site-licensing,
brought about by a combination of:
(1) Historical neglect of the importance of the problem.
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(2) Lack of resource and expertise at local level.
(3) Institutional restrictions on WDAs which undermine their ability to
control and enact thorough local management reinforcing (1) and (2).
Thus, the overall control and reassurances supposedly offered by
T&D site licensing are seen to be largely vacuous. This control cannot, as
it stands, justify the official claim that it allows avoidance of "front-end"
control via closer hazard definitions, stricter prenotification requirements,
more waste data, and more positive designation of waste T&D routes.
Furthermore, these inadequacies and inconsistencies "are being exploited
by some waste disposal contractors [61]," who may legally deposit wastes at
sites where the conditions are so vague as to mean anything.
Multiplying the system effects of this T&D licensing failure are:
(1) The freedom mentioned earlier for waste producers or
handler-brokers to find legal cheap landfill, which in a free market
undermines the demand for and investment in higher technology
T &D facilities.
(2) The very large scale of this free-enterprise zone in UK waste life-
cycles makes definition of these life-cycles all the more difficult.
(3) The general uncertainty created by these inconsistencies undermines
all-round confidence and trust, which are especially vital ingredients
for the viability of a highly voluntaristic system like that of the UK.
The design and enforcement of T&D licenses is the central element of
implementation, so we look next at enforcement.
7.5. Enforcement
Enforcement involves consultation, informal advice and persuasion, moni-
toring, record-keeping, development of site licenses, issuing of formal com-
pliance notes, and, ultimately, prosecution. This must be performed with
many kinds of industry and company, with wastes being freely transferred
in and out of the area of responsibility, and with a need to keep up not only
with all the immediate practical tasks, but also with scientific, technical,
and other developments in policy advice. As public opinion is more
actively expressed, the conflicts that WDAs must resolve become more
difficult. There are further statutory duties also, such as the gathering and
preparation of data for a waste disposal plan, site licensing, appeals, etc.
All of these functions are normally delegated to a "waste disposal
department" in the local authority, which is usually also responsible for
municipal waste collection, treatment, and disposal. However, the strength
of these departments, and thus the quality of enforcement, varies
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enormously throughout the UK. In some WDAs it is part of the duties of a
single person. The HWI noted that "inadequacies and inequalities are com-
monplace [62]" with site license breaches going uncorrected by WDAs.
Furthermore,
Very different attitudes towards the policing of hazardous waste dispo-
sal sites prevail amongst English and Welsh WDAs. The two
extremes are exemplified by one English WDA, where until recently no
staff provision was made for inspection duties and other WDAs, par-
ticularly some of the metropolitan counties, which deploy teams of
inspectors, with provision for out-of-hours working.
Between these extremes, there remain considerable differences. Com-
paring for example, two major hazardous waste landfills of broadly
similar inputs, both in the south of England, at one, WDA inspectors
made two or three unannounced visits each week and took spot check
samples for analysis from waste arriving at the site. This WDA also
imposes rigorous documentary prenotification requirements on the
hazardous waste disposal sites in its area. In the second WDA, which
has only one major site licensed to accept a wide range of hazardous
waste, it is normal practice to make an inspection visit once every
three weeks, usually by prearrangement. In this case no attempt is
made to sample wastes: normal practice is for the WDA inspector to·
provide the site operator with empty sample jars for the operator to
fill over the next three weeks, and to collect the filled containers left
for him. This takes the basis of trust too far [63].
Lack of manpower and lack of expertise tend to run together. To
iIlustrate, during interviews in our research, one environmental health
officer in Wales, when asked what he would do if asked where an old car
battery should be disposed of, answered that he did not know; yet another
environmental health officer in a nearby WDA, has been conducting sur-
veys on his own initiative into the amount of hazardous waste arising from
local school laboratories, pharmacies, etc., and what they do with this
waste. The former could be thought of as incompetent; however, handling
of waste (all waste) is only a smaIl part of his overaIl responsibility. In
another district - a net receiver of hazardous waste - the total staff in the
whole poIlution control section now consists of two people. Formerly there
were four, but with a shift of political emphasis to housing, the poIlution
control department was reduced to two and the housing department
boosted instead. This arbitrary designation of personnel indicates the insti-
tutional blocks to professionalism in the field.
The replacement of DPW by Section 17 of COPA in 1981 was sup-
posed to reduce the population of registered wastes by about 70% and thus
cut the administrative costs proportionately for WDAs and industry. The
new regulations implied a shift from bureaucratic administration of the
waste notification system to field inspections, sampling, etc. In actuality
Decentralized Regulation and Technical Discretion 225
however, the expected reduction of consignment notes has not occurred,
and WDAs are still heavily burdened with an administrative mode of regu-
lation. In one Welsh district council, with two staff dealing with all pollu-
tion, 2000-2500 notifications, sometimes with five-page attachments, are
received per year, each needing to be read, understood, collated, and some
followed up, in addition to all the other regular responsibilities.
Contrary to the DOE's official position that local authority regulatory
resources would be spread less thinly by the new approach, the WDAs were
hostile to it because of what they saw as a substantially increased workload
caused by the extra field-monitoring required, despite the lack of resources
to do it. They argue that the new special waste definitions and consign-
ment arrangements leave a large undefined middle-ground of environmen-
tally hazardous wastes that are now excluded from registration, without
which the WDAs feel unable to exercise responsibility for ensuring that no
special wastes are included in that uncontrolled population. This conflict
was one of the central issues of the Section 17 Review (1985).
The key issues in the review were the scope, administration, and
enforcement of the regulations, with the focus of attention on breaches of
control. The report warned that "the public's perception of and sensitivity
to such breaches represents an urgent stimulus to improve effectiveness of
control [64]." Although it is obviously impossible to give any definite figure
of breaches, the DOE estimates that, on the evidence currently available,
there are 150 significant incidents of illicit disposal of toxic and dangerous
wastes each year [65]. To this must be added the broader effects of lax
legal disposal noted earlier.
In the UK the enforcement failures caused by a widespread lack of
local resources, expertise, and attention are compounded by the complexity
of interpretation of the regulatory definitions, for example, of what consti-
tutes special waste. Although difficulties arise from the imprecision and
complexity of the technical definitions of hazardous wastes (see earlier),
enforcement is undermined by legal statements in the regulations too. The
worst of these in local authority experience is the definition of unlawful
disposal as "causing and knowingly permitting" controlled waste to be
deposited on an unlicensed site. The practical consequence of this legal
phrasing is that illegal disposal virtually has to be discovered in the act, for
prosecution to be possibly enforceable. There may then also be complex
and expensive technical uncertainties as to whether the waste falls into a
controlled, hazardous category, and whether the site license (if any) legally
permits that waste consignment or not.
In addition to these difficulties and the sheer lack of resources,
enforcement is undermined by organizational dislocations even within the
local WDA:
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The waste disposal officer typically has responsibility for all aspects of
waste management within his Authority's area, i.e. the waste survey
and disposal plan, the acquisition and development of local authority
disposal sites, their operation, for site licensing and inspection and for
the administration of the Special Waste Regulations. Decisions on the
issue or modification of site licenses are occasionally delegated to the
waste disposal officer but more usually retained by the appropriate
Committee. Enforcement actions are normally the province of the
council's legal department.
In a few disposal authorities in England and Wales site licensing,
inspection and enforcement are located separately from the waste
management function, e.g., in a department with a traditional enforce-
ment role, such as weights and measures. Thus the waste disposal
officer is responsible only for the authority's operational role in waste
disposal [66].
Council legal departments are responsible for all legal functions, and so do
not specialize in waste regulation, nor even necessarily in pollution control
generally. They are naturally more cautious in calculating the costs, risks,
and benefits of prosecuting a case than enforcement officers might be, and
this caution is etched even deeper by the vagueness of the legal definitions
involved. Waste disposal officers have complained about the difficulty of
persuading their legal departments to act; yet the legal officers are also in a
difficult position over prosecution, its uncertainty, and expense. They need
to have clear-cut cases, which are hard to find. Typical enforcement
scenarios involve prosecution to ~ecure the fulfillment of site license condi-
tions, e.g., to avoid landfilling an allegedly special waste, or prosecution of
a disposer of allegedly special wastes in an uncontrolled site, both rarely
clear-cut.
WDAs, as far as possible, rely on advice and/or persuasion to deal
with license problems, using prosecution of offenders as a last resort. Suc-
cess has usually been with operators who wish to act responsibly anyway,
but who have made mistakes, and there is now a feeling that tougher meas-
ures have to be established for persistent offenders. The problem is that
even if a legal department decides to prosecute a case, it takes three
months to two years to move a case to court, the outcome is uncertain, and
then the sentences are often too light. Most offenses fall under magistrates
courts, where the maximum fine allowable is only 1000 pounds sterling.
Should a case even reach the court, the defendants usually have good
scientific experts and can employ a specialist hazardous waste or pollution
lawyer, while WDAs have to rely on the nonspecialist local authority
lawyer. Even the largest authority, the Greater London Council (GLC,
now disbanded), found this a continual frustration.
Even if a significant shift away from desk-bound "enforcement" to
field inspection were to occur, these enforcement problems would not
diminish (indeed, they would probably multiply, at least until inspection
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began to take effect in better practices), because the costs of following up
direct inspection with tests, sampling, and chemical analyses are very con-
siderable and, as discussed in Chapter 10, are not definitive anyway. In
fact, the weakness of many WDAs with respect to expertise and technical
resources leaves them effectively dependent upon the firms they are sup-
posed to be regulating for advice and analysis. In the collaborative British
system this is not of itself a matter for official concern.
The typical British attitude is reflected in the comment by a senior
official at the DOE, "If someone from the US EPA has discussions with an
industrialist, there usually has to be at least one lawyer present. The fact
that almost anyone, and especially industrialists, can telephone the head of
the Land Wastes Division of the DOE for advice on a certain waste prob-
lem is something incomprehensible in the American situation [67]." This
informal collaborative network is supposed to operate at the local level too.
For example, in one district in Wales, a major multinational oil firm has
its own in-house landfill on its refinery site and until recently an incinerator
(purpose-built for acid tars). The local WDA licenses and "monitors" the
site. The local environmental officer makes an occasional visit but, as one
such officer emphasized, the whole network is based on trust. In fact, if
there is likely to be a problem, usually associated with smells, the company
telephones the WDA beforehand so that if a member of the public does
complain the WDA will already know the cause of the problem. This
naturally helps their public credibility. If the WDA needs any scientific
advice or laboratory tests it automatically calls the head of the company
laboratory, who readily helps out. The company naturally has far more
technical expertise than the officials at the WDA, and is far better equipped
to control its own site. Previously, the company did take some waste for
processing from an adjoining WDA, but after an incorrect declaration was
made, it has not accepted any more. In fact, it is a significant comment on
transaction costs that, despite under capacity, they claim there would now
be far too much extra work to accept wastes from outside. The company
also has its own consignment note system within the refinery. The person
in charge of waste disposal at the company site could not foresee any prob-
lems that he had not already dealt with in the past and could not see any
action necessary should anything occur, other than to inform the local
WDA as a matter of courtesy. A strong climate of institutional trust and a
relaxed attitude toward uncertainty prevails.
In another district a similar situation exists, but local expert help is
provided by a major international waste disposal company, instead of the
waste producer. Again, the same level of trust prevails, and the WDA
official was confident that he could trust the firm, despite the fact that its
public credibility had suffered through allegations of malpractice. The fore-
going examples are taken from district council WDAs, but this kind of trust
and dependency is not confined to them. Although in such a complex,
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decentralized system relationships are varied, the overall culture is summed
up in the official advice given by the DOE in Waste Management Paper
No. 23, that conflicts or ambiguities in the definition of special wastes for
regulated T&D can be resolved by mutual informal consultation of the
relevant parties, without recourse to elaborate legal or technical rules and
procedures.
When the regulated company is responsible this cultural climate is
acceptable, but even with responsible companies differences of interest and
judgment on risks can occur, and mechanisms for handling these must be
available. Most of the officers in the smaller district WDAs thought that,
apart from the problem of resources, they were more in command of the
situation than a county-level WDA in that they know better "who is who"
and "what is what" in their area. As our interviews showed, however, and
as other sources have confirmed, this self-confidence is not entirely soundly
based.
In the larger councils, the GLC, and other metropolitan county coun-
cils (now abolished) the situation on the face of it was quite different, and
yet in some basic elements, such as legal enforcement, it was not. Some of
these WDAs had large, full-time teams consisting of chemists, engineers,
inspectors, and enforcement officers; they often helped out smaller, less
well-equipped WDAs. With the political abolition of the GLC and metro-
politan county councils in 1986, the HWI advocated that hazardous waste
management should remain the responsibility of a common unit in each
area, thus maintaining these pools of expertise. It warned that the dis-
bandment of such teams could lead to an increase in already widespread
"cowboy activities and fly-by-night tipping":
In Merseyside [one of the metropolitan WDAs] it has sometimes
proved necessary to deploy inspectors in twos, and even in threes,
equipped with personal radios, when investigating the activities of
some local asbestos strippers and their "transfer" stations [68].
There is a widespread feeling that the abolition of the larger WDAs
may only hasten a general perception that regional units of regulation on
something like their scale are necessary.
We have seen that practical inspection and regulatory relationships
within and around the WDA vary widely. It is necessary to recall that this
is a fragmented system of regulation, at the very back-end of the waste
cycle, mainly at the disposal site. WDAs, in particular, have advocated
more systematic attention at the front-end of the waste life-cycle to reduce
the uncertainties besetting them at the back-end. Registration of special
waste arisings is a central instrument of any front-end regulatory attention.
However, a waste arisings registration scheme has been ruled out, trip-
ticket notification being regarded as adequate. The large distinction
between the two arises from the free market of waste handling, which
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means that the small and fragmented WDAs have no control over waste
movements in and out of their area, and so experience great uncertainty. A
national register of waste generation would, if it were practicable, reduce
these uncertainties considerably. It is therefore worth looking at some of
the practical realities of notification.
The trip-ticket notification system was established under the earlier
DPW regime, for a wider population of wastes as already explained. Atti-
tudes formed under DPW have proved difficult to adapt to the new philoso-
phy and framework of COPA, leading to conflict and confusion over the
precise purpose and practical implementation of the waste notification
requirements.
The producer of a waste defined as special must, before the waste is
removed, prepare six copies of a standard form, fill in the waste description
and point of production and destination, and send a copy to the receiver
("away") WDA, at least three days prior to despatch. When the carrier
collects the waste, the name and date are recorded by the carrier in the
next section, and the waste producer completes a further section confirming
that appropriate advice was transferred on collection. A copy of this goes
to the "home" WDA. Finally, the receiving T&D operator fills in a section
confirming the validity of licensed disposal at his or her facility. Copies are
returned to the home WDA, who is responsible for "closing the loop" on
proper disposal by tallying this copy against the first copy completed by
the waste producer.
The main confusion over this system is whether it corresponds with
the national policy of placing control emphasis upon T &D site licensing.
The local authorities have argued that it would be more consistent if the
receiving or away WDA closes the loop on the trip-ticket, because the
receiving WDA in the end needs to control what is coming into its area's
T&D facilities, if the regulatory strategy is back-end site licensing control.
But this argument assumes that the trip-ticket system is meant to be a
real-time control mechanism (as opposed to a post hoc information system)
and this has been vehemently resisted by industry and, more gently, by the
government. A CBI spokesman expressed industry's frustration with the
WDAs' attempts to retain a more rigorous framework of control:
The need for records has been enforced through the EEC Toxic Wastes
Directive but extensive "cradle to grave" documentation was not
envisaged in the drafting of Section 17. Unfortunately, these sensible
new requirements were also lost sight of in an increasingly emotive
debate of whether the documentation provided WDAs with a means of
control over the point of disposal. Such polemic diverted energy which
could have been used with greater benefit to educate those who would
be involved with the new Regulations and, above all, completing the
guidance literature, Waste Management Paper No. 23 etc., on time.
Thus the Regulations were launched in a climate of hostility to be
operated at grass roots level by individuals who were anxious, ill-
230 Risk Management and Hazardous Waste
prepared and often confused. Little surprise that their reception has
been so mixed [69].
Thus, again, a fundamental conflict about the meaning and role of key
information has weakened the coherence of social relationships on which
the UK lays so much emphasis in justifying its system. To show the
ramifications of even apparently minor factors, however, let us look at the
prenotification requirement. The theory behind prenotification is that the
receiving WDA and the T&D operator should know when which kinds of
wastes are due, evaluate whether they should be received, and make proper
arrangements for really difficult consignments. In practice,
"prenotification" is often mailed, second class, on the day of waste
despatch. Strictly speaking this is illegal, as COPA Section 17 requires
that it be posted so as to arrive at the T&D contractor at least three days
in advance of delivery. But with all the other day-to-day pressures on
plant operators, late prenotification is not unusual. When it does happen,
the receiving officer at the T&D site may not know about a waste until it
arrives at the gate. He then has to decide on the spot :
(1) Whether the waste fits the copy of the documentation, which the
driver should carry.
(2) Whether the documented waste description fits the site license condi-
tions.
(3) What to do if these are in doubt, e.g., phone someone responsible.
When both site license conditions and documentation of the waste are
vague, as is often the case, the site operator is under immense pressure to
let it through. It has been pointed out that in some WDAs a site clerk
would need to have a degree, not only in chemistry, but in law too.
Several other normal factors, some "structural", others ordinary
organizational realities, mean that the information or "control" offered by
waste consignment notes falls far short of any theory:
(1)
(2)
Loads defined for recycling are exempt, yet often end up as wastes for
which the cheapest disposal is being sought.
The consignment document sent from the producer to the home
authority only states where the waste was produced and where it was
taken. But in the commercial structure this is often an intermediate
transfer station. The producer will not know what happens beyond
this point, further responsibility for transformation and/or disposal
being in the hands of the broker. Thus, the "cradle-to-grave" docu-
ment may only record an intermediate "grave", which may not be the
ultimate disposal point. In theory every stage and new life-cycle is
fully recorded, but in reality this becomes less likely with intermediate
commercial agents and handling points.
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(3) Widespread "branching" of waste life-cycles mean that some consign-
ments quite legally disappear. If a broker receives a "waste" that con-
tains valuable materials and sells it on as a good to a recovery mer-
chant or transforms the material on-site, part or whole of it is legally
removed from notification. Under the present special wastes
definitions, even simple dilution could remove a waste from the con-
trol and notification system. If it later notices a lack of correspon-
dence in the records, the WDA will not know, unless it follows up
with time-consuming specific inspections and inquiries, whether the
waste was illegally disposed of or legally processed.
(4) The size, weight, whether tankers or skips are half-full or complete,
mixed, etc., are often not defined. No units are specified on the form,
nor would they be enforceable.
(5) There are supposed to be six copies of the documents, the last one
returning to the home WDA for "closing the loop". Yet this bottom
copy, in particular, may be simply illegible.
(6) Information necessary for an on-the-spot check-up of waste descrip-
tions or sources may be simply left off or illegible (names, phone
numbers)' making proper control decisions, e.g., for a T&D site
manager, very laborious and unattractive.
(7) Collection and transport contractors are sometimes left to fill in the
documents on behalf of the waste producer. They are allowed to
amend the document if necessary.
(8) The "season-ticket" system whereby regular consignments are given a
single document covering several loads, whilst obviously sensible in
many respects, depends upon the regular consistency of these loads,
and thus multiplies the above uncertainties proportionately.
(9) Finally, the sheer volume of documents to receive, decipher, read, col-
late with partners, extract data from, prepare follow-up questions,
file, and retrieve when needed, is overwhelming. Informal reports cir-
culate of WDA offices littered with mountains of unprocessed consign-
ment notes (the estimated number of such documents in circulation
per year in the UK approaches half a million).
One of the official justifications of the restricted definition of special
waste under COPA is that DPW's earlier documentation of a larger waste
population had already provided the necessary regulatory information base.
In fact, the WDAs did not process the data that was available to them on
the DPW consignment notes, because of the lack of resources to do so and
the difficulties of translating the notes into meaningful data. Many of these
difficulties remain as outlined above, and still obstruct efficient use of the
consignment note system, even for its designated purpose of post hoc infor-
mation and identification of mismatches and problems, let alone for any
system of actual control. The transaction costs of the system are already
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high and an attempt at more rigor would escalate them wildly, with ques-
tionable returns in terms of regulatory quality.
One possible way of reducing uncertainty would be to register all spe-
cial waste producers, so that only this identified population would be gen-
erating consignment notes. Yet in the DOE's estimation:
'" if special waste producers alone had to be registered (about
100000) the initial direct costs for industry would be of the order of 10
m pounds sterling and those of authorities 4-5 m pounds sterling a
year '" If all commercial and industrial waste producers (between 1.5
and 2 m) were included, the initial costs to industry would be over 150
m pounds sterling and those of authorities over 60 m pounds sterling
[70].
Although these figures were disputed by the WDAs, when combined
with the inevitable uncertainties outlined above in description, communica-
tion, coordination, and checking, the orders of magnitude involved demon-
strate the limits of enforcement via "definitive" information bases.
It is a symptom of the deeper conflicts of perception as to the basic
relationships involved in regulation that the consignment note system
should have ever been regarded as potentially a direct method of control.
The whole idea behind the home WDA closure of the loop was that the
WDA's should thereby gather data on hazardous waste arisings in their
area; whereas the away WDA closure implies more emphasis on the back-
end control of wastes via T&D site management. But the central designers
of the UK regulatory framework have regarded it all along as a means of
generating necessary information, a supplement, not an alternative, to their
model of informal collaborative relationships at relevant points, particularly
for T &D site licensing.
It is remarkable how even an elaborate and apparently precise system
of notification can be subject to so much informal confusion and uncer-
tainty in practical enactment. If mutual trust prevails these uncertainties
remain in check, but once it begins to crumble they become a repertoire of
further conflict, requiring escalating legal or technical rigidity.
The belief that the consignment note system has not even generated
adequate information, let alone control, is reflected in the WDAs' insistence
that waste producers should be required to provide more detailed informa-
tion on wastes. Central and local authorities have basically different views
of what technical information is necessary for regulation; these derive from
different views and experiences of institutional relationships in regulation.
Institutionally fragmented, socially marginal to the commercial T&D net-
works, and feeling marginal to central policy negotiation, the WDAs natur-
ally seek recourse in more comprehensive and precise technical information
and criteria.
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7.6. Conclusions
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The UK distribution of regulatory responsibility is one of the most decen-
tralized in the industrialized world. Combined with private commercial
control of waste life-cycles and imprecise regulations, this adds up to a frag-
mented and extremely flexible system, with attendant benefits and costs.
Hazardous, or "special", waste is defined by an inclusive list of generic
substances, but with exclusions based on waste characteristics. These are
scientifically defined, but imprecisely so. Discretion is built into the techni-
cal framework, corresponding with a collaborative, informal institutional
climate that encourages negotiation from case to case according to situa-
tional variations,
Nearly 200 local waste disposal authorities have separate responsibil-
ity for interpreting the imprecise regulatory terms, applying and enforcing
them, and administering the special waste trip-ticket system. Under various
constraints, such as limited criteria for refusal, they are also responsible for
T&D site selection and licensing, and imposing conditions that, supposedly,
specify allowed and disallowed wastes, acceptable operating practices, etc.
They are also responsible for inspection and enforcement; in effect, their
range of responsibilities bridges regulatory policymaking and implementa-
tion, but within key formal and informal constraints, and at such a level of
decentralization that inadequate concentration of resources is a serious
problem.
T&D site (i.e., landfill) licensing is the mainstay of overall control in
the UK system. However, the special waste definitions apply only to trip-
ticket transport requirements, while a different, longer list of wastes "for
record-keeping purposes" relates to disposal. The UK appears to be unique
in having two different lists for different parts of the waste cycle, which
underlines the extreme disaggregation of its regulatory system. However,
the technical content of the classifications gives no indication of their infor-
mal and flexible institutional role, and thus of the variable consequences.
Much of the UK system of hazardous waste management can be
understood from its institutional history. It arose from concern over
uncontrolled toxic chemical dumping, and local authorities were the
automatic organizational units to take over responsibility. This integrated
hazardous waste disposal with domestic refuse disposal: institutionally, via
regulatory dependence upon disposal site licensing and established land-use
planning; and technically, via codisposal of "hazardous" with "nonhazar-
dous" domestic wastes in landfills. However, whereas the public authorities
have a responsibility to collect and manage domestic wastes right from
their point of production, they are "outsiders" to most if not all of the
hazardous industrial waste life-cycle, and do not control what leaves or
enters their area. This is a cause of uncertainty and insecurity, especially
when they view it in close proximity with domestic waste management.
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This is also probably a significant obstacle to the development of stronger
professionalism, since it is a major institutional constraint (one of several)
upon the exercise of a coherent professional managerial role at the WDA
level.
The most important general observation about the UK system is its
remarkably strong dependence upon informal trust and collaboration
amongst the various institutional actors, at all levels. Apart from anything
else, this makes it more difficult than usual to pick out specific parameters,
such as hazard definitions or other regulatory mechanisms, for comparison
with other systems. More extremely so than in other systems, these are
only the tip of an iceberg of implicit, culturally established understandings
of responsibilities and relationships. Thus, connoisseurs of the UK system
will point out with some justification that criticisms, for example, of the
restricted scope and clarity of UK special waste, or of its apparently unbri-
dled enthusiasm for landfill codisposal, omit the full story; this would
include a very considerable, and more flexible, supplementary context of
confidence between parties, self-regulation and mutual regulation, colla-
boration, and trust. Informal norms and pressures may be at least as sub-
stantial and effective as more formal ones, especially when the issue is int-
rinsically ill-defined and calls for flexibility.
The UK's technical imprecision and uncertainty in regulation is not
merely a result of its strong institutional traditions of mutual confidence
and trust; it is a necessary dimension of wider UK processes, especially
intragovernment and government-industry relationships. This cultural
style does not merely allow, but needs technical uncertainty as a currency
of informal institutional interaction, demonstration of good faith, and wil-
lingness to compromise - the hallmarks of UK regulation. The technical
uncertainty is unthreatening (unlike, for example, in the Netherlands or the
USA), because of a lack of institutional uncertainty; there is confidence that
negotiations between interest groups will resolve uncertainties into accept-
able compromises. There are few other countries in which the decision pro-
cess for defining the full, legal hazard status of a waste could be described
in an official government document as follows:
Where a waste producer does not have access to such [suitably
qualified] staff, guidance may be available from certain of the larger
specialist waste disposal contractors: failing this it is suggested that
the waste producers and waste disposal authority (and other parties as
appropriate, e.g., a water authority) should hold joint discussions to
establish the status of a particular waste [71].
Under these conditions introducing precise and inflexible definitions,
criteria, and controls would be a statement of lack of trust in the other par-
ties. This would corrode the whole edifice and its forms of social control.
It would be a tacit breach of a whole labyrinth of interdependent commit-
ments that make up the viability of the overall system.
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Even the definition of a "regulator" in the national system is nowhere
near so clear-cut in theUK as elsewhere. The Land Wastes Division of the
DOE is proud of the 200 or so man-years of industrial experience amongst
its staff of about 12. They see themselves more as consultants than police-
men, even acting, on occasion, as honest brokers for firms seeking T&D ser-
vices, putting them in touch with T&D operators who could help. They
are keen to emphasize their extensive personal network throughout the
industrial world that they regulate, and believe very strongly that regula-
tion only works because industry wants it to work, and that mutual regula-
tion through this elaborate informal network is the crucial component of
the system. Furthermore, expert review committees hardly demarcate roles
between industry, science, and government agencies, because such formal
distinctions do not matter. Thus, scientific inputs to regulation are natur-
ally imprecise and informal because institutionally "science" is embodied in
industrialists, government staff, and others, in an organic mix with
economic, organizational, and other pragmatic interests and perspectives.
Interestingly, compared with other systems this not only creates an opera-
tionally and technically different system, but even different definitions of
what science is. This is discussed in relation to processes of public legitima-
tion in Chapters 11 and 12. Flexibility in definition and interpretation of
technical criteria are essential in this form of decision process. They design
uncertainty into UK regulation, but uncertainties which the insider actors
are confident can be negotiated. This culturally rooted perspective creates
relaxed responses to natural uncertainties, such as the effects of landfill cod-
isposal (see Chapter 12).
Therefore, imprecise regulatory criteria and restricted formal powers
are not only a pragmatic response to the ill-defined structure of hazardous
waste management as an issue; they are a necessary function of the wider
UK institutional setting, which shows a healthy disrespect for formal con-
trols. However, there are deeper conflicts that emerge within the appear-
ance of a wholly informal collaborative UK system. The very actors who
ought to be implementing and benefiting from its discretionary opportuni-
ties for local optimization are the ones who are least happy with its lack of
precision and certainty. It is ironic that the justification of flexible criteria
and situational risk management emanates from central government, not
the local WDAs who implement those criteria into actual regulation. Yet
the justification is supposed to be about their local autonomy to shape
regulation to their own circumstances. In other countries, such as the USA
and the Netherlands, central government seeks control via standardization
and precise formal controls. It does not trust that it can manage the
behavioral uncertainties that imprecise regulations would involve. In the
UK, central government holds the opposite view, but local authorities are
left bearing the brunt of institutional uncertainties over wastes and their
production, exchange, movement and disposal.
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In fact, the local authorities consistently complain about the lack of
precision and certainty in the technical standards they are supposed to
enforce, and the lack of formal controls further up the waste life-cycle (such
as licensing of waste producers and handlers, and more precise information
on industrial waste generation). The reason is obvious in the light of this
chapter. They are in no position to manage the behavioral uncertainties
into consequences they find acceptable. Contrary to the central model,
they are beset by institutional uncertainty and need technical-legal cer-
tainty to compensate. In other words, they feel outside or, at best, on the
margins of the informal social networks of central policy bargaining, and of
the private commercial arena of industrial waste handling. There are, of
course, extensive informal relationships between parties at the local level,
and some between local and national levels; but the overall sense at the
WDA level is of fragmentation and marginalization, largely disconnected
from the idealized collaborative and trusting social world portrayed at
national level. The very fact that the HWI revealed such a surprising mess
at local level, at the very point of regulation officially defined as the crux,
namely site licensing, indicates both a previous lack of effectiveness of this
informal, trust-based framework at this level, and a lack of central aware-
ness that its model is not necessarily a realistic portrayal of life at the sharp
end.
The logical conclusion is that the WDAs are too small, have too many
combined regulatory responsibilities and constraints weighing upon them,
and have too little expertise or other social resources to be confident about
converting the technical uncertainties into satisfactory results. Their lack
of power to focus regulatory attention earlier in waste life-cycles is a major
impediment because of the great uncertainties they face before wastes actu-
ally arrive at a disposal site, where WDAs effectively begin to regulate.
Strictly speaking, it is up to a local authority, e.g., the district council of
Torfaen in South Wales, where the Rechem incinerator receives wastes, to
interpret the scientific literature in toxicology and carcinogenicity into
practical regulations [72]. In the light of the complexities only outlined in
Chapter 10, this is an awesome and unrealistic responsibility. In practice,
of course, the WDA is dependent upon others.
The options would seem to be:
(1) To consolidate the extreme regulatory decentralization by matching
the degree of technical rigidity and precision to the enforcement
agency's institutional situation - this would mean a parallel to the
Dutch approach, of specific, listed constituents in a waste at fixed
numerical concentration thresholds. In defining by fiat more stand-
ardized risk situations as control tests, this would reduce the theoreti-
cal degree of refinement in the risk discriminations, but it would also
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reduce the degree of uncertainty faced by the WDAs. The improve-
ment in implementation might more than compensate for the reduc-
tion of theoretical situational optimality.
(2) To leave the regulatory definitions, etc., alone, but regionalize the
WDAs into larger institutional units, concentrating more expertise,
legal, and other resources there. This would potentially give the ensu-
ing regulatory bodies the formal and informal capacity to manage the
prevailing uncertainties flexibly (the theoretical justification of impre-
cise and informal approaches) into adequate results more in accor-
dance with their perceptions and interests.
Either of these general options could be complemented by stronger
powers to regulate mOre upstream, e.g. by registering waste producers
and/or waste arisings.
At present, the vigor of the local authorities' more adversarial,
precision-based regulatory stance is muted, but the situation is changing
fairly rapidly. The HWI's first (1985) report contained unusually sharp
and stinging prose for an official government agency in a culture that is
used to heavily muted public criticism, accompanied by private bargaining
and in-fighting. Furthermore, public concern has been aroused by interna-
tional incidents, repeated allegations of health risks around high-
temperature incinerators, and a succession of inquiries and reports. Local
public opposition to landfill sites has thus far not coalesced into a national
movement, but with bodies such as Greenpeace now taking an interest, and
with waste imports rising sharply in the mid-80s, this could change. The
House of Lords Gregson Report warned against the complacency that is
sometimes a companion of informal collaborative networks:
There is a belief that because in this country there have been compara-
tively few major incidents, we can, without too much effort, maintain
this position in the future ... This complacency is, at times, tinged
with the arrogance that "We know best", and has probably given rise
to a very serious loss of public confidence in the whole activity of
waste disposal [73].
In these circumstances the balance of strengths and weaknesses of the
UK institutional approach may tilt away from the flexible, informal, and
trust-based framework. Whatever the actual quality of environmental
end-results of UK hazardous waste management compared with other coun-
tries, it is an important problem for the credibility of regulation that there
are little or no overall points of reference by which legitimately interested,
nonspecialist "third parties" such as environmentalists or other public
organizations, committees of inquiry, labor unions, international regulatory
bodies, such as the EC (and we would have to include as outsiders, partly,
even local WDAs), can obtain a clear view of the whole system of regula-
tion and its rationale. Such nonspecialist bodies cannot have the degree of
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involvement that understands variations of risk management from one
situation to another. They need to see consistent and clear decision rules,
but in the UK these do not exist.
Another consequence of the collaborative, informal social networks of
UK regulation is that it cannot institutionalize a more investigative, critical
role as part of the regulatory system itself. For example, what in the USA
would be regarded as normal "critical research" on the scientific analysis of
PCBs in illegally dumped electrical capacitors, was performed in the UK by
an investigative national TV program (BBC Newsnight), rather than by
regulators or scientific groups in the normal system. A more resilient
approach to public credibility of regulation would have this critical expert
"watchdog" role built into regulatory institutions and processes themselves,
rather than leave it to the inevitably somewhat haphazard polarized and ad
hoc style of the media.
Therefore, a question against UK flexibility in technical criteria and
institutional rules is whether it can reconcile itself to the growing needs of
external accountability and corresponding demands for synoptic, precise
standards and formal controls. One can argue that these are more symbols
for public reassurance than effective regulatory tools, but the fundamental
conflict is there, and its terms are changing.
It may well be also that even if they could be extended to include the
local authorities (who are, after all, the main regulators), the benefits of a
relaxed and flexible institutional system incur the associated cost of being
unable to move the focus of waste management further upstream in the
hazardous waste life-cycle, to preempt many later uncertainties. UK
dependence upon private commercial T&D, with no specific restrictions
other than the special waste trip-ticket, and back-end site licensing, leaves
a marked lack of overall coordination between waste arisings and the provi-
sion of appropriate T &D facilities. Although the low-cost "flexibility" of
landfill control has allowed this system to work, it has created difficulties
for high-technology T&D. Whether the free market can provide adequate
alternative T &D capacity if landfill becomes more expensive, controversial,
and restricted is open to question.
The UK already focuses more strongly than most upon the very
back-end, namely T&D site licensing, rather than on the point of waste
arisings. Whereas some countries have created incentives to reduce waste
arisings by increasing T&D costs all-round, UK landfill prices have been
actually falling, undermining even the high-technology back-end T&D
options, let alone providing any upstream pressure to recycle or reduce
waste arisings. Thus, one report has concluded that:
... there have been three EEC Directives on waste [74] placing
emphasis on recycling, but judging by their impact on practice in the
UK they seem to have been totally ineffective ... In several other
countries, e.g., Denmark, FRG, France a strong commitment has
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developed and this is enshrined in legislation and encouraged by
appropriate financial measures to increase the amount of waste
recovered ... Of all major EEC states, the UK has stood out in its
diffidence in this area.
... there is no substantial or continuing commitment to these goals of
the kind that has emerged elsewhere in the Community, nor is there
any real prospect of such a commitment developing in the near future
[75].
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Of course, differences of view exist in this point as on all others. The
UK's reclamation industry claims to be an important wealth creator in its
own right [76].
The UK approach offers no chance of a coherent management of
wastes from the production point (as would occur in the rejected National
Waste Register and in more elaborate regulatory waste lists and treatment
designations). The site based approach instead creates de facto pressure to
stretch site license "restrictions"; rejection simply leaves a waste "out in
the open" again, out of effective regulatory control until it appears at
another site. (The trip-ticket notification system, in addition to being res-
tricted to special wastes, is not a real-time regulatory mechanism.)
A further ramification of site licensing dependence is the express reli-
ance upon the "sensible" landfill of hazardous wastes. The scientific
justification of policies seriously underestimates the importance of analyz-
ing the social realities behind such easily glossed-over conditions like "sensi-
ble". If institutional realities make the conditions nonachievable, then the
"scientific justification" is reversed, and the "optimal" policy turns out to
be a bad one. The dependence on landfill is extremely vulnerable to poten-
tial local public opposition, inspired by evidence that "sensible" landfill
may indeed be socially unenforceable. Thus, what appears to be an
optimal technical regulatory design in view of the structural properties of
the hazardous waste issue, because it tailors risk assessment to local situa-
tions, may be violating the narrowed margins of error because the embed-
ded social assumptions of ideal situational management are not realistic.
The evidence points in this direction.
How a regulatory system handles its basic institutional uncertainties
and conflicts is important even if its material environmental and economic
effects are difficult to compare with other systems. To a significant extent,
if institutional uncertainties are left to fester they breed a lack of
confidence, which leads to corrosion of the climate of self-regulation and
"independent" compliance that have to be nurtured in any system. The
British institutional economy of flexible, mutual regulation via informal
relationships, tacit norms, and imprecisely formulated rules is envied by
some observers from opposite conditions, notably from the institutionalized
mistrust and adversarial culture of the USA. Informal networks of
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institutional confidence, however, tend naturally to create boundaries of
exclusion, even if also not formalized. These are becoming significant in the
UK, and new balances between institutional distribution of powers and
technical strategies may need to be evolved. As an example, a more deter-
mined and coherent management of waste arisings would take some pres-
sure off local site licensing, with its attendant enforcement problems (and
rising public-acceptance difficulties), whilst still allowing flexible technical
risk definitions to be retained, but perhaps implemented by larger, regional
WDAs.
Since the WDAs find it technically and institutionally impossible to
examine and classify wastes adequately at their point of production, they
are forced onto the very back end, namely the disposal site. Thus the "bar-
rier" philosophy of risk management prevails, where the emphasis is on
selecting a good disposal site; once this is achieved it is thought that what
goes in is not very important, because (it is thought) a good site will deal
adequately with virtually anything. Thus upstream waste discrimination
and direction (more like probabilistic risk analysis and risk-ranking) comes
to be seen as unnecessary.
Whilst there is some technical justification to the "barrier" approach,
especially since domestic wastes are known to produce leachates as hazard-
ous as many special wastes, it is difficult to justify over-reliance upon it.
Analysis of the UK case creates the distinct impression that this technical
approach is inspired as much by the institutional realities of WDA impo-
tence to intervene further upstream in waste life-cycles, as it is by carefully
and critically developed technical knowledge of site assessments and long-
term risk potentials. It is also likely that although at present the ambigui-
ties (described in section 7.3.1) in special waste definitions do not give rise
in practice to extensive technical disagreements, this may be due to the fact
that waste producers privately recognize that the present approach suits
their interests, and, in this context, the costs of being generous in giving
the benefit of the doubt over special waste definitions to regulation, are less
than those that would be involved in a change of regulatory focus to further
up-stream. No doubt more stringent upstream regulatory attention to
waste "arisings" would also generate more conflict as to their precise legal
definitions and technical risks. But more concentrated institutional
resources would probably be able to negotiate these with industry without
undue weakness, and without resort to excessive technical standardization
and rigidity.
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CHAPTER 8
Hazardous Waste Management
Hungary
Erno Kiss
8.1. Introduction
•In
The Hungarian system of waste management is underdeveloped, largely due
to starvation of capital and other resources required to actually build the
facilities. There is, in fact, an active public awareness of the need for regu-
lation and a sophisticated appreciation amongst regulators of the technical
needs and possibilities. Given that communication is normally not well
developed between East and West European countries, a main aim of this
chapter - more prominent than for the others - is simply to provide data,
and to build a descriptive account of what is happening, in technical and
institutional terms, in the Hungarian context. Given its relatively open
social and economic interactions, especially with Austria, Hungary is an
important conduit of information between the countries of Eastern and
Western Europe. We first give an overview of the present situation, then
trace the emergence of policy perceptions and responses to the issue, before
going into more detail about the procedures and regulations being
developed. We then give an account of some of the problems encountered
in Hungary, before finishing with a more comparative discussion.
8.1.1. An Overview of the Hungarian Waste System
To provide some perspective we give here some rough figures for the various
types of waste produced in Hungary. The usual uncertainties apply, as out-
lined in Chapters 3 and 9.
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Institutionally, the Hungarian system distinguishes fairly sharply
between municipal and/or domestic wastes, production wastes, and agricul-
tural wastes. Although in practice these waste life-cycles interpenetrate a
great deal, unlike most Western countries they are formally controlled by
different bodies. The Ministry of Housing and Urban Development handles
municipal wastes; the National Council for Environmental Protection and
Nature Conservation (State Office) is responsible for hazardous industrial
wastes, and the Ministry of Agriculture and Food for most agricultural
wastes.
Solid municipal wastes amount nationally to 14 million m 3 . Less than
half of this was estimated in 1982 to be collected in an organized manner,
the rest being "discharged into the environment in a manner impossible to
control" [1]. How much of this waste is hazardous is unknown, but soil and
water pollution is thought (from local monitoring) to be "considerable".
Liquid municipal wastes (Le., mainly sewage) have to be transported
to sewers when no sewage disposal systems exist, under fragmentary organi-
zational control. No figures are available, but significant volumes of liquid
industrial wastes are discharged into sewers.
The annual quantity of production wastes (from mining, building, and
power production wastes) is estimated to be 19.5 mte, of which 7-8 mte are
estimated to be bulk mining wastes, mainly harmless. About 5-6 mte are
thought to be hazardous, based upon voluntary declarations by waste gen-
erators. Half of the latter figure consists of "red mud" waste from alumi-
num manufacture. Owing to the ~uge quantities involved, this fluoride-
containing waste is managed by simply dumping at or around the site of
production, a practice known to have caused pollution problems. Of the
remaining 2-3 mte of hazardous industrial wastes, between 0.9-1.9 mte are
regarded as sufficiently dilute or in such physical condition as to be ecologi-
cally harmless, even if in theory they arise from processes that may generate
hazardous wastes. This leaves about 300 000 tonnes that are classified as
genuinely hazardous industrial wastes, under the definitions in existing
regulations - the 1981 Initial Act (see below).
However, this annual figure of industrial wastes that require special
treatment and disposal facilities (T&D) is doubled by the generation of
"infectious wastes" from the food industry, hospitals, etc. Ideally, these
require expensive (and largely unavailable) treatment by incineration. The
overall annual generation of about 1.2 mte of infectious wastes (mainly of
animal origin) has been reduced by processing in the network of 9 factories
under the National Enterprise for Producing Animal Protein Feeds. How-
ever, lack of full capacity and residual wastes leave about 300 000 tonnes of
hazardous infectious wastes to be dealt with under the national hazardous
waste regulations. Thus, the annual total of hazardous chemical and infec-
tious biological wastes from production is about 600 000 tonnes.
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Agricultural wastes overlap with food industry wastes (e.g., infectious
animal carcasses) and chemical industry wastes (e.g., pesticides). About 20
mte of organic solid wastes and 42 mte of liquid manure are thought to be
generated each year. Although these can produce highly toxic run-off
liquors, neither is incorporated under regulation. Surplus pesticides that
are "stored" by agricultural businesses and even at regional agricultural
inspection stations have caused a control problem of "considerable quan-
tity" [2], though there are no known figures for the volumes involved.
Of the 600000 tonnes or so of hazardous industrial wastes, about
120000 tonnes fall into the category designated as requiring high-
temperature incineration, about 280000 tonnes into that category requiring
intermediate chemical treatment and/or controlled landfill, and the rest into
the category for recycling (theoretical, but as yet not actual [3]). In prac-
tice, as we describe later, an infrastructure of proper T&D facilities - even
of controlled, properly designed landfills - is not yet available, though it is
now being created. At present it is estimated officially that about 15% of
legally defined hazardous wastes are properly treated and disposed of
according to the regulations, mostly by in-house incineration, e.g., at oil
refineries. Because the landfill regulations, established in 1984 as part of
the 1981 Initial Order, are stringent, no legal landfill sites yet exist in Hun-
gary. Pending their construction, temporary storage sites (for up to 10
years) have been designated in relatively less sensitive areas (e.g., away
from watercourses), to reduce the effects of uncontrolled landfill.
8.1.2. The formal institutional structure
In addition to these figures an outline of the formal organizational structure
of regulation and related decision making is valuable, and given in Figures
8.1 and 8.2. Figure 8.2 is an enlarged view to indicate a point, sometimes
not appreciated, about centrally planned economies, namely the extensive
institutional pluralism in the relevant decision-making field. Indeed, in
many respects the problems caused by potential organizational fragmenta-
tion could be greater here than in more "decentralized" systems.
The two main regulatory bodies are the Ministry of Health and its
regional inspectorates, and the State Office of the National Council for
Environmental Protection and Nature Conservation (OKTH), which has a
hazardous wastes department, with regional inspectorates.
The regional inspectorates are primarily responsible for checking com-
pliance with the Initial Order, and naturally give their attention to the local
environment and communities. In the case of hazardous waste regulation
they monitor more directly the waste producers, rather than the environ-
mental media. The Ministry of Health's longer-established provincial public
health and epidemiology services are less directly authorized to check the
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I
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and communities
Figure 8.1. The directly relevant framework for the regulation of hazardous wastes
in Hungary.
waste producers. Their primary task in relation to hazardous wastes is to
conduct initial official investigations of environmental areas and communi-
ties found to be contaminated with hazardous wastes.
These two regional services usually cooperate, if not officially, in a
concrete way at the local level. The effectiveness of this cooperation derives
primarily from the personal relations between the local workers of the paral-
lel regional services. There appears to be little conflict or competition
between these regulatory agencies, so this loose-knit, informal collaboration
apparently creates no extra problems for waste producers. At the national
level a joint Council of Waste Coordination exists to promote the coopera-
tion of all the relevant organizations and agencies.
The institutional picture is described in more detail in the rest of this
chapter; the wider framework is shown in Figure 8.2 to indicate the
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distribution of responsibilities among the bodies at national level for, e.g.,
agricultural wastes and the creation of recycling and low-waste production
technology innovations.
8.2. Historical Emergence of the Issue
A comprehensive program for modernizing industry was launched in Hun-
gary after World War II, followed in the late 1960s by the intensive develop-
ment of mechanized agriculture. As a result the industrial and agricultural
infrastructure has developed considerably over the last 30 to 35 years. This
extensive development of the economy included a tremendous growth of the
chemical industry, which increased production almost 34-fold between 1950
and 1980. But this growth has imposed increasing burdens on the environ-
ment, including a considerable expansion in the types and amounts of
hazardous wastes being produced. This output is expected to grow at about
3% per year for the foreseeable future, despite policy commitments to low-
waste technologies. Since the late 1960s, the problem of environmental and
health hazards due to hazardous wastes that emanate primarily, but not
only, from the chemical industry has become an important issue.
Since the early 1970s, several major cases of environmental pollution
from hazardous wastes have been discovered. Other cases of inadequate
pollution control (especially nitrate contamination of drinking water, which
has caused the use of bottled water for babies in some parts of Hungary)
have amplified public sensitivity to waste management generally. The first
case to cause concern was that of toxic waste sludge produced by an auto-
mobile and truck works. It was found that heavy metal salts and cyanide
wastes had contaminated the subsoil and had spread uncontrolled beneath a
waste dump. In another case, in Tatabanya, cyanide that leached from a
waste dump into a nearby reservoir was detected by health authorities. In
other cases, arsenic contamination was reported in areas of the Danube and
Tisza Rivers, which resulted from the unsafe storage of a catalyst at a
chemical plant. In addition to these and other domestic incidents, publicity
surrounding studies on the potential dangers of hazardous wastes abroad,
mainly from the USA and the FRG, helped to call the attention of poli-
cymakers in Hungary to this issue.
In 1971 the Hungarian National Institute of Public Health (OKI, a
research-oriented division of the Ministry of Health) launched a study of
industrial wastes. This study was carried out by ten provincial public
health and epidemiology stations (KOJALs), with the cooperation of 140
industrial companies, selected as being representative (see Figure 8.1). In
assessing the data, the Ministry of Health elaborated guidelines for storing
and treating wastes that are considered hazardous to the environment and
human health. At this time these guidelines did not have the force of law,
but were intended as recommendations for industry.
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Before the establishment of the executive State Office of OKTH in
1979, only the Ministry of Health had any responsibility relating to the risk
management of hazardous wastes. However, its control was weak and
indirect, since its main responsibility was general public health. The Minis-
try focused its monitoring and research on human populations and its con-
trol activities could not extend far beyond this point. Unless specific health
problems could be associated causally with an industry's waste (as hap-
pened later at Vac, see below), it had no mandate to examine industrial
waste-disposal practices. Nevertheless, perhaps because of the general polit-
ical and cultural climate of industry-government collaboration in a noncom-
petitive economy; because it was not seen by the cooperating industries as a
potential "policeman"; and perhaps because at this stage there was no pub-
lic climate of concern and social uncertainty, OKI was given full access to
"internal" industrial information. The "pilot" survey was followed up
between 1978-1980 with a much enlarged exercise, covering 3300 plants,
involving 20 regional KOJALs. However, this later study was performed in
the context of proposed formal legislation and control, and some have sug-
gested that this new climate created a relationship that reduced the accu-
racy of the data supplied.
The larger waste survey was paralleled by surveys conducted by other
Ministries, and led to regulations in 1981 which, among other things,
defined further, more precise waste and production-process information
requirements from industry. This is described more fully below.
At least among the upper r-eaches of society, well articulated aware-
ness of environmental problems began as early as in other countries. In
1974 the Hungarian Popular Patriotic Front (PPF) held a well attended
and widely publicized meeting on environmental problems, which led to
several policy initiatives.
Subsequently, environmental problems in general were addressed by
high-level, comprehensive policy initiatives on environmental protection.
This resulted in the enactment of Law II/1976 on the protection of the
human environment. This law provided the general framework for further
legal regulations on environmental protection, but it was not then specific
enough to act as a means for the effective regulation of hazardous waste
disposal.
Even after 1976, however, producers could still deposit and "dispose"
of wastes (some later classified as "hazardous") legally at their own discre-
tion outside the premises of the company - unless the manner of disposal
violated other public health regulations. Often such wastes were disposed of
with municipal garbage or were "stored" indefinitely by the plant. Several
pollution incidents were connected with such "storage", which effectively
became long-term dumping. Even as late as 1982 an official joint paper
from the Ministry of Health and OKTH [4] observed that:
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. .. enterprises dispose of their own hazardous wastes at municipal
waste dumps or their own dumps discharge them into public sewers or
incinerate them under uncontrolled conditions, in the open air or in
boilers not designed for the purpose. It is not unusual for wastes to be
discharged in unknown places under conditions that cannot be con-
trolled.
This lack of special treatment for hazardous wastes was due mainly to
a lack of direct legislation that gave authority to inspect plants and waste
movements. Fundamentally, there was little planning when designing
industrial facilities for the treatment and reutiIization of the wastes pro-
duced. The heavy political emphasis on the need to increase industrial out-
put has discouraged consideration of waste problems in the industrial plan-
ning phase. Only a small number of companies have invested in their own
waste disposal technologies; e.g., an oil refinery voluntarily installed an
industrial incinerator. In other cases, incinerators of smaller capacity were
built by the Chinoin Pharmaceutical Works and the Nitrokemia Chemical
Works. But apart from these sporadic examples, industrial wastes of unk-
nown quantity and composition appear to have been continuously deposited
in the environment, i.e., in ditches, gullies, and other dumping sites, includ-
ing untreated waste dumps at industrial sites.
In 1977, in response to unresolved environmental problems and rising
public awareness, the Council of Ministers established OKTH as an
advisory body, and the State Office as its executive body. The OKTH State
Office was granted sole authority for developing regulations on air pollution
and for nature conservation, and shared responsibility with the Ministry of
Health for noise and hazardous wastes.
Law 11/1976 on environmental protection, the basis for the foundation
of OKTH and its State Office, only very gradually provided a statutory
framework for the regulation of industrial wastes. One problem was that the
traditional appreciation of nature in Hungary (reflected in the influence of
the PPF) had not, in the 1970s, been translated into the creation of minimal
pollution standards in the environmental media (except for drinking water).
There was thus no general control framework to restrain toxic waste dump-
ing. The dominant principle of concern reflected in "environmental" regula-
tion policies was public health, which is one stage further downstream from
the control of production and wastes than the installation o( general
environmental media standards.
Nevertheless, with the information obtained from its earlier survey,
OKI called attention several times in the 1970s to the need for formal con-
trol of hazardous wastes. However, these demands foundered for several
reasons: the relevant department of the Ministry of Health was being reor-
ganized and anyway had only an indirect connection with the issue; it con-
tained medical expertise, but no industrial chemistry expertise; and there
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was only fragmentary and circumstantial evidence for causal connections
between toxic waste and local health problems.
OKTH, although being planned, was not yet in existence, and the
Industry Ministry was more concerned about problems of increasing output.
In the face of the very strong and coherently organized executive political
concern to increase industrial production, environmentalist groups, though
certainly active, were institutionally fragmented, dispersed, and had little
scientific or other evidence to use as a resource to alter the balance. The
ministry that guided and commissioned the second OKI survey, for exam-
ple, was not a Health or Environmental Ministry, but Housing and Urban
Development, which had responsibility for municipal (nonindustrial) wastes.
However, in 1979 a disastrous situation, arising from improper waste dispo-
sal in the small town of Vac, stimulated urgent action not only to deal with
that specific problem, but to produce more general remedies as well.
8.3. The Case of the Chinoin Plant in V:i.e
The Chinoin Pharmaceutical Works, near Vac, used one site to store raw
materials and by-products, but from 1952 onward the company also used
the same site to dispose of wastes, partly by open-air burning and partly by
landfill. In 1977, after recording high levels of water and air pollution, the
county council and the local water authority outlawed both disposal prac-
tices because of the contamination threats they posed to drinking water sup-
plies. However, the accumulation of wastes in "storage" continued, in the
absence of any practical alternative. Toward the end of the 1970s, in cer-
tain parts of Vac the drinking water became suddenly turbid, yellowish, and
smelled of chemicals. Public concern was aroused throughout the town, and
this was publicized in the media. According to the county public health
department numerous illnesses with symptoms of vomiting and diarrhoea
affected approximately 20% of the population. This situation continued for
some time, since all initiatives to remedy it foundered in red tape. Finally,
in several stages, a number of wells, primarily in the Vac-South water basin,
were closed and have not been reopened. People began seeking other
sources of drinking water; many local inhabitants who worked in Budapest
brought home drinking water in cans for their families. Naturally, car own-
ers had a distinct advantage, but car ownership was relatively low.
The local water and public health departments received many com-
plaints about the quality of the drinking water but responded that it was
safe. This was, in fact, true according to Hungarian standards; one county
public health department official later admitted in a statement concerning
the outbreak of illness that the reason for their reassuring replies to public
concern was that they did not want "to create a panic"! Despite this frank-
ness, they admitted that wells had been closed, not because they had
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definitely caused illness, but because one prevailing standard required that
drinking water should not have any unusual taste or smell.
Because of the contamination, more than one third of the potable
water supplies for Vac, Godollo, Dunakeszi, and 14 other small communities
were temporarily cut off. The Institute for Water Quality Protection of the
Water Management Research Center of the National Water Authority
investigated the case (using mass spectrometry) and found that contam-
inants in the water included various solvents such as butanol, benzene, and
toluene. Groundwater samples were taken from more than 20 observation
wells drilled especially for this purpose. Knowledge of the Chinoin plant
and other pollution sources in the area made it certain that most of the con-
taminants had originated from the plant. Experiments conducted with
small mammal and human blood cell cultures from residents in the area
confirmed detrimental health effects.
By spring 1980 the huge pit at the Chinoin works had been filled and
was surrounded by approximately 12000 barrels of various toxic, flamm-
able, and explosive chemicals; many of the barrels were unsealed and
unsuitable for transport. Through the intervention of the then Ministry of
Industry, a license from the Ministry of Health was obtained for a one-off,
open-air burning of the stored wastes, but the burning had to be discontin-
ued because of high levels of air pollution detected by local monitoring
instruments. The burning was later resumed, after some additional precau-
tions had been taken. Chinoin has since been forced to export some of its
more difficult wastes for T&D, using up limited foreign currency credits.
Many relevant authorities, institutions, and responsible individuals
had been well aware for some time of the possibility that the water supply
at Vac was being contaminated because the Chinoin waste site was large
and well known; but no action was taken. Several weeks before the scandal
broke, attempts had been made to clean up the Chinoin plant. The sudden
move to dispose of the waste by burning had been made not only because of
the fear of adverse publicity, but because the Council of Ministers decided
to make a government committee and its chairman personally responsible
for remedying the uncontrolled dumping and water supply pollution that
had been going on. The public scandal engendered the creation of an ad hoc
decision structure that was able to cut through the normal bureaucratic
complexities.
8.4. Hazardous Waste Legislation
Partly as a result of the Vac scandal and using information from the
enlarged 1978-1980 waste survey, in 1980 the OKTH State Office began to
develop more precise legislation to address the problem of hazardous
wastes, which at that time remained legally and technically undefined. This
legislation was prepared by the OKTH State Office in cooperation with
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experts appointed by the Ministry of Health, which had conducted the two
main waste surveys. The basis for this collaboration was provided by an
order of the Council of Ministers, which conferred responsibility for dealing
with toxic chemicals in the environment on the National Institute for Public
Health (OKI) and on the local public health departments (KOJALs). In
effect, the central body was responsible for planning and setting norms for
waste disposal, whilst the local bodies were responsible for monitoring and
enforcement. However, such matters as powers of inspection and analysis
were left somewhat ambiguous. In November 1981 a law was passed by the
Council of Ministers to deal specifically with hazardous wastes; this was the
so-called "Initial Order" .
The order began with an attempt to define hazardous wastes under
legal regulation. It began with a general definition based upon waste types,
drawing heavily upon the existing FRG waste catalog (see Chapter 6). The
Hungarian version of this list was compiled by experts at the OKTH and
the Ministry of Health. The decree enacting the 1981 Order by 1984 ela-
borated upon the general waste-type classification by adding a list of
specific constituents, ranked in three hazard categories somewhat like the
Dutch list. Then a five-fold set of characteristics tests was defined, which
all doubtful or new wastes had to pass in order to be declared nonhazar-
dous. This latter "fail-safe" element is extra to the FRG approach, being
more similar to the US one, although precise and standard laboratory proto-
cols for sampling and testing could not be laid down. The enacting regula-
tions also included specific norms for the proper T&D of given wastes, but
because of a lack of actual facilities these norms have not been widely imple-
mented as yet.
A draft of the Order was circulated among the ministries and state
authorities concerned and a compromise order was finally worked out.
There were some objections from the Ministry of Industry concerning the
timing of the Order. As in other countries, they wanted to develop a T&D
facility network before control legislation was imposed, but they were over-
ruled. It was felt by a significant body of policy opinion that, especially in a
situation of capital scarcity, investment in T &D facilities would only come
about if "forced" by formal regulations that created a hazardous waste
population to be managed by controlled T&D and if also supported by
government R&D policies to develop industrial techniques.
In addition to governmental circulation, the initial draft was discussed
in public, by industry, trade unions, scientific committees, committees of
the Union of Technical and Scientific Associations, and by local branches of
the PPF. However, only the opinions of government agencies had to be
considered; the opinions of public interest groups did not.
An unexpected reaction of the companies concerned was a general
sense of relief, because at least the Order eliminated a highly uncertain
situation. They did complain, however, that their administrative burdens
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would increase with the compulsory reporting of their hazardous wastes,
and that they would face additional costs in connection wi.th the legally
required controlled storage and neutralization of hazardous wastes.
Nevertheless, the Initial Order was put into force on January 1, 1982, with
further enacting regulations in 1984.
The Initial Order was supplemented by executive instructions from
the Ministries of Industry, Agriculture, Housing, Transportation, Finance,
and Defense. In addition, a regulation issued by the State Office gave a for-
mula for calculating penalties for offenses under the hazardous wastes law.
This formula took into consideration the nature of the violation, the amount
of waste, and its hazard classification. The primary aim of the penalties -
administered almost like normal taxes - was not to provide income for the
budget (although the fines are paid into the account of the Central Environ-
mental Protection Fund), but more to influence the attitudes of the com-
panies involved. The increased expense incurred through improperly
disposing of wastes and thereby polluting and endangering the environment,
it was hoped, would act not only as an economic, but also as a social incen-
tive to force the companies to comply with the regulations and to modify
their processes or develop technologies for recycling wastes. The Order and
its penalties were viewed not as punishments but as incentives.
The first fine actually imposed was in 1983. Most penalties are
appealed by companies, and the legal procedure leading to actual payment
of the penalty is quite lengthy. Based on present data fines totaling 160
million forints (approximately $4 million) have been assigned in 129 cases,
but only Ft80 million have been collected. (For comparison, in 1982 a total
of Ft210 million in fines for air pollution were paid.)
However, there are some legal loopholes that make implementation of
the Order impossible in special situations:
(1)
(2)
(3)
The Order does not apply to nonprofit organizations or to very small
profit-making concerns.
The sewage sludge from communal sewage plants is not regarded as a
hazardous waste (although it is often hazardous).
The Order stipulates that, in case of a direct and serious danger to the
environment, the environmental protection authorities can close down
the activity producing the hazardous waste. However, the ministry
"controlling" (i.e., sponsoring and planning) the waste-producing com-
pany may override and cancel such an order for economic reasons.
Besides these legal loopholes, the small number of environmental pro-
tection staff also reduces the chances of implementing the Order. There are
16000 plants that produce potentially hazardous waste in Hungary, and
there are only about 30 to 35 inspectors. In the region of Budapest alone,
for example, there are about 7000 potentially hazardous waste-producing
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plants, but only three inspectors. With this ratio and an even inspection
schedule, a given waste-producing site can be inspected personally roughly
once every ten years!
In addition to the above problems, the correction and extension of the
list of hazardous wastes is also an important question. It is obvious that
structural changes in the economy and technological development are likely
to produce additional hazardous wastes, not included previously in the ini-
tial list. Therefore, the Initial Order requires that each new industrial
waste be regarded as hazardous until it can be declared non-hazardous. As
in most other countries, the Hungarian regulations list properties and tests
that define a waste as hazardous and thus formally "listed" for regulation.
The waste producer is legally responsible for the risks from badly managed
hazardous wastes, but the authorities are responsible for defining the waste
as hazardous in the first place. In Hungary, a company that produces a new
waste can apply for an exemption from the hazardous waste regulations.
The Department of Public Health must then test the waste to either place it
in one of the three categories of hazard in the list, or exempt it. Final deci-
sions are made by the OKTH and the Ministry of Health. The characteris-
tics tests include the usual measurements of pH, oxygen demand, flamma-
bility, leaching rates, heavy metal concentration, organic solvent content,
microbiological tests, etc.
Before discussing the scope and problems of implementing regulations
under the Initial Order framework, it is worth emphasizing that a central
element of the Order is the information recording and analysis that it intro-
duces. Unlike parallel exercises elsewhere, e.g., in the US, the UK, or the
Netherlands, this does not focus upon waste arisings, subsequent move-
ments, or final disposals. There is no "trip-ticket" registration system for
wastes in Hungary, apart from the international conventions governing the
general transport of dangerous goods. The information declaration system
focuses instead upon industrial production processes and their waste aris-
ings, and is part of a comprehensive national environmental information
system that is being developed. The details of the information exercise are
given later, but here it is worth stressing how this emphasis not only
corresponds naturally with existing norms and administrative arrangements
for gathering "internal" industrial data by government authorities (at least,
documentary data; perhaps less so, direct inspection and analysis), but also
corresponds with the ultimate aim of adapting production to low-waste
technologies.
The Initial Order regulates four main issues: inspection of waste pro-
duction; storage; treatment and disposal; and ways of directly preventing
environmental pollution.
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8.5. Inspecting and Recording Hazardous Waste
Production
According to the 1981 Initial Order, each hazardous waste generator must
complete a questionnaire that requests the daily and annual amount of
wastes produced, their chemical types, and the method of collection,
storage, pretreatment, and neutralization. The data required to be reported
were selected so as to meet what the OKTH State Office defined as the
"minimum" information needed to protect the environment. The aim
behind the data definition is a complete materials balance of the processes
involved. In practice, this is a very detailed data exercise if properly con-
ducted, the questionnaire containing over 100 questions. For example, com-
panies are required to detail which section of their plant gives rise to which
particular wastes, and an associated "technology tree" describing the plant
and processes must be submitted with the waste details.
The data will eventually be stored on computer at the Institute for
Environmental Protection. The. completed forms are "controlled" by the
regional inspectorates of the State Office, by the regional stations of the
Institute, and, when needed, by the local department of wastes. "Control"
here means mainly a "desk evaluation" of the plausibility of the data pro-
vided. Regulators check the declared waste types and volumes against typi-
cal production coefficients for that industry, so that material inputs can be
checked for discrepancies. This is a fairly crude form of initial control, but
it allows for more detailed follow-up analysis. On occasion, inspectors con-
duct random on-site examinations, check the methods of storage, and ask
companies to provide accounts of material balances and the full quantities
of wastes reported. These inspectors are chemical engineers, all of whom
have at least a general knowledge of the processes involved. Inaccuracies
are often caused by the fact that the companies are not yet familiar with
methods for conducting waste-oriented material balances, so that the data
are distorted in many cases.
To date, some 60% of hazardous waste generators have returned more
or less adequately completed forms, but many of these have had to be
repeatedly queried and checked, since the whole process has proved more
complex, uncertain, and time-consuming than was first imagined. So far,
only about 50-60% of the reported data (Le., 30-36% overall) can be con-
sidered complete and ready to be put on computer. The reliability of the
data is influenced by several factors, the most important of which are:
(1) Within the companies that produce the majority (according to some
estimates, about 70%) of hazardous wastes, the accounting of materi-
als and technological descriptions are usually focused on end-products,
so that the type and quantity of wastes produced in intermediate
stages and in final waste streams (which are often combinations)
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cannot be readily identified. Usually, only subjective estimates are
provided.
(2) Sludges, which are a common physical form of wastes, contain a vari-
able proportion of water and only the solid portion may be dangerous.
This water content, which may be as high as 90-97%, cannot be deter-
mined accurately.
(3) Variations in production processes due to normal fluctuations in con-
ditions, management, and worker practices, etc., cause waste volumes
and compositions to vary uncontrollably within surprisingly wide
limits.
(4) Producers do not always continuously record production levels. Often
records are made on a quarterly basis, so that details of any short-
term changes are concealed.
In order to increase the reliability of the data reported, the OKTH
State Office intends to influence the Ministry of Finance to change its
method of accounting for production credits, so that the types and quantity
of wastes produced can also be recorded and penalized.
Records are kept not only by the OKTH State Office, but also by the
Inspectorate for Chemicals and Explosives Industries commissioned by the
Ministry of Industry. Between 1978 and 1980 the Inspectorate conducted a
separate study of a sample of hazardous waste producers, which included
337 firms on 670 sites. The data included the origin of the waste, amount
and type of waste, and a description of its chemical properties (solid con-
tent, water content, flammability, toxicity, solubility, etc.). By extrapola-
tion to the national level this survey estimated that up to 220000 tonnes of
hazardous waste are disposed of annually by deposition and up to 140000
tonnes are incinerated, mostly in an uncontrolled manner. Compared with
the variability of waste arisings figures for most market economies (where
production data are more secret), this is surprisingly consistent with esti-
mates from other surveys. It is an interesting point of cultural comparison,
however, that Hungarian regulators do not believe they have adequate
knowledge of waste arisings and the production processes that create them,
even though they appear to have far better knowledge, at the waste produc-
tion end, than Western regulators. Whereas the latter tend to accept this
situation and concentrate on waste movements and final T&D site licensing,
the Hungarians are making more efforts to clarify their understanding of
how wastes are produced, to influence upstream processes so as to facilitate
downstream regulation.
Hazardous wastes that are produced in Hungary and that are not
accurately covered in the various surveys can be divided into four
categories:
(1) Hazardous wastes that are produced in such large quantities that they
were simply omitted from the list in the Initial Order for pragmatic
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reasons. These included such wastes as red mud produced during
aluminum production and the smelting of aluminum and mineral
sludges.
(2) Hazardous wastes that are processed by specialized companies, e.g.,
animal carcasses.
(3) Hazardous wastes that are burned in small-capacity in-house incinera-
tors neutralized chemically, bound by special procedures (e.g., embed-
ded in bitumen or ash), transported abroad for incineration, or recy-
cled for further use in production.
(4) Very hazardous wastes "temporarily stored" by the waste generators
(the distinction between "temporarily stored" and "deposited" is often
extremely difficult to make).
In order to improve centralized control of hazardous waste disposal,
the State Office of OKTH has submitted a proposal to the State Planning
Committee recommending the establishment of a national network for
hazardous wastes T &D facilities. This network is discussed below.
8.6. Treatment and Disposal Facilities
In 1980, the OKTH State Office commissioned the Institute for Environ-
mental Protection to design a network of T&D based on the existing data
on waste generation. The plans were completed in 1980 and included the
construction of five incinerators and the designation of eight new controlled
landfill locations. In discussions of the proposal the President of the OKTH
State Office and the Minister of Industry agreed that, since the majority of
hazardous wastes are produced by industry, the Ministry of Industry should
be responsible for organizing and financing the national network. The
Inspectorate for Chemicals and Explosives Industries was charged with this
work. Hungarian law follows the same principle as in Western countries,
that the producer is ultimately responsible for the wastes it generates,
though this liability can, in some circumstances, formally pass to a trans-
porter or handler. In 1982, the State Planning Committee approved the
establishment of a country-wide T&D network, although the problem of
who would be responsible for its financing remained to be negotiated. In
1983, the OKTH State Office defined the technical standards for treating
and storing of hazardous wastes.
In establishing this network several difficulties have arisen:
(1) In Hungary, there are very few geologically and morphologically suit-
able areas for landfills; most of the country is covered by porous sedi-
mentary rocks, with only a few underlain by impervious clay. In addi-
tion, there are no abandoned salt mines, such as those in the FRG,
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which could be used as controlled dumping grounds. Of the 51 poten-
tiallocations tested by geologists, very few were found to be suitable.
(2) The regions that were found to be suitable are now being subjected to
detailed geological examination. If approved, the Ministry of Industry
Inspectorate responsible for the investment must apply for county
council permission to use the sites, but at this level serious difficulties
have arisen. County officials try to avoid, whenever possible, the
establishment of what have been called "poison cemeteries" in their
area, for the simple reason that they are afraid of losing their popular-
ity. People are afraid of "poison cemeteries" because of the previous
media debate and official prevarication that created confusion in con-
nection with the water contamination at Vac. "Dangerous" wastes
have evoked public uncertainty and fear, and the issue is very prom-
inent in public perceptions of environmental risks in Hungary.
(3) Present economic difficulties in Hungary do not favor the establish-
ment of a capital-intensive network that will put a heavy burden on
scarce capital resources. This situation is aggravated by additional
circumstances. It has already become evident in the design phase
currently underway that the main units of the high-temperature
incinerators can be acquired only by import from Western countries.
Funds for establishing what is essentially a pollution control network
can only be provided from financial sources normally used for techno-
logical development. There is, therefore, direct competition in the
same budget between funds "for new production technologies, which
might entail reduced wastes, and buying clean-up technologies to
manage wastes from existing industrial processes. Furthermore,
because of peculiarities of investment in Hungary, parts of the pro-
posed network are relatively more expensive than in the case of a
foreign establishment of similar capacity. For example, in the FRG a
landfill with an annual capacity of 70000 tonnes could be operated by
a staff of five, while one designed in Hungary would require 50 to 60
persons.
(4) Management of the waste plants is to be carried out by consortia of
waste-producing industries helping to finance the plant, customers,
and local authorities. However, industries in Hungary cannot be forced
to invest in the waste treatment network, so that there is no state-
enforceable guarantee of industry participation and financial invest-
ment. Also, the state agencies involved have taken a long time to
negotiate their proportional responsibilities for capital financial input.
The overall uncertainty and resource limitations have led to cutbacks
in the planned network, even though this will mean a shortfall of T&D
facility supply in relation to demand.
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Some of these difficulties are illustrated by the following case study.
8.6.1. The siting of a landfill in Zsambek
The relevant county council agreed to geological investigations in the vicin-
ity of the village of Zsambek, in the county of Pest (near Budapest) in an
area considered suitable for a hazardous waste landfill. A layer of clay was
found in one section of the area, which, with respect to both its permeability
and size, was regarded as geologically the most suitable site in Hungary.
Local residents were officially informed by the local council of the
intention to establish a "poison cemetery" at the site. Fears were expressed
(partially due to confusion surrounding the Vac scandal) that the drinking
water supply would become contaminated, and protests were made against
the establishment of the site. The protests continued despite further tests
that have proved that the clay layer would act as a natural seal, and that
the groundwater under the clay does not, in fact, flow toward the village.
In addition, Zsambek's water supply will soon be provided from the Karst
Water Basin, in the course of a coal-mining program soon to be completed.
The county council decided, however, to deny the license for the site
because of the continuing protests.
When the president of the OKTH personally exerted pressure on the
county council, they "mobilized" the parliamentary representative of
Zsambek district, who interceded with the Minister of Housing and Urban
Development. The Minister argued successfully that since the proposal had
resulted in such social unrest, a suitable site should be sought elsewhere. At
that time, OKTH specialists were confident that they would find another
clay-layered site and they did not push to keep the Zsambek site open by
further negotiation and lobbying through other government processes.
However, an alternative site is yet to be located, so this decision is now
regretted. The PPF was highly influential in defeating the proposal. The
proposed site was located in woodlands used for recreation, including hunt-
ing by influential people. The PPF enjoys support from such people, and it
has been said that was able to exert strong pressure in informal personal
networks at high levels.
8.6.2. The current situation
Because of these difficulties, the planned size of the national network has
been reduced. From five incinerators and eight landfills, the State Planning
Committee now hopes to establish one incinerator and three landfills. In
February 1984, the situation was as follows:
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(1) The network is designed to contain an incinerator with an annual
capacity of 30000 tonnes and three landfills with a total capacity of
40000 tonnes. These would be established and operated by an associ-
ation of 178 companies concerned.
(2) Of the investment costs, 45% would be provided by the companies,
50% by loans, and the remainder from the Central Fund for Environ-
mental Protection of the State Bank for Industrial Development.
(3) However, even these greatly reduced estimates of investment costs are
twice as large as the available resources. The cost estimates are also
highly uncertain, since no final decisions have been made as to the
actual technology for the incinerator or the landfills.
(4) According to the most recent - but still unfinalized - plans, the first
landfill would start operations in 1986-1987, the second in 1987, and
the third in 1988, while the incinerator would start in 1988-1989.
(5) This reduced network will not be accepted as final by the OKTH State
Office. It still plans eventually to establish the entire network (i.e.,
eight landfills, three incinerator-s) and interprets the present plan as
only a first phase.
8.7. Discussion
From the perspective of the IIASA comparative project, the following points
are most interesting about the Hungarian case.
When one examines the evolution of the public issue and the first
phase of policymaking, namely legislation, one finds that Hungary is little
different from Western countries - indeed, many hazard criteria and other
norms have been more or less directly adopted, e.g., from the FRG, and
used in the Hungarian legislation.
However, the national institutional relationships between industry and
government generally have a direct effect upon the focus and implementabil-
ity of regulatory legislation. Hungarian industry is centrally planned and
financially supported in particular ways and, especially in the larger indus-
tries, there is no market competition. However, there is no central state
dictation to industry, which is generally free to manage its own affairs.
Thus, industry may, for example, choose not to participate in the planned
waste T&D infrastructure, which is meant to be financed and run by con-
sortia. It is even free to export wastes, without permission, so long as it has
the collateral business to pay the necessary foreign currency. Note that this
is a less restrictive framework than those of Hessen, Bavaria, or Denmark.
There are, of course, economic incentives that are designed to
encourage participation and good waste-management practice generally;
examples are higher charges for customers who do not invest in the planned
network's T&D plants, and the fines system. In theory, excessive fines
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should make it optimal for an industry to decide instead to pay less money
to be a part-financer of the infrastructure or, at least, to pay to be a custo-
mer of proper facilities. The fines and incentives do not appear to have
been effective as a direct means of tightening up waste disposal. This is so
because the lack of competition, established state support, and the national
commitment to avoid unemployment mean that an industry might avoid
paying fines for lax waste mangement to one state agency, while obtaining a
countervailing subsidy from another. It has been difficult to gauge the true
extent to which this happens, but existing institutional arrangements
(which may, of course, be defensible on wider grounds) appear to allow it.
It is important to note that "central planning" does not at all mean
monolithic planning. Centrally planned systems cannot necessarily over-
come the institutional realities of interdepartmental fragmentation much
better than others can. For example, for arbitrary reasons, some issues pro-
pagated by local bodies (such as the KOJALs of OKI who pursued hazard-
ous wastes as a problem) often fall between the attention frameworks of
higher level bodies that could place the issues more clearly on the policy
agenda. The relevant department of the Ministry of Health was being reor-
ganized when scientists and local inspectorates began demanding policy
attention for hazardous waste control. The OKTH was only just coming
into being - "everywhere there were new faces, new roles, new people" -
and no effective attention. Interest and responsibility fell between, rather
than squarely upon, the Health, Housing, and Industry Ministries and their
various institutes, to the extent that they performed different surveys of
waste arisings when they needed such data. In the process of developing
regulations and other strategies, in surveys and in implementation, there is
a pluralism of agencies and interests, and therefore of negotiation and diver-
sity. Whether there is adequate incentive throughout the system - legal or
economic - to solve the problems, is not a question we can answer, but
there is an interesting relationship between regulation and attitudes, to
which we return below.
Overall, therefore, there is the paradox that this centrally planned
economy has little formal institutional resources to implement an urgently
needed national T&D infrastructure. There is also no guarantee that indus-
try will use and thus protect the viability of the infrastructural investment
once in place. This institutional problem interacts with and exacerbates the
already severe investment capital shortages.
Despite these institutional shortcomings for dealing with the back end
of waste regulation, however, some institutional features of the Hungarian
political economy are potentially superior to those of the "market
economies" for achieving the ultimate goals of waste reduction.
The various potential points for regulation delineated in the schema
discussed in Chapter 3 were: industrial production (P), waste generation
(W), transport (Tp ), treatment (Tt ), and disposal (D). The Hungarian
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system of regulation places its weight upon the first two, since, as a cen-
trally planned economy, it already has the institutional arrangements and
accepted cultural practices that allow easy state agency access to "internal"
industrial process data. As we have seen, this is being developed to take
into account hazardous waste factors more systematically and comprehen-
sively. Furthermore, the idea of influencing production to meet new social
goals and values is quite normal in the Hungarian context, unlike for
Western nations, with no such general traditions and whose dominant cul-
tural values and entrenched interests maintain that in a competitive
environment production information is private property. It is argued,
largely successfully, that it is a sacred industrial right to maintain this
autonomy. The comparative situation can therefore be depicted as in
Figure 8.9.
Full waste life-cycle
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Figure 8.3. Comparison of emphasis in waste life-cycle, of Hungarian and most
Western systems.
The disadvantage of the typical Western situation was discussed pre-
viously, namely that the most important, widely agreed as necessary mode
of regulation (moving toward less waste-producing process technologies, or
at least controlling the composition of unavoidable wastes, to encourage
recycling) is the least accessible to regulation. The Hungarian institutional
arrangements in principle overcome this problem, but in practice the finan-
cial resources needed to convert the information at this level into actual
regulatory effects are in very short supply. Nevertheless, the system focuses
attention at this more strategic point, even to the extent that there is no
transport trip-ticket system in Hungary and, indeed, very few hazardous
wastes are transported; most are "stored" or treated on-site.
The data compilation on production technology trees, material
input-output balances, and waste outputs may, in the end, be less accurate
than its elaborate framework suggests. Nevertheless, it appears that once
available in computerized form it will, for the reasons already given, be
much better than corresponding data from most if not all other countries.
This is not only true of detail and accuracy, but also of the focus of the
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information - on production. Furthermore, a very real extra benefit may lie
in the indirect effect of data gathering at the production process phase, in
that it makes industrial managers more sensitive to the waste dimension in
design, planning, and routine decisions, via the very exercise of producing
such detailed data for the regulators. This attitudinal objective was often
expressed to us during interviews.
The Hungarian case seems to substantiate the view that there are
significantly different strategic definitions of hazardous waste management
as a policy issue. In addition to the considerations above, in Hungary there
seem to have been no scientific debates about specific risks of given com-
pounds and wastes, and little formal risk analysis. The risk estimates impli-
cit in other countries' hazard lists have been adopted, and government
scientists have used informal judgments to decide whether waste descrip-
tions from the industrial data surveys qualified the waste as a listed waste.
These judgments have not been subject to formal review or justification.
The problems of developing an industrial infrastructure have been far more
pressing than the need to formalize and refine a risk assessment regulatory
approach.
In order to make further advances much would now seem to depend
upon the ability of the relatively young bureaucracy of OKTH to negotiate
and bargain within and outside government, and upon the strength and
clarity of public opinion on the need for national control (which means at
least a national T&D network). It may well be that a scientific risk-benefit
assessment approach will come to the fore to justify different positions in
the severe competition for state resources that will figure centrally in the
next phase of the issue in Hungary.
In Hungary as elsewhere, public concern and media debate about
environmental risks is a very significant element in policy implementation,
especially over siting. Although the economy may in some respects be less
highly developed than those of many Western countries, public awareness is
high, and the culture is sophisticated and articulate, with a strong tradition
of independent journalism that sustains this.
The question of social attitudes and policy implementation is discussed
in Chapters 11 and 12. It is clear from this discussion (particularly of the
Vilc situation) that in Hungary, as elsewhere, public outcry has had more
effect and cut more bureaucratic knots more rapidly than the patient,
private intragovernmental efforts of the Public Health lnstitute (OKI).
There is a broader, relevant political-cultural factor indicated in the
references to attitudes and regulation; this cultural factor merits more
attention. We noted earlier that in the socialist economies, the philosophy
of directing production to reflect social goals and values is routinely
accepted as part of the political-cultural landscape. Therefore, once the
environmental value (and economic benefits) of preventive measures in
hazardous waste management have gained a significant niche in
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government, the whole cultural context is already amenable to the principle
of influencing industry's attitude.
The crucial element, that of a context of compliance and cooperation
in production changes over and above formal regulations, is therefore
already in existence, whereas the opposite is mostly true in Western market
economies. The social assumptions underlying regulation in the latter situa-
tions (although there are variations) are that attitudes are autonomous and
regulation involves setting up constraints against the free play of those atti-
tudes. Even in the more "collaborative" setting of the UK, the philosophy
of regulatory pragmatism dictates adaptation toward the regulated party's
values, to try to find common ground from where "collaborative regulation"
can begin. Marginal shifts of regulated parties' attitudes are the most that
is conceivable.
In the Hungarian political culture, on the other hand, it is normal to
assume that large-scale collective shifts of values and priorities are feasible
as policy instruments and regulatory targets. Furthermore, it is clear that
hazardous waste regulators see this not only as a shift in the culture and
internal priorities of industrial production, but also of broader patterns of
consumption. According to an official government report:
... neither the established technical-productive system, nor the
predominant consumption patterns can be considered fundamentals.
Every possible means available to us should be used with a view to
reduce gradually the amount of materials becoming waste by
transforming the above in a manner favorable to us ...
There are two possibilities for reducing the quantity of wastes ori-
ginating in consumption and commerce. One of them is the introduc-
tion of such new types of products whose basic materials after their use
can be made fit for reutilization by simple means. The other is to
influence the conscience, ways of thinking and attitude of the popula-
tion so that as a result the speed of obsolescence of articles of consump-
tion would slow down and only those materials would be discarded
whose utilization is no more possible [5].
Such synoptic and ambitious "regulatory" goals could perhaps be
more accurately described as cultural programs in the broadest sense. In
Western market systems they would be rejected by most as paternalistic
and authoritarian attempts at social engineering. Yet in terms of the
expressed aims of policy everywhere - namely the revision of industrial
innovation frameworks to include reduction of downstream hazardous
wastes (as discarded products or as by-products of production) - these pol-
itical cultural features and their institutional counterparts may be more
realistic than those approaches that regard front-end production and tech-
nological innovation decisions as an autonomous sacred turf. It may be
better to try to evolve systematic, measured ways of influencing this crucial
area of decision than to have it influenced sporadically, inconsistently, and
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in private for the large companies who can afford the necessary R&D,
through the unstable process of public reaction and threat.
To use the terms of existing discussion, Western regulatory systems
seem to rely heavily in their public stance upon (formal) technical norms
and languages, as if these will compensate for a receding and neglected
(informal) moral and cultural context of shared values, and a will to compli-
ance. The Hungarian system and collective planned systems generally seem
to retain better the cultural climate of compliance, even if they do not have
the practical technical and economic means to put it all into effect. It is
probably easier to develop the latter than it is to recover the former.
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CHAPTER 9
Risk Assessment of Technological
Systems - Dimensions of Uncertainty
Brian Wynne
9.1. Introduction
In all policy systems, "uncertainty" is a wild card that has come to under-
mine effectiveness and confidence in regulation. The characteristics of
hazardous wastes discussed in Chapter 3 may make this issue more sensitive
to uncertainties than others.
In the previous chapters we have analyzed concrete examples of the
interactions between technical and institutional uncertainties, which have
led regulation down many different avenues. We have also seen that under-
lying uncertainties are manifested at different levels and in different ways in
different contexts. Some of the causative factors seem to be universal, but
these may be given specific shape by more local factors within regulatory
cultures and institutional arrangements. The emergence of uncertainty as a
central issue also seems to have coincided with the rise of the problem of
regulatory credibility, and recognition of the importance of implementation
and its failings.
In this chapter we analyze some more universal factors embedded
within the overall "problematique" of uncertainty and technological risks.
Very roughly, we focus here upon analysis of uncertainties, while Chapter
10 deals more with institutional and scientific responses to them, especially
in the light of the credibility problem.
To begin our analysis, we return to a question raised in Chapter 3,
concerning ways of viewing technologies or risk-generating systems. We
propose a general concept of technologies as organizational-
technical networks of interdependent subarenas, not all of whose primary
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focus is the technological "output" or "system" in question. I argue that
risk analysis and policymaking operate with the assumption that technology
is well defined, with a unitary rationality. This may have been appropriate
for highly structured engineering-risk systems, but the network concept
corresponds more with the realities of risk generation, implementation, and
social risk perception, in the diffuse risk systems that are becoming more
typical. It is therefore more likely to provide a better basis for practically
useful risk assessment.
Perceptual differences are often treated as rather exotic matters of
public "irrationalities" only, having little or nothing to do with real techni-
cal knowledge. The present analysis argues, however, that "perceptual"
differences also affect experts and frame their rigorous technical risk assess-
ments as to:
(1) What a technology is.
(2) What are its significant components and connections.
(3) What are its boundaries and external context.
Yet these influences are usually unrecognized, and two pressures push risk
analysts toward standardization of their model of "the" risk system:
(1) Normal scientific method, encouraged by the domination of risk
analysis by relatively well structured, standardized engineering sys-
tems (e.g., chemical plant).
(2) The climate of demands for public justification, which tends to lead to
the centralized projection of uniform scientific control and consistent
cross-system decision rules.
These tendencies, unless recognized and countered, create problems for less
well structured risk systems as they create a widening gap between expert
analysis and implementation in actual risk situations. I suggest that
although there is a need to recognize nonstandard, situational risks, the ten-
dency to assume a single fundamental problem framework or risk-generating
system still predominates, and obstructs clarification of the interactions
between institutional and technical factors in regulation. We develop the
argument that even expert risk analysis of highly structured risk systems
can be seen to involve prior framing assumptions, yet conflicting risk ana-
lyses are attributed instead to technical imprecision and uncertainty due,
for example, to lack of data. Framing commitments that underly technical
analysis for regulation are not only prior choices; they are part of a tissue of
informal judgments within science, which ultimately cannot be justified by
more evidence, or by tightening, rules of inference, method, or logic. Yet
the opposite model dominates public (and expert) attitudes and policymak-
ing institutions [1]. As shown in Chapters 10-12, the pervasiveness of this
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intrinsic, informal dimension of science complicates the growing public
requirements of formal accountability and standardization for authoritative
regulation.
With this model of technologies as social-technical networks, we argue
that in its different framing of "the same" risk-generating system, expert
risk analysis incorporates informal and inadvertent judgments, for example
about which parts of dispersed systems of risk are pertinent, the behavior of
organizations or humans, or the credibility and boundary conditions of
technical data, relationships, and models. The ensuing expert disagree-
ments are not resolvable by more objective information because they reflect
the latent conflict of institutional perspectives - structural or institutional
uncertainty as outlined in the Introduction - and not technical uncertainty.
If these uncertainties are resolvable at all it is by negotiation over prior
frameworks and implicit assumptions, which accumulate to give knowledge
(and uncertainty) its detailed shape. I show that this is true even for well-
defined, extensively analyzed systems, such as nuclear reactors or LEG ter-
minals, let alone for less well structured ones, such as hazardous wastes.
The connection with hazardous wastes is that disagreements about
risks or dislocation between national systems over applied risk frameworks
(hazard classifications) invariably invokes the response that more technical
precision and rigor is the solution. This, we argue, may only artificially
reduce uncertainty, whilst increasing systemic ignorance and vulnerability.
The germane uncertainties are often not those "passive" ones to do with
lack of precision in our measure of the objective world, but are "actively"
created uncertainties that are functions of contending cultural backgrounds,
institutional purposes, and needs within the risk system being defined and
analyzed.
Although the strict impossibility to objectively define risk problems is
stressed here, the aim is not to suggest that formal risk assessment is worth-
less; it is to lay bare the extreme fragility of decision processes based on
such ideas of objectively attainable authority, especially once public skepti-
cism begins to assert itself. This inherent vulnerability is multiplied by the
large unknowns and the behaviorally indeterminate, ill-defined nature of the
policy field in the hazardous waste case, properties that undermine attempts
to discriminate and even rank with any scientific precision the risks associ-
ated with different chemicals, industries, wastes, and regulatory options. In
these circumstances, those administrative cultures and regulatory institu-
tions that do not realistically correlate the scope and flexibility of their risk
assessment regulatory framework with the diversities and uncertainties of
the actual risk-generating system, are more likely to find their policy
analysis and implementation picked apart and undermined by the ensuing
mismatches.
Risk assessment requires reliable estimates of the chances, processes
and effects of exposure. This is a combination of intrinsic material
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properties and situational variations - how a waste is packaged, mixed,
treated, confined, etc. Unfortunately, as discussed in Chapter 3, physical,
chemical, and behavioral heterogeneity, as well as unpredictable multiple
behavioral freedom in the system, mean that "downstream" unpredictables
may swallow up putative "intrinsic" waste-stream risk differentials.
However underripe the field may be for it, increasingly formal risk
assessment frameworks seem inevitable as demands for tighter control and
reassurance multiply. It is therefore necessary to explore what the possibili-
ties and implications are for using formal risk assessment approaches to
hazardous waste management. There is currently a lively debate among
policymakers in this area as to how standardized or situation-flexible risk
analysis can and should be. As the intrinsic-situational risk management
dilemma illustrates, the degree of elaboration and standardization of
analysis depends upon institutional assumptions and commitments - at
what points in the system, over which actors, are controls to be exercised,
and for what purposes? How much can system actors who affect situational
risks be trusted to act responsibly? These are matters of wide national vari-
ation, as shown in the previous chapters.
Even in the UK, the traditional stronghold of non-quantified, discre-
tionary methods of decision making on issues involving risks, both a recent
Royal Society Study Group and the Royal Commission on Environmental
Pollution independently expressed strong support for more quantification of
risk assessments [2]. The European Commission and the UK Hazardous
Wastes Inspectorate have begun to explore what expert systems may have
to offer through formal risk modeling, which has for many years been a US
interest in the hazardous waste area, as in others. Formal risk frameworks
(though not full probabilistic analyses) have been described in Chapters 4
and 5 for the Netherlands, the UK, the FRG, and Austria. Not only in the
USA, therefore, but also in Europe there is growing pressure to adopt for-
mal risk assessment methods in hazardous waste management. We there-
fore first briefly review present risk-analytic methods to show how they
relate to our conceptual analysis of technological systems, expert knowledge,
and the typical confusion of technical and institutional types of uncertainty.
9.2. Defining Risk
Risk analysis formalizes a model of a risk-generating process (or family of
processes) so that quantitative methods of assessment can be applied to
those risks. It is obvious that the more clearly structured is the real risk
process, or regulatory problem, the more easily it will succumb to formaliza-
tion. In this section I show how the analytical process is inevitably selective
in choosing its focus, "freezing" the context of its selected focus, assuming
that no contribution to risk arises from that "context", and thus limiting
the kinds of conceivable risk mechanism. This selectivity creates more
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severe problems, the more the technology in question is dispersed and
network-like.
The conventional definition of risk is the product of the degree of harm
a given event would cause, and its probability of occurrence
R=PxC
This would express a risk as, say, the estimated number of attributable
deaths or other damage per unit time of operation of a given activity. But a
chemical plant might accidentally emit lethal clouds of toxic gases every
year in a remote region, and cause zero harm. Or a given chemical waste
may be toxic and thus, in principle, of high hazard, but environmentally
highly immobile and remote, so of low risk. Hazard may therefore describe
the intrinsic "worst-case" damage a process or material could cause, whilst
the above definition of risk incorporates variable situational qualifications,
which reduce the probability of this worst-case damage [3]. The degree to
which these "situational" risk factors are under the control of regulators,
designers, or operators itself varies. Furthermore, risk analysts make
different assumptions about their controllability, so that some of these fac-
tors are the focus of design analysis and choice, others are recognized but
less structured, whilst still others may lie unrecognized, embedded in the
structuring of the analytic problem, but excluded from the explicit analysis
itself.
In the case of industrial plant, some of these situational qualifications
are that: properly designed, constructed, and operated equipment has a low
chance of failure; many parts of processes have fail-safe or redundancy built
into the system in case of failure; and have monitoring systems that
automatically react to early signals so as to prevent major failures. Other
less explicit assumptions might be made about the professional expertise of
operating staff, rigor of inspection, likely response to pressure to cut
corners, the degree of design, construction, and operating experience, qual-
ity control of component manufacturers, management and organizational
factors, etc.
In the case of hazardous chemicals, there are equivalent qualifying fac-
tors (though on the whole, less well defined), such as the physical form of a
chemical (e.g., if it is an inhalation danger, is it in fine powder form or could
it "easily" take such a form?), its mode of containment, and its local dispo-
sition (is it accessible to environmental pathways back to human
populations?) .
A typical schematic form of an analytic risk function would be as in
Figure 9.1. On this formulation the same risk, R, can be given by different
combinations of P and C: for example, PIC1 = P 2C2. But these represent
very different events, experiences, and associated uncertainties. Thus, a
compelling criticism of the R = PC approach has been that the universal
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dimensions so produced, takes no account at all of what may be major
differences in the processes, kinds of damage, and human experiences
involved - it does not compare like with like. "Risk" as conventionally
defined and used in analysis and regulation is thus an artificially narrowed
concept; it may not capture the features of an issue that its different partici-
pants define as its essential properties. There have been various attempts
to overcome this limitation by factorizing technological risks into "attri-
butes", but as argued in Chapter 11, these have failed to come to terms
with the social-technical network nature of technologies.
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Figure 9.1. Typical overall risk function, smoothed over component events (small
curves).
A related difficulty of compound risk approaches is that they may con-
ceal value commitments in their definition. Risk expressed as the product
PC may covertly incorporate different kinds of harm - mortality, morbidity,
different kinds of economic loss - and these may be measured against
different denominators. Thus, a comparison between two production
processes in terms of risks per unit time, is very different from a comparison
of the same processes by risks per unit of output or labor input if one pro-
cess is more productive than another in terms of time or labor. A workforce
may wish to know risks per unit of work time; a manager, per capital input
or output; and a local resident, per unit of residence time. These often
buried yardsticks can change the apparent scale and importance of risks
very considerably [4]. Thus, the specific "technical" orientation of an
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analysis, even if not chosen on value grounds, may have value implications
embedded within it, unknown to the analyst.
9.3. Event-Tree and Fault-Tree Analysis
The extra precision of risk assessment by the use of such techniques as
event-tree or fault-tree analysis has been of great value. However, there is
always a trade-off between precision and sensitivity with the artificial
nature of analytical framing. The framing problem is more acute in poorly
structured risk processes, but it is always present. It is worth outlining the
analytic event-tree and fault-tree techniques, so as to demonstrate this.
Event trees and fault trees are complementary ways of modeling risk
processes. Event-tree analysis starts with a postulated event, such as a
pump- or valve-failure, and examines the cause-effect branching chains that
may proliferate from the event into undesired end-points, such as the
release of toxic chemicals or radioactivity. Fault-tree analysis works the
other way about, by specifying a given end-point or "top-event" then
analyzing all the possible chains of "upstream" cause and effect that could
lead to the given end-point. A typical form is given in Figure 9.2.
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Figure 9.2. Complementary use of fault-tree and event-tree analysis.
The key property of such formal analyses is that they require
specification of all the relevant end-points or initiating events, and they
define cause-effect sequences in terms of YES-NO (either-or) gates. Along
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with other assumptions (see below) this allows computation of the
estimated overall probabilities of different downstream consequences.
These techniques have several acknowledged problems:
(1) Initiating events still have to be identified and their probability PI
estimated as a starting point. Whether to treat this as a "black-box"
estimate or break it down into a further fault tree is a matter of judg-
ment. Completeness can never be guaranteed even in well defined,
heavily analyzed systems. The extreme subjectivity and conflict in
expert estimation of PI is frequently obscured in statistical methods,
for example by assigning probability weights to them, which
represents the conflicting expert judgments as if they were random
natural variation. Yet it is recognized that the effects of uncertainty
in estimating initiating events - that is, uncertainties on or outside the
framework of the formal risk analytic technique - carry through and
dominate uncertainties in the overall conclusions.
(2) Formalization into trees suggests that all possible cause-effect
sequences are "either-or" options, e.g., that a valve is either open or
shut. Real processes are far more complex, so many significant system
deviations and proliferating chains occur due to partial faults, e.g., of
a pump working intermittently or below the designed power. This
interacts with the problem of completeness of I. In a US Nuclear
Regulatory Commission update of earlier reactor safety studies, for
example, new initiating Qvents had to be considered because those
caused by partial loss of support systems, like power or cooling water
(of higher P than complete loss), generated significant final risks.
They could lead not only to shutdown, but also could undermine cer-
tain further safety systems.
(3) Related to the last point above is the well known problem of common-
mode or common-cause failures. These may affect the probabilities of
several branches in the event tree together, thus destroying the key
assumption of independence that is necessary to be able to integrate
multiple probabilities into overall risk estimates; in effectively fusing
several otherwise separate sequences, common-mode failures can intro-
duce large increases in risks.
External events, such as earthquakes and off-site power failures, are
examples of previously underacknowledged initiating events and common-
mode failure mechanisms. Another example is maintenance inadequacy.
These may generate parallel failures in several sub-systems at once,
markedly changing the overall risks in ways not easily captured in formal
event tree analysis. They arise outside or in the interstices of the analytical
framework.
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To partly summarize, differences in risk analysis, even of well defined
systems using formal models, are not only caused by incomplete data, which
is where responsibility is usually placed. (Even data have to be selected
from previous cases and applied to the "similar" case in hand, which
involves choices of rule.) Analytical differences, or uncertainties, are also
due to framing differences between different experts, which affect in fine
detail the structure of the actual problem each is analyzing. The practical
consequences for the divergence of overall risk estimates are very substantial
- several orders of magnitude even for nuclear reactor analysis, which is
probably the most heavily analyzed of all.
Further difficulties exist in using formal techniques in risk assessment,
with responses typically concealing framing uncertainties as pure technical
uncertainties.
(1) The technique of multiplying chained probabilities and then integrat-
ing convergent chains conceals the fact that different kinds of process
and related uncertainty may be involved in the separate routes to
given end-points. Some may involve only mechanical failures, yet oth-
ers may embody human interactions of various sorts. Even within
relatively well defined systems, aggregation is necessary. However,
significant uncertainties can be inadvertently concealed, and there is
no single optimal balance between overall compression and decomposi-
tion, because there are different needs that coexist within the same
regulatory system.
(2) The selectivity of attention of formal analysis can be highlighted in the
following way. Take a given set of events in a risk-analytic event tree.
For each event we need to estimate its probability. One way of doing
this is just to seek past performance data - e.g., of pump failure or
boiler cracking. But any such event can be decomposed into subsidi-
ary and conditioning processes. Storage tank rupture or boiler failure,
for example, can be decomposed from a general class inter alia into
materials fabrication and tank design processes, pressure dynamics,
corrosion mechanisms, vibration processes, and crack propagation
processes, in the specific operating context envisaged. Whether to
decompose the formal analytic tree into such greater detail will depend
on judgment about the overall sensitivity of outcomes to that part of
the system, whether data or theoretical modeling can sustain more
detailed analysis, etc. Not all parts of a system can be so decomposed;
some have to remain aggregated and "black-boxed". Some may
remain aggregated because the subsidiary processes they conceal have
not even been recognized, e.g., human intervention may be buried in
apparently technical parameters. The particular shape of selections
made in analytical framing depends upon tacit evaluative (maybe
inadvertent) judgments, and the specific methodological orientations
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and skills of particular expert disciplines. Again, divergent expert
analysis may be due to such subtly different constructions of problem
definition based on legitimate commitments (not always expressly
chosen) both outside of and within the domain of factual questions
themselves.
(3) So far we have considered only the well defined part of risk processes,
a typically complex plant with accidental releases as end-points. How-
ever, there are many different potential release events from a given
plant, each of which has to be analyzed as to the estimated conse-
quences, both for the workforce and externally. In order to reduce the
estimations of "external" consequences to a feasible scale they are usu-
ally grouped into a smaller number of families. For example, hun-
dreds of release possibilities were classified into 14 release categories in
the US Rasmussen Reactor Safety Study WASH-1400, to give the
inputs to analyses of external consequences. The external environmen-
tal dimension usually involves more complexity, uncertainty, and lack
of structure, and thus more opportunity for different expert framing
and structuring, than does "internal" plant risk analysis.
(4) Even before composite probabilities are estimated, the description of
possible chains of events is in itself so complicated and open to
interpretation that there is room, even after a real event such as the
Three Mile Island accident, for dispute as to whether or not the real-
world event sequence was actually described in the preceding
analysis [5].
(5) The information basis of probability estimates for component failures
and cascading sequences of events is highly variable. In some cases
the empirical experience is good enough for reasonable statistical
extrapolation; in other cases the applicability of historical data is ques-
tionable (e.g., what samples of past boiler failures should one use? Can
data on conventional steam boilers, of smaller size, thicker or thinner
metal, less quality control, etc., apply to nuclear pressure vessels?);
should one take data on all like components, or those produced by the
manufacturer for the plant in question? In other cases not amenable
to even indirect "experimental" validation, theoretical estimation has
to suffice. But in all cases, even where there are data to use, inference
commitments are made. For example, using data on thin boiler
failures at certain pressures for estimating failures in thicker boilers at
a different pressure tacitly theorizes that these variables have no effect
on failure rates. Expert commitments on such issues as these are
equivalent to problem-framing commitments in that they are depen-
dent on tacit evaluations of the meaning of information taken from
other contexts of use. These evaluations are influenced by the expert's
working context.
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(6) When it is recognized that no usable data exist, recourse is usually
taken to methods of eliciting and structuring explicitly subjective
"expert" judgment, such as Bayesian statistics. Uncertainty so eli-
cited is fundamentally different from that associated with random
events or imprecise observations. For example, it depends critically
upon the community of "experts" chosen to be consulted, the social
structure of which affects the coherence of elicited judgments. Rela-
tively close-knit scientific specialties can be expected to produce nar-
rower "uncertainties" than less socially coherent research networks.
This factor appears to affect Morgan's analysis of the aerial sulfur
transport and damage question with regard to acid deposition [6]. The
different scales of uncertainty found in the phases of aerial transport
(narrow) and health effects (wide) could be interpreted as an artifact
of the social cohesion of atmospheric chemistry as a discipline, and the
opposite for the "community" of health effects experts.
Methods of representing subjective expert uncertainty also tend to
obscure socially structured uncertainty as if it were objective technical
imprecision. Use of log-normal degree-of-belief distributions for a parame-
ter, such as a frequency, is usually presented as a median with an error fac-
tor. The error factor is the square root of the ratio of the 95th to the 5th
percentile of a log-normal distribution. A typical subjective estimate would
be given as 1O-4 /yr with an error factor of 10. But the statistical quality of
this kind of estimate is demonstrated by the fact that to obtain a compar-
able assessment based on a conventional statistical confidence interval
would require data of only one occurrence in about 10 000 years! The unus-
ably low quality of such estimates, and the rank ignorance behind them are
concealed by the formal presentation.
Bayesian and related methods have thus contributed to the confusion
of socially generated expert framing uncertainties and conflicts, with "objec-
tive" uncertainties to do with lack of data. Inadvertently, this has also
suppressed pertinent questions about the authority of consulted experts to
comprehend risk problems, and whether there are dimensions not just out-
side their domain of reliable information, but beyond their imagination and
experience, as framed in their version of the risk system or analytical
problem.
To summarize this section, expert definition and analysis of risk
processes involves many dimensions of actively strategized, value-laden
commitment (which is more extensive and subtle than value choice):
(1) In the overall choice of damage processes and risk units.
(2) Selection of some elements and not others for detailed attention.
(3) In the compression of some detailed process differences into unitary
classes, yet distinguishing others.
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(4) In the application of data generated in different, maybe unknown, con-
texts of use.
(5) In assumptions about behavioral-technical interactions, such as opera-
tor, maintenance, or other implementation reliability.
(6) In implicit assumptions about problem boundaries as to the stability of
external contexts and of further relationships embedded in chosen
functions or variables.
These various problem-framing and structuring commitments intro-
duce divergent expert risk analyses that are not merely a result of inade-
quate data - they are uncertainties, or more accurately, conflicts introduced
by active shaping of the analysis by those diverse commitments. Experts
themselves are immersed in their own analytical frameworks, and work
under scientific norms that encourage standardization in the pursuit of pre-
cision. The fact that they are perhaps the least able to appreciate the
context-bound nature of their processes makes it difficult for them, natur-
ally, to appreciate basic variances within a technological system and the
importance of social contexts of implementation.
Bearing in mind our interest in regulation, one significant practical
difference in risk problem-framing assumptions made by experts concerns
the controllability or otherwise of elements of the risk system. This directly
influences judgments about the scale and uncertainty of risks, and about
what forms of regulatory influence are feasible. Thus, if a risk analysis is
framed on the assumption that a particular element is either totally auto-
nomous or already fully controlled (or even does not exist), it will highlight
other elements for analysis, i.e., those that it already assumes to be (a)
relevant and (b) regulable. Thus, a kind of circularity is possible where par-
ticular forms of risk analysis, when used in regulation, merely confirm their
own value premises and implicit definitions of "the system" to be regulated.
The above analysis already indicates that "intrinsic" risk is strictly
speaking a meaningless term, because risks are by definition conditioned by
situations. "Intrinsic" or "objective" risk therefore implies freezing those
assumed conditions, whatever they may be. Situational discrimination
seems to represent an overall improvement in the clarity of risk definition,
but the distinctions are not absolute. For example, if a chemical waste is
treated (deliberately or not), thus reducing its hazardousness by making it,
say, less soluble and therefore less environmentally mobile (as well as less
gut-ingestible), is this an intrinsic change or a situational one (especially if
it is a reversible change)? It depends upon a judgment about the regularity
or uncertainty of the process or actors who could effect the change, deli-
berately or not. Containment or back-up devices for nuclear reactors or
other hazardous installations may be regarded as "intrinsic" parts of plant
design, because this change of design is virtually part and parcel of institu-
tionally unified risk analysis, regulation, and design. There is no "natural"
Risk Assessment 01 Technological Systems 281
state of a material or technology by which to define its intrinsic risks, and
which could act as a definitive basis for explicating all detailed or more
macroscopic situational risk qualifiers. In this sense, by making assump-
tions - deliberate or inadvertent - about whether the components of an
overall risk-generating system fall within the scope of risk analysis or are
part ·of its given context, analysts are more deeply a part of the normative
processes of regulation than is usually recognized. This is especially true for
a behaviorally structured and diffuse risk system like hazardous wastes.
Even in more structured problems, it does not at all make sense to
talk of experts merely discovering "facts", which are then distorted into
divergent shapes by different policy interests. Nor does it make sense to
reduce the complexity of the experts' prior framing to hidden value choices.
We now turn to a range of examples to illustrate these points.
9.4. Liquid Energy Gas Facility Risks
LEG terminal facilities are an example of a well defined risk problem. The
IIASA study of the risk analyses produced during four different national sit-
ing decisions identified 15 different risk analyses, but although the technolo-
gies and processes analyzed were very similar in all four cases [7], they
reached very varied conclusions. In part, this was due to different analyti-
cal definitions of what was meant by risk - what kind of potential cost (e.g.,
population risk or critical group; risk per day, per job provided, etc.)? How-
ever, there were deeper incompatibilities than this. As Mandl and Lathrop
note:
. .. several decisions must be made in the course of performing a risk
assessment, such as how to characterize risk, what presentation for-
mats to use, what gaps to fill with assumptions, what assumptions to
adopt, which of several conflicting models to use, how to indicate the
degree of confidence of the results, and which events simply to omit
from the analysis. These decisions can push the results in any direc-
tion ... [8].
Some studies included shipping collisions or grounding and spills, oth-
ers focused only on land storage tank rupture, others included transfer
spills, but none analyzed potential sabotage. Even on specific events, esti-
mates varied without any explanation. One study assumed that for a typi-
cal layout of six tanks surrounded by dikes, a valid estimate for a maximum
credible spill size was 15% of the contents of one tank, whilst others took at
least the full contents of one tank as a conservative estimate. The estimated
probability of a spill at one site varied by a factor of 103 (lO-3 to 10-6) in
three separate analyses. When the perspective is extended to cover effects
of a release, the conflicting assumptions multiply. Different models of
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dispersion and ignition were used, different causes of damage were assumed
- some took secondary blast effects to be the sole cause of deaths while oth-
ers took thermal radiation.
It may be initially tempting to say that analysts chose their detailed
problem definition to suit the conclusion they wanted; but not all such
framing commitments are visible as choices to the analyst making them
and, anyway, they do not always have identifiable effects on the conclusion.
At least some of the separate commitments involved in problem definition
are inadvertent and determined by social and methodological positions, such
as the specific intellectual traditions of the analysts, etc. This has been
found to occur in science generally [g]. Even when there is (to the external
observer) a clear connection between an analyst's problem framing and her
organizational position and interests, this may be a result of the framework
having become naturalized within that organization (e.g., that its own
operations and management are competent), which is fundamentally
different from saying that there was deliberate choice of framework to suit
the desired outcome.
As Mandl and Lathrop conclude:
... what is striking about the estimates is the magnitude of the
differences. Societal risk, individual risk, and the risk of one or more
fatalities vary over four orders of magnitude across sites, and the risk
of ten or more fatalities varies over eight orders of magnitude across
sites. It is hard to imagine another area of political concern where per-
formance measures receiving as much attention as these did could vary
over such a wide range. Yet even more striking are the differences
between the three reports prepared for Point Conception. There is
about a factor of ten difference in both societal and individual risk ...
There is a difference of four orders of magnitude in the risk of ten or
more fatalities. A policy maker faced with such variations could con-
clude that all three reports are based on very limited knowledge of the
risks of LEG [10].
Furthermore,
Each report poses as a representation of the current state of knowledge
regarding LEG risks, but because that knowledge is incomplete, some
of the reports represent it using probabilistic terms or error bounds.
Yet each report is based on a different state of knowledge: different
assumptions are made, models used, probabilities estimated, etc. No
one report in fact represents a comprehensive representation of the
current state of knowledge. When SAl gives a probability of 9.9 x
10-7, and FERC [11] gives a probability of 8.1 x 10-3 , for the same
event, the policy maker is likely to be somewhat at a loss as to the
appropriate figure upon which to base his or her decisions ... each
represents only a subset of the total state of knowledge. Yet neither
report acknowledges that the other estimate exists!
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The implication, not fully spelled out, is that through their inadver-
tent selectivity of detailed frameworks, formal risk analyses may appear to
contain ignorance and "uncertainty" within apparently probabilistic
bounds, as if they are all analytically manageable, therefore definable as
"risk" [12]. The real uncertainties, however, may be better characterized
by:
(1) Ignorance (there are factors and combinations of potential alternative
frameworks that are not even identified, let alone "estimable").
(2) A wide scope of legitimate expert analytical choice in defining the
relevant risk-generating system structure - structural "uncertainty" .
Thus, the resulting knowledge is not characterized only by passive
uncertainty, that due to the effects of imprecisely known quantities, but also
by the actively (but not necessarily deliberately) shaped uncertainty of con-
tradictory frames of reference. The fact that five of the 15 risk analyses did
not even mention uncertainties only confirms Thompson's description of
this as decision making and analysis under contradictory certainties, within
different frameworks [13]. The conflict is due to the cumulative effects of
implicit analytical commitments even in defining what the "technology" is.
This point is seen better if technology is viewed as a social-organizational
network, intersecting at several nodes with other networks [14]. The more
heterogeneous and extensive the risk-generating system is, the more impor-
tant this concept becomes, and the more misleading the conventional ethos
of risk assessment.
9.5. From Technical Imprecision to Social Contradiction
Cox has identified unrecognized uncertainties that underly risk assessments
caused by variation in the actual processes being evaluated, when fixed
processes are being assumed in the risk analysis [15]. In order to simplify
his example, Cox takes the evaluation of only workforce risks. Although he
discusses risks of electricity production technologies, his point applies to all
technological processes. The following is an outline of his argument.
Modern analysis can define technology as a chain of stages connected
by input-output flows. A given stage is defined by its input-output struc-
ture, e.g., stages of mining, smelting, refining, manufacturing, and finishing
in a typical metallurgical industry; waste arisings, "packaging", transport,
storage, and treatment and disposal, in the case of hazardous wastes. More
detailed models can be made of single stages.
The occupational risk per overall unit of output associated with a set
of stages, J in the process, is
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where the set of stages J is defined as a technology (say, incineration),
which is assumed to be well defined with a constant input-output structure;
Qj is the number of units of output from stage j per year; L j is the number
of man-hours of labor used in the production of one unit of output from
stage j; rj is the number of deaths per employee-hour in stage j; and aj is
the fraction of the annual output from stage j (e.g., x tonnes of enriched
uranium from fuel reprocessing) needed to support whatever overall produc-
tion unit is used as risk yardstick (e.g., per 1 GW of electricity produced or
consumed).
Conventional uncertainties arise in the risk assessment and multiply in
the usual multilinear combination of values. However, there are more basic
uncertainties in defining the "system", "process", or "technology" in the
first place. For example, every real-world process is an open system, with
inputs from and outputs to an outside environment. Therefore, a process or
technology has to be defined by placing limits on it, thereby also defining its
environment. But then arises the thorny question of what is the appropri-
ate system or problem boundary, or ~ put another way - the appropriate
attribution of risk responsibility?
Should a nuclear reactor risk assessment include the proportional risks
of reprocessing, transport, waste disposal, uranium mining, and even possi-
ble horizontal nuclear-weapons proliferation, since these are arguably asso-
ciated with it as inevitable entailments? Should the risk assessment of
fluoride-contaminated hazardous waste from aluminum smelting incorporate
an element of the risks of coal mining or nuclear risks, because of the inten-
sive use of electricity in aluminum production? In coal risks, does one
include the risks involved in the manufacture of, say, the trucks found at
mine heads, even though the same trucks would have been made, with the
same risks, had there never been such a coal mine? Once begun, the possi-
bilities of such network connections are limitless.
Inhaber's use [16] of essentially the same approach to analyzing energy
system risks, for example, found high total risks for wind and solar power.
But closer examination showed that these high risks resulted from an arbi-
trary assumption that dirty coal would be used as back up for these (inter-
mittent) technologies used as base-load supply systems. Thus, Inhaber's
definition of "solar technology" included dirty coal technology too! A nor-
mal definition of solar and wind technologies has them organized with
storage systems or with clean back-up. This is a different definition of the
technology as a social-organizational unit.
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As Cox emphasizes, real economies and real technologies are far less
simple than that implied in fixed internal structures, and thus fixed techno-
logical coefficients. Both the boundaries and internal structure of a technol-
ogy can (a) vary in the real world, and (b) be defined variably by the risk
analyst (and others) as "the" technology or "the" risk problem in question.
Another set of examples that enlarge the same point come from
scientific disputes over the environmental risks of the proposed MacKenzie
Valley pipeline from Arctic Canada to the USA [17]. Implicit, and eventu-
ally revealed, in the analysts' conflicting scientific conclusions were different
social-behavioral judgments, which created tacitly different problem
definitions. Thus, some scientists assumed that one pipeline could realisti-
cally be evaluated for its effects in isolation from further pipelines, roads,
telegraph lines, airfields, residential service towns, and other developments
(the "corridor"), which other scientists assumed would inevitably follow and
should therefore, they believed, be a "natural" part of the system to be
evaluated. If socially one initial pipeline would likely beget a whole corri-
dor, who is to say which is more "objective"?
In another part of the same dispute, the damage to tundra from con-
struction work was assumed by some analysts to be limited to that within
official limitations of construction to winter months, when the tundra was
hard-frozen. Other analysts assumed this was unrealistic because they
believed the pressure of deadlines and huge investments would inevitably
cause these limitations to be broken in practice, with summer-season con-
struction leading to far greater damage. Different behavioral assumptions
led to different "technical" risk problem definitions. In these cases, as
before, there is no objective, singular problem definition or technological
system that can be more and more precisely "revealed" by more analysis.
9.5.1. Nuclear technology
In the UK Windscale Inquiry in 1977 into a proposed oxide nuclear fuel
reprocessing plant [18], the Inquiry chairman, the nuclear industry, and
government agencies defined the risk assessment decision as that concerning
a single reprocessing plant, and nothing more. Objectors on the other hand,
assumed that the plant, which generated plutonium, and uranium for
further rounds of nuclear power systems (and weapons) would create insti-
tutional momentum for more nuclear developments, including widespread
fast breeder reactors and plutonium commerce. They defined the risk
assessment question and the associated technological system as much larger
and more diffuse. However, this was dismissed as "emotive" nonsense by
the chairman.
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Here was a conflicting choice of technology or problem definition
which, despite the chairman's view, was not a "facts" versus "emotions"
division. Although not recognized as such by the Inquiry, it was a conflict
of founding problem definitions. The conflicting definitions were a symmet-
rical pair based upon different behavioral judgments and objective social
experiences of the contending groups. To members of the establishment, it
was rational to draw a decision boundary round the present plant, because
they could objectively expect to influence and identify with the subsequent
decisions whether or not to make further commitments. These future net-
work decisions, the technologies and potential effects involved, could be logi-
cally fenced off and neglected. For outsiders to the decision-making estab-
lishment, however, an incompatible, but equally logical, view prevailed.
From their social experience, it was rational to assume that they would
have no real part in any of those subsequent decisions, as they had been
excluded in the past. On past experience, to them they would not be deci-
sions at all. It was therefore rational to condense all the possible foreseeable
future network developments into the present "single plant" decision. The
technology or risk system was thus defined to take these extensive further
questions and probabilities into account. The relevant event-tree was
enlarged in inverse proportion to the social access to (past and future)
decision trees.
The important point is that each position, "expert" or otherwise, was
based upon behavioral judgments and social experiences that were necessary
to frame a problem at all. But ,each was equally defensible, or illogical,
according to one's social position. No deeper, more objective definition of
"the technology" existed. Nevertheless, the language of the Inquiry was
totally that of an "objective" technology with "objective" effects, which
could be discovered through the conflict by more rigorous analysis.
9.5.2. Pesticides
The official UK government scientific Advisory Committee on the Safety of
Pesticides (PAC) evaluated the risks associated with 2,4,5-T in the late
1970s, when public suggestions about its pervasive harm were accumulating
[19]. Having analyzed the latest scientific evidence, the Committee decreed
that 2,4,5-T could continue in widespread use. After attempts to reopen the
issue by the National Union of Agricultural and Allied Workers (NUAA W),
the main labor union involved in spraying 2,4,5-T for farm and other
employers (including many local authorities and government agencies),
PAC reasserted the safety of 2,4,5-T, dismissing as unscientific the large
NUAA W dossier of admittedly circumstantial clinical and other evidence of
actual harm.
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This rather patronizing scientific rebuttal only polarized the gathering
conflict further and, eventually, in the face of further union action, PAC
advanced the explicit qualification that its assertion of the safety of 2,4,5-T
was conditional upon its proper manufacture, distribution, and use. These
conditions were precisely where the farm workers' and others' direct experi-
ence and evidence was focused. For example, drums of 2,4,5-T often arrive
with defaced or removed labels that are supposed to describe proper condi-
tions of use. Even if these are known, the organizational realities of farm
life often do not allow a farm worker to refuse to spray just because the cli-
mate is not correct, or because specified protective equipment is defective or
nonexistent. Chemicals, called "adjuvants" that speed up the action of the
main chemical are often added, despite the effects being unknown, and new
spraying technologies designed to improve economic efficiency have had
marked effects on exposures, e.g., by producing finer sprays. Also, the cul-
tural reality of such a work life does not encourage a man to say he is con-
cerned about the possible risks of such materials. In this behavioral reality
of the technology of 2,4,5-T use, the workers were the experts and not the
PAC scientists. To the workers the experts were "in cloud-cuckoo land
behind a laboratory bench" [201. The "objective" risk analysis of the PAC
experts, which focused only upon the laboratory-controlled tests in the
scientific literature, also required a certain set of concrete situational param-
eters to define it. In transforming these into a policymaking risk analysis of
the process of use of 2,4,5-T, they were effectively assuming a whole stand-
ardized and idealized social world of use or implementation. They focused
exclusively on only one part of the technological network, from one cogni-
tive dimension. Note that their risk analysis was not neutral with respect to
the real-world context, but would only have been valid if the real context of
implementation accorded with the implicit ideal. The experts, entering with
their highly selective frame, excluded a priori the realities of distribution
and use of 2,4,5-T, which potentially radically altered its risks. There is a
parallel here with the questions about "sensible" landfill as a hazardous
waste policy, discussed in Chapter 7.
The point of this example is to demonstrate again the inadvertent
selective analytical framing of the process or technology for risk assessment.
Because of its insensitivity to the implementation context the narrow,
unrealistic definition in this case eroded regulatory credibility beyond the
specific issue.
A very similar example to the pesticides case concerns the conflict over
beef-cattle growth hormones. In 1985, a scientific committee of the Euro-
pean Commission pronounced three nature-identical growth promoters to
be safe if used under certain conditions (e.g., earlobe injection, dose thres-
hold, 90-day waiting period before sale, etc). When the Council of Ministers
rejected the scientific advice due to strong political pressure, Commission
bureaucrats were outraged that their scientifically well prepared advice
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should be overturned by what they regarded as popular hysteria and super-
stition. However, it is arguable that popular feeling did reflect a question
mark that the experts had ignored - are the crucial conditions of the risk
analysis enforceable in social reality? These conditions define the risk sys-
tem under which the scientists pronounced safety. The experts again
appear to have automatically assumed that these would be met - an ideal
social world of implementation. The implicit popular judgment, that they
are most unlikely to be met, was equally legitimate, but not acknowledged
and not impartially analyzed by the parties involved.
The importance of the network model for technology and risk
processes is exemplified in the above cases. These networks are composed
of cross-cutting rationalities. There are good reasons why farm workers
spray herbicides in unsafe conditions and want to inject growth hormones
under uncontrolled conditions, which are to do with the social and economic
realities of farming. There are good reasons why transfer agents in hazard-
ous wastes mix waste streams in ways not defined by regulators, to do with
the feasibility and economics of waste treatment and transportation. In an
urgent examination of arr~ngeIi1ents for controlling methyl isocyanate
(MIC) following the Bhopal disaster in 1985, a French inquiry found that
MIC was being imported through the port of Marseilles to a plant in Bez-
iers. Unloading of the MIC was being performed in a very unsafe manner,
as if the barrels were bales of straw or grabs of coal. This apparently
irresponsible activity, in the "periphery" of the technological network, was
locally logical and necessary, because the economics of dock operation
require a crane and its operator to fill a shift productively. This requires
many loading and unloading operations, so that shifting attention, focus,
and practice of the operator between different kinds of material is very
difficult, especially if piece rates are being paid to increase productivity [211.
Thus, even when such network processes that are surreptitiously
increasing a previously defined technological risk are discovered, they can-
not necessarily be easily corrected by, as it were, flipping an operational
switch, because the "deviant" action, as (perhaps) seen from the central risk
management perspective of a given technology, is embedded and normal in
a cross-cutting network of social, economic, technical, and other commit-
ments. Even in relatively highly controlled risk situations, like nuclear
plants, it is known that radiation workers take off their exposure-recording
instruments in order to avoid being removed from radiation work (and the
corresponding bonuses) because they have reached the official dose limit.
When this can happen in "controlled" situations, truck drivers with hazard-
ous cargoes can certainly try, with reasonable odds for success, to simply
remove identifying hazard signs so as to cross frontiers at forbidden points
or go through forbidden tunnels, and thereby perhaps save several hours of
detour. "Central" risk management and unitary, standardized risk analyses
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may increase scientific precision only by excluding the so-called context,
which is actually the substance in another framework.
It is arguable that the extensiveness and dependent intersections of
modern industrial and technological processes are growing and becoming
more acute, such as in the siting of modern chemicals industries in develop-
ing countries. The case of radiation exposure to unknown numbers of peo-
ple when a cobalt-60 X-ray source was taken from a US hospital, allegedly
with management acquiescence, and passed via scrap yards (in which chil-
dren played) into steel for houses and furniture all over Mexico and parts of
the USA, is a graphic illustration of what can happen. So too is the episode
in Michigan in the 1970s when herbicide was stored with cattle food in a
warehouse, leading to unknown amounts of contaminated beef on the
market.
Once alert to the extent and complexity of network possibilities, one
can see more clearly how expert risk analysis itself risks lack of effectiveness,
and escalating loss of credibility, by its unreflective framework selectivity.
In issues with strong network and behavioral properties, decentralized risk-
analytic capability with institutional sensitivity is clearly necessary.
To summarize, different social assumptions influencing definitions of a
"technological system" (including its implementation) can generate different
expert problem definitions in "the same" risk analysis. There is no single
objective definition of a technology or risk problem that supersedes all oth-
ers. Risk analysts have to make commitments to a particular definition,
before and during analysis - these commitments may differ. This point has
been addressed at length, because it clarifies a key confusion frequently
found between two quite different types of uncertainty in risk analysis.
The kind of institutional uncertainty we have identified envelops the
system rather than being located within it, because "the system" or "the
problem" is itself subject to conflicting definitions, in our case of "hazardous
waste". This uncertainty is not in the data and definitions, but surrounds
them.
9.6. Uncertainty by Strategic Design
Earlier we distinguished between "orthodox" technical uncertainty or
imprecision (which may include real system indeterminacy) in risk analysis,
and structural or institutional uncertainty, brought about by (frequently
subtle) framing differences of analysts' problem definitions.
There is more room for conflict in the expert framing and definition of
"the same" risk-analytic problem than has previously been recognized. The
more that a regulatory problem area is behaviorally as well as technically
diffuse and indeterminate, the more significant is this distinction. Institu-
tional uncertainties are central in many processes of information-generation
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relevant to the hazardous wastes issue, because information is not unitary,
but relative to the same frameworks that define technical terms in different
ways.
In this section we examine the different kinds of uncertainty that
underly the attempt to define terms and data normally regarded as abso-
lutely central to a hazardous waste regulatory scheme. We progress from
ordinary uncertainties or imprecision in measuring hazardous waste, via
active, socially generated uncertainties in identifying them, to active,
socially generated uncertainties in even defining hazardous wastes.
The act of defining a hazardous waste by regulatory authorities is tan-
tamount to defining actors, and then defining their actions with that waste.
The practical uncertainties are a product of two mutually amplifying fac-
tors:
(1) The inevitable imprecision in the regulatory definitions.
(2) The variable interpretations of these definitions by waste producers
reporting wastes and by waste handlers, who may not even define
them as wastes.
We have already seen the institutional and technical processes at work on
these uncertainties in real cases, ranging from highly centralized manage-
ment (at Land level in the FRG) to extremely decentralized management
(UK). Now we attempt to clarify some of the different types of uncertainty,
and their implications for rational regulation.
9.6.1. Conventional data uncertainties are softer than they
appear
The General Problems
Even if the definitions of "hazardous" and "waste" were universally agreed,
and there were also no intermediate interests that diffract "real" quantities
and kinds of waste arisings into official regulatory data (see below), there
would still be more problems than often recognized, simply in making accu-
rate technical observations. A T&D company in the UK was criticized for
not controlling the composition of the wastes delivered to it. The company
contracted experts to help devise an accurate analytical sampling device for
just one of its many consignments, an oil-water emulsion delivered in 4000
gallon tankers [22]. A standard vertically sectioned thief-tube was recom-
mended. Trials found that even this simple two-phase physical sampling
was impossible to perform except by very rough estimation. In reality,
there were not two phases but at least four - water, sludge, oil, sludge -
with very indistinct boundaries. Samples along the tanker (which was only
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bafHed, not compartmentalized) showed variations of ±50%, though they
should have been identical. This was the simplest physical sampling and
analysis, yet it proved impossible to perform anywhere near accurately.
This was also for only one load of only one type of consignment among
many different sorts. It is not surprising in the light of such realities that
even in the detailed data survey of waste arisings in Hungary (see Chapter
8), it was admitted that experts frequently had to resort to guesses to
obtain figures at all.
This type of sampling and analysis variability exists even where the
waste is a laboratory sample, as we discuss in Chapter 10, and it is not
avoided by systems that use precise concentration limits as hazard
definitions. If these uncertainties alone were extrapolated to bulk waste
arisings and fully recognized, they would demonstrate the problems of
depending upon precise hazardous waste arisings data for effective regula-
tion. So, far from achieving regulation based at least on analysis and
confined to the above orders of uncertainties, the situation in the UK, for
example (which is probably fairly typical), is that:
Only a minority of waste producers or waste disposal facilities are
equipped with weighbridges. Waste arisings continue to be expressed
in a variety of exotic units encompassing imperial and metric weights
and volumes, together with the traditional and totally inadequate
"guestimates" such as the number of lorry-loads, the number of bags or
other containers. Compounding this confusion, the waste disposal
authorities adopt non-uniform conversion factors to convert from
volumetric measures to weight [23].
Thus, we can see how scientific sampling and analytical inconsistency,
even in a well defined situation, overlaps with extremely loose recording,
even of gross volumes, let alone composition.
This leads us to a case study of attempts to quantify hazardous waste
arisings.
Determining the Amount of Hazardous Waste in Massachusetts
The state of Massachusetts has been relatively active and progressive in
dealing with hazardous wastes. It has made several attempts to measure
the volume of waste arisings that it has to control [24].
Attempt 1: The GGA study. In 1976, the Division of Water Pollution Con-
trol of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts commissioned a study from an
environmental consulting firm, the GCA Corporation, to "survey the quan-
tities, the geographic distribution, and the current practices of hazardous
waste disposal in the commonwealth" [25]. As a first step, to determine the
quantity of waste generated in the state, GCA reviewed the division's file of
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permit applications and monthly reports from licensed waste transporters.
These reports were required under a Massachusetts law prior to the enact-
ment of the federal RCRA regulation. The reports were supposed to
include monthly summaries of where transporters picked up a waste, where
it was sent, the waste type, and methods of treatment and disposal. How-
ever, eCA found this information incomplete and difficult to track or com-
pile [26]. They therefore decided to conduct a telephone survey of a selected
number of firms. Some 446 plants responded to their telephone requests for
information, which usually represented the "best guess" of the plant
manager or the plant's environmental engineer.
To yield statewide totals the waste figures reported were simply extra-
polated on the basis of number of employees in the firms surveyed, com-
pared with the total number of employees in the industries state-wide. The
firms surveyed represented 36% of the state's manufacturing employees.
This procedure assumed a linear relationship between waste generated and
number of employees in a particular firm, which eCA admittedly had no
evidence was correct. But they felt that the estimates of waste so generated
were "probably accurate to within a factor of two". With this methodology
eCA estimated that 37.57 million gallons of waste were being produced per
year in the state [27].
Attempt 2: The New England Regional Commission study. In 1979, the
New England Regional Commission employed Arthur D. Little (ADL) con-
sultants to develop estimates of hazardous waste generation for the six-state
New England region [28]. ADL performed no new analyses, but used the
data of previous state studies, including the eCA report in Massachusetts.
Taking eCA's raw data and performing the same extrapolation based on
waste generated per employee ratios, ADL estimated that the total waste
generated for Massachusetts in 1979 was 49.2 million gallons, an increase
over eCA's total of approximately 30%, presumably due to changes in
employee statistics [29j.
The difficulty in using waste per employee ratios for extrapolation is
shown by the wide range of ratios ADL found in New England (see Table
9.1). The report admitted that "variations between the states are not
readily explained on the basis of industry differences [30]".
In addition to this estimate, ADL provided a "high sludge" estimate
on the assumption that the introduction of planned wastewater treatment
programs would lead to an increase in hazardous waste generation. Figures
from Connecticut, which already had such a program, were used to estimate
"high sludge" amounts for the other states. This amount for Massachusetts
was reported as 84.9 million gallons per year [31]. It was this crudely
estimated range of generated hazardous waste, 49.2-84.9 million gallons per
year, that became the official state statistic for hazardous waste generation.
It was published, however, in units of tonnes, by assuming a water density
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Table 9.1. ADL ratios.
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State
Connecticut
Maine
Massachusetts
New Hampshire
Rhode Island
Vermont
Average
Standard deviations
Waste generated
per employee per year
255
258
82
156
72
155
163
81
of 240 gallons per tonne. This gave 200000-350000 tonnes of waste per
year. Looking at one assumption alone, sludge or solid waste could be
several times heavier than water, leading to tonnage figures several times
greater than these estimates..With little reference to their uncertainties, the
figures were used to argue for the enactment of a state hazardous waste con-
trol program modeled after RCRA.
Attempt 9: Department of Environmental Management. Obviously not
satisfied with these attempts, the Massachusetts Department of Environ-
mental Management (DEM) decided in 1981 to do its own survey [32].
They hired yet another consulting firm, Urban Systems Research and
Engineering, to computerize and compile the information contained in the
state's transporter reports (the same reports rejected as too incomplete by
GCA). This study calculated 170000 tonnes of hazardous waste produced
in the state. In addition, DEM reviewed the EP A notification list of poten-
tial generators (compiled under RCRA) and an industrial directory in order
to identify "potential" generators who were not reporting their wastes.
Interviews were conducted on-site and by phone, and reviews of out-of-state
manifest totals for waste from Massachusetts delivered to other states
"revealed an additional 17000 tonnes of hazardous waste not reflected in
our totals." DEM's final estimate was 190000 tonnes of hazardous waste
per year [33], about six times the earlier estimate "accurate to a factor of
two."
DEM identified sources of errors in this estimate, which were drawn
from on-site interviews with 25 generators:
(1) Underreporting of waste from generators who appeared in the trans-
porter reports.
(2) Generators who did not file transporter reports as required by law.
Finally, DEM admitted that these figures, "for the first time generated by
hard data", took no account of waste being illegally dumped "by pouring it
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down sewers, incinerating it without approval ... , mixing it with conven-
tional wastes, or using illegal disposal facilities". Quite honestly they con-
cluded, "the extent of illegal disposal in Massachusetts is unknown [34]".
From a state to the nation. This case shows that estimates of hazardous
waste generation, often presented as hard facts and used in developing poli-
cies for control, are inherently "soft" numbers. Even more sophisticated
surveys are usually based on information voluntarily submitted by genera-
tors who face large incentives to underreport their wastes. Amounts of
waste being illegally disposed of are simply unknown.
The problems of a state trying to determine such figures are even
worse at the national level. In August 1983, the preliminary results of a US
national survey of hazardous waste generators conducted for the EPA,
again by a consulting firm, were released. This survey was again based on a
telephone and mail questionnaire of approximately 10000 generators who
had identified themselves to the EPA as generators under the RCRA regu-
lations. Yet in 1981 only 20% of the firms surveyed admitted to having gen-
erated any waste at all! The study concluded:
The initial estimates are preliminary in nature and are subject to sta-
tistical uncertainties. Nonetheless, the study suggests that 150 mte of
hazardous waste were generated across the US and its territories dur-
ing 1981, in contrast to previous estimates of 40 mte [35].
This also contrasts with the 250 mte that the US Office of Technology
Assessment estimated by simply adding up state estimates for the 50 states
and territories [36]. All the elaborate effort, therefore, has produced figures
for regulation that vary by a factor of about six.
In the end, one must conclude that regulatory resources might be
better spent than subsidizing the environmental consulting-firm industry to
produce numbers that inevitably have spurious authority conferred upon
them simply because they exist. Donovan's summary of her experience
tracking fuelwood consumption estimates in the Himalayas could be applied
directly to the hazardous waste issue:
All too often, consultants have neglected to explain the methods used
to arrive at their expert opinions ... some estimates have been boldly
quoted and requoted, often without citation, in ever more respectable
documents, until a very casually contrived estimate has become the
basis for policy formation and program planning.
Thus, despite qualifications and caveats, processing the very rough esti-
mates of hazardous waste arisings through the regulatory bureaucracies and
into public policy arenas has stripped away their contextual properties, so
giving the impression that they are a measure of objective reality rather
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than a partly circular index of socially constructed and intrinsically open-
ended definitions. A practical conclusion is that, even at the state level, it is
very difficult to envisage clear guidelines for capital investment programs in
T&D facilities, unless either the private market is allowed to use its own
wisdom and take its own risks on a fully open basis, or the public authori-
ties take comprehensive responsibility for regionally defined facilities, which
focus less upon fine distinctions of risk as a qualifying criterion and more on
producing an integrated waste management.
9.6.2. Institutional diffraction of key data and key terms
When the authorities began in 1945 to try to assemble data for risk assess-
ment about people's precise exposure to the blast and radiation from A-
bombs dropped on Japan, they relied upon self-reporting of where people
were at the time of the blast, and calculated doses from this [38]. Many sur-
vivors apparently misreported themselves to have been out of town, because
a strong social stigma had rapidly grown against association with having
been exposed to radiation. Later, when free welfare services were offered to
radiated bomb survivors, many of those who had been away suddenly
recalled that they had, after all, been in town, so the figures for the exposed
population expanded, with corresponding changes in risk estimates.
In some countries where production is centrally planned and fervently
pursued, incentives such as bonuses are offered to plant managers and
workers who reach or even exceed production targets. There is therefore a
natural temptation to overrecord production levels. Systematic tendencies
in this direction have been observed, involving large-scale, informal social
coordination to avoid detection [39]. In some cases even entire factories
have apparently been fictionally created for the benefit of central regulatory
"data", so as to bolster "production" and bonuses. Ingenious supporting
elaborations have had to be developed, such as massive routine wastage and
breakages to explain why the extra production did not generate correspond-
ing revenue. In another case, involving new equipment and funds for oil
production:
Reports submitted by the Ministry in the five-year period showed
modernization proceeding according to schedule, and production figures
barely short of plan indices. But an outside inspection in 1981 revealed
virtually no attempt to introduce the new methods. Report data had
simply been invented, and there was a shortfall of millions of tons of
oil. Equipment had been left to rust and be pilfered. Inspectors found
that thousands of barrels of imported reagents had been dumped beside
railway tracks, thrown into abandoned river pits, and even encased in
the foundations of railway embankments [40].
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In this case, of course, inspection happened upon the target, but even
so it took five years even for this scale of "data-diffraction" to be detected,
by which time responsibility and remedy were extremely difficult, if not
impossible.
When the Hungarian public health authorities were conducting their
survey into hazardous waste generation, it was found that agricultural sta-
tions, of the government agriculture inspectorate, had been unofficially stor-
ing disused pesticides for many years, when they should have been declar-
ing, properly treating, and disposing of them. The stations were found to
have been systematically underreporting their inventories so as to "mask"
their own inefficiency and negligence [41].
Reliable data about waste arisings - their types, properties, volumes,
origins, movements, etc. - are regarded (along with a meaningful hazard
classification or listing of wastes) as the main foundation of a hazardous
waste regulatory scheme. Naturally, everyone expects such data to be
fuzzy. When the Environmental Safety Group of Harwell, UK, gave evi-
dence to the Gregson Committee Inquiry of the House of Lords, they gave a
range of 2.5 to 4 million tonnes of estimated hazardous wastes arisings per
year in the UK. Discussion with the Committee expanded the range to 6.6
million tonnes. From the Harwell experts' experience of the issue, and hav-
ing themselves conducted surveys, they thought this range relatively nar-
row. The Gregson Committee, which contained some experienced environ-
mental policymakers, but no hazardous waste specialists, was horrified that
regulation should have to proceed in the face of such a large uncertainty as
that reflected in the range of estimates [42].
The point about the examples above, however, is not so much the
range of uncertainty, as if about a piece of reality which is physically
difficult to observe, but the fact that the observation itself is always medi-
ated by other social actors. Sitting between the observer (central regulator)
and the reality he wishes to observe, these actors (whose behavior the
observer wishes to control via the observed data) actively diffract the obser-
vation, often very substantially because they have different (and even
changing, in the A-bomb survivors' case) interests that give the observa-
tions meaning and clothe them as "facts" or "data". They are data and
uncertainties created by actively strategizing agents. Even when the stra-
tegy is not to deceive a regulator or researcher, the diffraction will still
occur. It is uncertainty created by conflicting views of reality, not by the
incompleteness of a single one.
Thompson and Warburton give a similar example of conflicting data
on fuelwood consumption rates from research on Himalayan deforestation.
Like hazardous waste arisings, this factor is apparently crucial in regulation,
but the range of estimates differ by up to 70 times [43]. Such variations do
not only fog, they obliterate the "discoverable" differences between factual
effects of policy options on which normal policymaking subsists. The
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observer inevitably depends upon the regulated for data by which to regu-
late them. As we see below the less controllable are the regulated, the more
it is tempting to tighten the data and definitions. But if this becomes
detached from supporting institutional measures, and too extreme, it simply
becomes a framework of delusion on a grand scale.
The same kind of actively created uncertainties, or conflict of social
meanings and frameworks, pervades the creation of central data in the
hazardous waste management issue, but this problem has a further wicked
twist to it.
For hazardous wastes, not only is there a strong diffraction caused by
cross-cutting observation and reporting frameworks, but there are even
deeper uncertainties as to what (and who) is being observed and regulated
anyway. As we have seen in the previous chapters, different basic
definitions of what is "hazardous" and what is "waste" are used by different
actors in the system, and by different regulatory bodies in different state or
national systems. There is no intrinsic risk of a given waste, only risks
depending upon situations. How tightly regulatory systems try to specify or
control these varies according to local institutional processes embedded in
wider cultural structures. Even the most elaborate attempts to specify tight
criteria and definitions still fail to eradicate generous interpretational flexi-
bility in several dimensions. Thus, even within a single system, fluctuating
definitions of the key terms "hazardous" and "waste" sharply affect the
estimated volumes of hazardous waste arisings, even before one takes into
account more deliberate diffraction. In this case, therefore, the underlying
"solid reality" becomes a mosaic subject to social definition, even before the
observation phase brings more uncertainties into play.
9.6.3. Hazards in waste
The context-dependent character of "hazard" has been a theme of the whole
book. It was specifically discussed in Chapters 3 and 5, and earlier in this
chapter; we also return to a further aspect of this in Chapter 10. Let us
now, therefore, look at "waste".
A very common and serious ambiguity lies in the storage or even sale
of toxic waste against the possible future recovery of constituents, when it is
then defined as a (nonregulable) resource. For example, a liter of silver- or
mercury-contaminated oil or solvent may be a (hazardous) waste if taken as
such. But if chosen to be defined as one of a thousand different liters, to be
collected and combined, it may legitimately be an unregulated resource.
Speculation against future market prices of contaminants allows a large area
of license in deciding whether or not to subject a material to regulation.
Furthermore, because this kind of judgment may be made "downstream" in
the life-cycle of a waste, say at a transfer station where the transfer agent
decides to sell an incoming waste as a resource to a recovery operation, it
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will then disappear from the regulatory records. No one will know, without
specific checks on that individual consignment, whether it was illegally
disposed of or its character legally changed from waste to good.
Many industrial economies have thriving, if insecure, T&D sectors
based on entrepreneurs who buy and sell wastes or recycleables, and profit
from their knowledge of where a "waste" (for whose disposal they have been
paid) can be sold as a net good. The uncertainties are amplified by the cul-
tural style of risk taking in this commercial area. Brokers go all out to sell
their T&D services, often ignorant of precisely what materials they will
receive once deals have been struck. They exploit the uncertainty, hoping
that they will more than compensate for unexpectedly nasty consignments
by "windfall" double-profits when a "waste" can be sold as a good. The
recovery and recycling industry is also well known for its "instability", with
many companies starting and quickly disappearing from sight. This, of
course, makes control all the more difficult. The US EPA will attempt to
control "speculative storage" in future, but this adds an unknown number
of extra agents to be policed.
An intriguing, but important, case of the definitional-perceptual ano-
maly occurs when tankers, or drums of pressurized or frozen liquid energy
gas are "emptied". Because they are no longer carrying their usual load (of
goods), they are treated as containing nothing, so they are considered
nonhazardous. In fact, they now contain a residual "good" that has become
a hazardous waste - gas vapor at ambient pressure. Many accidents have
occurred because of this perceptual anomaly.
The silt that is carried naturally down the Rhine and deposited as a
great economic nuisance in Rotterdam harbor used to be converted into a
resource by dredging all 40 million m 3 of it every year and spreading it on
agricultural land, where its high organic content was a benefit [44]. But in
recent years, the toxic contamination of the Rhine has made this silt a
hazardous waste, useless for agricultural land, and it has even been
disqualified from being dumped at sea by the London-Oslo Conventions.
(Notice that if the Rhine had dumped it in the North Sea, it would not have
been disqualified!) However, the imaginative Dutch have turned it back
into a resource by using it to landfill a new polder and, suitably insulated,
to create new residential or industrial land. While the material concerned
has remained true to itself, it has had various truths invested in it by the
surrounding institutions and actors dealing over it.
9.7. Ignorance, Uncertainty, and Expertise
Our examples have shown qualitatively different kinds of uncertainty. We
began by showing that even for well defined risk-generating problems,
uncertainty and disagreement blamed upon observational imprecision and
lack of data usually conceal deeper uncertainties that are actually more
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subtle conflicts of expert framing of the problem. We have also shown how,
when we view technologies as technical-organizational networks of inter-
secting and interdependent processes, the problem of framing becomes even
more acute, though it ought to be more visible. The network concept of
technology allows us to see more clearly:
(1) The significance of "downstream" or "peripheral" network variants
and intersections.
(2) The multiple social relationships that people can have with a techno-
logical system and the cross-cutting rationalities of diverse actions and
perceptions relating to the technology. This becomes especially
relevant when we consider public reactions (see Chapter 11).
(3) The vulnerability and brittleness of regulation based upon risk-
analytic expertise which focuses too precisely on only one part of the
overall network. The normal context-bounding processes of scientific
analysis, the unconscious framing processes described earlier, and the
natural preoccupation of scientists with precision, all tend to create
realms of ignorance, which underly the arenas of defined uncertainty
and risk that are formally structured by scientific methods. Thus, the
validity, effectiveness, and credibility of regulation is vulnerable if ele-
ments of the network and its diverse rationalities and variations are
excluded. This exclusion in analysis has a practical counterpart in the
neglect of implementation worlds when risk analysis moves into design
of optimal regulations.
Full appreciation of the practical importance of this point requires a
brief digression into the philosophy of science. It is usually taken for
granted that science embraces uncertainty, feeds on it, and reduces it pain-
stakingly to more reliable knowledge. Partly this is true, but the part that
is false is more important, because it is not recognized. The uncertainties
embraced and highlighted by science are already a reduced population,
selected by prior cognitive framing commitments which a priori exclude
other frameworks from the explicit problem domain. This prior framing is
culturally ingrained, by the cumulative theoretical and methodological com-
mitment of a technical specialty. In gradually increasing precision within
the defined domain, questions about the context and framing are suspended,
and die away. Unexplained anomalies that arise within the domain of well
defined scientific "puzzles" are passed over into the background, and either
written off as freaks or shelved in the faith that one day the existing frame-
work will be able to incorporate them. (The parallels with risk management
are striking. There are interventions from "outsiders", to be written off as
irrational, and there are quietly admitted problems, such as more at-risk
subpopulations or synergy effects, which are for another day.) Further-
more, the difficulties involved in overcoming this intellectual reductionism
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are more than "merely" intellectual, because the processes are a main con-
stituent of social processes of order, cohesion, and progress in scientific com-
munities; thus, they are more deeply rooted.
Effectively, therefore, science decreases uncertainty (solves its defined
puzzles) whilst increasing ignorance (suppressing the excluded context).
Whilst this may be functional up to a point within science, it is not neces-
sarily an appropriate mode for science in public - for example, dealing with
uncertainty in risk management. In public contexts this mode invites regula-
tory commitments that are vulnerable to dislocation arising from the exter-
nal "context" (or network dimensions), of which it has created its own
ignorance and inadvertently concealed. Furthermore, these artificially
excluded dimensions are not only physical, but social and perceptual.
Thus, one could say that uncertainty is inversely proportional to
ignorance. In other words, decreasing acknowledged uncertainty by using
standardized risk assessments in heterogeneous risk arenas is increasing
ignorance, and hence regulatory vulnerability. Equally, when ignorance is
reduced, e.g., by the radical surprise of an unimagined "external" network
intervention (the 2,4,5-T experience or the Love Canal discovery), uncer-
tainty is increased. But uncertainty as seen from a single point can also be
deliberately increased, e.g., by decreasing the standardization or centraliza-
tion of risk assessments and their institutional use, as a means of reducing
overall ignorance and system vulnerability to surprise.
The practical distinction and interaction between uncertainty and
ignorance is illustrated in a brief discussion by a UK review committee of
the issue of potential synergistic effects of chemicals in mixed wastes. The
local authorities' association representative had advocated revision and
tightening of the regulatory definitions so as to include this possible prob-
lem. However, the committee's overall reaction was skeptical:
The Committee accepts that, with tens of thousands of chemicals in
commercial use, synergistic couples may occur in mixed wastes. It is
not however convinced that the present state of knowledge would per-
mit them even to be properly identified, or the definition of special
waste to be amended to take account of their existence. Given that
one of the most persistent criticisms of the definition of special waste
has been the reputed scarcity of reliable toxicity data, a fortiori it
would be impracticable to seek to qualify the definition by reference to
a genuinely obscure and poorly documented phenomenon [45].
In other words, the committee seems to be saying that such risks exist,
but since they cannot even be estimated, regulation must be structured as if
they did not exist. Note that in this case, at least the excluded question was
recognized before being re-buried. In other cases of the scientific framing of
problems, they are not - recall the examples of 2,4,5-T.
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The point is not whether the committee was correct or otherwise in
ignoring synergy, but whether the implications of leaving it out of technical
regulatory definitions are picked up and compensated for by institutional
correlates. Thus, it would be realistic to exclude this dimension from regu-
latory definitions if, instead, one relied upon local authority experts to know
what in their area is being mixed or might be mixed, and what the most
risky combinations are likely to be (of course, this would require intensive
investment in local regulatory institutions). The overall point, however, is
that reliance upon unitary formal regulatory risk definitions and analyses,
and the assumption that their advancing precision (i.e., standard situations)
will adequately match ill-defined behavioral-technical contexts of the sort
that exist for hazardous wastes, only makes for greater ignorance. This is
because the analytical-regulatory framework, if it remains within a unitary
institutional orientation, is less able to recognize and respond to network
pluralism. In appearing to manage uncertainty, it fosters ignorance and the
potential erosion of public credibility.
9.8. Conclusions
Regulation is the crucial arena in which universal principles and ideal
methods or starting assumptions must be converted into concrete effects. It
is here that the concepts embodied in science and in policy rhetoric have to
grapple with real, varying social experiences, as well as organizational and
physical constraints, uncertainties, and contradictions [46]. Science, here
risk analysis, is one of the few generally valued resources in making environ-
mental policies, and in making them credible. In the risk assessment of
chemicals, scientific uncertainty and ignorance are being relentlessly
expanded by institutional driving forces, because of the escalating under-
standing and control demanded of science [47]. This topic is discussed in
Chapter 10.
The dominant model of science in policy and risk management por-
trays a given pool of facts defocused by the surrounding imprecision or
technical uncertainty. This fuzzy area stands as a "feasibility space" for
credible, conflicting technical views of risks, etc. [481. When the facts are
uncertain enough, different groups may even, with equal credibility, define
spaces that do not overlap. More objective analysis or disciplined debate
(or both), so this model goes, will tighten reality's constraints on conflicting
claims, and thus approach a singular feasibility or credibility space within
which all policy options must be located.
Conventional approaches to policy decision-making under uncertainty
depend upon the idea that the factual domain, though uncertain, can be
treated as prior to and independent of values, and that decision-evaluation
processes (e.g., into standards for regulation) optimize within the
302 Risk Management and Hazardous Waste
mathematically formalized uncertainties. Even uncertainties in values are
treatable in this framework, using multicriteria methods. However, if the
factual domain and its uncertainties are actually reflections of values, and
complex ones at that, the whole framework of thinking about science, risk
assessment, and regulation changes. Ignorance may surround the frame-
work of explicit uncertainties; this ignorance is more significant when
different frameworks exist in the very system being analyzed. The aim in
this chapter is to show that "factual" technical uncertainty, including that
developed in highly controlled expert analysis, already embodies multiple
institutional commitments of a value kind, the important ones of which are
often tacit, incremental, and inadvertent. This is not recognized at all by
the dominant model, which portrays expert disagreement as due to residual
data imprecision or to deliberate external policy interests illegitimately con-
cealed in the science.
We have used examples from technological risk analysis to show that
intrinsically different definitions of the relevant problem system always
exist, even in well defined systems. (This does not mean that any definition
can be made up.)
The essence of formal risk analysis is to advance precision, but this
may reduce uncertainty only to increase ignorance. Institutionally, this
correlates with an assumption of, or need for, risk situations that are stand-
ardized in behavioral and technical detail; this in turn corresponds with cen-
tralized uniform regulation. Yet the features of the hazardous wastes issue
emphasize the severe limits of this approach. The cross-cutting, multiple
rationalities and the data diffracting processes outlined earlier in this
chapter, show how unrealistic is regulation based upon uniform, precisely
equal life-cycles and risk situations for the same waste, wherever it arises.
Actors in the system can define even apparently unambiguous technical
terms in unforseen ways. Only in 1984 did it come to the notice of UK
regulators that liquid wastes banned from landfill were being redefined and
legally landfilled as solid waste by putting them in drums - which were
immediately burst open by the landfill-compressing caterpillar tractor.
The problems of creating coherent frames of reference for expert risk
analysis were seen to exist even for nuclear reactors; but the level of flexibil-
ity, the indeterminacy, and the lack of structure in the case of hazardous
wastes places the goal of such a single-frame coherence beyond reasonable
limits of credibility. Even at the level of national systems, if we could imag-
ine that these were internally coherent, we show in Chapter 5 that incompa-
tible overall approaches, criteria, and technical frameworks were developed
for regulatory use. Assumptions as to the underlying risk situations (includ-
ing their degrees of standardization) vary enormously, depending upon
institutional structures of regulation.
In using risk analysis for regulation, we have first to define the struc-
ture of the risk-generating system, to decide which factors are important
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risk creators, which of these can be controlled or mitigated, and how. If it
is very badly structured, this could be due to lack of information (it is
better structured than we know); or to genuine variability and indeter-
minacy; or to both. Hazardous wastes suffers both, but the diverse
behavioral freedom within the system looms large. If every actor were per-
fectly trustworthy and infallible, no overall structure would need to be con-
ceived. Central policy could issue environmental protection norms and let
the system run itself. Each actor would conduct her own risk analysis
according to her own situational activities, aims, and constraints. From a
central point of view this would be amorphous and insecure (except that the
actors are trustecl), but still an optimal sytem. At the opposite extreme, if
no one could be trusted, then their freedoms would be totally removed, and
central control of all wastes would be necessary, with a single organizational
structure for the whole life-cycle. A single risk analysis framework (akin to
the WET model) could define "best practicable environmental" (i.e., T&D)
options for every waste, and these could be enacted by the controlling
agency.
The whole point, of course, is that neither of these scenarios is realis-
tic, for different reasons. The strategic question is how much freedom to
give to actors within the system - economic agents and local regulators - for
example, whether they should be given tight, direct behavioral prescriptions
("all solvents to high-temperature incineration"); removed altogether (e.g.,
replaced by a monopoly public corperation); or allowed to perform their
own risk analysis against indirect norms (e.g. "if a leach test shows poten-
tial toxicity above a threshold, landfill is not allowed"). There are many
detailed options, (licensing, inspection, mandatory rules, codes or practice,
etc., etc.).
The overall point is that risk-analytic uncertanties that appear as
technical uncertainties have underlying institutional determinants, and thus
potential institutional solutions.
In Chapters 6 and 7 we examined institutional approaches that have
very different implications for the way in which the underlying tension is
managed between standardized, more precise risk assessments that are less
rooted in diverse situational realities (high ignorance, low uncertainty), and
less standardized, less precise but more situationally connected ones (low
ignorance, high uncertainty). The centralized management systems of
Bavaria and Hessen effectively collapsed this tension by institutionally
reducing life-cycle variability to within the control of one management
framework. The UK has implicitly accepted the need to keep risk assess-
ment more situationally located, dispersed and flexible (but without the
institutionally distributed regulatory resources to make it work well). The
USA has adopted the most standardized, precise, and centralized technical
approach of all, yet for an institutionally dispersed system. This high
ignorance, low uncertainty US approach is possibly the most prone to
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uneven results - dramatic failures and perhaps dramatic successes. These
different approaches not only correlate the different technical approaches of
the countries with their characteristic institutional structures, but also
correspond with broader political cultural properties.
Note the radically different view of the role of science in policy that
emerges from this analysis, as compared with the conventional one. In the
latter, it is scientific lack of resolution that leaves room for policy values to
play on and produce versions of the facts to suit conflicting partisan posi-
tions. Two implications are:
(1) That the values are chosen.
(2) That more rigorous scientific analysis will produce less uncertainty,
therefore less opportunity for concealed value conflict. This, indeed, is
how Weinberg's notion of transscience structures the relationship [49),
except that he identified areas of science that, for the lack of intrinsic
resolution, could not reduce uncertainty beyond a certain point.
This conventional stance corresponds with the policy belief that if regula-
tion is incomplete and uncertainty is high, then the crucial need is for
greater technical rigor in defining "hazardous waste" .
Our perspective shows that since expertise is always fundamentally
context-bound, intensifying formal analytic inputs can actually increase
uncertainty and incoherence, as each elaborates its own incommensurable
underlying institutional framework. This is exemplified by many modern
cases of scientific experts in policy debates [50).
The implication is that the cognitive framing of risk analysis - what is
taken as the idealized context, what degrees of aggregation at what points,
what kinds of uncertainty to try to analyze and control, what to ignore -
does not merely flow from "the objective" problem, "nature", or "scientific
method". But neither is it reducible to chosen values. Furthermore, it has
direct practical institutional dimensions, because the relevant risk-
generating processes interpenetrate technical and human behavioral actions.
Thus, the way a risk analysis is framed implies that certain behavioral rela-
tionships in the regulated system are unproblematic, and that others are
problematic.
The effect of our argument that scientific uncertainty is more intract-
able and, indeed, qualitatively more fundamental than is recognized is to
cast doubt upon the viability of any regulatory system, national or interna-
tional, that depends upon technical precision and standardization of risk
analysis, unless it can first "standardize" institutionally. If this is deemed
impossible or unacceptable, it may imply decentralizing analysis and regula-
tion of risk situations, but there are two key caveats:
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(1) The institutional resources must be available in distributed form.
(2) It is unrealistic to expect to fully match the extreme heterogeneity and
indeterminacy of hazardous waste life-cycles by institutional dispersion
of regulation, because (a) the uncertainties are deeper and the degree
to which they can be formalized for analysis and control is more lim-
ited than recognized (see also Chapter 10); (b) the desired decentrali-
zation comes into direct conflict beyond a certain point with the limits
of (1) above; and (c) public credibility demands a degree of unification
in the overall view of the system, to justify its operating rules.
There are severe limits to the ability of formal risk analysis to analyze
and control technical uncertainties when these, and the risk-analytic fram-
ing, are driven by underlying institutional uncertainties. A logical response
to these dilemmas would therefore seem to be either: to limit the institu-
tional uncertainties and reduce the need for refined analysis, by redefining
hazardous waste life-cycles into single management systems on a partly
decentralized (e.g., regional or state) level; or to accept the intractability of
the uncertainties by attempting to strengthen self-regulation mechanisms.
A problem with the latter is that one of the main methods of doing this has
been to layout precise normative risk-analytic criteria (e.g., testing
methods), but these only address one point in the life-cycle, so the problems
of relevance and overstandardization still apply. Also, the question of ensur-
ing enforcement remains, even if the risk analysis is carried out.
Whatever one's preferences, th.e overall conclusion of the analysis is
that the transaction costs of controlling back-end uncertainties in hazardous
waste management are realistically far higher than presently recognized.
Thus, means must be found to reflect this in the relevant upstream
decisions.
A main theme of this chapter has been to argue that scientific risk
analysis always has to frame a risk problem, which means defining a
"model" risk-generating process. This involves tacit judgments, which may
vary among equally competent experts. Science progresses by freezing a
defined context and assuming an ideal world. Progressive science "pulls
itself up by its own bootstraps" , by responding to signals that indicate devi-
ations from reality in the set of assumptions. The world becomes more rich
and complex, the science more interesting and useful. Nevertheless, a basic
and necessary tendency also pulls in the opposite direction, to cling to exist-
ing themes and their primary framing assumptions until they are "really"
worked out. Progressive conflict clarifies the nature of these commitments,
so that their validity, implications, and alternatives can be reexamined.
Sometimes, however, scientific paradigms may manage to insulate them-
selves from critical evidence and alternative premises, so that their primary
assumptions are not challenged and developed. The prevailing analytical
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framework does not enter into constructive interaction with its surround-
ings, and so develops its own ideal-world assumptions.
We have shown in this chapter how the risk analyses of several sys-
tems - .pesticides, growth hormones, the McKenzie Valley oil pipeline, the
Windscale nuclear fuel reprocessing inquiry - were oblivious to the central-
ity of the social assumptions that they had to make, even to define a
coherent technical risk-analytic problem. They were therefore in no position
to explore the implications and validity of those naive, ideal-world framing
premises and system definitions, nor to interact constructively with alterna-
tive assumptions or evidence. They keep uncertainty low and ignorance
high. Our suggestion is that risk analysis and regulation must nurture
institutional methods for identifying their founding value premises and
social assumptions, and to interact constructively with alternative experi-
ences and premises. Especially for the more dispersed, network-like techno-
logical risk systems, intensifying the conventional, "context-free" framework
only risks decreasing public credibility. Yet there are strong pressures
toward this identification.
In Chapter 10 we examine this tension by moving from the risk
analysis of technological systems to that of toxic chemicals and environmen-
tal processes.
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CHAPTER 10
Risk Assessment and Regulation
for Hazardous Wastes
Brian Wynne
10.1. Introduction
This chapter examines the application of risk analysis to toxic chemicals,
especially to hazardous chemical wastes. It focuses the general perspective
of Chapter 9 on the more specific problems of toxic chemical wastes and
their environmental distributions. The overall area is usually differentiated
into three foci - risk source (e.g., chemical plant) at the point of emissions;
environmental movements and concentrations, etc., or exposures; and effects
on humans. The conception in Chapter 9 of technological systems as net-
works complicates this simple framework. For hazardous wastes, the com-
plications deepen because the first two categories interpenetrate, since
environmental movements and transformations of wastes occur by human
design as well as natural processes, creating many different emission situa-
tions and mechanisms, even for the same type of waste.
In this chapter we first outline the emergence of
chemical-environmental risk assessment and indicate the degree to which
its analytical capability falls short of comprehending the actual processes of
risk generation. Recalling the heterogeneity and lack of structure, the mul-
tiple points of partial regulation, and the analytical confusion of natural and
human behavioral factors in chemical waste life-cycles, we return to the
problem of how regulation tackles the yawning gulf between the state of
risk-analytic knowledge and actual risk processes and situations. Informal
expert judgment is found in two related areas: the relatively controlled
scientific field of toxicology; and risk analysis of ad hoc chemical risk situa-
tions. The existence of informal, subjective judgments within science is not
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in itself remarkable, but the extent of its domination of attempts to formu-
late accountable scientific analysis in regulation whilst attempting to retain
a language of formal expert control, suggests that regulatory bureaucracies
are engaged in the artificial conversion of rank ignorance and implicit
conflicts of perspective into "manageable uncertainty". The evidence sug-
gests that the increasing concern with credibility and reassurance that is
inspiring the development of risk analysis also encourages further develop-
ment of the split within science, between a public language of order and
control and informal disorder. We conclude this chapter with a discussion
of this predicament.
10.2. Environmental Risk Assessment: The Poverty Trap
The institutionalization of public health concern in legislation and associ-
ated regulation has meant the natural extension of risk assessment into
areas of· environmental pathways and human or environmental end-effects
[1]. Although some disciplines relevant to the latter - for example, toxicol-
ogy - have long traditions, their previous ethos has often been clinical and
individual, and so badly suited to questions of collective public health
effects [2].
Although formal risk analysis was dominated in the 1950s and 1960s
by risk source, or "mechanical system" analysis, this period also saw the
beginnings of more systematic environmental exposure and dose-effect
analysis. Indeed, attempts systematically to gather evidence and define the
risk associated with radioactive exposures had begun with the establishment
of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) in 1927
[3]. However, this originated in the concern of clinical radiologists about
individual risks to themselves and patients in clinical X-ray therapy and
diagnosis. The effort took on new impetus and was reorganized in the
1950s, following the industrialization of nuclear energy and a shift toward
collective public and workforce exposures and risks. Early work in the field
was dominated by pharmacology and experimental pathology (as well as the
earlier clinical traditions), from which chemical toxicology also developed.
The established paradigm was built around the simple concept of a thresh-
old so as to reduce acute doses and associated acute effects (e.g., gross tissue
damage as measured by histology). Thus, approaches to risk and regulation
standards setting involved short-term experiments to establish "no observ-
able effects levels" (NOELs) for such gross effects. These were then con-
verted straightforwardly into maximum allowed exposure limits by the
application of a safety factor, typically 10 for workforces or 100 for public
dose limits. The implication of this approach was that such exposure limits
involved zero risk.
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A whole institutional framework was established on these conceptual
and methodological commitments. Initially, even radiation-induced carcino-
genesis was also thought to be associated with only gross tissue damage.
However, with the observation in genetics of radiomutagenesis and the
somatic cell mutation theory of carcinogenesis (an early version of the
"one-hit" model of carcinogenesis), the alternative idea slowly became esta-
blished amongst a new sector that the origins, at least of cancer, lie in more
microscale damage to far more sensitive entities, such as genetic material;
this would emerge as recognizable effects only over the long term. This new
idea suggested that there may well be no dose threshold for health damage,
including mortality, so that no "zero-risk" standard could ever exist. How-
ever, long latency periods and multiple causes became associated with the
observation of effects and entirely different scientific end-points, methods of
observation, and supporting interpretive frameworks became involved.
It was through the gradual though contested establishment of this no-
threshold idea that risk analys.is in its presently recognized form developed
[41. In this new form, standards setting took on a concern for risk-benefit
balancing, on the grounds that if no zero-risk levels of exposure could be
found, and zero exposure to most agents was impracticable, a level of expo-
sure and corresponding risk would have to be set that made an acceptable
trade-off between risk levels and the costs of reducing exposures. Thus, all
the now-familiar procedures of optimization, evaluation of "best practica-
ble" control technologies, elaborate analysis of low dose-effect relationships
for various agents, and concerns for public distributions and acceptance of
risk, entered into mainstream regulatory agendas and processes.
As compared with radioactive risk assessment, two further factors
complicated risk assessment for chemicals.
First, exposure is to relatively few different kinds of radiation (e.g., a-
emitters, .a-emitters, 1-emitters) from relatively few sources or events.
Chemicals and their forms of environmental release are so multivariate and
diffuse that they present different orders of magnitude too complex even to
identify exposure pathways and populations, let alone to begin to attach
quantitative estimates to them.
Second, radiation penetrates tissue physically and delivers its damag-
ing energy in relatively well understood ways, so that specific organ or tis-
sue doses can be reasonably calculated from external exposure effects.
Although biological processes are important too, e.g., metabolic uptake and
movement of particulate radiation (especially a-emitters, which deliver
highly localized doses), well defined physical models are available to show
specific local damage. The same is far from true for most chemicals, so that
specific internal organ or tissue doses cannot be calculated even if exposure
levels are known.
When we consider exposures to chemical wastes, this ignorance and
complexity is expanded even more, because the chemical compositions,
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points of generation and disposal, and subsequent mixing of wastes are fre-
quently badly known at best.
Thus, in both dimensions of "external" risk analysis - exposure path-
ways (including points and focus of emission) and dose-effect estimations
(including the judgment of which possible effects to explore) - hazardous
waste management is severely underdeveloped [5]. Probabilistic estimations
often conceal downright inestimability or ignorance. Some regulatory pur-
poses can avoid some of these lacunae - for example, the intrinsic hazards
of chemicals can be ranked without having to analyze situational exposure
routes and magnitudes; and different disposal options and exposures for the
same chemical can be evaluated assuming the same dose-effect relationship.
On the other hand, ignorance within each may multiply. For example, if an
existing inhalation pathway for a given chemical is not identified and inha-
lation creates more damage than ingestion, then the mistake begun by
ignorance in one dimension is multiplied by ignorance in the other.
One can put the state of development of chemicals risk analysis in per-
spective by observing that far less attention has been devoted to it than to
nuclear radiation, and yet it is a far more diverse and ill-defined area [6];
but even with the relatively huge attention devoted to it, for decades, the
low-dose radiation risk issue still defies scientific definition and consensus.
Thus, in its review between 1976 and 1980 [7] the US National Academy of
Sciences' Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation (BEIR III) Committee in
the end split irreconcilably over carcinogenic risks, and had to conclude that
ignorance was still so deep that no single dose-effect inference was
scientifically warranted at doses beneath 10 rad, the very area of public
health and regulatory concern.
For perspective it is worth thinking of event-tree analysis as a method
for examining the movements of environmental chemicals:
(1) Even in localized situations the processes are characterized more by
continuities and gradations than are mechanical systems (though
recall from Chapter 9 the problem of partial failure of components or
of grades of human intervention). Thus, more complex, continuous
and nonlinear functions and models are needed.
(2) In most broader situations, especially taking cross-interactions into
account, we are simply too ignorant to construct models.
(3) Even where process parameters or relationships exist, we have little or
no information that would allow a normal risk-analytic estimation of
probabilities of exposure, or of mechanisms of possible exposure.
Furthermore, emissions risk analysis for a complex plant either stops
at release categories, or has single-phase dynamics, such as vapor- or
radioactivity-dispersion, to model. Toxic chemicals are often mixed and,
unlike accidental releases from a plant failure, the starting dispositions may
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Table 10.1 The range of potential human health end-points to examine in chemi-
cals risk assessment (nonexhaustive).a
REPRODUCTIVE
Sexual dysfunction:
decreased libido
impotence
Sperm abnormalities:
decreased number
decreased motility
abnormal morphology
Subfecundity:
abnormal gonads, ducts, or
external genitalia
abnormal pubertal development
infertility (of male or female
origin)
amenorrhea
anovulatory cycles
delay in conception
Illness during pregnancy and
parturition:
toxemia
hemorrhage
Early fetal loss (to 28 weeks)
and stillbirth:
intrapartum death
death in first week
Decreased birthweight
Gestional age at delivery:
prematurity
postmaturity
Altered sex ratio
Multiple births
Birth defects:
major/ minor
chromosome abnormalities
(detected in early fetuses,
through amniocentesis, in
perinatal deaths, in live births)
Infant mortality
Childhood morbidity
Childhood malignancies
Age at menopause
a Adapted from Lowrance (ed.), ref [5].
NEUROTOXIC
Various tissue toxic attack -
axons, neurons, myeline, glin,
blood vessels
Distal axonopathy - various sites
Vibration sensation
Motor nerve conduction
Peripheral neuropathy
Sensory conduction
Cranial, spinal, lemniscal and
thalamo-cortical nerve activity
Toxic encephalopathy - convul-
sions, hallucinations
Inflammations
Tremor
(Pigmentation changes)
GENETIC
Biochemical:
altered protein electrophoretic
mobility, altered enzyme function
Chromosomal:
sister chromatid exchanges (differ-
en t cells and parts of cell cycle)
chromosomal aberrations and
breaks, micronuclei formation
Sperm:
abnormal morphology
lactic dehydrogenaze isozymes
CARCINOG ENESIS
Various sites and kinds of tumour
"ASYMPTOTIC" DISEASES
Reduced performance of normal
functions - perceptual, memory,
motor skills, reflexes, balance,
intelligence, problem solving,
attention levels, sleep, etc., etc.
Many of these categories interact in different ways, e.g., observations at one level may be
symptoms of 'observations' at another.
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be very poorly known. There is also a dauntingly wide array of different
health effects to have to try to identify, evaluate, and ultimately model (see
Table 10.1). Although some of these may be near-enough related as to be
under the domain of one expert specialty, most imply separate commit-
ments fmm scientific traditions of observation, etc., for which a given end-
point has been naturalized to the exclusion of others. Thus, risks cannot be
evaluated comprehensively by choosing between and then comparing or syn-
thesizing different kinds of health end-point. Each one represents a whole
way of life of an expert discipline, and may be brought into high focus (or
out again) by cultural values and attention cycles. To say, as do some deci-
sion models (see Chapter 11), that risk management can analyze evenly for
the range of effects of Table 10.1, then "choose" among them by weighting
for values, is to ignore the different "institutional" traditions and commit-
ments that constitute each mode of analysis.
The environmental-biological side of chemical risk analysis is therefore
in its infancy. Indeed, in important respects it becomes more infant as time
passes, because the rate of new chemicals and mixtures arising, combined
with the rate of "new" exposures from "old" chemicals (e.g., past dumps) is
greater than the rate of toxicity research. Recall from Chapter 3 the arrival
of up to 1000 new chemicals on the scene every year and the extreme costs
of fully testing these, not to mention the timescale of approximately three
years. This is for new chemicals only. At the Love Canal waste dump,
after a colossal analytical program jnvolving over half a million data points
[8], over 400 different chemicals were eventually identified, with a range of
characteristics (Table 10.2) estimated from a cursory scientific literature
survey on animal and in vitro testing.
Table 10.2. Characteristics of the 400 chemicals
found at the Love Canal site.
Characteristics
Mutagens
Carcinogens
Embryotoxicants (teratogens)
Hepatotoxicants (liver)
Neurotoxicants (brain)
Renal toxicants (kidney)
Pulmonary toxicants (lung)
% of total
11
13
7
10
16
10
9
However, over 50% of the chemicals identified had no research record
at all. Their properties were simply unknown, even though they had been
produced and disposed of up to 90~40 years ago. Even the data on the rest
were so uncertain that the EPA's Carcinogen Assessment Group judged
that only 4% (15 of 400) of the chemicals found could be given reasonably
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secure individual risk estimates (under unrealistically well defined dose
conditions).
The pressures upon scientific knowledge as a regulatory (and antire-
gulatory) resource have strained the system beyond breaking point in
recent years. Thus, in 1984 three top executives of a giant US company,
Industrial BioTest (IBT), which it is estimated had been responsible for
about one third of all toxicity tests for new chemicals in the entire world,
were jailed "in one of the biggest scientific frauds ever seen in America" [9].
Thousands of chemicals in products (and wastes) were accepted worldwide
on the basis of IBT's "tests", without independent repetition because of the
enormous costs. Thousands of IBT's studies, performed for "a Who's-Who
of the chemical, food and drugs world", were utterly worthless, with
directly fabricated results. In others, nearly half of the exposed population
of animals had died through lack of care, then been disposed of and either
recorded as zero-damage results or replaced by unexposed animals.
Since IBT's exposure, US agencies have found that this was not an
isolated case. Two executives at a New Jersey laboratory were convicted
for falsifying data, and two more laboratories closed down following govern-
ment investigations. Six more had government contracts canceled and four
others sanctioned for lesser misdemeanors. The economic implications of
these regulatory holes are indicated by just one case, that of the artificial
sweetener Aspartame. World sales are estimated at $600 million per year,
or two thirds of the total turnover of the producer, Searle Pharmaceuticals.
According to an investigation for TV [10], when the US Food and Drugs
Administration (FDA) examined Searle's own tests on Aspartame and six
other products, they found them to be so shoddy and inadequate that they
recommended a Grand Jury be convened so as to investigate possible crimi-
nal violations [11]. Tumors had been removed unreported from animals,
and chemicals fed to the animals were not ground up and fully mixed into
the animals' diet, but were given as lumps of the chemicals, which the
animals could easily avoid, thus receiving a zero dose.
The credibility of these tests was defended on the grounds that "scien-
tists in regulatory agencies around the world, some 36 different countries
have affirmed that Aspartame is safe. They've all reviewed the same data".
Yet this argument only underlines two important points:
(1) That the data reviewed were still Searle's own data; to have obtained
independent data (which is what the usual reassuring image of
scientific method would suggest) would have been unrealistic.
(2) That even if independent data were too costly to have obtained, the
scientists "of 36 countries" demonstrated a normal property of sci-
ence, that is credulity, contrary to the public image of unflinching
skepticism and independent testing of claims.
318 Risk Management and Haza,.dollS Waste
In chemical risk regulation, at least, the costs of this false reassurance
provided by a misleading public image of science far outweigh any value it
may once (if ever) have had. The misconception encourages the idea that
safety claims have been separately tested under formal reproducible
scientific conditions, even when this has not been done. Any short-term
public reassurance on specific questions is often repaid with interest in a
later loss of general credibility by the institutions involved.
Chemical risk analysis is in a kind of intellectual "poverty trap".
Because it is not well developed and the demands for knowledge are nearly
always created under conditions of urgency, the kind of "research" per-
formed is closely tied to urgent, retrospective regulatory demands. Even if
this did not generate sloppy science and corruption, it draws resources from
more carefully conceived fundamental research, which, simply because it is
pitched at a more general conceptual level, when it does advance may solve
problems of larger classes - it is more anticipatory. There is also a natural
tendency for regulatory bodies (and regulated bodies for that matter) to be
concerned only with the "science" (such as immediate monitoring) that
corresponds with their minimal legal and regulatory needs. Both these fac-
tors create a certain framework for regulatory science in this area which we
examine in greater detail later, in the context of public reactions. Contrary
to the myth that science proceeds independently of its institutional setting,
we see that it is substantively shaped by it.
In the next section we examine one response to the severe shortfall of
regulatory resources and attention, namely how priority is given to which
materials to select for risk analysis.
10.3. Ignorance, Judgment, and Stepwise Testing
As indicated in Chapter 3, even where it is most elaborate, regulatory
attention for hazardous chemicals focuses upon only a small part of the
available problem domain. The growing excess of chemicals and their
potential effects over the available analytical resources combine to reduce
the area of rigorous attention relative to "demand". Also, as analytical
techniques become more powerful and refined, e.g., chromosome damage
techniques and various neurological field techniques [12], they ironically
expand uncertainty because they move further ahead of the ability to inter-
pret the meaning of their new observations [131.
In the risk analysis of chemicals and chemical wastes, therefore, step-
wise or tier-testing schemes have become normal currency, although their
structure is far from fully defined [14]. Tier testing is designed to identify
the priority in which smaller populations of material should be subjected to
more refined, more expensive, and time-consuming risk analysis. Stepwise
hazard ranking attempts to create a practical hierarchy of increasingly strict
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regulatory control for increasingly hazardous materials, or combinations of
materials and situations.
In principle, these two phases are distinct because the first is an
analytical process, which ought to be only a preliminary to the second,
practical regulatory approach. In reality, the scientific poverty trap out-
lined above means that regulations are made directly on the basis of tier
testing, which, being based on standardized laboratory protocols, does not
address the situation variance problem in waste life-cycles.
10.3.1. Tier testing
Given that only a small fraction of all potentially harmful chemicals can be
tested, the aim of tier testing is to first perform cheaper, more rapid, and
cruder screening tests on a wider range, in order to try to find out what
materials to test in more detail. One very important pragmatic limitation
of such schemes is that they usually only apply to newly introduced com-
mercial chemicals [15]. Therefore, those already in circulation or created
anew in wastes are exempted unless particular ones are arbitrarily "chosen"
and brought to attention dramatically, as with PCBs or with Love Canal,
Gouderak (the Netherlands), and other dumps. Tier testing therefore
bypasses a first, greater level of ignorance, particularly true of hazardous
wastes, which involves not even knowing what chemicals, where, and in
what form, to even screen for more detailed risk testing. In the hazardous
waste area, tier testing has been used most in the analysis of past waste
dump problems.
As already noted, there is a daunting range of potential adverse
health effects to test for, and there is no reasonable scientific connection
between rapid, acute effects and chronic, low-level effects. Thus, the order-
ing of tests is scientifically rather arbitrary. Whereas regulators see it as a
rational means of optimizing regulatory knowledge within very limited
resources, industry sees it as a rational means of cutting down regulation
and thus the costs of introducing new products [16]. Many different
schemes have been proposed or used. Typical is that proposed for the 1976
US Toxic Substances Control Act by a "consensus group" of industry and
professional environmental bodies, convened by the Conservation Founda-
tion r17]. This scheme is organized into four tiers, the first being a review
of primary chemical and physical properties, such as chemical structure,
volatility, purity, solubility, adsorption/desorption, etc. The second tier
begins the biological tests, e.g., for acute toxicity in mammals, birds, and
fish. Given that each LD 50 value (the mean lethal dose of 50% of subjects
tested) is a statistical determination needing many data points, this already
implies many laboratory experiments. This tier also entails plant and seed
toxicity tests, analysis of transformation and degradation processes, and
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short-term mutagenicity and carcinogenicity tests, such as in vitro cell
transformations. Already, in addition to escalating costs, it is notable that
strict requirements for standardized experimental designs and reproducible
methods are involved. These are by no means easy to develop and estab-
lish in practice, even between technically experienced practitioners, and
require elaborate development involving interlaboratory comparisons and
exchanges, thus further multiplying the costs and time scales. The labora-
tory conditions also, by definition, simulate a real-world risk process, and
mayor may not be a realistic model thereof. We return to this important
question later.
If the earlier tests indicate the need, a third tier goes into greater
detail, with "longer term", typically gO-day tests, for subacute, chronic, and
teratogenic effects in vivo and in vitro, in a range of species and cell cul-
tures. Biodegradability, bioaccumulation, and other environmental move-
ment and/or transformation tests are also required at this stage, so as to
develop a picture of potential exposures under different conditions.
If indications from the third tier suggest it, the final tier involves life-
time chronic toxicity tests in at least two mammalian species, with associ-
ated histopathological examinations and further mutagenicity tests. Neuro-
logical tests in various species, life-cycle plant growth and reproduction
tests are also involved. Metabolic and environmental transportation stu-
dies are required to include more examination of the by-products of such
transformations, since these may be toxic even if the parent chemical is not.
Some kind of escalating set of tests as outlined above is a pragmatic
necessity. However, necessity should not be confused with fulfillment of
rationality (and risk control) in any stronger sense. Merely listing the
escalating tests in this way gives no sense at all of the vast array of large-
scale and detailed experimental and interpretive uncertainties at every
point. Furthermore, the structuring of the burden of proof in the stepwise
screening process means that a chemical is exonerated from further tests
unless it gives some positive indication in the earlier tier. But, for example,
the acute tests and effects that occur earlier in the testing scheme may not
relate to chronic effects, which occur by entirely different metabolic path-
ways, and act upon different entities and functions from acute effects.
Thus, formally tiered risk analysis schemes and experimental protocols are
not a substitute for experience and judgment. They are usually thought to
replace these less accessible, less "controllable" decision processes with
more transparent and controllable ones; however, the more elaborate for-
malization of risk analysis there is, the more informal judgment may be
needed to fill it out and work it. It is important to realize that we are not
dealing with a trade-off between formal or informal decision processes.
Rather, the required scope of formalized analysis is being expanded by an
ever-increased scope of required management and control, of perceived unk-
nowns in the environment. It is entirely possible for uncertainty and
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informal judgment to expand along with formalization, as the required area
of "control" expands.
10.3.2 .. Problems of using these models
Tier tests are framed as numerical scoring systems using risk assessment
models. These systems fit bureaucratic needs by assimilating results of
different test batteries into single, weighted aggregate scales, which are
automatically calculated. One such model [18], attempting to distinguish
degrees of hazard for wastes, has
... a single value represent all types of effects from different types of
cancers to different kinds of graded responses such as liver damage.
The conceptual link ... is the probability of an incident per unit dose.
A score of "2" on our scale, for example, is intended to represent
roughly a 1% risk of either contracting cancer or having an adverse
effect from consuming 1 mg of pollutant per 1 kg of body weight per
day ... The model assumes ... that most reported MEDs, or minimum
effective doses, correspond to a risk of about 10%.
In the model one finds that the "roughly" 1% risk referred to is actually an
order of magnitude estimate. This is only one link in chains of such multi-
plying uncertainties.
One can understand the reasons for attempting to develop such for-
mal models, but their use is not without cost. The model synthesizes not
only qualitatively different effects and processes, but also multiplies qualita-
tively different uncertainties into single dimensions. Acknowledging some
of the uncertainties, the modelers then proceed to frame them:
There are two general problems in scoring risks to health posed by
hazardous wastes. First, most waste streams are complex mixtures,
and many are poorly characterized. Second, even if adequate informa-
tion were available on the composition of the wastes, for most chemi-
cals, there is insufficient information on inherent hazard and environ-
mental behavior to permit precise estimates of risks. For these rea-
sons, scoring for risks to health is subject to large uncertainties and in
many cases depends on scientific judgment. The scoring scheme we
developed does, however, base application of scientific judgment on a
formal scientific underpinning. By providing rigorous definitions of
the factors to be scored and by specifying numerical equivalents for
the scoring categories, it is possible to assign fairly precise scores to a
number of well-studied chemicals. These scores can then guide the
assignment of scores to less well-studied chemicals and to mixtures ...
[19].
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This confidence in the controlling effects of the method of formalizing
the scores, for 140 different chemicals in diverse wastes, could only be
justified if the "relatively well-studied" chemicals did not suffer significant
extra uncertainties by dint of being wastes (as the authors themselves ac-
knowledge they do) and if the waste and environmental processes for all the
chemicals were the same, so that they could be assumed constant on a rela-
tive risk basis. These are unrealistic assumptions, yet the model simply
combines all the uncertainties as if qualitatively the same into a log-normal
probability distribution. The "guidance" provided by existing scores might
give a false sense of solidity, especially in "analogous" case analysis.
The four major sources of uncertainty identified are:
(1) Lack of information (e.g., of inherent hazard).
(2) Site to site variability (e.g., quantity of materials released).
(3) Environment variability (e.g., population susceptibility).
(4) Chance events (e.g., leakage).
They indicate nothing of the real life-cycle system transformations and
indeterminacies due to organizational-behavioral factors, and account only
(and incompletely) for physical, natural system uncertainties. In addition,
the kind of assumptions made about environmental movements in the
model involves "simple dispersion relations and some subjective judgments
based on common sense to arrive at a scoring system for exposure" [201.
Despite these very crude means of encoding processes that are riddled
with uncertainties and ignorance into an elaborate computer model, a
reviewer was very frank about its ultimate role. In addition to providing
guidance about priorities for more rigorous regulation (note the inadvertent
switch from tier testing to direct hazard ranking), its main property is its
manipulability, and its main role in life is persuasion:
Certainly the Model can be manipulated to reach almost any desired
outcome provided all of its ramifications are clearly understood and
can be put in perspective. The key will be to utilize this knowledge for
appropriate policy and economic purposes. Since the framework will
accommodate most outcomes, manipulation of the Model will allow for
flexible control of hazardous waste issues without requiring major pol-
icy departures ...
The key issue will be to convince the public that the Model
represents reality with respect to the perceived risks [21].
What hardly needs to be pointed out is the glaring contradiction
between the rather dubious basis for credibility of regulatory policies pro-
vided by the model and the central public persuasion role envisaged for it.
Even where the predominance of informal judgments throughout the formal
modeling is admitted, as it is here, the implications of this pervasive
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subjectivity are disregarded. Indeed, it seems that it is the need for public
persuasion using "science" that drives this production of formal caricatures
of knowledge.
It is important to emphasize that the point of this account of a formal
risk model is not to deny the worth of trying to structure relative risks and
options; it is to emphasize the inevitable dilemma that accompanies such
attempts. This dilemma is that the synthetic processes of modeling such
extreme levels of aggregation of phenomena using extremely artificial
parameters and indices does not clarify research questions and issues for
further resolution; it conceals them in the combined processes of aggrega-
tion and negotiation for social credibility in which the "knowledge" is
utterly entangled.
The bureaucratization of diverse basic processes, values, and interact-
ing uncertainties into one simple numerical dimension is encouraged by the
felt need for the "objective" authority that is supposed to emanate from
formal models [22]. Powerful forces press for their development and use,
and they may even serve as·a rit"ual framework in which opposing parties
share in negotiating policy consensus. However, a more realistic possibility
is that the gaps and inconsistencies, apparent behind the pretensions, will
fuel, not dampen, continuing dispute and lack of credibility. On one item
alone, for example, expert estimates of chemical toxicities vary by over two
orders of magnitude, while the aggregate uncertainty allowed in the model
indices of hazard is one. Under these circumstances risk analysis may actu-
ally obstruct rather than encourage the development of credibility (not to
mention more mature and discriminating science) in regulation. In
environmental-chemical risk analysis it is typical to find that many of the
supposedly precise, experimental tests, let alone interpretations of results,
have to be "done in the hands of a master" to mean anything at all [23].
Another widely acknowledged expert, McKay, has criticized the whole
framework of stepwise testing and ranking in chemical risk analysis as a
misbegotten attempt to substitute for experience and judgment:
Undoubtedly, "scoring," or "rating," or "prioritizing" numerical
schemes will be developed, allegedly to assist in identifying the most
hazardous substances. It is the author's opinion that such schemes are
usually misleading and are often pursued only because of intellectual
laziness. There is no substitute for the careful gathering and assimila-
tion of reliable, physical-chemical, biological, and industrial data by a
broadly experienced group of well-informed and well-intentioned indi-
viduals who can then make a balanced judgment in which all the
issues have been weighed subjectively [24].
This defense of science as a craft skill incorporating tacit experience,
intuitive judgment, and subtly negotiated intraexpert agreements is often
counterposed to formal models and methods. Yet craft skills may still be
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organized and rooted in useful practice. The main problem is that the kind
of science McKay is defending costs more, takes longer and makes explicit
the need for public trust in expert institutions. Regulation's use of formal
caricatures as if they were science falsely implies the existence of an ade-
quate knowledge for regulation, and attempts to side-step the issue of pub-
lic trust.
Stepwise ranking schemes for hazardous chemicals, including wastes,
extend in two directions from the kind of tier-testing scheme outlined
before.
First, even to pass the entry gate, selection has to be made. Only
about 6% of chemicals in the marketplace have been tested for animal car-
cinogenicity. Thus, for example, the Interagency Testing Committee (ITC)
for the US Toxic Substances Control Act was required in 1979 to provide a
scoring system to meet a six-month congressional deadline for the full
repertoire of 70000-100000 or so chemicals already in commercial circula-
tion. This was to determine which of these should enter into a more careful
scheme akin to that outlined before. The expert group that conducted the
scoring was itself forced to use a series of crude gates and selection princi-
ples established ad hoc [25]. The key one was simply to borrow lists from
existing regulations in the hope that these had more definitive origins - a
familiar resort. Furthermore, for all its heroic attempts to be definitive and
explicit, the group repeatedly had to bridge huge gaps of ignorance and
uncertainty with subjective judgments.
Second, the starting point for the ranking of hazardous chemical
goods is relatively well defined compared with that for hazardous wastes.
The quantitative ranking process for hazardous goods either takes the
approximately 500 new chemicals per year, cuts them down first to about
40, then down to the three to six per year that can actually be subjected to
full STAR (Scientific and Technological Assessment and Review) testing at
a cost of $500000; or, as in the exercise above, it selects 900 from the origi-
nal 70000 or more, and works these down in a similar way. Hazardous
chemical wastes, on the other hand, are much less well known because,
being socially defined as wastes, their chemical compositions and purity
have no positive economic value; therefore, they may also be mixed and
vary indiscriminately with unknown chemicals that result from uncon-
trolled interactions. As Finnecy has noted:
Firstly there are many thousands of possible constituents in a waste,
and waste is very rarely even an approximately pure substance.
Secondly waste is rarely ever completely analyzed by anyone. Rather,
analyses (or estimates of one sort or another) are made of a few
'significant' components while the rest of the waste is largely
unidentified in anything other than general terms [26].
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Even leaving aside for the moment this extra dimension of ignorance
of hazardous wastes, it is worth quoting at length the reflections of a scien-
tist involved in the ITC ranking exercise:
I would draw several conclusions from this exercise ... that the scheme
that was used incorporated a very significant degree of scientific judg-
ment at every step. At each screening step, the chemicals screened out
were examined manually by experts and the scoring involved at least
as much scientific judgment as the use of objective data ... that the
scoring system which considered 15 factors and had a range of 0 to 3
or 0 to 4, was at least as complicated for each of the factors as was
justified by the available data. It may in fact have been too compli-
cated. It may have tried to divide the chemicals more finely than our
knowledge would justify. Frankly I believe that any reasonable scor-
ing system can handle hundreds of chemicals with no finer subdivision
than 0 to 3, or zero, low, medium and high ... that the screening pro-
cess was limited primarily and very severely by lack of data on most
chemicals. In fact, I would say that, if for each of the 900 chemicals
we had placed information on the seven factors into separate boxes, at
least two thirds of the boxes would have remained empty. My conclu-
sion is that the scoring process was not limited by scoring methodol-
ogy or by any other screening methodology. It was limited by the lack
of data. I would therefore suggest that elaborate scoring systems are
not justified at the present state of our knowledge. Until we have such
more extensive data on most of the factors for which we have to
screen, there is no point in developing elaborate scoring systems
because they cannot be used [27].
This expert not only recognized that schemes and rankings apparently
controlled by formal criteria actually required more informal judgments,
rather than less, but also that risk-analytic ranking systems may conceal
ignorance. The kind of streamlined "scientific knowledge" that such
classifications require is easily confused with more fundamental scientific
knowledge, which embodies open gaps and conflicts, conditional limitations,
situational adjustments, and so on. Because it converts ignorance into
apparently manageable uncertainty, this regulatory science cannot easily
develop strategies to cope with surprise and irreducible conflict or
ignorance. Regulatory systems may have to act as il knowledge existed and
ignorance were strictly bounded. But the institutional processes involved
confuse this regulatory "as if' confidence and associated "knowledge" with
deeper scientific knowledge.
We have shown in Chapter 9 that a central dimension of expert infor-
mal judgment lies in framing a model of the risk-generating process for
analysis; but in this chapter we have shown already that this is not the only
source of informal judgments in risk analysis. We develop this point
further, but first we need to look at the regulatory contexts in which tacit
expert definitions of risk-generating processes meet other kinds of informal
judgment.
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10.4. Degrees of Hazard and Situational Risk
Optimization
Although risk analysis begins with the estimation of "intrinsic" hazards, of
engineering plant or chemicals or both, various situation-specific factors
enter into regulatory risk management. The basic aim is simply to refine
regulation to correspond with degrees of hazard in real cases, rather than
with blanket worst-case scenarios. This analytic refinement is also an
economic one; it parallels the regulatory attempt to use risk-benefit optimi-
zation [28] in that in trying to make regulation more "efficient", by tailor-
ing defined risks to varying specific situations, margins for control costs
(but also for allowable uncertainty and error and thus of safety) are also
naturally reduced. This, therefore, implies the need for a greater regula-
tory ability to define the specific controlling properties of such varying
situations. This assumption is highly problematic.
The "intrinsic" risks of a chemical plant might be defined as the pro-
babilities of given release rates of harmful agents. Situational factors -
such as environmental attenuations, siting (proximity of populations and
other sensitive entities, such as drinking water), typical particle size, chemi-
cal form, etc., of releases - affect estimates of the actual situational risks.
In the case of large-scale plants, such as liquid gas terminals, the releases
and environmental pathways to be considered as situational risk qualifiers
may be very few, usually to do with atmospheric dispersion characteristics
of vapor clouds (liquid gas plant) or particles (chemical and nuclear plant).
These are complex enough, but simple when compared with waste life-cycle
situations.
The definition of any specific risk situation is basically identical to the
problem discussed in Chapter 9, of defining the relevant structural charac-
teristics of a technological risk system. For hazardous wastes the risks of
understating uncertainties and variations are greater because of deeper
scientific ignorance and greater situational variation.
Various possible approaches exist to define situational risk qualifiers
and to organize these into regulatory degree-of-hazard schemes [29]. The
usual assumption is that the more situation-specific risk definition identifies
risk-reducing features, which therefore allows the severity of centralized
regulation to be relaxed to a minimal base line, supplementing it with the
risk-qualifying factors introduced by more autonomous, situation-specific
operator experience and good management practices. The former may be
"directly" regulated with specific rules, etc., while the latter may be only
indirectly regulated (e;g., by economic incentives), or merely assumed to
take place.
However, as the 2,4,5-T case illustrates, note that it is not necessarily
the case that situational realities reduce risks. Whether laboratory experi-
ments with individual pure components capture the "real, intrinsic"
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hazards of chemicals in environmental circulation is questionable and, as
mentioned earlier, the distinction between the "intrinsic" or "natural"
hazard of a substance and its situational hazard is not an objective distinc-
tion free from social determination and variability. Often, what is defined
by one party as an intrinsic hazard already contains unrecognized assump-
tions about standard situations and institutional factors, which appear as
natural to that party, but which others see as questionable or false.
10.4.1. Regulating degrees of hazard
Different regulatory systems construct different distributions of direct con-
straints and autonomous responsibility when balancing "universal" risk
characteristics and flexible situation-specific realities [30]. For example:
(1) Listing for universal control (e.g., registration) those hazardous
wastes with intrinsic hazardous characteristics; then taking account
of, say, volumes produced, physical form, typical concentrations of
hazardous constituents, professionalism of industrial management, sit-
ing, etc., only in separate local decisions (e.g., plant licensing) about
specific T &D practices.
(2) Exempting, even from primary listing, those wastes, even if intrinsi-
cally hazardous, that are not produced in large volumes or concentra-
tions, produced perhaps only by large technically well-endowed com-
panies, or arise in aqueous form if they are mainly an inhalation risk
[31], etc.
The regulatory arguments in favor of the latter approach are that it
optimizes more flexibly to variable situations, and that it slims down pri-
mary regulatory lists, thus allowing more attention to focus on the more
intense hazards [32]. Thus, situational optimization can coincide with risk
ranking. This also coincides with industrial interest in greater autonomy
from regulation. Thus, for example, Dow Chemicals' main criticism of the
EPA hazard listings was that they were based upon the estimated intrinsic
hazards of constituents only [33], effectively hypothesizing that waste would
be improperly managed. Dow proposed, instead, a stepwise degree-of-
hazard scheme, which placed estimated real exposures (including produc-
tion volumes) at the front end, thus reducing the apparent risks in an
"equivalent toxicity" measure. Likewise, the European Chemicals' Industry
Toxicological Research Institute (ECETOC) has advanced a three-tiered
degree-of-hazard approach, which combines intrinsic toxicity criteria with
"exposure conditions which correspond to those in man or where the
relevance of the exposure conditions can be deduced" [34]. Thus, again,
situation-specific, socially determined factors are tacitly incorporated into
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the same standard degree-of-hazard regulatory ranking scheme as if they
were natural, intrinsic factors.
This is generally typical of European institutional processes, which
compound "intrinsic" scientific factors with extrinsic factors via informal
procedural mechanisms and imprecise, flexible "technical" criteria [35].
These institutional mechanisms may involve joint advisory committees with
interest group representatives, not only scientists, who deliberate in private
and negotiate the particular weaving together of scientific and extrinsic
("intrinsic" and "situational") factors.
In the UK, situational risk-qualifying factors for a given waste have
been identified, such as [36]:
(1) Physical location.
(2) Quantity.
(3) Concentration of hazardous components.
(4) Physical form.
(5) Detailed environmental disposition (e.g., if a fine powder, is it open to
wind dispersion; is it adsorbed by clay surroundings).
(6) Sensitivity and number of targets exposed to it.
(7) "How damaging the hazardous effects are to the target," i.e., the
intrinsic hazards of the chemical constituents of the waste.
The apparently "intrinsic hazard" list for regulatory control in the
UK actually already incorporates informal judgments of several such situa-
tional factors; furthermore, the decision structure provides for automatic
delisting of specific wastes on this list unless they also meet the regulatory
criteria for toxicity, etc. [37]. The US system, on the other hand, specifies a
list of controlled wastes and adds, as a catch-all, several tests that all
unlisted wastes must also pass in order to be exempt from control [381.
Whereas the US system is designed to automatically include unlisted hazar-
dous wastes, the UK system is designed to automatically exclude listed
wastes that in their specific circumstances are not deemed hazardous. This
decision is an ad hoc local one. Each system has a combination of intrinsic
hazard definitions and methods of defining situational variants, but these
are very different in their institutional and technical roles, and in the
degree of standardization that they imply.
10.4.2. Situational variables - natural and social
In addition to the extra uncertainties and narrowed error margins of situa-
tional variation, a further complication with systems that attempt to incor-
porate situation-specific factors in more flexible actual hazard rankings is
that they risk confusing naturalistic risk factors with socially determined
ones. This point is crucial and deserves close examination.
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We are now familiar with the idea of the "life-cycle" of a hazardous
waste as it passes from generation, via various phases including transforma-
tion, to "final" disposal (see Chapter 3). In emphasizing the need to incor-
porate situational risk-qualifying factors, for example, it is observed that:
... hazardous waste may be hazardous in only one phase of its life
cycle. Acid waste for example, may be hazardous only up to the point
where it is neutralized before final disposal. Organic solvent waste
may pose a hazard only until it is burnt in an incinerator [39].
Notice, however, that these are examples of "life-cycle changes";
situational risk reductions are not natural transformations, such as biode-
gradation with time into harmless products (some natural transformations
increase risks). They are the results of deliberate human interventions. It
is precisely these for which regulatory controls are required, first, to define
as necessary and, second, to enforce. We cannot assume that benign
behavioral interventions will always occur naturally; otherwise regulation
would be unnecessary. Systems vary in their dominating value judgments
as to how far the net of trust in the behavior of actors in the system should
(or, perhaps inevitably, has to) stretch. This affects how much precision
and standardization is built into regulatory test rules and definitions, and
how tight they are. There is, as shown above, a tendency to confuse these
behavioral dimensions with genuinely natural factors, which may in some
situations reduce exposures and risks from intrinsic "worst-case" levels by
attenuation or benign transformations. Even many of these "natural"
processes, however, must also be activated by deliberate human action
(e.g., to site a landfill on thick clay and to allow only certain compounds to
be filled; or to maintain pumps properly), and are thus not natural in the
sense that they cannot be assumed to take place automatically without
regulatory control to ensure good management.
Risk modeling often conceals these behavioral assumptions in "techni-
cal" parameters or coefficients, making the results - and ensuing regulation
- brittle to ignorance of the variabilities in the concealed behavioral factors.
The discussion in Chapter 7 of UK dependence on landfill codisposal regu-
lated by site selection, licensing, and inspection, is a good example. There,
the technical policy depends on behavioral assumptions about decentralized
situation control, which may not be realistic.
As the accumulating empirical research on actual environmental regu-
latory implementation is showing, such proper management is not even
ensured when direct regulatory statutes and bodies exist to "enforce" it
[40]. Yet degree-of-hazard schemes incorporating situational factors often
mix questionable assumptions about the ideal behavior of the complex sets
of actors involved in hazardous waste, together with genuine physical
environmental factors that may reduce real exposures (and thus damage) to
below theoretical worst-case possibilities.
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Much hazardous waste policy analysis argues that environmental
situational factors, which (it is assumed) reduce exposures from "worst-
case" possibilities, should be given more prominence in risk assessments for
regulation [41]. Underlying this argument is a feeling that widespread pub-
lication of disquieting laboratory evidence of toxic damage from a whole
host of chemicals in the last decade or so has encouraged exaggeration of
the real risks and a consequent overregulation based upon "worst-case"
assumptions that neglect exposure-reducing realities. The following argu-
ments are typical:
Perhaps the most direct approach [is] to assemble a list of toxic
effects, along with a list of tests that establish the presence or absence
of those effects ... Such an exhaustive approach has been commonly
required for food additives, pesticides, new human drugs and animal
drugs ... While such an approach may define the biological effects due
to a substance, it is necessarily incomplete, since such information is
only a part of what we need to know to define the actual hazard to
health or the environment
. .. it is generally less expensive, more technically appropriate,
and equally protective to evaluate the potential environmental impact
to the degree necessary to make decisions on the degree of contain-
ment control based upon actual expected impact, rather than treat
routinely for worst case conditions in which it is assumed that the tox-
icity associated with a particular source extends for considerable time
and distance [42].
Reflecting this concern to modify an intrinsic risk approach with
environmental risk factors that attenuate and/or dilute, data frameworks
stress criteria such as:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
Production volumes, places, and durations.
Modes of dispersion.
Physical form and containment.
Environmental transformation, absorption, partitioning, etc.
Proximity of populations (including eating and habits of environmen-
tal usage).
Food chains and other possible exposure routes and limiting factors.
Likely exposure levels and durations.
Again, however, we can see that many of these criteria beg the ques-
tion of controlling the behavior of multiple, unidentified actors in waste
life-cycles, because many of the apparently physical parameters are affected
by such behavioral processes. Corresponding risk analysis models and data
frameworks combine exposure-related hypotheses and calculations with
estimates of intrinsic effects. At the same time, strong arguments are made
to incorporate such "situational" dimensions in formal regulation. These
are supported by optimistic claims that:
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. " there is emerging a capacity to predict the environmental fate of
newly introduced chemicals by means of techniques such as ... evalua-
tive models. Such techniques predict the likely compartments of the
environment into which the contaminants will flow and accumulate,
thus exposing biota and humans to toxic effects [43].
However, the insecure foundations of such claims were outlined
before. They are also exposed by the same author's admission that this
same area "contains a vast number of species with varying and poorly
understood interdependencies" in which, yet again, "scientific knowledge
severely lags behind regulatory needs" [44].
Even considering the physical-chemical and biological unknowns in
the domain of environmental movements and exposures, therefore, there
are severe difficulties and risks involved in trying to optimize risk analysis
and regulation to varying situations, without destroying or overstepping
safety margins. We have seen that scientific analysts confuse natural and
behavioral factors that affect risks, and do not appreciate the behavioral or
social assumptions on which their proposed technical refinements of risk
management are based.. This is true even for relatively pure, well analyzed
chemicals. For hazardous waste one must add the extra complications of
badly known and more variable waste compositions, and semi-autonomous,
ill defined behavioral factors that sharply affect their physical dispositions,
releases, and thus environmental conditions. The risks are especially sensi-
tive to some of these behavioral factors. The intellectual difficulties of dis-
tributing the constraints properly between intrinsic, standardized risk
situations and varying situational ones is paralleled by the institutional
question of how to distribute discretion in defining such situations and thus
controlling actual regulation at the sharp end of implementation.
In the next section we illustrate that, even in the highly controlled
and artificially simplified context of scientific testing, ignorance and
indeterminacy of situational variations are too great to allow credible stan-
dardization.
10.5. Standard Tests and Situational Risk Assessments
10.5.1. Case study of the US elutriate procedure (EP) test
Conventional science routinely has to reconcile the variability of specific
cases with the search for underlying universals. Regulation must manage a
similar reconciliation, but the principles and purposes are different.
Conflicting pressures and contradictory strategic aims are exposed at the
heart of regulatory science.
If regulations embody key definitions of materials for control, such as
"hazardous", "special", or "controlled", these are defined either by lists or
properties or both. We can call these definitions decision rules as to
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whether a waste must be included in a further set of behavioral rules (regu-
lations). In order to define whether a given waste has a given property,
clear criteria must also be defined for each property, and standard, reliably
reproducible tests established. We can cal1 these observation rules that
support the decision rules. For properties such as flammability, corrosivity,
etc., relatively simple indicators can be defined, e.g., flash point or pH
(though even these are not without ambiguity), but it is for characteristics
such as toxicity or carcinogenicity that the major difficulties arise.
The first area of difficulty is identical to that discussed above for al1
chemicals, even those with well defined compositions. This is that any
standardized hazard criterion:
... is not technically valid for assessing the environmental hazard asso-
ciated with solid wastes primarily because the transport and transfor-
mation (environmental chemistry) of the solids-associated contam-
inants can be markedly different for each specific environment, and
usually play a dominant role in determining the hazard associated
with the introduction of solid into the environment. The environmen-
tal chemistry of contaminants is influenced by many factors ... and
must therefore be evaluated on a site-specific and solid waste-specific
basis [45].
It is important to note that these situation-specific arguments apply
not only to the particular environmental conditions that surround a waste
in any given site, but also to the variable condition of wastes themselves.
Wastes given the same name in a hazard classification or list, and which
are thus identical in regulatory terms, usually vary in composition and phy-
sical form between plants performing the same process and even from the
same plant over time (and over their subsequent life-cycle, as already dis-
cussed). These variations may cause significant changes in risk characteris-
tics, e.g., leaching properties for hazardous constituents. Even if the chemi-
cal composition of different wastes is identical, changes in the physical
form, such as particle size distribution, degree of aeration, etc., may radi-
cally affect the release of hazardous constituents (and thus risks) in the
same environmental site.
Despite the force of these arguments, regulatory bodies have under-
standably been tempted by the opposite appeal of a single universal cri-
terion and a corresponding standard test, at least for the initial characteri-
zation of wastes as hazardous before going on to consider situation-specific
variations. An apparently simple example of such standard criteria are
concentration thresholds for listed constituents of wastes, with "standard"
analytical methods for tests. A regulatory test for toxicity in the USA is
the elutriate procedure, or EP test, which is formally designated as a stan-
dard, statutory test to bring wastes that fail it under regulatory control
[46].
Risk Assessment and Regulation for Hazardous Wastes 333
The EP test is designed to test the leaching rates of potentially
hazardous waste constituents into water, so as to simulate releases from
landfill sites. A "representative sample" of a waste is mixed with a solution
(pH 5 acetic acid) that is supposed to represent typical landfill conditions,
and the leachate separated from this mixing is then analyzed for certain
listed constituents. If these are present above a specified concentration, the
waste is legally hazardous. So far the listed constituents are 14 chemicals
or elements taken from water quality regulations under the Clean Water
Act. The concentration thresholds in the leachate are set at the standards
for acceptable drinking water quality, multiplied by an arbitrary factor of
100. This large "situational" factor is to allow for assumed further attenua-
tion or dilution between leaching and escape from a waste site, and possible
eventual contamination of drinking water.
As one expert has remarked:
The primary requirement of a method to be used in making such an
inherently expensive decision as whether or not the leaching from a
waste is hazardous or whether a disposal method is safe, is repeatabil-
ity. Not just that one technician in one laboratory can run three repli-
cates, and get the same answer. Ten technicians in ten laboratories
must be able to [47].
Interlaboratory precision and repeatability is absolutely vital to regu-
latory use of such standardized hazard classification tests, especially since
very strong economic and political interests are at stake in the results. The
regulations therefore stipulate detailed methods, which are obligatory for
conducting such tests. Even so, the possibilities for methodological varia-
tions and disparate measurements, even on the same laboratory sample
taken from a waste, are very large and still undefined.
Even with the standardized method, an interlaboratory evaluation
program in 1979 found poor reproducibility from standard laboratory sam-
ples. (In other words, all the severe variations in sampling a real waste
have been excluded.) Thus, for example, the EP test on a sample of fly ash
from the coal-burn waste in arsenic leaching found a mean concentration of
0.227 ppm, but with a standard deviation in the results of ± 0.226, i.e., ±
100% uncertainty [48]1 Chromium fared somewhat better at ± 50%. Other
standard tests, all involving apparently precisely controlled statements of
method, also showed such poor reproducibility that even for the same
laboratory sample, it has been concluded that the EP test is highly unreli-
able as a regulatory instrument. Sampling variations introduce an even
further dimension of variability and uncertainty into the attempt to define
the "intrinsic" hazard of a waste. These are uncertainties quite extra to
the question of whether the standardized test criteria (i.e., definition of the
notional risk situation for wastes) reflect real risk situations.
The experimental method for the EP test is thought to be well-defined
and controlled. Yet some of the factors that produce variable results are
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very subtle, and may not even be consciously recognized as elements of
method by the practitioners themselves. These factors include [49]:
(1) Leachate:
(a) Precise purity and composition.
(b) Redox conditions (e.g., dissolved oxygen).
(c) Temperature.
(d) pH, including buffering.
(e) Method of preparation and storage.
(2) Batch or column (continuous) test.
(3) Volume of sample.
(4) Leachate-solid waste ratio.
(5) Method, vigor, and duration of agitation.
(6) Method of addition of solution to solid waste sample.
(7) Material, design, and even exact position of mixing vessel.
(8) Contact-agitation time.
(9) Sample preparation, e.g., grinding, homogenization.
(10) Organic contents of waste sample.
(11) Particle-size distribution, porosity, etc.
(12) Number of elutions performed per waste sample.
(13) Leachate-solid separation method - centrifuge, settling, filtering -
and time.
(14) Preservation of samples before leaching.
(15) Preservation of leachates after mixing and before analysis - freezing,
drying, light exposure, time, etc.
This is not an exhaustive list, but it already presents formidable difficulties
for precise repeatability. Some of these experimental factors have been
specified in the standard test protocol, others have not. It is therefore
important to understand the several levels of variability that accumulate:
(1) (a) Is the "standard laboratory sample" a representative sample of a
real waste in a real situation?
(b) Is the "standard sample" taken from a waste by any given
laboratory the same as the "standard sample" taken by another
laboratory?
(c) Is the "standard sample" taken by a given laboratory the same
as that taken at another time by the same laboratory?
(2) Laboratory methods and detailed practices that affect leaching - the
same three questions apply as in (1).
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(3) Chemical analyses of a standard leachate from the experimental leach
test are also highly variable, especially for the low levels of concentra-
tion that are relevant. The same interlaboratory program mentioned
above [50] found that, with the same leachate sample and the same
analytical technique, analytical results could vary by ±100% in this
concentration range.
These kinds of recalcitrant analytical variation are not unusual in
standardization programs. As Collins and others have documented, experi-
mental reproducibility in science, even for "simple" experiments, involves
many tacit, craft aspects of detailed laboratory practice, which are barely
specifiable, if at all [51]. Some practical procedures correspond with
theoretical commitments and problem definitions, so that variations of
practice cannot easily be ironed out even if they can all be identified. Thus,
reliable standardization for consistent and secure regulation is far more
difficult than is usually recognized, and would anyway in practice be prohi-
bitively expensive, even if it were achievable in principle.
The potential variations outlined above incorporate two separate
kinds of uncertainty. First, there is that resulting from variation in
detailed laboratory practices, including sampling and analysis. Second,
there is the uncertainty as to whether the standard laboratory test condi-
tions laid down in the attempt to gain clarity and reproducibility bear any
resemblance to the real conditions of a waste. This is not only a question of
representative sampling, but also of whether, e.g., a specific agitation
method and duration mandated for the test is a realistic simulation of
solid~liquidmixing and leaching in a real landfill, or whether pH 5 leachate
is always realistic, etc., etc.
Clearly, for a laboratory test protocol to be practical, it must simplify
conditions from its real-world counterpart; and to be valid it must identify
the factors and detailed experimental conditions that match the key actual
factors that affect leaching of hazardous constituents from a landfill. Yet
these are poorly understood even in general, let alone in the fantastic
variety of specific sites, their particular properties (which vary within one
landfill and over time), waste inventories, and management practices. Nor
do the possible differences between laboratory tests and real conditions
always produce overconservative regulatory results. The leachate pH
specified in the EP test, for example, is 5, to represent what is thought to
be a worst-case scenario of disposal of an industrial waste with municipal
waste. Yet compounds of some toxic metals (such as arsenic, selenium, and
chromium) are more soluble and therefore subject to greater leaching in the
alkaline conditions of some landfills. Other landfills are much more acid
than pH 5. The range of pH found in a study of US landfills was 1.5-9.5
[52]. A variety of other uncontrolled and poorly understood factors in
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different waste site conditions could similarly lead to under-estimations of
real risks by the standard testing protocol.
To summarize, attempts to standardize central regulatory observation
rules fail because of situational variations, even in the highly controlled
process of laboratory scientific testing. Yet this is already an artificially
simplified sample, and science is supposed to be definitive and controlled by
clear and precise rules. If situational variation is a problem even here, we
must multiply the problems manifold for the real world of wastes and
situations.
10.5.2. Formal science, informal science, and the allocation of
authority
This brief review of the EP test illustrates a fundamental dilemma in the
use of science for this kind of regulatory instrument. Efficient, optimal, and
defensible risk assessment requires that methods for measuring risks match
real risk situations. The wide variability of such situations, even for the
major single treatment and disposal method - controlled landfill - would
thus require the local modification of test methods and experimental
parameters to match particular cases. This has been widely and vigorously
advocated by industry and other bodies, but such diverse, ad hoc
modifications destroy the basis of uniform and accountable regulatory
management. Furthermore, it· is inherently impossible to distinguish
between legitimate situation-specific test adjustments and those adjust-
ments that affect the consistency and reproducibility and, thus, the exter-
nal credibility of the tests.
It has been estimated that developing just one of the several candi-
date extraction tests from which the EP test was chosen cost one central
research body $1.5 million [53]. The EP test is an example of a formalistic
caricature of science. Its regulatory establishment changed the orientation
of research away from developing an adequate predictive understanding of
leaching mechanisms under different conditions, toward the more mechani-
cal and relatively superficial problems of experimental reproducibility and
classification under artificially defined standard laboratory conditions. The
origins of this inflexibility lie in an extreme institutional need to regulate,
using science of a particularly formal, transparent, and uniform kind [541.
The test represents an expensive attempt to use science to reconcile a
deeper institutional conflict. The technical conflict between a fictional
standard situation and widely variable real situations embodies an institu-
tional conflict between central, standardized control, and industrial (or
local regulator) autonomy. Using standard, precise test protocols, like
using laboratory science to define real-life pesticides risks, effectively
requires that the world be reorganized wholly in the image of those
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laboratory tests. They are a code for implicitly required behavioral stan-
dardization. Luckily, this is utterly unrealistic [55]. Central standardiza-
tion implies that regulators do not trust industries to devise and do their
own tests and allow for local factors in a responsible way. Perhaps a more
accurate way of putting this is that regulators are forced by their own
social relationships to show themselves (to courts, Congress, environmen-
talists, and other industries) to be regulating everyone with total equality
(even if this does not lead to equal effects). Apparently, no intermediate
position is conceivable in which guidelines are centrally issued, and uncon-
trolled industrial autonomy in their use is restrained by more substantial
local regulatory institutions. These could have a better chance of under-
standing local realities, but still retain and actively interpret the overall
central regulatory philosophy, goals, and guidelines. The level of uncer-
tainty and error in the EP test, and the extent of its shortfall with respect
to reality, is a function not of the inadequacies of scientists, but of the
resolving power and social standardization expected of such a test. If it is
so brittle and unreal, more robust criteria and tests could retreat from the
attempted scientific precision and place the burden presently overloading
the scientific domain upon more distributed institutional processes. But
this in itself would require adequate resources at that level, a central trust
in state or other local authorities, and a political culture that generally
allows such devolution in issues like this. Analysis of the technical prob-
lems, therefore, reveals questions about the institutional structure of regu-
lation and, ultimately, about political cultures.
For comparison it is instructive to recall the equivalent "test" for tox-
icity used in the UK to define specially controlled wastes. As described in
Chapter 5, the test is "simply" that if any 5 cm3 sample of a waste would
cause acute toxicity ("death or serious tissue damage") if ingested by a 20
kg child, it is to be designated special waste [56]. Although the weak techn-
ical basis and ambiguity of this test has been criticized, and it has been
described as offering a potential field day for lawyers [57], its institutional
role and surroundings in the UK system render it relatively uncomplicated
to administer. (Whether it has the desired effect is a different matter.)
Responsibility for case-by-case interpretation in practical regulation is allo-
cated to the discretionary wisdom of those with statutory responsibility for
control, namely local authorities, with occasional advice from government
experts and even the waste producer. Although explanatory guidelines are
also offered for advice, these are still rich in the need and opportunity for
situation-specific judgment, which in principle allows more flexible tailoring
of regulatory classifications to real-world variations.
In lacking universal, clear decision rules, as we saw in Chapter 7, the
UK approach thereby offers less opportunity for third-party access, review,
and accountability, but it is impressively strong on institutional confidence
and required collaboration, and correspondingly economical in its demands
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on formal public science. Informal expertise buttressed by institutional
arrangements and broad rituals, which stress this elitist "craft" image of
scientific expertise in the UK, replace the elaborate public use of formal
precision and "public" science in the USA. When appeals to formal science
for authority begin to escalate beyond a certain ill-defined but strongly
influential (and rather low) threshold, these are superseded by normative
appeals to accept institutional authority (e.g., "Competent industries and
local authorities acting in good faith should reach a socially negotiated con-
sensus which weighs technical judgment with economic and other factors.
Third parties should accept such consensus as legitimate"). It is when
these fail that major rituals (such as public or parliamentary select commit-
tee inquiries) to reemphasize such norms are performed [58].
10.6. Institutions, Formal Decision Rules, and Informal
Judgment
In Chapter 9 we made the "important claim that scientific framing processes
shape the content of analysis by a complex involvement of social assump-
tions, value judgments, technical judgments with value implications, and
technical judgments with no clear value implications. These framing com-
mitments go on during the detailed development of analysis as well as prior
to it. Many informal judgments buttress formal methods, definitions, and
reasoning. We argued that this is true even for well defined technological
risk analysis, and this led to a novel perspective on uncertainty, expert
disagreement, and credibility in policy.
Earlier in this chapter we indicated that risk analysis of toxic chemi-
cals - especially aggregated risk-ranking and environmental modeling - was
being overstretched into formal frameworks. These embody extremely
crude subjective judgments, but have an envisaged central role in policy
persuasion and conflict management that plays down this informal side.
Yet, because of the strong role of subjective factors in the models, the deci-
sion rules are eventually exposed as being too manipulable to be credible.
This is all part of a general process that we called the bureaucratization of
uncertainty. By the same token, specification of the EP test observation
rules appeared to be too inflexible, yet its production of results still too un-
certain, to be credible in broad-based regulatory use. We pointed out that
the bureaucratization of uncertainty is driven by a felt need for formal,
aggregated, and standardized systems of regulatory knowledge, as part of
public legitimation.
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A further aspect of the growing specification of precise observation rules
like the EP test as part of regulatory decision rules is the reshaping and
control of science that it embodies. Research is increasingly constrained by
standardized and carefully specified rules that reflect narrow external objec-
tives. This is evident in the toxic chemicals field especially, as illustrated
by the international propagation of toxicity testing codes and the external
control of scientific inferences when these have policy consequences but no
clear scientific warrant for anyone of the options. We now examine both
of these areas so as to develop our perspective on uncertainty and institu-
tional responses to it. This will prepare for the wider discussion of issues of
public credibility given in Chapter 11.
The proposals of the European Chemicals Industry Ecology and Toxi-
cology Centre (ECETOC) on Codes of Good Laboratory Practice [59] were
a direct result of the legislation of such testing codes by the US FDA, fol-
lowing the episodes described in Section 10.2. The ECETOC proposals
were careful to try to defend scope for expert craft judgment, but even they
listed nearly 100 separate rules that a laboratory performing such toxicity
tests would have to follow. These ranged from agreed definitions, through
organizational requirements, such as how to replace a Study Director, to
planning, operating, and reporting procedures. To illustrate, the standard
operating procedures to be specified in a test protocol are given below:
SUB-PART E: TESTING FACILITY OPERATION
E.!. STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES
A testing facility shall have written and approved standard operating
procedures that are adequate to ensure the quality and integrity of the
data generated in the course of the study. Deviation from these stan-
dard operating procedures shall be authorized by a competent person
as designated by management, and documented as raw data in the
study.
Each separate laboratory area shall have immediately available
standard operating procedures relevant to the activities being per-
formed there. Published text-books and articles, manuals and direc-
tions may be used as supplements to these standard operating
procedures.
A historical file of standard operating procedures and revisions
thereof, including the dates of such changes, shall be maintained as in
sub-part J .3.
Standard operating procedures, where applicable, shall describe
but not be limited to the following:
a) Test, control and reference substances (henceforth called sub-
stances)
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c)
d)
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i) Receipt, identification, characterization, handling, formu-
lation and storage of substances.
ii) Testing the homogeneity and stability of substances, and
concentration of substances in mixtures with carriers.
iii) Administration of substances.
Test system
i) Room preparation and external conditions for the test sys-
tem as appropriate.
ii) Procedures for receipt, transfer, proper placement, charac-
terization, identification and care of the test system.
iii) Test system observations and examinations.
iv) Laboratory tests and analyses.
v) Handling of individuals within the test system found mori-
bund or dead during the study, where applicable.
vi) Termination of an experimental study and/or necropsy of
the test system.
vii) Collection, identification and handling of specimens.
viii) Histopathology.
Equipment
i) Use of equipment.
ii) Maintenance, cleaning, calibration and/or standardization.
Documentation, evaluation and reporting
i) Data collection, handling, storage and retrieval.
ii) Preparation of reports.
Handling of test system animals required a whole separate section of
rules and principles. Note, too, that these are principles to be applied in
specifying test protocols. Any actual test protocol would be more detailed
still.
The purposes of this detailed managerial control of scientific research
are to exclude discretion and even minor variations, to "mechanize"
research into programmable observation and decision rules. The laboratory
test codes, or observation rules, apply to the generation of data. The infer-
ence rules being increasingly dug out, specified, and controlled (as shown
below) apply to the interpretation of data into regulations. Both aspects
combine to produce a comprehensive network of growing rigidification of
the risk analysis. The problem is that the necessary purpose of reducing
incompetent or otherwise dubious analysis, and even merely variable com-
petent analysis, conflicts with the need to allow discretion to define test
parameters so as to match diverse real conditions of exposure.
By so standardizing specified risk situations into those embodied in
more and more elaborate, rigid, and precise test protocols, this approach
actually draws risk analysis away from an appreciation of the network and
situational variants that affect the real creation and delivery of risks. It
therefore becomes inflexible to diverse situational factors, less real from the
experience of people actually in the system, and it thus lays itself open to
irrelevance and lack of credibility. Ironically, the standardization born of
Risk Assessment and Regulation for Hazardous Wastes 341
concern to establish credibility of regulations in the hazardous waste area
becomes too rigid to retain credibility.
10.6.2. Interpretation rules
Given that so much regulatory dependence is now placed upon toxicological
risk analysis, there is pressure to clarify the "internal" decision rules of the
science so as to render the consequent regulatory decisions transparent and
open to detailed review. The US White House Office of Science and Tech-
nology Policy proposed in 1980 that the observed infusion of scientific risk
analysis by policy values could be overcome by a "return" to strict separa-
tion of facts and values. A more sophisticated approach was developed by
the US National Research Council, Committee on Risk Assessment in the
Federal Government [60]. This study proposed a distinction between
scientific risk assessment, risk assessment policy, and risk management.
Risk management would consider the conventional economic, social, and
other factors extrinsic to science, which are weighed in decisions upon
"acceptable" risk standards. Scientific risk assessment means the conven-
tional fields of science unsullied by policy considerations.
The interesting dimension is the middle one - risk assessment policy.
Here questions of a scientific nature are nevertheless strictly unanswerable
by science, either because of uncertainty due to gaps in science, or to
inherently trans-scientific properties of the issue. Anyone of several
scientific inference bridges or decision rules could be legitimately used to
reach across the gaps and allow the construction of policy-relevant scientific
knowledge - each might be consistent with, but not determined by, existing
scientific knowledge. Yet each may have its own policy implications, so
that the choice of a "scientific" decision rule is inevitably partly a policy
matter. A good example is the choice of an extrapolation rule for low-dose
toxicity or carcinogenicity effects in humans, when what empirical data
there are rest upon high doses, in animals. Choice of a linear, quadratic,
linear-quadratic, or threshold low-dose-effect relationship is more or less
equally legitimate according to available high-dose data, but the choice
often dramatically affects the estimated effects, e.g., excess cancers, depend-
ing upon the constants employed. Whittemore gives an example of three
equally credible alternative models of dose-response curve for nasal tumors
in rats exposed to the defumigant, ethylene dibromide, showing that the
choice of model changes the estimated tumor rate at low doses by over two
orders of magnitude [61]. In other cases the change can be as high as six
orders of magnitude. It therefore seems to be necessary for policy to make
an inference bridge, but which scientific inference rule to choose as a "risk
assessment policy" is legitimately a matter of po/icy choice.
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Leaving aside more recognizable value inputs, such as discounting
future risks, various ways in which values more subtly infuse the factual
analysis in toxicological risk assessment have now been recognized. Fami-
liar examples, in addition to the high-low dose-response function question,
are:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
How should the relative significance of apparently divergent results in
different species, different organs, different genders, etc., be weighed?
Should body weight, surface area, or metabolic system correction fac-
tors be used to extrapolate from animal data to human estimates?
What are the effects of different means of administering doses, and
different dose rates?
Should "benign" tumors be counted (and how can they be dis-
tinguished from malignant ones)?
How can the balance be weighed between statistical probability of
false positive results, on the one hand, and weakening statistical
power to detect true carcinogens, on the other, by the choice of sta-
tistical confidence limits?
How can this balance be weighed when separate studies give opposite
results at the same confidence limit?
Should maximum-likelihood effect functions or upper confidence limits
be used?
These inference choices are usually visible and clear in their effects upon
the policy conclusion. However, they are continuous with a further range
of finer and deeper inference options within scientific knowledge. An
important general category of these concerns the range of validity of
observed data and relationships. Some of the above are in this class; for
example, whether an observed tissue or organ sensitivity to some chemical
is species-specific; or whether a given dose administration method produces
artificially high results because of some idiosyncratic factor, or is of wider
validity.
10.6.3. Inference rules and plural scientific cultures
It is important to realize that many of these scientific commitments are
made without any choice or realization that an inference option exists.
They are part of the given scientific specialty's culture. For example, some
data in carcinogenicity or toxicity testing are generated from experiments
on species chosen for their known, exceptionally high yield of tumors,
because their purpose was the examination of the mechanisms of tumor
development. This "special case" knowledge may be lost in the reporting of
bare data on excess tumors for a given dose, and the risk data unwittingly
used as a basis for wider extrapolation. In other cases, structure-activity
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relationships of a new chemical with a known one may suggest certain
potential toxic effects in the new chemical, even though the experimental
evidence is ambiguous. What kind of structural parallels are regarded as
significant or insignificant, and how much weight to give such relationships
compared with experimental data, may well affect risk estimates substan-
tially, but these commitments may be already established in the "natural"
state of accepted knowledge and practices of a given scientific specialty.
The question of how much weight to place on animal studies com-
pared with human data (which are usually more sparse, less controlled, but
more direct) is also a case in point. Epidemiology as a specialty naturally
gives more weight to human data, and its intellectual diet is precisely in
making the fine distinctions and judgments necessary to evaluate badly
structured human data. Conversely, animal pathologists condense all of
those uncertainties into one aggregate uncertainty surrounding "uncon-
trolled" human data and epidemiology generally; their discipline thrives on
the uncertainties that surround distinctions between forms and sites of
damage in animal experiments, etc. Their natural values are to place
credence, suitably refined and discriminating as befits their own special
expertise, in animal studies.
Even the dose-response function question provides an example of this
same cultural divergence within science. Before the influence of epidemiol-
ogy and genetic-damage theories of carcinogenesis, pathologists (who relied
upon tissue- and cell-damage techniques to examine damage processes) and
pharmacologists (who observed physiological effects) both saw dose-effect
thresholds through these well established methods of observation. These
were the natural frameworks when these disciplines turned toward new
problems, such as modern toxic chemicals. They were not even seen as
"inference choices", as if alternatives existed, until challenged by other
approaches that had not been socialized within that taken-for-granted disci-
plinary paradigm. They were the framework within which further scientific
puzzles were shaped and evidence interpreted, not the subject of such ques-
tions.
It is worth noting that the natural methodological commitments out-
lined above are integrated with their own theoretical commitments too. For
example, whether one treats benign tumors as significant depends on beliefs
about the exact mechanism of cancer, the variability of metabolic or
immune system processes, and so on. There is a certain circularity about
this - premises define observations, which confirm premises. Each specific
scientific commitment relies upon a network of supplementary commit-
ments, some supported by evidence, others suppositions that have gradu-
ally become buried in the taken-for-granted context. When such a scientific
commitment is challenged because it is seen to have policy implications
(e.g., about risk levels) those supplementary inferences and suppositions
can be identified and examined for their scientific warrant. An example of
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what happens is given by Jasanoff in an analysis of the formaldehyde risk
debate in the USA [62J. Formaldehyde is acknowledged to produce excess
cancers in rats at doses similar to known human doses. However, there
have been several null results and also the distribution of cancer sites in
rats is known to differ from those observed in exposed humans. In particu-
lar, the observed preponderance of nasal cancers in rats does not occur in
humans, even though formaldehyde is mainly inhaled as a gas. To pro-
ponents of stricter regulation, these bodies of evidence encourage certain
new balances of significance in supplementary issues - cancer-site
correspondence for known carcinogens is not always found between animals
and humans; and humans may breathe more through the mouth when irri-
tants are around. Industrial proponents argued instead that the null
results indicated a threshold dose, and that the absence of human nasal
cancers was very significant. Combined with the ambivalent mouse data,
this was used to argue that nasal cancer in rats is species-specific, and thus
nongeneralizable - a result of cell damage in the nasal tissues of rats,
which, it was suggested, must be hypersensitive.
This argument developed into a conflict over the proper interpretation
of the very limited mouse data. These showed some excess nasal cancers at
high doses, but not in a statistically significant number. However, the
opposing sides differed on what value of statistical significance is to be used
when the natural background rate of a cancer is very small, as it is for
nasal cancers in mice. The US EP A argued that significance standards
should be relaxed in such cases, and again raised new inferences that chal-
lenged taken-for-granted ideas in the existing knowledge structure - they
suggested that mice may reduce their volumetric breathing rate when sub-
jected to inhalation irritants, thus effectively protecting themselves.
Each exchange in this continuing debate threw up new challenges to
previously taken-for-granted and "closed" scientific assumptions and com-
mitments, which supplemented the explicit commitments. There is no rea-
son to suppose that each process of deconstruction could not continue, dig-
ging deeper and deeper into the established body of scientific knowledge
held by different parties.
In a working paper for the aforementioned US NRC Risk Assessment
study, for example, McCray explains how, having begun with the "naive"
conventional wisdom that values and facts could be cleanly separated, he
was surprised to find how many value choices had to be made in making
necessary inferences within toxicology [63J. He first identified 36 such infer-
ence choices, including those listed before, but this soon grew to over 50.
Moreover, some of these were recognized to be composite commitments,
which could be broken down into multiple component inferences. For
example, the question was raised in the formaldehyde case of what
significance to attach to small numbers of excess cancers in mice, which
have a very low natural "background" rate. To set the statistical
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confidence limits lower for low-background rate species or sites - as the
EPA experts argued one should - implies a commitment to one particular
alternative in the available theories of the cancer mechanism. The use of
absolute or relative risk models in extrapolating limited-time results into
full-term damage estimates also implies similar alternative commitments.
How to evaluate apparent "saturation effects" in metabolic processes or
toxic effects depends upon commitments to different assumptions about
metabolic mechanisms. The list proliferates. As a general matter, McCray
concluded that so many observations and relationships in toxicology were
specific only to a given experimental context that it was impossible to
develop generic decision rules within the scientific component of risk
analysis.
10.6.4. Context-bound scientific knowledge
An important point about the networks of finer inference commitments, as
opposed to the gross ones such as which dose-effect function to use in going
from high-dose data to low-dose estimates, is that they are less clear-cut
and direct in their policy implications. In these cases a commitment to one
option or another cannot be directly correlated with a policy value commit-
ment. The eventual influence upon a risk estimation is indirect and condi-
tional upon further commitments in the network. The finer commitments
are also more buried, taken for granted, and less visible as choices to the
scientists concerned (and to outsiders). For example, the assumption that
a given detailed method of dosing an animal produces generalizable effects,
with no artifacts due to situation-specific processes, does not necessarily
have an identifiable consequence for ensuing risk estimates and policy con-
clusions, which are constructed several intellectual stages later.
This point is important because it is often assumed that the inference
commitments, which may have no clear scientific warrant and have an
effect upon risk estimates, are deliberate value or policy choices. Consistent
with Chapter 9, our analysis here suggests that they are not even neces-
sarily always choices, let alone choices made with specific external policy
interests in mind. This perspective on the inference-based network struc-
ture of scientific knowledge is not at all a special feature of toxicology, or
chemical risk assessment. It has been advanced as a general feature of sci-
ence, even in its "hardest" forms, and has been supported by a broad-based
body of detailed work in sociology and the history of science.
Pinch's analysis of von Neumann's "impossibility proof" against the
hidden variables explanation of quantum phenomena in sub-atomic interac-
tions is a good example [64]. Pinch's historical reconstruction showed flaws
in the von Neumann (1933) proof that were not identified for a long time,
since it was adopted rapidly by mainstream physics anxious to justify its
unease about hidden variables theory and its developing commitments to
346 Risk Management and Hazardous Waste
something different. Von Neumann's "proof' became the key reference
point for 40 years or more to justify rejection of the "hidden variables"
approach. The proof became "naturalized" as a given fact, despite resting
upon chosen premises and inferences that were open to question: these
disappeared from view by a process of social closure of the cognitive
questions.
Wynne's analysis of the justifications used, again by mainstream phy-
sics, to reject a deviant theory of X-ray-matter interaction (the J
phenomenon) in the 1920s offers another example [65]. Here, dubious
"replications" of the crucial experiments claimed to show that the original
experimental observations were spurious. The negative "replications" were
embraced enthusiastically and uncritically, and they were used as authori-
tative, culturally rehearsed reference points right into the 1970s. The tacit
social agreement to accept such "replications" as definitive and conclusive
was deconstructed by a detailed historical analysis. This deconstruction
did not falsify the mainstream's commitments to reject the J phenomenon;
but it did indicate the social element in the construction of knowledge, and
in the corresponding closure of questions existing in the supplementary
beliefs and commitments.
Later work, for example, by Latour and Woolgar [66] and Knorr-
Cetina [67/, developed this kind of analysis to show how the formation of
agreed commitments is integrated with the social processes of tacit persua-
sion or justification of knowledge. Thus, there is an inherent misrepresen-
tation of the social commitments to particular inferences, standards of evi-
dence, criteria of classification, etc., as unavoidable, given in nature, and
universal. Again, however, it is important to stress that this is an incre-
mental and diffuse process, deeper than the deliberate play of specific exter-
nal interests and value commitments.
We can now bring together this interpretation of the underlying
open-endedness of scientific knowledge with our previous discussion of the
standardization of regulatory testing in the EP test, toxicology testing pro-
tocols, etc. The inherent open-endedness, or incompleteness of scientific
knowledge, is completed by social processes operating in practical contexts,
to produce practical scientific knowledge. The increasingly elaborate
specification of scientific practices is an attempt to control social uncertain-
ties and variations in detailed methods of observation or data production;
the attempt to draw up standardized sets of inference rules is an attempt to
control social uncertainties of inference commitment in the network of
scientific judgments needed to convert the data into risk estimates (and
hence regulations). But standardizing risk analysis in this way is tan-
tamount to prescribing, and standardizing, in extreme detail, the real
worlds of risk situations and processes. Even if it were achievable, it loses
contact with reality.
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The reasoning behind such standardization is to restore authority.
The US NRC study's proposal formally to discriminate between scientific
risk assessment and risk assessment policy, or policy-determined scientific
inference rules, was intended to reinsulate "proper science" from an insidi-
ous invasion by implicit policy interests and concerns. Thus, a new arena
was separately defined with its own norms and principles. The choice of
inference rules in this arena would be guided as much as possible by
current science, and scientists would judge whether the state of knowledge
justified equal policy choice between inference options, or whether new evi-
dence suggested transfer of such a rule out of the policy domain and into
the purely scientific one, etc.
10.6.5. From private to public audiences
The argument in favor of standardization is explication of decision rules
and assumptions. The guarantor of salvation against arbitrarily varying
value commitments, and unspecified relationships between models and real
risk-scenarios, is supposed to be transparency. Lowrance's prescriptive
principles are typical and have been widely cited:
First, [scientists] can leaven their discussions by including critical,
articulate laymen in their group .,. Second, they can place on record
their sources of bias and potential conflicts of interest, perhaps even
stating their previous public positions on the issue. Third, they can
identify the components of their decisions as being either scientific
facts or matters of value judgment. Fourth, they can disclose in detail
the specific bases upon which their assessments and appraisals are
made. Fifth, they can reveal the degree of certainty with which the
various parts of the decision are known [681.
McCray has expressed a similar norm - if risk assessment truly is an
inextricable mix of scientific judgment and value judgment, the best operat-
ing principle is to make sure that the assumptions made in assessing risk
are routinely made explicit; in this way, they can be subjected to both
scientific and political scrutiny. Risk assessments should identify each area
of inference where scientific uncertainty is confronted, and should state the
analytic choice(s} made in each area.
Despite offering major advances over previous approaches, McCray
and Whittemore both still cleave to the assumption that all biases are from
value choices, and transparency is the solution.
The basic problem with the "transparency" approach has already
been demonstrated. As one reaches into science for open inference commit-
ments with policy implications, these are not conscious to the expert, and
they can be found extending deeper and wider, even if - as mentioned - the
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precise way their policy consequences fall becomes less clear-cut. The solid
ground of science free from judgments and inferences that are not fully
determined by logical rules and unambiguous facts recedes as it is more
closely examined 1691. The appearance of natural factual solidity is created
by legitimate, institutionalized social agreements and judgments of scien-
tists to ignore unexplained anomalies, to resolve an ambiguity one way
rather than another, etc. Scientists are comprehensively socialized into
particular institutionalized sets of such judgments and inferences, and
thereby become immersed in them as if they were utterly natural and logi-
cal. To refer to these as value choices is to do violence to their depth and
subtlety and to suggest, quite falsely, that they can be set aside if the
expert so wishes. Basing the credibility of regulation upon this premise by
making transparency, open peer review, and formal statement of value
choices the institutional principles may be a brittle strategy.
Seen as a cultural process, the construction of authoritative
knowledge will vary from one context of use to another. The contours of
defined uncertainty and fact can vary at several levels:
(1) Between different scientific traditions, with their different "natural"
methodological, theoretical, and network commitments.
(2) Between different practical contexts over space and time for the same
scientific tradition; for example, consensual views accepted as fact,
such as a blood-grouping characterization based on a given technique,
can be demoted to "judgment" if the technique is shown to be based
on other suppositions whose warrant is not complete. Pinch has
shown how in solar physics, for example, scientific definitions of the
degree and location of uncertainty in the same specialty vary with the
particular context of debate [70].
(3) Between regulatory systems: as indicated in Chapter 2, different regu-
lations for the same problem occur in different systems despite the
universal availability of the same research. Each system evolves
different network constructions, even of "the facts", in a complex,
incremental combination of inference commitments, selection of
emphasis, and assigned credibility of different studies and approaches,
etc.
Several conclusions to be drawn from this analysis are:
(1) The attempt to develop definitive standard observation and decision
rules in science for regulation is ultimately doomed, because the pro-
cess of digging out strictly open-ended inferences and commitments
buried in the structure of scientific knowledge can go on potentially
indefinitely unless some institutional means of closure is reestablished.
(2) There is not an objective amount of uncertainty attached to any given
estimate or statement that can be stated for policy. The degree of
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uncertainty perceived by an expert in a piece of knowledge depends
upon its perceived role in a relationship or context of use.
(3) The overdependence upon "definitive" scientific observations or
analysis for risk management generates pressure for bureaucratized,
mechanistic forms of science, which have every detail of method and
inference controlled to a degree that is both unrealistic to achieve and
- even if unachieved - corrupting.
(4) When one takes fully into account the vast potential for the elabora-
tion of scientific uncertainties when science is pressed to deliver
authority, the costs of achieving anything approaching definitive
knowledge for viable regulation are far greater than ever suspected.
Thus, the transaction costs of approaches to back-end regulation
dependent upon this kind of standardization through scientific risk
analysis may be far greater than previously thought.
(5) The pressures to formalize risk assessment science will intensify, even
in relatively informal decision cultures such as the UK [71]. However,
the attempt to gain legitimacy via formalization and "transparency"
should be cautioned by the realization that this may produce carica-
tures of scientific knowledge and method whose pretences are eventu-
ally laid bare, with further erosion of public confidence. Scientific
authority and consensus rests upon socially mediated credulity - a
readiness to suspend skepticism - as much as upon critical scepticism.
Putting such scientific knowledge to work to restore eroded institu-
tional credibility is only likely to erode the science too, by exposing its
ultimately social-conventional basis.
(6) Over-elaborated "science" is being extended in a vain attempt to con-
trol institutional uncertainty and pluralism within the risk-system to
be regulated. This is neither a realistic nor viable response to those
structural uncertainties which entail greater costs than those normally
recognized in downstream regulation.
10.7. Conclusions
In this chapter we have analyzed the extent of misfit between deep and
diverse kinds of uncertainty that surround all the various dimensions of
hazardous waste management, and the need to regulate as if the uncertain-
ties involved were narrowly limited and thus credibly manageable within
unidimensional, quantitative boundaries. Risk analysis as a technical
activity is expected to reconcile this fundamental contradiction in a way
that is credible and authoritative to a wide array of different actors and
institutions, with their own experiences, interests, and perceptions of the
issues. Unfortunately, science as a regulatory ally tends naturally toward
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the negation of uncertainty and diversity, and lends itself easily to bureau-
cratized forms, which artificially convert genuine ignorance, ambiguity, and
indeterminacy into apparently controllable risks or marginal uncertainties.
A balance has to be maintained between too little structuring of the
risk framework, in response to the authentic unknowns and lack of
definition of the field, and overelaborate, artificial bounding and conceal-
ment of ignorance, in response to demands for definitive risk-benefit
management knowledge. The former emphasis runs the risk of lack of
effective control and lack of pressure to develop consistent technical and
evaluative knowledge for regulation; the latter runs the converse risk of
actually obstructing the search for more precise and effective regulatory
knowledge. It risks concretizing the standardized frameworks that have
been artificially cast around the unknowns and variances in the field, as if
these creations were reality. Although individual regulators may recognize
this distinction, the system may still be constructed and run as if no such
distinction existed.
There are two reasons for requiring that risk analysis be formalized,
i.e., that its decision rules should be transparent. The first concerns essen-
tially descriptive needs; if an analysis of risks in a system or situation is to
be authoritative it must be reproducible and its assumptions, data, logic,
and manipulations be accessible to test by other experts. The second rea-
son relates to the prescriptive role of risk analysis in regulation. The role of
regulatory norms is to control behavior. However, in hazardous waste sys-
tems, unlike conventional pollution controls, this cannot be done by specify-
ing only performance criteria that are the end-product of a regulator's risk
analysis and some process of evaluation. Because of the complex behavioral
life-cycle, which has perforce to remain partly free, boundary conditions
have to be specified in terms of general criteria of hazard, materials, and
actions. Many diverse and unknown behaviors and situations must be con-
trolled, even if they cannot be clearly defined. The actual regulated actor,
or a local regulatory body (or both) then has to be left to perform a
"situation-specific" risk analysis of their local situation, and to do this, nor-
mative risk-analytic methods (observation rules) and criteria (decision
rules) must be laid down by the central regulator for the "regulated" to fol-
low. As we have seen, these rules can vary in precision, but what they lack
in clarity must be compensated by mutual institutional trust and collabora-
tion between the parties involved. Behavioral controls are then imposed on
the regulated if his (in theory, centrally controlled) risk analysis shows that
in a given situation certain specified risk criteria have been met.
In both aspects of its role, normative and descriptive, risk analysis has
to withstand divergent interpretation, challenge, and criticism, and it has
to be clear enough to be properly repeated. Hence, the observation and
decision rules of science in this field are coming under increasing and more
penetrative demands for full explication and precision - the transparency
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norm. At the same time the "coverage" of science in this area seems to be
being outstripped and uncertainty is growing, thus pulling in exactly the
opposite direction. As mentioned before, the scope of formal knowledge
socially required by management is increasing faster than rigorous
knowledge can expand. Therefore, the pressure continues to produce
increasingly elaborate formal risk-analytic models and regulatory decision
rules, yet these are based on more and more fragile foundations.
As we have argued in the more general framework of the last two
chapters, the context-dependent limitations of scientific analytical formali-
zation provide opportunities for conflicting framing, not merely observa-
tional imprecision. This deeper form of uncertainty is fueled by divergent
institutional interests and perspectives, often of a subtle and unintentional
kind, and by behavioral freedoms that influence risks in the hazardous
waste cycle. We saw in Chapter 9 that uncertainty can be intractable even
for relatively well structured problems. For hazardous waste life-cycles and
chemical--environmental risk analyses these problems escalate. Further-
more, the very nature of science is not to embrace uncertainty and to be
explicit and sceptical about inference choices, but to bury and become
unself-conscious about the majority of them.
A consequence of this analysis is that science in its usual sense will
inevitably fall behind in the task of reducing uncertainty in risk manage-
ment and thus in buttressing the credibility of regulation. The general
analysis of uncertainty and its effects upon regulatory coherence, given in
the last two chapters, only sharpens the damaging effects of the hetero-
geneity and behavioral indeterminacy of the hazardous wastes risk life-cycle
upon attempts at standardized or formalized risk analysis and regulation.
Conversely, the perceived benefits of decentralized, flexible institutional
mechanisms and related technical frameworks are multiplied. To the
extent that technical certainty is a surrogate for institutional uncertainty,
regulation that attempts to control the latter by indiscriminately expanding
its expectations of the former places itself in severe difficulties.
In the next chapter we address more directly the implications of the
widespread concern over public reactions to hazardous waste regulation -
actual or anticipated - and try to offer a coherent framework for thinking
about this incoherently experienced "risk perception" problem. This public
dimension has so far surfaced only briefly, but it needs to be more explicitly
related to the issues of scientific uncertainty, risk-analytic framing, and
institutional credibility dealt with so far.
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CHAPTER 11
Risk Perception, Decision Analysis,
and the Public Acceptance Problem
Brian Wynne
In Chapter 10, I described a growing dualism in the role of science or risk
analysis in regulation. I argued that this has been caused by decreasing
confidence in regulatory institutions, requiring them to engage in more ela-
borate justification of decisions. The influence of this increasing reas-
surance role on the structure of risk analysis may be the opposite of that
required for ill-structured and heterogeneous problems. Thus, an inherently
self-defeating understatement of fundamental uncertainties is intensified by
this growing role.
In this chapter I analyze a related aspect of regulatory responses to
the "reassurance" problem. I examine the way risk perception studies have
been incorporated in decision approaches to risk management. I suggest
that these approaches are fundamentally inadequate, even counterproduc-
tive, because they automatically convert concern into an extra attribute of
risks in an esoteric decision technique - an abstracted, individually rooted
"negative utility". This denies the objective grounding of risk definitions
and perceptions in the social experiences and relationships of technologies.
I therefore show how decision-analytic techniques convert structural
uncertainty and conflict that arise from authentically heterogeneous social
existences into the artificial one-dimensional technical uncertainties of
"expected utilities". Even recent extensions, using risk perception studies
to incorporate elements of public concern, fall foul of this basic fallacy. In
appearing to deal with public concern, this elaboration of managerial tech-
niques leaves unrecognized the need to respond with institutional innova-
tions. One such partial approach, namely formal compensation programs
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for siting hazardous waste faciities, is then reviewed in the context of the
preceding interpretation.
11.1. Risk - From Abstraction to Context
The new public perception dimension is reflected in the now-frequent
lament that decision makers are being forced to manage risks according to
how many people will be frightened rather than how many will be killed.
The predominant framework is that there exist objective physical risks asso-
ciated with different technologies and activities; then there are subjective
perceptions of those risks. Hence, the so-called "objective-perceived risk
dichotomy" [1], the assumption amongst experts being that irrational emo-
tional factors enormously multiply public judgments of the scale of some
objective risks, such as nuclear power, while reducing the scale of others,
such as road accidents. These "subjective biases" are taken to have
extremely costly, even terminal, implications for those technologies that
attract these negative associations. Measured by economic value-of-life
statistics for the costs of extra control technologies per calculated life saved
(extra risk avoided), different social and technological activities show enor-
mous variations, reflecting composite "biases" from a supposedly rational
overall distribution of risk reduction resources [2].
In the 1970s, such observations led to psychological research to
account for these subjective biases and variations [3]. The initial assump-
tion was that lay people were just ignorant of the risk levels of different
activities, and that simple information, e.g., of comparative risks, would
correct them [4]. When both resistance to such information and evidence
demonstrating passable lay knowledge of quantitative risks proved this
assumption false [5], the dominant "rational" view then became that people
were behaving primitively, looking at risks with superstitious overtones and
emotive associations [6].
The more serious work began to factor risks into multiple attributes
and to identify people's differential scaling of these [7]. In addition, the sys-
tematic forms of bias in popular cognition and framing of problems, espe-
cially the treatment of statistical figures and choices, were intensively inves-
tigated [8]. The existing fields of behavioral decision theory and decision
analysis developed rapidly, based upon normative models of rational indivi-
dual choice modeled largely by one-off gambling decisions [9].
A cardinal premise of all the risk perception work was that (physical)
risks exist separately from the context in which they are experienced. Thus,
the development of the idea of risks as objective, unidimensional quantities
was that they also contain intrinsic attributes. Public perceptions of these
could be measured, and even quantified and compared with "objective"
measures. The hope was that in this way the "public perception"
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dimension could be abstracted into general formulas of "acceptable risk" for
different technologies. Risk attributes were regarded as subsidiary explana-
tions for bias away from "objective" risk measures. They were not, at this
stage, seen as oblique indicators of the context from which real risk experi-
ences are analytically abstracted and given transformed meaning. The work
of Otway's group at International Atomic Energy Agency/International
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IAEA/IIASA) was discontinued
before it could develop from the investigation of the supposed attributes of
risks to the attributes of technologies, which are the source of risks [10].
However, it was then realized that the basic determinants of public reac-
tions were not risk-specific attributes and attitudes, but more comprehen-
sive belief-value systems within which the "risk" or technology was experi-
enced [11]. Even so, decision analysis used psychology whilst neglecting the
sociological implications of this point.
In a critical review in 1982 of "scientific" definitions of "acceptable
risk" in regulation, Otway and von Winterfeldt summarized some of the
more common risk attributes found in a range of psychological research on
risk perceptions [12]. These included involuntariness, lack of personal con-
trol, uncertainty and disagreement, lack of personal familiarity, imaginabil-
ity, delayed effects and anxiety, "societal" damage (e.g., genetic degenera-
tion, or catastrophic potential), invisible benefits, inequitable risk-benefit
distribution, and human rather than natural causes.
It is immediately evident that even some of these "risk" attributes are
in reality attributes of the social relationships in which the risky activity
takes place. That is, they are not merely attributes of the risk, nor even of
the "technology", if this is viewed as context free. They are attributes of
the technology seen as a historical process of social relationships. In conse-
quence, the nature and boundaries of the "risk problem" , even the physical
risks themselves, let alone the social risks inherent in those relationships,
objectively vary according to social experiences and positions. (This boun-
dary problem was discussed in Chapter 9). This sociological translation of
attributes makes the bridge from the two psychological approaches of
psychometric factor (or attribute) analysis and the more comprehensive
belief-system frameworks. The panoply of "rational" models for analyzing
risk decisions are based upon the false premise that when we measure their
reactions, people are (or should be) making decisions about physical risks
reified and separated from their context in the way analysts suppose they
are. This "objective risk" framework is itself a subjective artifact of
analytical-policy managerial framing, which bears a questionable relation-
ship with other, objective categories of social experience, perception, and
evaluation. Indeed, the experience of "technologies", as I argue below, is
rooted in empirical social experiences of decision-making institutions and
their historically embedded relationships. The implicit conflict between
normative "rational" risk decision methods and descriptive sociological
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accounts of the way concern is enacted in real issues focuses on whether
these deeper institutional dimensions of social experience should be recog-
nized as a legitimate part of public decision beyond discrete "utilities" or
"attributes" of an imposed problem.
A concrete illustration of the distinction between a risk-based and a
social relations-based approach is the experience of occupational risks in a
hazardous industrial plant. Experience shows (and plain common sense
would suggest anyway) that workers' responses to physical risks cannot be
dissociated from their response to management attitudes and social rela-
tions in the plant [13]. Any single "event" or "decision" is located within
that continual social process - abstracting a discrete decision is already to
distort the basis of concern. If those social relations with management are
pervaded by mistrust and hostility, the ever-present uncertainties in physi-
cal risks will be quite rationally amplified, because they are being managed
by untrustworthy actors; the overall objective risk is correspondingly multi-
plied. Physical risk attributes integrate with other attributes of the technol-
ogy, including its (past and present) social relations.
The basis of perception relating to the acceptability of a "risk" is,
rationally, the basic social experience, which is not physical risks alone, not
even technology in a context-free sense. It is the technology as embedded in
an institutional web of control, seen as a social organizational process.
Thus, we reach the important watershed in the risk field, that the
abstracted language of "risks" elaborated over this area of social interaction
by "risk analysts" suppresses a whole dimension of social experience
involved in a given technology or its risks. It thus denies legitimacy to the
values and anxieties that arise from this domain. Adopting this framework
in "risk management" or regulation, therefore, jeopardizes its own credibil-
ity by effectively saying to people that their own social experiences and
searches for meaning do not count; or, if they do, only as separate indivi-
dual subjective psychological states, often classified as neuroses or patholo-
gies for which "therapy" may be required [14]. I argue that this self-
destructive cycle occurs even where regulators attempt to take risk percep-
tion studies into account, i.e., when they are prepared to relax the failing
"objective" prescriptions offered by "revealed preference" societal risk com-
parisons or comparative value-of-life quantifications, and systematically
incorporate factors for public "concern" or "risk aversion" .
11.2. The Sociological Roots of Risk Attributes
I now illustrate concretely how the dominant framework based on the
psychology of risk perception has obliterated an institutional dimension. I
then show how this analytic method has been incorporated into extensions
of established decision-analytic approaches to regulation and risk
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management, with the effect of simply elaborating the basic fallacies of
those frameworks whilst imagining that they are responding to public
concern.
As indicated earlier, psychological risk perception studies have
attempted to factorize the multiple elements of risks that people supposedly
perceive, "weigh", and accordingly react to. One of the most sophisticated
and influential research traditions is that associated with Slovic and
Fischoff, and their collaborators [15]. They and others [16] have taken the
many relevant attributes - up to several dozen - identified by various per-
ception studies and, using standard data reduction techniques, eliminated
duplication. They accounted for the variance in recorded attributes by
reduction to just two orthogonal dimensions - "dread" and "unfamiliarity".
The attributes showed high intercorrelation, and further analysis was
claimed to show essentially the same two-dimensional pattern. Fischoff et
al. called these, respectively, the "emotional" and "cognitive" dimensions of
response [17) (see Figure 11.1). The way in which this kind of work has
been interpreted is that the key dimensions - "dread" and "unfamiliarity" -
are subjective psychological categories. Even if widely held, they are taken
to be basically individual mental states, which bias perceptions of "real"
risks. Yet there are ample indications that this is a categorical misrepresen-
tation, and an effective suppression of objective social categories of experi-
ence and action. While others [18] have argued that the observations are
empirically unsound, I suggest that, even assuming they are sound observa-
tions, they can and should be seen in sociological terms. Let us take some
examples.
The "dread" dimension of nuclear power is widely associated with two
particular symbols - the mushroom cloud image of annihilation by the
atomic bomb and the unseen, all-penetrating image of radiation. Yet the
supposition that this unseen property of radiation creates an automatic
sense of dread is false. This is shown by examining Figure 11.2, taken from
a British newspaper supplement on nuclear energy in 1956 at the opening of
the first electricity-providing nuclear power station [191. In those more
trusting, paternalistic days, as the caption illustrates, the unseen nature of
radiation was being socially constructed as a positive element of the image
of nuclear power - it was part of the mystery that kept the controlling
experts and elites suitably distanced, socially and intellectually, from the
public, which was evidently meant to simply look on in awe. Thus, this
attribute is clearly only a code for a set of social relationships, the associa-
tion with one particular set or another being contextual and socially
achieved. Measuring its existence by psychological research is to measure
that social achievement, and not an intrinsic individual mental state.
It is not that the psychological observation is wrong, but that it is
incomplete and, as such, may mislead. Thus, taking the fundamental
category of experience and reaction to be psychological rather than social is
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Figure 11.1. (a) Hazard locations on factors 1 and 2 derived from interrelation-
ships among 16 risk characteristics. Each factor is made up of a combination of
characteristics, as indicated in Figure 11.1 (b) (from Slovic et at. [17]).
wrong, because it implies individual rather than social categories for under-
standing and responding to public reactions.
Taking the "atom bomb" part of the "emotive" dread now, this can be
seen to express a substantial empirical logic in the institutional realities of
nuclear technology. There are two equally defensible, but contradictory,
rationalities in the possible connections between nuclear energy and nuclear
weapons. One of these would say that the possibilities for horizontal proli-
feration of nuclear weapons (hence increased chances of atomic bombs
annihilating us) by the spread of civil nuclear energy are nullified by the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards, managed by the competent
IAEA. This is a legitimate (predictive and present) behavioral judgment.
An alternative judgment is that proliferation to unstable states is proceed-
ing inexorably, with the (not exclusive, but substantial) help of global civil
nuclear energy diffusion. In this equally legitimate stance, safeguards are
failing and, indeed, it is unrealistic to expect that formal safeguards could
ever control that proliferation. In this alternative view there is also a con-
crete empirical judgment about institutions, which allows an empirical
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association between nuclear energy and nuclear weapons. Which one of
these conflicting views is "correct" is beside the point in the present context.
The point is that each one is equally empirically defensible and rational.
Thus, the so-called irrational emotional dread of the atomic bomb and
the mushroom cloud as a risk-perception multiplier for nuclear energy can
be taken as a linguistic shorthand, or symbolic language containing a cogni-
tive dimension (namely a tacit behavioral judgment) that the institutions
supposed to keep nuclear energy and nuclear weapons apart are not able to
succeed. The alternative belief is also based upon questionable social
assumptions. Its lament of the emotiveness of the weapons association and
recognition only of direct physical risks (on which dimension there is,
indeed, no connection) is merely an authoritarian way of dismissing those
different legitimate social judgments and concerns.
We can also take an illustration from the "unfamiliarity" dimension.
This may again be treated as a purely individual cognitive state, but it is
more plausibly related to the social processes of decision making (or "risk
management") about the technology in question. When examined more
closely, conflicting "risk perceptions" in the debate about the UK's planned
oxide nuclear fuels reprocessing (THORP) plant at Windscale in the 1970s,
were seen to derive from different basic definitions of the boundary of the
technology, or risk source, in question [20]. The same dislocations of basic
framework can be identified in conflicts over waste disposal facility siting,
reflected in the frequently expressed fear that a facility of a certain proposed
size, or a research facility, will later be expanded with no control [21]. To
those who were used to exclusion from decision making, the THORP issue
was a temporary window on a usually alien social process. There was a
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Figure 11.2. A 1956 newspaper presentation of Dounreay atomic plant, UK.
quarter-century of social exclusion to catch up on, as witnessed in the fre-
quent opposition references to past secrecy and regulatory incompetence as
an argument against the new plant. Judging the current and future risks
rationally involved judging the risk-managing institutions; and the evidence
for this rationally came from the concrete experience of past behavior and
relationships. The technology is a historical process, and the risks are rooted
in this process. "Unfamiliarity" is deeply misrepresented by regarding it as a
risk attribute that converts into individual cognitions.
There was also a rational desire to associate all potential future fuel
cycle developments (and their risks) following on from the reprocessing
plant with the decision on that one plant itself, because there would perhaps
(on solid experience) be no consultation with those future decision steps.
The nuclear proponents, and the decision-making establishment generally,
dismissed this as emotive and irrational; but they could rationally identify
with and participate in any future decision steps. In decision-analytic terms
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they could conceive of distinct future decision trees, with real open-ended
decisions. The public objectively could not, and thus rationally condensed
the putative later tree and all its potential events (risks) and negative utili-
ties onto the present decision. Each boundary definition for the formulation
of risk problems was rational, but they were incompatible. However, rather
than recognize its underlying social dimension, the authorities took the
wider risk boundary framing to be the familiar emotive multiplication of the
objective risks by an unfounded, irrational perceived risk multiplier.
Differing social realities of trust or control can also underlie apparently
inconsistent risk perceptions made by the same people of "the same" risks.
For example, when domestic users spray far more pesticides on their own
garden than they will accept to be sprayed on forests, there is a logic to this
"inconsistency" that derives from their lack of control of the present and
future spraying of forests. The "risk problem" in that case objectively
extends out into an open-ended future, unless they feel they can control the
responsible institutions. In their garden, they can.
Underlying all risk perceptions, the public and experts are framing
social assumptions, which are often based in experience. These underlying
social dimensions of risk are suppressed by the dominant approach, and
there is no medium in which they can be reorganized, debated, and
negotiated.
11.3. The Social Alienation of Effective Causes
So far I have tried to show that an important dimension of public experi-
ence and concern is omitted, and thus denied value and legitimacy, by dom-
inant approaches to risk perception. Later I illustrate how these approaches
have been embodied in extensions of conventional "rational" decision tech-
niques in risk management, but first it is worth exploring how deep the
sociological roots may go, and how they might be expressed in forms that
mayor may not be picked up by risk perception research, as distant signals
of something more profound and complicated. I suggest that people's
choices and perceptions are constrained by the systems of explanation they
construct in an attempt to order their (disorderly) social experience. This is
consistent with a sociological version of Otway and others' argument for a
comprehensive belief value system approach to public reactions as opposed
to attribute-utility analysis of risks and perceptions [22). This deeper
ground can be approached by unpacking one attribute reported by Slovic et
al. as part of the "unfamiliarity" dimension [23]. This is the perceived unin-
telligibility and apparent arbitrariness of the effective causes of the risks in
question - who or what, if anything, is controlling the risks that persecute
us?
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Anthropologists and sociologists have long recognized that we attempt
to render experience consistent and orderly by creating fundamental con-
tinuity between experience of society and of nature [24]. Durkheim noted
[25] that we domesticate disordered areas of experience by extending fami-
liar explanatory categories and frameworks from more orderly areas of
experience. In stable societies with little control over nature, elements of
social stability and emotional security would become the categories for
understanding nature. In technological societies, with apparently strong
control over natural processes, we might use these as the basis for explain-
ing otherwise troubling and disordered areas of experience, such as human
nature or rapid social change. Indeed, the boundary between nature and
culture is a matter of incessant argument and negotiation as we attempt to
locate authority for our beliefs and prescriptions in the "inviolate and
untouchable" laws of nature rather than the "mere" values or arrangements
of human society [26].
When accidents happen or harm is threatened, there is wider uncer-
tainty - and scope - for negotiation over the explanation of their ultimate
cause. If fundamental, morally significant social experience is seen as
atomistic and fragmented, natural processes will tend to be seen in the same
framework: hierarchies are assumed to exist in nature where they are deeply
etched and "natural" in social experience [27]. In modern differentiated
societies our knowledge of the social causes of decisions and actions that
affect us is indirect and mediated by our attachment (or denial) of credibil-
ity to different sources of explanation. Experts and expertise mediate our
understanding of society and relations with each other as much as they do
our relations with nature. In a complex modern society there is a need for
reassurance of the ultimate order of things, a need that may be fulfilled by
explanations of identifiable causes and responsibilities for events that are
otherwise diffusely but intolerably threatening and capricious. When we are
not provided with such credible explanations from credible sources, then for
good reason we are likely to create our own.
I suggest below that the sources and dominant values behind techno-
logical development in modern society are now generally so obscure and
inaccessible that the controlling causes of risks (and actual damage) are
inexplicable in terms familiar to ordinary people. Social stratifications of
decision making and expertise have reached such extreme degrees of aliena-
tion in many fields that the lay "consumers" of such decisions are forced to
fill a void of responsibility with their own cultural constructs, symbolizing
their experience of these apparently capricious, unintelligible social rela-
tions. This at least domesticates and constrains an otherwise more deeply
threatening arbitrariness in experience.
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11.4. Social Constructions of Responsibility -
Domesticating Disorientation
In his classic account of the social and psychic devastation caused by the
1972 Buffalo Creek dam failure in the Appalachian mountains [28], Rai
Erickson proposes that the reaction of the economically and politically mar-
ginal people who were victims of that "point disaster" was profoundly con-
ditioned by their prior internalization of a state of "chronic disaster",
represented in their long-term neglect by and alienation from employers and
public authorities. The psychic withdrawal characteristic of extreme trau-
matic shock that Erickson observed was already consolidated on the com-
munity scale in the alienation and self-dependence of the community, trust-
ing none of the agencies on whom they nevertheless depended, and thus
tolerated, for economic survival. Erickson argues that what was most
significant about the social aftermath of the disaster was not the personal
trauma - "psychic numbing" -- which everyone experienced, but the collec-
tive trauma, the inability of the old social networks to reestablish them-
selves as the framework of personal psychic convalescence and development.
The people felt betrayed by the coal company that had neglected the dam
whose burst caused the disaster, not because they had previously thought it
a conscientious company, but because structurally, in their position, they
had been forced effectively to trust it - to behave as If they trusted it,
despite realistic appreciation of its selfish motives, past neglects, etc. This
seems a suggestive general way of looking at "public acceptance", even in
normal circumstances.
In Erickson's perspective the powerless always tend to defend and
rationalize, thus consolidate, their own impotence and apathy because to do
otherwise is to expose themselves to the greater human damage of explicit
recognition of neglect and powerlessness. They withdraw, and justify and
defend that withdrawal as consistent with cosmic principles; it becomes
their culture, integrating their beliefs about cause and effect in the experi-
ences they encounter with their established social relationships. Erickson
saw the classic symptoms of trauma in the ordinary human reactions to
"the age we are entering" , namely "a sense of cultural disorientation, a feel-
ing of powerlessness, a dulled apathy, and a generalized fear about the state
of the universe" [29j. These are the symptoms of social experiences and roles
that are highly prescribed by others, yet where the logic and structure of
such prescriptions - of their own social marginality and manipulation - are
obscure. They are the "ineffectuals" in Thompson's terminology [30], whose
lives are prescribed by others, and who view nature and the world and their
own experiences as determined, but capriciously so, by some unintelligible
others. The "effective causes" of their powerlessness are socially invisible.
The dam burst and flood was tantamount to the condensation onto a single
and dramatic event of years of nonaffirmation, or identity stripping, by the
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outside world. There is a basic continuity between event-focused accidents
and chronic exposures to unknown threats. This is well captured by
Fowlkes and Miller:
The most insidious feature of the unnatural disaster, then, is its capa-
city to become increasingly widespread at the same time that it goes
unrecognized and its unidentified casualties increase proportionately.
Whatever the destructive impact of chemical exposure itself, the unna-
tural disaster takes an equally destructive toll in the form of irrepar-
able damage to the social fabric where exposed communities or other
social groups divide and polarize in their attempts to understand and
resolve the ambiguities confronting them [31].
I would only add that the diffusion of social uncertainty as to where such
physical chemical exposures are coming from, and why, is now so extensive
as to create a context of anxiety regardless of whether or not there is a real
physical and/or chemical threat - and expertise is routinely unable to offer
clear discrimination.
The foregoing example highlights a deep complexity in social attitudes
and values that is not at all recognized in policy analysis. Single events and
historical processes are a seamless web - discrete accidents or decision prob-
lems are interpreted consistently with already accumulated social experi-
ences and problem agendas. In the Buffalo Creek case, the survivors
seemed to have had a sense of who was responsible for the technology's
havoc, but an even stronger sense of hopelessness that anything could be
done about it. In this case the effective cause of their disaster was at least
seen as human agents. But there was an ambivalence in attitudes, which
seemed to reflect a sense of extra-human agency in the events - of forces
beyond human control simply taking their own capricious directions; and to
the people they were forces beyond their familiar and "controllable" realm,
because, although human, they were forces belonging to the inaccessible,
alien, and generally untrustworthy social world of "bosses", "decision mak-
ers", "experts", and the like.
A coal company and its management of a dam might be taken as a
supreme example of a concretely visible, familiar technology, with clear lines
of control and responsibility. If such a familiar technology can be perceived
as alien, how much easier must this be for more complex technologies?
Many technologies and industries typical of the modern age - nuclear
power, genetic engineering, modern war technologies, toxic chemicals, and
computers - lie at the opposite extreme. Their controlling human agents
and relationships are far more invisible, diffuse, and socially remote. It is
impossible for ordinary people to even identify, let alone identify with, the
effective causes of their confusing and often troubled experience of these
technologies, even if they do not produce dramatic interventions in their
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lives. Yet the importance of these experiences requires that people con-
struct some working explanations so as to rationalize them one way or
another.
Coal companies may not surround themselves with the elaborate lan-
guage and relationships of "expertise" and the rhetoric of legitimation more
associated with modern technologies. But like many other industrial and
technological areas, they are pulled along in the slipstream of a general
mode of legitimation that cultivates the idea of awesome, other-worldly
technical power, controlled by forces beyond the bounds of ordinary nature
and culture (recall Figure 11.2). But this disorienting relationship's corol-
lary is an ambivalence and instability of attitudes that being alienated and
indiscriminate, can suddenly flip over from benign (or, at least, neutral)
social externality to malign externality.
The point is that, with the effective causes and structures of responsi-
bility so obscured, the only possible public responses are total acceptance or
quiescence (tinged with a lingering anxiety in the face of such supernormal
and unintelligible power), or total rejection (tinged with a lingering fascina-
tion at the sheer technical mastery such technology may entail). There is
no possibility for internal discrimination, measured criticism, or conditional,
qualified responses - all possible currencies of moderation arE; historically
obliterated, leaving behind inflexible absolutes. Furthermore, when things
go wrong, the natural logic is to conclude that someone somewhere is being
malevolent, rather than acting in normal ignorance [32]. In this mode, once
the public recognizes the eternal fact of life that nothing enjoys zero risk,
the result is a loss of public credibility; the smallest risks or problems
become signals of a crucial fall from infallibility. This is tantamount to
primitive thought, where the symbol is collapsed into the word, and no
creative tensions exist any longer between the metaphorical skeletons of
ideas and the literal versions of the metaphors. People behave as if the
technology were literally an alien being from space. They have effectively
been encouraged to think this way by past modes of promotion and legiti-
mation of "technology". It is worth looking at some suggestive evidence.
Psychoanalysts have examined clinical cases involving condensed
images of technology. These have become central surrogates to explain
more complex experiences and potential responsibilities that people cannot
unravel. The images, or specters, are not only psychic simplifiers but also
analogical frameworks for social relationships. They are constructed of
technological metaphors and images; perhaps increasingly so given the
increasingly central role of such experience in daily life.
Daly defines a specter as a kind of potent, artificially created, but
invisible behavioral force:
A sense of the operation of such forces arises when men find they can-
not account for emotionally significant events by ascribing them to the
Risk Perception, Decision Analysis and the Public Acceptance Problem
conventional sources of power and efficacy (e.g., human, natural,
divine) which are believed to make things happen in the world. When
such inexplicable events persist and are experienced by numbers of peo-
ple, agencies are created to account for these events. These agencies
are given names, made into realities, and adapted to as powerful things
The spectral view of technology arises from a sense of domination by
mysterious forces or agencies which are, or were, linked to technologi-
cal enterprises but which are now apprehended as being beyond the
control of any particular man or collection of men ._.
[People] behave as if the spirit of meeting specifications in many
discreet, limited and finite human ventures had taken flight from the
hands of responsible agents and become an independent reality - a real-
ity which has come to overhang the modern world and to enter into the
dynamic processes of personality - as a spectral object [33].
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There is, in other words, a ritual defense mechanism - a transference
of responsibility onto identifiable agents, for complex and otherwise inexpli-
cable experiences that are too emotionally important to be ignored. Daly
describes how several patients created such specters of their own biological
systems, investing them with powers to decide and cut a clean swathe
through otherwise overpowering ambiguities. Thus, they would obsessively
refer to a simple measure, such as their pulse rate, as a guide to decision
making - it was made into a source of "objective decision rules" supposedly
reflecting a greater, more powerful, but impenetrable mechanism.
It is a central point of Daly's analysis that these conditions are no
longer, if they ever were, restricted to clinically psychotic individuals. In his
view, they are now mass neuroses, transmitted in normal processes of popu-
lar cultural dissemination. Given the kinds of symbolic action depicted in
Figure 11.2, this is hardly surprising. Indeed, the past use of images of
scientific and technical power as being from outside the realm of human
interests and values has ironically cultivated an escalating search for objec-
tive social decision rules based in science. This is akin to a collective-scale
version of consulting pulse rates; an example is the incessant effort to avoid
the ambiguity of negotiating acceptability from situation to situation, by
instead trying to create objective scales of "acceptable risk" .
In many cases the social creation of such technological specters may be
a rational reaction by people to irrational situations in which they are
placed.
Consider the experience of the people of Times Beach, Missouri, who
were offered $33 million for their whole town by the EPA in 1983, because it
had been so pervasively poisoned by dioxin-contaminated oil and chemical
wastes that it could never be cleaned up [34]. Like others before and after
them, most notably the citizens of Love Canal, New York State, they
suffered years of uncertainty as claim and counterclaim were swapped over
their confused heads, about their health and its probable origins in the
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unknown contamination that had pervaded their homes and bodies.
Government agencies and scientists contradicted each other repeatedly, and
obscurity surrounded the effective causes of their awful predicament. If
human hand had been involved, perhaps (as the defendants argued) it was
still not straightforward human irresponsibility, but legitimate ignorance:
nobody knew that the waste oils sprayed on dust roads at Times Beach
could contain dioxins; nobody at Hooker Chemicals knew, when the old
canal bed was used to dump chemicals, that it would eventually be used for
residential development [35]. Even actions aimed at protection, mitigation,
or compensation were experienced as exacerbating the existing alienation,
fear, and mistrust. Thus, necessary tests on people naturally generated
more fear as blood samples were taken, yet the results remained obscure
and "private" to the experts. EPA monitoring crews entered people's
homes dressed in "space invaders" protective gear while children were "just
running around" in normal clothes [36]. Even some of the EPA staff
involved felt uneasy about the extra alienating effect this must have had
upon the people - and this was meant as a protective, remedial project!
Apart from the fragmentary cultural transmission of fear and blame,
this encounter with aliens was the only concrete experience of the issue that
many people had. Yet although it was, perhaps, an extreme version, this
was not a basically abnormal experience. Most people are fragments of
technological systems, which entail many connected parts whose coordina-
tion is essential, but complex and chronically problematic. However, they
never experience the whole system [37]: their experience is fragmentary and
bounded by their local organizational and cultural context, within which
they have to make out. Finding it impossible to penetrate the boundaries of
their local experience and to understand the rationalities, interests, and
interactions of those whose doings structure that situation, they create
shorthand images to "explain" those external agencies and their frequent
unpredictability and apparent malevolence.
A graphic example of this was given by McDermott, who described a
specter created by American GIs in Vietnam [38]. They were operating in
the jungle, constantly sniped at or attacked by Vietcong guerillas who could
not be identified and pinned down; regularly shelled and rocketed, but never
even sure it was not by their own side; and received orders but never expla-
nations from their superiors. Their experience was frightening, confusing,
contradictory, and utterly obscure as to its effective causes. They could not
find an enemy and they could not identify their friends. Yet they received
orders and were attacked in an equally arbitrary fashion. Their (very high)
risks were an inseparable combination of physical and social realities. As
part of their rationalization of this predicament the GIs had condensed the
potent, but diffuse and invisible, effective causes onto a single symbolic
agent; they lived a relationship with a "huge fucking" gun, which lived in a
hollowed-out mountain and emerged unpredictably at whim to unload death
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and destruction onto them, in a manner that authentically described their
actual experience.
This "effective cause" of their risks was an agent beyond control,
imbued with a kind of autonomous malevolent intelligence. In one major
sense it was no comfort at all, but in another sense it was, because at least
it offered explanation, cause, and responsibility. It was at least a focus for
their fear and their blame; and it offered order to an otherwise uncontain-
able anxiety. It was a metaphor that represented their social relationships
with those elites (and here also enemies) who remotely, invisibly, and unin-
telligibly controlled their fate. It was a technological specter.
Langdon Winner has discussed this general process as technological
animism [39], in which "men export their own vital powers" into technolo-
gies, which then return in experience as alien and capricious. However,
Winner falsely implies a lack of social stratification or cultural
differentiation in this process. People are circumscribed by mystifications
created not by themselves, or "men" in general, but by processes of domina-
tion whose human structure is increasingly socially complex and remote,
and thus "invisible", unintelligible, and, indeed, authentically dislocated.
People therefore transfer responsibility from this frustratingly intangible
and impenetrable human complex onto extra-human specters. But they are
symbolizing real experience, not "mere" fantasies. We are talking about
transfer and condensation not so much of their own (anyway small) respon-
sibility and power, but of the power of elites in the confusing social and
technological structure around them [40].
Not only does this cognitive process artificially naturalize and consoli-
date the social alienation of decision makers and lay publics by placing the
"effective causes" of risks and technologies apparently beyond human
access, but it inevitably encourages a lack of human tolerance for ambi-
guity. This in turn creates a structural brittleness in the decision system,
for which we are now reaping a harvest of apparently irrational "public
opposition". When diffuse, but encircling responsibility is so condensed
onto such technological specters whose inner social workings are inaccessi-
ble, experience has to be interpreted, and life conducted, by either total
identification with or total repudiation of such simplistic specters. Thus,
public "debate" and interaction becomes rigid and prone to sudden discon-
tinuities: government itself may become less viable. As Crozier has put it,
there is no authority without negotiation [41], and since such fantasies and
specters preempt the possibility of negotiation by replacing and "blackbox-
ing" more discriminating perceptions of relationships and causes, they tend
to destroy even the possibility of legitimate, critically based, and mature
authority. Social learning and more socially robust policies are preempted
by this process, which is buttressed by the bureaucratic concealment of
ignorance.
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In this section I have advanced a much more complex picture of the
problem of public concern from that portrayed by developments of the more
"scientific" approaches of risk-perception psychology, decision analysis, and
all related techniques. Indeed, the problem is not only more complex, but
in some key respects the opposite of that implied by such approaches; this
means that their way of tackling "public concern" may actually only extend
it, albeit in more diffuse form.
11.5. Anxiety and Reassurance
At this point it may be helpful to differentiate analytically between two
dimensions to "concern". One is more specific, and relates to the usually
identifiable risks and attributes of particular decisions, accidents, or techno-
logies. But this interacts with the other more diffuse feeling of general
social uncertainty and inaccessibility to remote decision processes, which
includes an alienation and lack of identity with such controlling institutions,
a growing sense of unease and disorientation as to what values and princi-
ples guide their deliberations, and a growing feeling of anxiety about the
coherence of familiar, cherished social institutions. The latter is the kind of
experience interpreted in Section 11.4. as giving rise to a symbolic condensa-
tion of extra-human images of "effective causes" and ultimate responsibility
and control. The two dimensions are continuous and my differentiation is
analytical. Indeed, I suggest that the developing decision processes of han-
dling the more specific risks and decision concerns relating to back-end regu-
lation inadvertently exacerbate the deeper, more diffuse feelings of public
alienation, which arise more perhaps from the incomprehensibility of front-
end technological innovation and "control" generally. These in turn
influence public perceptions of other specific decisions or events, and are
only amplified when they are ignored by the specific decision framework.
The ways in which regulatory bureaucracies process ignorance, structural
ambiguity, and lack of control into a tenuously credible image of manage-
able risk, and the way in which scientific knowledge is often constructed in
"reassurance", both fuel this process. They are forms of symbolic action
that obscure the origins of more general social anxiety arising from the
unintelligibility of front-end innovation processes. Uses of science in reas-
surance, and decision-analytic methods of addressing public concern, coin-
cide in this respect. Both replace the need for institutional innovations
aimed at social learning with abstract concepts, which elaborate one-
dimensional managerial techniques, and thereby further entrench those
alienated relationships that are arguably the basic problem in the first
place.
A further implication of this analytical approach concerns the question
of how social responsibility is allocated for decisions, commitments, and
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events that produce risks and unwanted suffering. An interesting strand of
social anthropology interprets blaming as an important process of social
cohesion and even healing [42]. Being able to identify the agents responsible
for some significant misfortune or fear is, it is argued, an intrinsically
powerful part of domesticating and coping with that misfortune. Whilst
this may involve antagonism directed at a specific social target, the very
same process allows a corresponding identification with society at large, not
least because society at large may have helped to identify the blameworthy
and assign compensation, etc. When risks and damage are attributed to
"natural causes", but more especially to "unknown causes", there is no con-
crete focus for anxiety, anger, and retributive feelings. It is therefore
difficult for them to be purged because they have no channels of expression,
and the result is a diffuse but powerful sense of unease [43]. Therefore, as
part of the general corrosion of credibility of decision making, it may be
significant that in The Netherlands, for example, for all the thousands of
past uncontrolled waste dumps, including several spectacular and expensive
public health problems, very little remedial or punitive damages have been
recovered from the responsible companies, who have largely gone
unidentified. The same is true of the USA [44]. Even at Love Canal, where
Hooker Chemicals was known to have been the dumper, responsibility was
passed around endlessly between several bodies, and the whole episode
almost defined as if a natural disaster [451, with no socially defined responsi-
ble party to act as a focus for purging deep anxiety and preventing the esca-
lation of mistrust.
In the UK in 1984, the Black Report into excess childhood leukemias
around the Sellafield reprocessing plant [46], two official inquiries into
alleged health defects around chemical waste incineration plants [47], and
an official inquiry into the causes of an explosion at a public water transfer
scheme (Abbeystead), which killed 16 people and maimed several others
[48], all followed a common pattern. They all claimed public reassurance by
demonstrating that the prima facie, suspected responsible party was not the
cause, and that "unknown causes" generated the damage in each case.
Whilst reassuring in the localized sense that none of the operating com-
panies was therefore officially to blame, in another equally significant way,
this logic was not reassuring at all. If such tragic suffering can be visited
upon people without any identifiable effective causes, then logically they will
be averse to projects and plans that appear to expose them to even more of
the same. They will to all appearances become "risk averse". Yet, arguably,
had they been able to identify a cause they could have begun to reconcile
themselves to their grief, and to overcome it by channeling their blame onto
a specific agent. Social healing would have had, at least, a chance to begin,
and the ensuing containment or reduction of the diffuse all-pervading anx-
iety described by Erickson, Daly, and others might have even benefited the
blamed party.
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There is a gaping contradiction between the ex ante posture, of margi-
nal uncertainties and full control through rigorous knowledge, that is struck
by decision-making bodies when they promote and regulate technologies,
and the recurrent theme expressed after an accident. Then, the legitimate
ignorance argument - "no one could possibly have known" - comes to the
fore. The underlying belief seems to be that this more focused reassurance
defends and legitimates the general decision-making system by showing that
specific agents within it were not irresponsible or incompetent. I would
argue that it does the opposite, because it further encourages the belief that
unknown and uncontrollable causes are in charge - it creates greater social
uncertainty. Furthermore, the lack of official acceptance of responsibility
(even if nonnegligent) encourages a public sense of malevolence on the part
of the forces in control. Thus, the process of "defensive" legitimation is eat-
ing away at its own foundations [49].
So much for a more sociological interpretation of public concern and of
the interactions between its different dimensions. Let us now examine how
this dimension is treated in "rational" risk management decision techniques.
11.6. Decision Analysis - Destroying Social Institutions
There are various branches of decision analysis and here I do not present a
complete review. The general field combines economics and psychology to
generate normative frameworks for defining rational solutions to decision
problems [50]. Decisions are always defined as discrete occasions. The basic
method defines a branching set of options and probable consequences,
attaching subjective values to each of those expected outcomes and
estimated probabilities of their occurrence. In risk analysis, the potential
consequences of a technology can be factored into different dimensions -
deaths (to workers or public); morbidity; environmental damage; economic
damage (e.g., air pollution on crops; clean-up costs, etc.). These can be
further differentiated; for example, deaths to children can be said to involve
more damage than deaths to old people; collective deaths in one event may
be more costly than the same total number spread over many routine
events; etc. These are the "attributes" identified in risk perception work
described earlier. An "index of risk" can be composed of these factors for
the activity in question.
When units are attached to quantitative risks, many value choices are
made, whether or not these are explicit. For exactly the same activity or
"risk", deaths per employee may give a very different comparative risk pic-
ture and imply different safety norms from deaths per unit of output, or
time, or resources. These value problems are familiar enough and have been
tackled by several authors. A leading approach is that of Watson et al. [51].
They point out, correctly, that choosing an index of risk for a decision
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analysis is a value laden, political act; but if this can not be avoided, at least
it can be made more transparent, considered, and democratic. Decision
makers rather than experts can choose which individual attributes to use
with what weighting in a composite definition of "risk". The weighting dis-
tribution across the range of chosen attributes would be the utility function,
since it expresses the negative utility for that decision maker of those
aspects of harm chosen to be represented. Having performed this exercise in
an explicit way for competing options, and varying the operative utility
function, the decision maker can then trade-off benefits, risk, and values to
arrive at an optimal choice. In theory, given sufficient accountability and
consensus, this could be a societal choice. Indeed, the steady shift from ear-
lier interest in subjective expected utility analysis toward multiattribute
utility analysis for public decisions has been accompanied by much work
claiming to define the objective attributes of different technologies as a basis
for more "objective" public risk decisions [52].
There is no reason, in principle, why this formal procedure should not
include "public concern" or "risk aversion" as part of the index of harm, or
utility function. Watson et al. expressly recognize "concern" in this way,
and advocate its inclusion (assuming it is not based upon simple ignorance
of risk magnitudes) as one attribute alongside others in a multiattribute
utility analysis. "Concern", once converted into units, e.g., of money
equivalence, may be weighted in alongside potential deaths and injuries of
various kinds, environmental damage, etc. These negative utilities are
termed "detriment" in risk-benefit optimization techniques. Even percep-
tions of outcome-uncertainty can be at least formally included by discount-
ing greater perceived uncertainty .against lesser uncertainty. Converting
"concern" into units has been increasingly performed by eliciting people's
willingness to pay to avoid a given risk increment [53].
As far as it goes, this kind of framework is an admirable attempt not
to patronize public concern, but to take it seriously as a substantive, legiti-
mate part of public risk management and policymaking. There are, of
course, familiar and not at all trivial questions to do with the aggregation of
qualitatively different kinds of "attribute" and experience into single scales,
and with the assumptions mentioned above. However I want to identify two
further problems not usually acknowledged at all. These concern the trans-
parency or otherwise of people's problem definitions and technology
definitions; they lead us to question whether this overall approach of enlarg-
ing decision-making techniques can ever be an adequate way to address the
substantial dimension of public concern. To relate this to familiar terms, I
suggest that "attributes" are distant signals of a more basic divergence in
the very problem definitions that people are addressing, but which are dis-
torted into the single framework of the decision analyst. In Kierkegaard's
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terms (see the Dedication, this volume), perhaps risk attributes are
equivalent to the rules of aesthetics that the critic saw in the poet's
"music" .
The first problem is that the whole framework of Watson et al. takes it
for granted that the technology that is the risk-source is an objective,
bounded entity, definitely separable from other risk sources, and is the same
to all social groups. As discussed in Chapter 9, this is never so, not even for
experts. Its interpenetrations into other technical and organizational sys-
tems are manifold and its boundaries are intrinsically ambiguous and
socially defined. It is therefore not only a matter of what kinds of detriment
(including concern) to incorporate from an assumed given risk source, but of
what are the appropriate boundaries and shapes of the risk-generating prob-
lem in the first place. If concern originates in the lack of recognition of
divergent frameworks, it is not going to be solved by a method that incor-
porates it into a monopolistic framework. Because most technologies are
composed of heterogeneous social networks, as well as physical entities,
their defined characteristics and boundaries are different to the different
social groups involved, even those "internal" to a technology, as determined
by their objective social experience. Thus, they may not only be structurally
conflictual, they may also not be matters of explicit definition and choice.
Because their objective social experiences are different, different culturally
determined perspectives will define not only what risk attributes are
involved, with what weighting or utility, but also what technologies (and
social relations) are involved. Here we can recall the examples in Chapter 9,
especially the 2,4,5-T case and the Windscale reprocessing plant debate.
The usual analytic framing, of technology creating "consequences" or
"expected consequences", which are "evaluated", is thus fundamentally
inadequate. Multi-attribute utility analysis responds to "concern" by incor-
porating it in a decision technique that assumes a single, discrete, context-
free problem, and thus a unitary policy-decision framework of values. It
cannot recognize the social contextual properties of technology and the ori-
gins of concern in social relations, because its fundamental structure denies
context.
Another highly influential and important approach to decision
analysis, which has recently turned its attention to risks and the public con-
cern issue, is that of Raiffa and colleagues [54]. In order to illustrate the sys-
tematic neglect of institutional dimensions let us examine the coal-mine res-
cue dilemma. Raiffa has used this to illustrate the inclusion of concern,
signified by such legitimate attitudes as "regret" or "elation" over particular
outcomes [55].
Three miners are trapped down a mine and may die unless a rescue is
attempted. If a fourth miner attempts to rescue them, the chances of all
four miners being killed become four to one. The decision problem is dep-
icted in Figure 11.3.
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Attempt Rescue Do Not Attempt Rescue
1-p
The trapped miners are
not in real danger
a die
(satisfaction
of trying)
a die
(guilt for
not trying)
p
But it's
too late
0.8
0.2
But they
could be
saved
4 die
(regret for extra
death but satis-
faction of trying)
a die
(elation !)
3 die
(strong gu iIt
for not trying)
3 die
(strong gui It
for not trying)
Figure 11.3. The problem of the miners (from Raiffa [541).
The principle is that the utility for a perceived unwelcome outcome
includes an ex ante anticipation of potential ex post regret. This "concern"
may include guilt, for not trying to rescue the miners; it may also include an
element of the decision-maker's accountability to other groups. As Raiffa
puts it, "if accountability to others and regret are major concerns, then
these concerns should be recognized by incorporating them into the descrip-
tion of consequences."
Depending upon how these new attributes are weighted, ... it mayor
may not be "optimal" for (what is assumed to be) the decision maker to
make a rescue bid. (Using the usual mathematically simple computation of
the "least-cost" option.) For example, in Figure 11.3, let p = 1, and let
there be a 1 in 3 chance of "total rescue" (i.e. p = 0.75 that all four die in a
rescue bid). Then (assuming all deaths are accounted equally), if we use
classical methods and neglect any other considerations, such as regret,etc.,
it would be equally rational to attempt or not attempt a rescue, since the
expected utility of a rescue is -0.75 x 4 = -3, and of a nonrescue it is also
-3. If the "guilt" or "regret" for not trying were positive (i.e., negative util-
ity) then including this would tip the scales in favor of a rescue. However, if
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the guilt for not trying were outweighed by the regret for an extra death at
p = 0.75, the balance would swing back to favor a nonrescue.
Raiffa's attempt to account for factors such as guilt, regret, and
accountability in such decision-analytic terms is one of the most sensitive
and sophisticated attempts to develop a confessedly normative framework
into one relevant to observed realities. However, there are several intercon-
nected points that encourage similar criticisms to those already made of
other decision-analytic approaches.
The normative value of such a framework is reduced more than usual
by the evident fact that a range of different, conflicting decisions can be
reconstructed to be consistent with the prescriptive model, according to
adjustments to the now even larger and vaguer range of subjective utilities.
Raiffa's response to this is that the technique's value lies in forcing decision
makers to clarify their concerns, or "utilities", and the extra considerations
are part of this clarification. This is fair enough. But the question here is
whether the basically individualist model of "concern" ,
"regret", etc., can be adequate for social decisions, where institutional
values enter in a way not reducible to aggregated individual perceptions and
expressible utilities. The evidence from observation is that any "decision
maker" would want to "feel" a decision to be intuitively right and would
then, if forced to, retrospectively set the factors to reach the "rational" solu-
tion (i.e., the one felt to be right).
Raiffa implies, for example, that a decision maker who could not quan-
tify the utility of his or her accountability and regret considerations would
be illicitly "resisting" making these things explicit, for reasons of image
management. This betrays the false assumption that such considerations
are, in fact, individual and privately clear, even if kept from explication for
ulterior motives (a rationalist version of the conspiracy theory!). This
approach by definition cannot appreciate that "accountability" and "regret"
(like decisions generally) may be embedded diffusely, nonprecisely , but sub-
stantively in processes of social interaction, where their meaning (and thus,
"utility") is being incessantly renegotiated, as suggested earlier. They are
the currency of interaction whereby social institutions are maintained.
Thus, it is crucial to note that the problem is not the requirement to make
them clear, it is the requirement to make them clear in a context of mistrust
or social uncertainty, where they may be expropriated and used inflexibly
by analysts and decision makers with whom no negotiation will take place.
To extract control of their meaning from such contexts of relationships and
hand it over to a decision maker or decision makers with whom there is no
real relationship may be precisely the problem! It is to replace the need for
an enlarged social relationship of negotiation in decision making by an
enlarged technique.
In a real coal-mining accident, with three or however many miners
trapped in a mine, a real decision maker would make a rescue bid whatever
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the odds, because if he did otherwise and was seen, for example, to conduct
a "rational" decision analysis as to whether or not to mount a rescue, the
institution of coal mining would disappear. Men would not go down a mine
unless they trusted their fellows to try to rescue them in an emergency. This
is the hard evidence from social observation. In reality, any such individual
artificially abstracted event or decision is embedded in such concrete
historical-social processes. This is not "mere" context, but the seat of value.
This kind of collective trust is a necessary condition for the very survival of
the social-economic institution itself. The value of the institution (partly a
recognizable economic-social activity, but culturally far more than can be
expressed in mere words and numbers) is simply denied by the "rational"
decision-analytic approach. There is intrinsic quality and value in the forms
of social interaction that constitute coal mining as a culture, whereas deci-
sion analysis can only define the human interaction as an instrument in the
attempt to achieve individual values.
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that in a real coal-mine rescue
dilemma, the decision maker's concretely social sense of accountability
would intuitively supersede decision-analytic calculation - and rightly so.
The decision analyst might reply that this social relationship can be ade-
quately represented in the individual decision maker's utilities expressing
expected guilt, accountability, etc. In a case like a mining accident this
might be superficially so, because in such cases these particular utilities are
likely to be so strong as to make the decision to attempt rescue the clear
winner. But this may be the right result for the wrong reason: the very
approach still radically cuts off any continual relationship and regular nego-
tiation with the social context (i.e., publics). The quality and form of such
relationships, therefore, cannot be attended to as a necessary part of deci-
sion making.
Although in the coal-mining case the obliteration of continual institu-
tionalized social relationships may result in the right decision, in many
other cases the concerns and values alive in the "decision context" may not
be so clear-cut or focused. There may exist the same fundamental need to
recognize the authenticity and inherent value of these social bonds and their
own problem definitions, but being more diffuse, it will not be recognized
within the individual, event-specific utilities of decision analysis. A "success-
ful" run of the coal-mine rescue dilemma will therefore be categorically
misleading for the many more usual cases where "the" problem is less
clear-cut and universally recognized. The regulatory equivalent of the coal
mine case might be facility siting; yet, as I argue later, the individual utili-
ties framework used in formal compensation methods is not adequate to
deal with the realities of conflicting problem definitions, even around such
apparently clear and commonly held problems.
Thus, a major problem obscured by the use of the coal mine examples
is that decision analysis precludes recognition of diverse problem definitions
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that arise in the social context and that should be negotiated in the ongoing
institutional relationships of decision making. Reducing these dimensions of
social experience and interaction to individual psychological and "single-
decision problem" components of concern obliterates their moral standing,
and in doing so potentially undermines a basis for public trust of policy
decisions and decision-making bodies.
There is an important practical conflict that underlies sociological
attempts to identify the authentic categories of people's reasoning and con-
cern. This kind of work is often taken by its critics as an uncritical defence
of the substance of popular attitudes, beliefs, and reasons [561. This may be
true of some such work, but it is not at all a necessary part of it, and it is
not part of the present exercise. To understand the categories of experience
and thinking of other people as an essential prerequisite of being able to
communicate and negotiate constructively with them, is very different from
the faith that they are "correct". What must be defended is not the sub-
stance of popular attitudes, but that their own categories of meaning
authentically and legitimately exist and these may extend to deeply uneasy
attitudes toward decision-making institutions. Of course, to see the con-
sistency and resilience of belief systems once set in their proper social con-
text is more respectful than to assume that they are flawed through
unnecessary ignorance, mental failings, emotional maladjustment, or what-
ever; and this perception is often accompanied by a greater modesty about
the limits of our own rational frameworks and the institutional relationships
they reflect and justify. As analysts and managers, our frameworks of
rationality appear detached and purely instrumental (as in decis ion-
analytical models), because that is the social meaning of our public
knowledge - detachment from and manipulation of others [57].
The frameworks of more localized units of social familiarity see risks in
trusting the schemes of the social managers simply because the latter
effectively ask for a blanket erosion of familiar social bonds, to be replaced
by a blind trust in themselves; and then we complain of "irrationality" and
"emotionalism" when we do not receive such unqualified trust and credu-
lity! The relationship of the publics of industrial society to the decision
makers is, as I have said elsewhere, similar to that of the peasant farmer in
the Third World faced with the self-appointed "rational" economic plans of
the Western economic planner for improvement of that peasant farmer's lot
[58]. There is plenty of evidence to show that, while they too have socially
bounded knowledge, in their own terms, the peasantry know relevant things
that the experts do not recognize. Included in that local experience may be
knowledge that makes the expert's framing of the issue inadequate or
irrelevant. The conclusion is not that we should justify and encourage
further social alienation by celebrating a "superior" rationality of the "tech-
nological peasantry" , any more than that of the agricultural peasantry. But
the denial of the basic integrity of those categories of experience by self-
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appointed "rational" approaches is inadvertently the most likely cause of
further alienation and concern.
One reason for this kind of basic category mistake in the decision-
analytic approach is that its origins lie in the psychology of choice, which is
founded on isolated decision models taken almost exclusively from gam-
bling: Not only does this enshrine the individual decision-maker fallacy; it
also enshrines the assumption that decisions and attitudes do actually exist
in isolation from a social context - that they do not signify or interact with
historical and cross-cutting relationships, decision-streams, and problems.
Lopes has admirably summed up this limitation that pervades the whole
field:
The simple static lottery or gamble is as indispensable to research on
risk as is the fruitfly to geneticsl ... lwe psychologists are a bit trapped
by our own proficiency at being good experimentalists. We realize the
importance of control and so we are drawn to those tasks in which we
can exercise control. Hence our preoccupation with simple, static lot-
teries [59].
Such highly simplified "decision simulations" systematically exclude
such factors as past experience and relationships, or effects on future
options, or any kind of different problem definition. When they are then
found not to correspond with real-world choices and behavior, the rational
decision axioms that underly the simple experiments are not questioned -
reality itself is, as people are dubbed irrational, and therapy or "information
campaigns" are called for. Yet, as Lopes suggests, "People who violate
[rational decision] axioms may simply and with good cause be trying to con-
sider facts about the world that the axioms ignore" [60].
When we turn to the real world, we find that not only isolated indivi-
duals violate such tidy rational behavioral axioms, but that whole institu-
tions, organizations, and societies do so.
11.7. Rescuing Social Values
Many people are found to be hesitant about even giving credence to the
framework of values embedded in such decision simulations. These may
include private consultant-client (decision-maker) sessions to elicit utilities,
and questionnaires. The latter may elicit utilities from a larger population,
ask respondents to participate in a formal rational choice game (like the
coal-mine rescue or an equivalent gamble); or they may ask people to
express their utilities via "willingness to pay" questions (to avoid proposed
risk increments). As already indicated in the earlier discussion of Raiffa's
work, the reaction of decision analysts and "experts" is normally that peo-
ple who resist such exercises are deviant, irrational or otherwise, and need
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corrective therapy [61]. Yet this often intuitive unease with such frame-
works indicates a deeper problem, which these "rational" approaches ignore.
The skepticism may signify a deeper feeling that the individual utilities
framework already requires its participants to accept prior values, ones that
are not offered in the agenda of choice. To even enter the game is, there-
fore, automatically to give this whole moral framework a social authority,
without the necessary prior explication and negotiation. As it stands, the
whole framework may beg the most important value questions.
What are these more fundamental questions? They are signaled by,
but extend further than, questions about arbitrarily imposed problem
definitions. They concern the ultimate motivations and meanings of social
interaction and human nature. The sociological orientation employed here,
and the rational choice framework of risk decision making developed from
economics and psychology, are fundamentally at odds over this deeper issue
(which, incidentally, combines empirical-normative or descriptive-
prescriptive dimensions). Regardless of various perceived differences
between psychological and economic approaches [62] the decision-analytic
approaches all assume - or require - that human beings are essentially com-
plete as isolated individuals - they have their existing values and utilities,
and interact with others only as a process of exchange (a market) for max-
imizing, optimizing, or satisfying individual gratification. This is the
"essentialist" model of human nature [63].
Sociological work that has actually examined real situations shows
that a fundamental "utility" for people is the maintenance of established
and trusted social ties, loyalties, and groups, as the basic fabric of personal
identity. This is the "interactionist" or "relational" model of human
nature. In this view social interaction is not merely a means of optimizing
prior individual values, but is of inherent value in itself; it is also the ends,
that is the process of completion of individual values, which would otherwise
remain open-ended and incomplete [64]. Intrinsic value lies in certain forms
of social interaction as such, and not only in the ends achieved by the
interaction; it is thus inherently incapable of precise, "scientific", and static
expression as required by "rational" decision-analytical methods and by the
conventional psychology of risk perception. This mode of value expression
is a constantly recurring process because completion can never finally occur;
meanings and values have to be constantly tested, repaired, renegotiated,
and developed through autonomous social interaction. Values and percep-
tions are therefore inherently social and open-ended to some degree; the
requirements of precise, once-and-for-all "objective" specifications of values
and utilities are themselves a reflection of an alien and fundamentally
incompatible view of human relationships and public life. To the people on
the receiving end it is a major social risk to give assent to such a
moral-social framework.
Risk Perception, Deci~ion AnaI,,~is and the Public Acceptance Problem 383
It is important to note that from the sociological perspective there are
three separate flaws in the rational individual, or essentialist, approach.
The first is the familiar one that economic terms alone are inadequate to
grasp the categories of value and meaning in which people think, act, and
interact. Even when noneconomic realities are recognized, they are con-
verted into economic terms. The second is the artificial abstraction of
discrete decision problems from their institutional setting, where negotiation
of different problem definitions is the essence. These two have been raised
before. The third flaw is that, even if the definitions of utility and risk are
expanded to try to incorporate factors such as "concern" and "regret", these
are still defined as individual utilities. Social entities are still "valued" only
derivatively, as instruments; they are seen only as markets of exchange
between such "complete" individuals, optimizing this now-expanded range
of utilities. In denying that the process of social interaction itself has value
(because it is regarded only as instrumental means), the essentialist
approach embodied in all the "rational" methods denies the very basis of
meaning that people still have as partly their own. It therefore permits
inadvertent social identity stripping and is intrinsically unlikely to be able
to foster public identification and acceptance.
Even when handled with due sensitivity and liberal intent, as exhi-
bited by Fischoff, Watson, Keeney, Raiffa and others, this basic approach
cannot be directly extended to address the institutional elements of public
concern that I am trying to explore. The sociological framework holds that
the most basic value or meaning, motivating public and personal life, is the
continual maintenance of the social and cultural units with which people
identify, and to which they give personal loyalty [65]. This precedes
economic motivations, because, as the field of institutional economics
implies, the latter first need such a collective context in which to exist, just
as do any other ends. This "social imperative" could in theory be explicated
as a personal utility; but, even apart from the nonindependence of utilities
problem, this would involve such a drastic redescription into individualist
terms, that it would destroy what it was meant to represent. Furthermore,
as I have argued elsewhere following Kekes [66], there is a normative
rationality of social behavior that includes a general objective. This cannot
be parceled up into discrete, disconnected decision events. This is the
defence of one's social and personal autonomy from potential outside con-
trol. It is manifested in a "passive" rationality, which eschews the "active"
rationality of framing values, goals, and choices, in others' terms, for them
to expropriate and manipulate. Unwelcome control encroaches via the
explication of formal, static definitions of values, utilities, etc., to be taken
off as inputs to alien decision techniques and processes. Contrary to the
central faith of decision analysis, freedom may be tantamount to maintain-
ing imprecision in values, which allows flexibility to negotiate them amongst
one's own complex social networks.
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In addition to historicity, decisions and risks for real people have
interlinkage across the issues as defined by analysts or decision makers.
Some of these social interlinkages and incompatible problem frameworks are
distantly indicated by the attributes analytically associated with given risks.
Thus, even the progressive versions of rational policy and decision analysis
that try to recognize public "concern", do so within a potentially self-
defeating framework in which "concern" is defined as an individual trait
that can be dealt with by enlarging a managerial decision-analytic tech-
nique, even though it may be aspects of the managerial decision-analytic
relationship itself that are causing the concern. It is a form of identity
stripping by policymakers from the very people it is supposed to serve. Ela-
borating the decision technique may only elaborate the problem, not the
solution, by even more comprehensively expropriating the lay person's
meanings into an alien framework represented by the social relationships of
control and management themselves.
11.8. Empirical Explorations: Compensation as Risk
Perception Decision Analysis
In this chapter I have suggested that elaborating decision-analytic tech-
niques by factoring in "concern" is worse than no use if that concern is, at
least indirectly, related to the use of such techniques in the first place.
One response is to explore ways of adapting the institutional struc-
tures and relationships instead; for example, by more openly recognizing
scientific ignorance, structural conflict, and lack of control, and to adopt
social structures that have a broader "control" of technology. Another
institutional response is to place more responsibility to define the
significance of the risks in local (risk-receiver) hands, as was attempted in
the Massachusetts hazardous wastes facility siting initiative and others that
followed it. This approach attempted to replace formal decision analysis by
direct empirical solutions to the economic regulatory question of "How
much are they willing to pay to avoid a certain risk increment" (or its
inverse, "How much would they have to be paid to accept it?"). It is worth
briefly considering this important approach here, to see how its general
premises about public perceptions and decisions relate to those already
discussed.
The idea of compensating people on whom extra risks fall - as in com-
munities asked to play host to hazardous facilities - is not especially new.
Whatever it has been called, past developments have often been accom-
panied by mitigating factors, ranging from design changes, through local
sports facilities or redeveloped wildlife areas, to direct and indirect financial
transfers. Providing local jobs and spin-off business is a form of "compensa-
tion". However, since the late 1970s, there has been an attempt to
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systematize and refine the principles of this approach, at least for the
important facility-siting aspect of regulation. The most definitive work in
this direction so far has been in the USA, especially that of O'Hare et al.
[67]. It offers a major advantage, in principle, over the approaches criticized
before, because of its strongly empirical core - indeed, the approach was
embodied by O'Hare in the Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Facility Siting
Act of 1980, and has been repeated in several similar Acts in other states.
The starting point for the "compensation" approach is the baneful role
of the statutory Environmental Impact Analysis, which pretends to be a
definitive environmental and socioeconomic risk analysis of development,
but which in reality is satisfactory and credible to none of the various
interested parties. Intransigence is built in to the process, whereby
definitive claims are (as is always possible) picked apart by whichever par-
ties wish to do so in the analysis of the impact statement. If, on the other
hand, parties can be shown that they have something to trade in negotia-
tion, and something to gain by it, and if they are helped to develop their
own information on impacts and risks pertinent to them, then they can con-
cretely define a well-informed "willingness to pay" or utility function, in the
process of real negotiations.
The approach recognizes a range of different currencies of negotiation
more subtle than money, and attempts to clarify under what circumstances
different currencies may be valid. It also recognizes that some issues simply
may not be amenable to compensation processes. According to O'Hare et
al. [68], the characteristics of a "compensable" siting issue include lack of
existing mistrust between parties and impacts that are clearly traceable.
This already hints at problems. Before discussing these, however, one
further aspect is worth highlighting for its connection with already esta-
blished questions.
O'Hare et al. recognized that decisions normally involve relationships
that have a history and a future. Indeed, in real issues, decisions as such
are difficult to identify. In calculating strategies, therefore, parties to a
decision take into account expectations created by previous experiences of
the other party. If it acted in an authoritarian fashion last time, they are
unlikely to expect a viable compensation, so may not even bother to enter
negotiation, instead adopting an intransigent stance from the outset. Like-
wise, present actions have a future effect, what are called "demoralization
costs". Therefore, carefully organized compensation may be a crucial ele-
ment, not only for current decisions. Contextual relationships, e.g., in the
future, must be considered. This is a valuable insight and already a major
advance from formal risk-decision analysis, which (except via categorically
inadequate terms like "regret") recognizes no such context. In tacitly recog-
nizing the continuing social relations of such decisions, in which such factors
as "demoralization" are carried, the compensation approach is a break from
the elaboration of managerial techniques criticized before; and it offers
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potential for engagement in the alternative, which those approaches conceal,
of considering the options for "institutional repackaging" of projects, regula-
tions, procedures, and so on.
However, this is where the underlying problems and questions re-
emerge, because although the compensation approach broadens the
currency of negotiation from money alone, it is still wholly framed within a
conception of narrow market relationships, where "we expect the public's
participation in the political and legal process to be motivated by concern
for individual utility [69]." Thus, the range of "compensation" options is
restricted by this framework. If a more "interactive", sociological frame-
work were used, the conceivable options could be extended to include struc-
tural changes in the forms of social control of the development in question
and any like it (as opposed to one-off design changes, for example). Also,
irreversible improvements in the institutional process of debate, analysis,
and decision could themselves be considered as "compensation" (whatever
the specific outcome) in a different political culture (and perhaps even the
USA one) that did not solely recognize individual utility. These would be
entirely consistent with the need to build future trust or to avoid
"demoralization" .
A further elaboration of this "social relations" dimension would be the
radical alteration of these relationships and expectations by the promulga-
tion of the same development proposal, or regulations, but with an explicit
public recognition that developers (perhaps the developer) and decision
makers had acted corruptly, incompetently, or insensitively in the past, but
had now recognized these errors and had attempted to learn from them. It
might then ask for social conciliation, a new, more modest start, and com-
mit itself to (what would presently be) an utterly deviant course of ac-
knowledging ignorance of risk-implications where that existed. This would
be attempting to share control, and it would also be asking for shared
responsibility in making decisions in the face of such realities. Whilst this
looks absurdly infeasible seen as a sudden step, viewed as a goal and a gra-
dually emergent alternative to present trends it might be more realistic and
attractive, and consistent with principles of social learning as opposed to
political deskilling.
In any case, the point is that despite valuable breaks with more formal
analytic approaches, the existing individualist framework of the compensa-
tion approach has a restricted capacity for conceptualizing wider institu-
tional options as part of risk-related regulations or developments to which
publics have to react. Nor does thi.s framework allow the possibility that in
negotiation, issues, perceptions, and evaluations cross-connect and interact,
but in different textures for different parties. Thus, the recognized problem
of how to identify which range of impacts to negotiate over is actually a
rephrasing of the question of how to bound and structure the problem, or
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the definition of the risk source, in the first place - a central theme of earlier
critical discussion.
The logical need to recognize equally legitimate, different basic prob-
lem definitions can be seen by examining the question of information. The
assumptions about knowledge in the O'Hare et al. approach are interesting
to explore. They recognize that, as direct users, interested parties are more
likely to develop the precise kind of risk-benefit information they need than
is an analysis that claims to be definitive for all and sundry. (This has long
been recognized as the rationale for adversary procedures.) Greater
efficiency and the crucial ingredient of market intelligence appears to result.
This is an advance on conventional one-dimensional assumptions about
information and "facts".
However, there is no reason why this approach should stop at different
parties' information development within a common problem definition. A
central reason why parties differ as to the kind of impacts deemed impor-
tant, and as to the kind of information they best need for a decision, is that
they are actually addressing a different decision problem, because it is set
by them in a different network of connecting problems, experiences, and
constraints. A decision problem may superficially appear the same at a
common intersection of two (or more) problem networks (e.g., of parties to
a siting issue), but the network connections of the problem to associated
problems are different for each party. That is, the meaning and definition
of "the" problem at the intersect is very different, even though it may
appear "the same". This is the underlying social generation of irresolvable
ambiguity, with which conventional rational decision analysis also cannot
cope. Such frameworks simply cannot carry the requisite information to
represent the authentic problems. Genuine information richness requires
that these deeper problem networks be brought out. The deeper roots of
public risk perceptions would then be discerned.
Allowing for pluralism of information, as do O'Hare et al., so as to
carry more overall information in the "decision system", should therefore
logically be allowed to lead to the explication and definition of the different
and implicit problem networks of the different parties. This is the most
information-rich, market-efficient solution. One can therefore derive a
sociological framework from the (undeveloped) principles of O'Hare et al. on
information.
The "lack of existing mistrust" requirement for compensation to be a
feasible risk-decision process also falls foul of a more substantially sociologi-
cal basis than the "individual utilities" framework can recognize. This is
illustrated by the troubling experience of one aspect of the Massachusetts
Siting Act. Under the law, a prospective developer must file a Notice of
Intent (NOI) with the State's Hazardous Waste Facility Site Safety Council,
which was brought into being by the Act. In an attempt to have formal
licensing after a negotiated agreement on principles (so as to avoid the early
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and often fatal polarization that licensing hearings engender), the Council
then makes a very rapid evaluation of whether the plan is "feasible and
deserving of state assistance". This was designed as no more than a very
crude sieve, to filter out frivolous projects registered only so as to qualify for
land-acquisition development funding or whatever, and any other "obvious"
means, e.g., unnecessary capacity or undesirable agents. It was never
designed as a detailed analysis (the Council had only 15 days to decide), nor
as indicating a presumption in favor of development, and thus emphatically
was not a focus of conflict - the intent was to avoid such early polarization.
Yet the NOI has constantly provoked vigorous and detailed opposition,
effectively defining it as a licensing step.
This contradiction in official definitions of the situation evidently
surprised O'Hare et al., who saw it as evidence of public misunderstanding
of the merely preliminary filter role of the NOI "feasible and deserving"
review, and of the need to better communicate its proper role. But this
interpretation indicates a lack of appreciation of an authentic social
rationality, that every step in a decision process, whatever the official
definition thereof, builds presumptions and momentum for later steps, and
so must be energetically fought. The step signifies far more informally than
it does formally - the gap is the social relations dimension: There is also
here a dimension of mistrust, which underlies the previous point, that prob-
lems and perceptions rationally interpenetrate one another in networks.
Thus, a more diffuse preexisting sense of anxiety and suspicion of "author-
ity" has already created a climate of mistrust when a developer makes a
move, even if the developer is unknown to that community. This is con-
sistent with the interpretation earlier of the perceived arbitrary, nonhuman
nature of "the efficient causes" in people's lives and their risks. Even
known, "positive image" developers may thus have a background threshold
of mistrust to overcome.
By partly acknowledging the context and historicity of decisions, but
then reducing this to individual utility functions, the compensation
approach as so far developed shares many key limitations of the formal
risk-decision analytic approaches. When the individual decision model is
scaled up to collective decisions, even when different attributes and different
utilities are recognized and elicited (analytically or empirically), the
automatic assumption is made that every individual (and individual group)
in the collective public policy setting is focusing on the same problem, with
the same intensity and the same relationship to "other problems" (e.g.,
future compensation) as every other actor. This obscures the crucial social
fact, that people are plying different routes through their own networks of
problems, interconnecting differently with other ones, and intersecting only
at certain points (e.g., when a so-called "risk issue" emerges) with the
different problem networks of other groups. The network affects the shape
of the group's problem at the intersect. Allowing groups to express their
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utilities in different currencies of compensation is not an answer to this
issue, because the "utilities" are still individual, and related to a single,
imposed problem definition. An adequate answer would need to facilitate
the expression of different prior problem definitions and concerns. In its
turn, since social control (too little, too much, or the wrong sort) is part of
the problem for some groups at least, this may require changes in the social
relations - i.e., institutional control - of the developments being sited or the
technologies being regulated.
11.9. Conclusions
The main theme of this chapter has been that the dominant approaches to
risk management and regulation have begun to take seriously the "public
perceptions" issue, but that they share a central flaw. Whether formal
analytical or formal empirical (compensation), they assume that individuals
are the only seat of value, and that social interaction and its patterns of loy-
alty, identity, and trust are merely secondary instruments for the optimiza-
tion of these primary values - individual utilities. Concern or "risk aver-
sion" is then assumed to be solely an individual cognitive-emotional entity,
which can be reduced to and factored into such individual utility functions
without qualitative transformation of its meaning. The social rooting of
concern in the threat to cherished social relationships and identification is
inconceivable to this approach, because social relationships do not have
intrinsic value in themselves. This analytical framework does not merely
omit part of reality, but systematically, by definition, denies value and
meaning to a part of reality that may be highly meaningful to people; it is,
therefore, not just incomplete, but antagonistic.
I have argued that this approach has been buttressed by an unneces-
sarily psychologistic interpretation of good psychological work which indi-
cates, even if it does not directly show, the social grounding of risk percep-
tion. In various forms of decision analysis relating to risk decisions, even in
progressive attempts to address public concern, these social relationships
are not only not recognized, but they are effectively said to be worthless,
when the very experience of "worthlessness" via the expropriation of mean-
ings into alien, inaccessible systems of social control (such as decision
analysis) is arguably already the generator of that diffuse concern in the
first place. This social alienation of the "effective causes" of risks, the con-
densation of this experience of unintelligible social control onto extra-human
symbols [70] and, the consequent brittleness and polarization of policy
debate, was then illustrated from empirical and theoretical work in sociol-
ogy and psychiatry. The associated processes of social embrittlement or
political deskilling are consistent with the growing use of science for public
reassurance (as analyzed at length in Chapter 10), which, being based upon
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false premises, may actually contribute to rising background anxiety. These
reassurance roles of science amplify the social inaccessibility of the institu-
tional decision processes that they are defending, because they conceal
rather than explicate fundamental conflicts, uncertainties, and inherent
ignorance.
Overall, the analysis in this chapter indicates that there is a much
deeper, more pervasive, and intractable problem of public concern than nor-
mal approaches recognize, even remotely. This deeper anxiety is always an
integral part of the concern engendered in specific issues.
It could be argued that since this "concern" and the associated credi-
bility problems always plague us, whether in public or interpersonal situa-
tions, we should not become too neurotic about it. Deriving from this is a
practical argument against the kind of analysis I have given, that there is
always bound to be such social stratification, and exposing the basic socio-
logical roots of concern over risks is only to encourage a kind of fundamen-
talism that would destroy all public institutional authority, and thus social
life as we know it. This is a legitimate point of view and deserves to be
taken seriously. I therefore return to it in the final chapter. The essence of
my reply is that I have criticized certain deeply embedded myths of
rationality and authority in public decision making, not because they are
myths, but because they are inadequate myths, degenerative rather than
enabling. All it is necessary to say here is that the abundant existence of
increasingly active and, on its own terms, successful public opposition to
regulation of hazardous wastes does not prove that public acceptance or
credibility is decreasing, from whatever cause. An equally plausible sugges-
tion is that public "acceptance" has never amounted to much more than
passive toleration, and that the significant change is not in that (always
rather low) level of public credulity, but in what we are now demanding of
it. The rapid changes and increasingly inaccessible social control of the
technological innovations that "drive" those changes may simply be expos-
ing an uncomfortable fact about public trust in decision making institutions
that has hitherto been more easily concealed.
The last three chapters have given a rather theoretical analysis of sci-
ence, institutional credibility, and public risk perception in regulation. This
chapter may seem to have digressed wildly from the main theme of the
book, but I have tried to show a fundamental identity between the way sci-
ence is being caught up in institutional processes of credibility management
and the way "rationality" is employed to structure institutional responses to
public concern. These problems go far wider than hazardous wastes to the
more general question of how institutions handle uncertainty and conflict in
the modern climate. The "risk-averse" approach, of suppressing ignorance
and denying conflicting rationalities, predominates at present, but badly
structured risk problems especially call for an alternative strategic stance in
which these are accomodated, not suppressed with increasing strain and cost
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to credibility anyway. In the final chapter I knit this argument together
with a discussion of the more empirical comparative case study work on
hazardous wastes, so as to develop certain suggestions about the practical
development of approaches to hazardous waste management and, indeed, to
regulation generally.
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CHAPTER 12
Summary and Conclusions
Brian Wynne
The main aim of this book has been to examine risk management in the new
context of rising public concern about risks and the bodies supposed to be
controlling them. We have attempted to pursue this objective by compara-
tive empirical analysis of a relatively ill-structured risk management issue,
where the problems of implementation and the basic definitions themselves
are especially prominent. The shift of focus in this book to include com-
parative analysis of forms of legitimation as well as of specific regulations or
procedures is justified by the evident fact that the fastest-growing problem
for regulators is to make any regulation decision work, which includes mak-
ing it implementable and credible. Since images of science and rationality
are embedded in structures and processes of authority, it should be hardly
surprising to find that not only technical regulations, but even basic norma-
tive definitions of what constitutes "science" or "rational method", are
shaped by national political cultures. I have introduced the key idea that
science, or risk analysis, is playing two roles in regulation. It is involved
simultaneously in a descriptive (empirical) discourse - measuring risks, con-
trol mechanisms, etc. - and in a (symbolic) discourse of persuasion or
justification - negotiating the credibility of risk analyses, regulations, etc.
These discourses are not separate, but interpenetrate. Furthermore,
although the arenas may change, this dualism also exists in the practice of
science not involved in public issues.
Our overall analytical ambitions have inevitably left a somewhat bifur-
cated book, with Chapters 4-8 focusing on case studies, and Chapters 9-11
on the more abstract analysis of interactions between regulatory uses of
rationality, public risk perceptions, and dominant "rational" modes of
response to public concern. The latter chapters are crucial to understand
how the regulatory practices of risk management are to be seen in relation
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to public perceptions. The interpretation provided here indicates that an
adequate response to that concern would need to go beyond conventional
notions of "back end" regulation and challenge dominant cultural beliefs
about the sanctity of technological innovation.
Here I first draw together the main points that arise from each
chapter, and then attempt to integrate the more theoretical questions of
later chapters with the earlier more empirical materials. The later chapters
provide a basis for thinking about the significance of the relatively new, and
fundamentally different practical context of public justification which regu-
lation is now encountering. Even in the USA, where this dimension has
been more pronounced, it is only really the last decade that has seen its rise
to predominance in the ethos of government, and even then largely around
the two youngest regulatory bodies that are striving for credibility, OSHA
and EPA.
Rather than repeat what are now fairly well-worn analytical tracks in
the comparison of regulation, therefore, I attempt to develop a different per-
spective by asking questions about the role of science and rational decision
methods as a discourse of public authority. I try to show that rational
knowledge is organically rooted in social relationships, as part of a broader
discourse of authority. Although differences in institutional relationships,
cultural "styles", or administrative tradition can be seen systematically to
influence specific approaches to technical choices in regulation, they also
influence the forms of political discourse about those choices - their social
meaning and their validity or legitimation.
The notion of effectiveness, which often motivates comparative policy
analysis, is not easy to define, let alone fill out with realistic information on
its degree of actual fulfillment. All that can be said, at least in the case of
hazardous wastes, is that every country has good reason to ask itself
whether it has a right to expect public assent. Effectiveness is an inherently
nebulous yardstick, but it necessarily includes questions about whether
regulation can command public credibility (and for more reason than the
real point that practical compliance is likely to be better if regulations and
related arrangements are widely regarded as the best possible). It is cer-
tainly the case that credibility of regulation depends upon more than just
the material effectiveness of waste management.
Risk assessment as a technical-analytical activity has been developed
in this dualistic context of analysis pervaded by a concern for persuasion
way beyond the boundaries of a private technical sub-culture. The legi-
timacy of this combination of roles, or interests, should not obscure the
extreme complication that it creates, especially when (as has been true)
there is little awareness of or reflection upon it. This is especially prob-
lematic when we take into account the interactions between the forms of
analysis-persuasion and public experience and response. The general line of
argument in this chapter is that, granted the significant differences of
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institutional "style" between regulatory systems, even in modes of
attempted legitimation, there are some common processes embedded within
all these different institutional frameworks. Thus, in completing this book a
discussion of the comparative analysis of technical institutional interactions
is followed by a discussion of some general principles for appropriate institu-
tional mechanisms for regulation; but this is then enlarged into a more stra-
tegic discussion of appropriate response to the growing "legitimation crisis"
within which risk analysis and science more generally are being (largely des-
tructively) entangled.
I regard the last strand as critical for improved practical effects, how-
ever we define them in detail. In case it is seen as academic, daily experi-
ence indicates that the chemical waste issue may follow the paralyzing and
destructive route of the nuclear waste problem, unless different approaches
can be developed. Yet if this does happen, even in part, there will be far
more pervasive effects on whole economies, communities, and political sys-
tems. Despite all the fandango, nuclear energy is a relatively insignificant
part of the industrial scene compared with chemicals in general.
Before returning to the regulation-legitimation discussion, however,
we pick out the main points from the previous chapters.
12.1. The Main Points So Far
Risk analysis as a formal scientific attempt to quantify risks and evaluate
controlling mechanisms is being increasingly used - or at least, looked to for
use - in regulating hazardous wastes. At first sight this appears to conflict
with the inherent structural properties of this particular issue, which are
incompatible with the precision and standardization that formal analysis
involves. These issue properties were described in Chapter 3. This there-
fore raises the question of why there is such an interest in more formal,
scientific risk analysis. Of course, part of the answer is that even inherently
ill-defined risk-generating processes can still benefit in parts from a more
uniform, quantified definition of the risks and their controlling factors.
Nevertheless, we noted that formal risk analysis, often using elaborate
models, is virtually always developed, used, or demanded when credibility is
at stake, and conflicting policy positions are being advocated. More formal
precision, it is assumed, will close the argument. More cynically, formal
models are seen as a form of white magic to "prove" whatever stance policy
elites wish to establish in public minds.
The symbolic role of science in projecting public definitions of
managed risks, technical controls, reliable methods, etc., involves the propa-
gation of universalistic models of risk processes and situations, analytical
methods, and controlling responses. Standardized and precise risk models,
test protocols, etc., are the result. In order to arrive at something resem-
bling an analytical model, sheer guesswork of breathtaking proportions has
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frequently been undertaken, and the variability and uncertainties of real
risk situations are heavily understated. Thus, the significance of Chapter 3
is to point out how hazardous waste is an issue particularly incongenial to
risk management approaches that reflect these universalistic tendencies.
Some political cultures emphasize these more than others, but the point
about the public credibility problem is that normal policy responses every-
where are accelerating the impetus toward analytic standardization, unifor-
mity, and precision (as, e.g., in formal models), with potentially damaging
results to credibility and realism. Decision-rule transparency is often
equated with standardization. Chapter 3 introduced the important distinc-
tion between "intrinsic" and "situation-specific" risks, and the importance
here of the complex and indeterminate technical-behavioral life-cycle of
wastes. It also raised a point developed in Chapters 9 and 10, that a risk
analysis is always a simulation of a postulated risk-generating process.
Whether the analytic model corresponds to reality, and how flexible it can
be in reflecting variability in reality, are very different questions from its
"internal" consistency and robustness [1]. Large-scale ignorance of the basic
structural framing of analytical problems is falsely represented in conven-
tional scientific approaches as a marginal, probabilistic uncertainty in
analytical parameters and data.
Thus, the complex behavioral life-cycle, heterogeneity, and lack of
"structure" in the hazardous waste issue make it a different order of prob-
lem from conventional pollution issues, especially in the light of the "public
acceptance" dimension. The fact that "hazardous waste" leaves a factory
on the back of a wagon, to be exchanged between social-economic actors,
rather than in the air or water is of the utmost significance to implementa-
tion, public reaction, and the role of risk analysis. Other important struc-
tural features analyzed in Chapter 3 were:
(1) Paradoxically, regulation of hazardous waste requires a new industry
[of treatment and disposal (T&D)] to be developed, yet also closely
regulated. Fostering a new industry under such close regulation and
extreme public concern is a major policy dilemma, and allows the
existence of institutionally consolidated but fundamentally conflicting
perceptions and issue definitions, especially between policy center and
periphery.
(2) Hazardous waste is very far from a unitary regulatory issue. The
diversity of waste producers, types, conditions, movements, disposal
methods, and economic relationships suggests extreme heterogeneity of
problem definitions, risk types, and therefore, possibly, also of
appropriate regulatory policies.
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(3) The implications of this heterogeneity are further amplified by the
complex behavioral life-cycle of hazardous waste, in which it may
change its (socially conferred) nature. This more direct behavioral
responsibility and the "packaged" or "concentrated" property of
hazardous waste means that more intense, localized health or environ-
mental effects are possible (with consequent effects on public reaction),
and more direct, possibly dramatic social intervention is feasible (e.g.,
political refusal of cross-border transfer of wastes). Apart from any-
thing else, these factors render the issue more liable to social instabil-
ity and surprise in its management, and intensify the policy "need" to
project reassurance and consistency.
(4) The complex, variable physical-behavioral life-cycle of waste means
that there is no such thing as the "intrinsic" hazard of a given waste.
The status of "hazard" or "waste" is variable according to the
material's life-cycle situation, including the socioeconomic definition
used by its handlers. This is a combination of social, cultural, and
physical-technical determinants.
Thus, risk management has to find a practical way of resolving a ten-
sion between system-wide risk management considerations (like public reas-
surance, a centralized role) and situation-specific risk definitions and
controls.
Hazardous waste is a "last frontier" issue, in that it was regulated
later than "dispersive" waste emission to air and water. The attempt to
internalize properly in production costs the "externalities" of environmental
and health damage has been undermined by the transfer of waste, which
was previously dispersed, into (unregulated or loosely regulated) concen-
trated hazardous wastes, in the form of filter sludges, slags, dusts, etc.
Enforcing proper T&D here therefore has no alternative but to try to force
the costs back "upstream", to internalize them in production costs, because
there is no other medium left to which the externalities can be diverted.
Hence, there is even more pressure on the regulation sphere to dilute pre-
vailing scientific ignorance and lack of control into a false sense of accept-
ably managed risks. There are also potentially- more severe conflicts
between industrial and environmental interests, with regulators trying to
manage a correspondingly more unstable middle ground. The considera-
tions of Chapters 9 and 10 thus grow in significance for this issue.
These and other inherent structural issue properties of hazardous
wastes are also significant for their direct interpenetration with cultural fac-
tors and the social dimensions of risk perception and institutional credibil-
ity. These connections are developed through the case study chapters. In
the Dutch case in Chapter 4, we highlight the point that environmental
issues, like public policy decision-making generally, are socially constructed.
They have no naturally given boundaries, shape, or logic. Even after
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"definition" via formal legislation and enactment of precise regulations,
different actors in the regulatory arena are still able to define the issue in
diverse ways, according to their cultural-organizational situation. This
extends even to subtle redefinition of technical regulatory definitions and
meanings into diverse practical frameworks, and this negotiability is
extremely resilient to the apparent constraints of increasing uniformity and
precision of the official "standard" regulatory criteria. Rules never contain
an intrinsic logic of application to specific cases. The idea that one can
obtain more effective rules by focusing effort on strengthening the rules
rather than on the means of their practical interpretation is false [2].
This general point is important, especially for this book's emphasis
upon implementation. The Dutch case shows a large component of regula-
tion to be that of central bodies trying to control local regulatory bodies, as
well as regulators controlling waste handlers. In reality, whatever values
may have been "officially" negotiated into predominance in the formal regu-
latory policy, they have almost to be renegotiated all over again at the point
of implementation and enforcement. The rationality of implementation and
enforcement is not one of defective perception or diligence at local levels,
but of the local management of a set of conflicting constraints and values
that create a different technical-institutional problematique from that
envisaged in policy making at more central levels [3].
This perspective consolidates the point made throughout the present
book, and consistent with a major theme in recent years in policy analysis,
that it is important to integrate analysis of implementation processes with
that of policy- or rule-making per se [4]. This has become especially impor-
tant in the light of growing political recognition of implementation
"failures" in many areas, and the consequent loss of authority on the part of
regulatory institutions generally. For hazardous wastes indeed, their hetero-
geneity and extensive behavioral life-cycles make it difficult logically to con-
ceive of the traditional sharp split between the main phase of centralized
regulatory policymaking, followed by the relatively trivial "technical" phase
of policy implementation. Policy- or rule-making in the hazardous waste
case effectively has to be dispersed into the more decentralized and incre-
mental arenas of "implementation", because this intrinsic situational diver-
sity is so dominant [5]. As already noted, even control over what is to count
as waste has to be partly relinquished to autonomous actors.
After showing how the inherent heterogeneity of the issue encourages
and accentuates the conflicting rationalities of problem definition, in
Chapter 5 we then applied the same analytical orientation to the central
technical pillar of hazardous waste regulation; namely, the definition of
"hazardous waste" for legal regulatory purposes. In the Dutch case, cen-
trally defined quantitative hazard criteria were shown to be interpreted
flexibly and divergently at local levels, according to local social factors.
Hazard classification systems are generally the first and key regulatory step,
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since they define the population of wastes (and, thus, the waste producers,
handlers, and disposers) that must be subjected to controls. Especially in
view of the growing international transport of waste, these frameworks need
to be clear, precise, and consistent. Yet, an analysis of the process of estab-
lishment of hazard classification systems in the FRG, USA, Austria, UK,
and the Netherlands shows that each "local" technical hazard classification
is different, because different technical methods and combinations have been
employed, embodying different national (and in the FRG case, state)
administrative norms, interests, and social assumptions. This is a very
important insight for practical policy, because both within and between
sovereign regulatory systems the usual response to implementation loop-
holes and public disillusionment has been to call for more technical preci-
sion and uniformity in defining "hazardous waste". This could be regarded
as a symbolic projection, or reassurance ritual, but the fact is that regula-
tors also act as if they believe in it, which thus affects material regulatory
practice, and is not merely "external" rhetoric [6].
As the Dutch case showed ·within a single regulatory system, so
Chapter 5 shows comparatively, between systems, that technical norms and
criteria embody corresponding implicit behavioral-institutional prescrip-
tions or assumptions. Technical knowledge is not context free. What was
informally exercised diversity of practical interpretation within the Dutch
system is more structurally embedded and systematic at the international
comparative level. At both levels technical standards are socially con-
structed, as social languages reflecting their institutional setting. At neither
level, however, is it yet recognized that institutional diversity is tacitly
determining what is taken to be only technical lack of rigor or coordination.
A practical conclusion from this analysis is that attempts to plug
growing international "leakages" of hazardous wastes, just like local imple-
mentation lapses, will not succeed by continuing to entertain the fallacy
that a more rigorous standardization of technical hazard classifications is
the solution. Regulatory dislocation is due to more than the lack of techni-
cal rigor or standardization alone. This, it seems, can be carried so far, but
then runs up against the implicit need to standardize the different national
institutional assumptions, cultural traditions of decision making, etc.,
embedded in different national technical frameworks.
The misleading drift of current policy thinking is allowed to survive
because of the belief that there is an intrinsic natural meaning and
definition of "hazardous waste", out there in nature, which should be
revealed uniformly by more rigorous scientific scrutiny, whatever the local
starting point. Our analysis shows in a very concrete, empirical way that
this concept of scientific knowledge and method as prior to and separate
from social factors - facts clearly separated from values - is fallacious and
damaging [7]. This corresponds with insights gained from social and histor-
ical analyses of science, that scientific knowledge is always context bound
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and unable to provide a universal basis of values or norms. The "rules"
represented by scientific theories and concepts do not contain the meaning
of their practical application to situations [8], and elaborating those
theories, concepts, or rules does not overcome this inherent difficulty. It is
not a viable alternative to making the means of practical application more
resilient.
The belief that science can reveal "the" precise, universal definition of
hazardous waste leads to intensified attempts to standardize international
hazardous waste classifications, with the attendant growth of international
regulatory bureaucracy and bureaucratized scientific analysis to support the
definitions (as critically analyzed in Chapter 10). An alternative is to reduce
the amounts of hazardous waste that the international system has to carry.
In other words, there may be more benefit than previously recognized by
resisting the pressure for a free international commercial movement of
wastes and instead seeking the institutional mechanisms for better local
couplings of waste arisings with T &D facilities in the same region.
In addition, and addressing part of the same overall problem, the
insight that there is no scientific, context-free definition of "hazardous" or
"waste" means that there may be greater benefits than usually perceived
through institutionally reducing the indeterminacy, complexity, and mul-
tiparty nature of a typical waste life-cycle, which cannot be adequately con-
trolled by technical definitions.
In Chapter 6, we examined two states of the FRG - Bavaria and
Hessen - that have attempted to do this by statutory public ownership of
wastes (and the attendant risks), consigning them to publicly managed
T &D companies. In this institutional option, the regulatory responsibility
effectively merges with the T&D management operation, and the whole pro-
cess of risk discrimination and matching with appropriate T&D options
becomes more organizationally unified, internal to a public company. It is
therefore less behaviorally uncertain and, at the same time, more available
for regulatory oversight because it is physically (and organizationally) less
dispersed and heterogeneous. There are, of course, other problems with this
institutional arrangement; and in the European context it has become
controversial because the waste export bans imposed on local waste produc-
ers to ensure adequate input to the state's public facilities are said to con-
travene the principles of free trade given in the Treaty of Rome. Neverthe-
less, without prejudice to these other aspects of the overall argument, our
analysis tends to support something like this kind of institutional structure,
because of its regional coherence and the freshly perceived extra need (fol-
lowing Chapter 5) to reduce the pressure on international movements of
waste due to the intrinsic limitations of technical harmonization.
In Chapter 7 we examined the regulatory system of the UK, which is
highly decentralized in both this and its T &D industry. In further contrast
with the FRG states analyzed in Chapter 6, UK regulation and T&D are
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decoupled, T&D being nearly totally in private industrial hands. Imple-
mentation of regulatory standards and definitions at the local level was the
focus of this chapter, with special attention to the combined effects of:
(1)
(2)
(3)
Extreme local responsibility, even for the interpretation of highly
technical but not practically precise hazard definitions.
A burden of proof in enforcement upon the regulator, not the waste
producer or handler.
A regulatory policy focus on T&D site licensing (the back end of the
waste life-cycle) rather than on the clear classification and control of
waste arisings.
It was found that, in principle, the discretionary, flexible character of
the UK use of technical standards, and the institutional dispersion of regu-
latory responsibility, correspond with the structural issue properties and
risk factors described in Chapter 3. However, in the UK this institutional
dispersion is structured so as to leave small local authorities with responsi-
bility, yet limited institutional control. The responsible local authorities
simply do not have the concentration of resources and legal-administrative
instruments that are necessary to give effective practical interpretation of
complex legal-technical definitions, nor to perform all the associated infor-
mal interactions with industry that such a discretionary system demands.
Their institutional uncertainties are large. The options are either to make
the institutional basis of regulation stronger (e.g., by consolidating into
regional groups with stronger professional training, etc.) or to alter the
technical instruments of regulation to be more universal and simple, but less
flexible standards, such as specific concentration thresholds for chemical
constituents (as in the Dutch system).
The UK case shows particularly clearly an important general point,
which we emphasize, about the interaction of technical and institutional fac-
tors in regulation. Technical standards are a code for prescribed behavioral
relationships and rules. To the extent that institutional traditions and rela-
tionships are predictable and trustworthy to those involved, elaborate and
inflexible codes are not necessary in order to regulate behavior (which is the
real focus of regulation in managing risks). It can be "regulated" acceptably
as behavior unfolds, via ad hoc, informal negotiation [9]. Imprecise techni-
cal norms, or incomplete decision rules, could therefore be seen as necessary
to uphold long-established institutional-cultural traditions in the UK sys-
tem. However, this UK culture of mutual institutional confidence and infor-
mality decreasingly incorporates the local authorities (who are the key regu-
latory actors). The lack of transparency of risk-assessment decision rules in
the UK is also leading to concern about inconsistency and lack of public
acceptability. The UK style of regulation appears, therefore, to be entering
a period of flux, signified by a chronic dispute over the proper nature of
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technical standards, but more fundamentally about the proper institutional
distribution of regulatory resources and authority.
Although Europe is often taken to be uniform in comparative research,
we argue that the Netherlands has, in important respects, an opposite insti-
tutional climate to that of the UK, especially between different actors within
regulation; hence the Dutch use precise, inflexible technical standards. The
US setting is even more comprehensively unpredictable and lacking in inter-
institutional trust. Hence, the most elaborately precise and formal, all-
embracing, uniform, and inflexible technical regulations were established,
even if they were arguably unenforceable in practice, as witnessed by the
need for Congressional reauthorization [10]. The UK's informal, discretion-
ary system is only viable to the extent that it can successfully incorporate
the many local waste disposal authorities, and its apparent failure to do this
could push it toward the Dutch or US use of (more elaborate) technical sur-
rogates for the growing institutional uncertain ty.
An important example of the general institutional determination of
practical technical policies is the UK commitment to the landfill codisposal
of toxic wastes with domestic wastes, which is regarded as a deviant and
backward policy by many other countries. The UK view that this system
carries an acceptably low risk seems to be based upon an undeclared
assumption of an ideal social world of implementation of site selection,
licensing, and inspection and monitoring of nearly 5 000 landfills by nearly
200 local authorities, with a free-enterprise handling and disposal infrastruc-
ture. What may be an acceptable, locally variable but highly optimized risk
system in theory, may be worse overall than one that assumes a dubious
implementation world, and simply restricts landfill a priori. The apparently
lesser technical optimality of this approach (e.g., in the USA, and FRG)
may be justified by the different institutional premises that structure it.
Whatever the relative merits and realities of different technical policies,
their existence and effectiveness can only be understood by reference to
their institutional and cultural context.
A further important insight from the UK case study was the funda-
mentally different perceptions of their mutual relationships by the major
institutional actors in regulation. This was reflected in the conflict of views
between industry and local authorities about the universality ("objectively
ascertainable fact") or private control ("exclusive knowledge") of specialist
information about wastes. Industry argued that the burden of proof in
defining special wastes should not rest with the waste producer, because in
legal formality the regulator has access to the necessary regulatory
knowledge. Central government supported the industry view. In practice,
however, this formal definition of industry-local authority relationships, and
the corresponding social distribution of key knowledge, borders on fantasy.
As local authority representatives argued, the idea that a typical local
authority is on an equal information footing with all its waste producers for
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all waste streams is preposterous. The constraints and realities that define
the local rationality of implementation are inconsistent with the rationality
embodied in official definitions and justifications of regulations.
Another symptom of deeper institutional conflicts in perceptions of the
very meaning of regulation and its corresponding social relationships
involved the conflicting interpretations of the role of the UK consignment
note system, regardless of its formally defined role.
These and other examples indicate the important point - developed in
Chapter 9 - that institutional conflict or "structural uncertainty" among
social actors is more fundamental than the technical imprecision or uncer-
tainty that is the currency of conventional risk assessment. Scientists and
regulatory bureaucracies tend automatically to process the former into an
appearance of only the latter. As argued in Chapters 9-11, this eventually
undermines their public credibility and also underexpresses the back-end
ignorance and costs of current waste management. It is an inadequate
channel of feed-back from back end to front end, and its inadequacy is sys-
tematically (though not conspiratorially) re-created in the prevailing lan-
guage about uncertainty.
The Hungarian case study described in Chapter 8 illustrates further
institutional dimensions of the management of hazardous wastes. It
emphasizes the basic point that arose in the Dutch case, that all the para-
phernalia of formal risk analysis and associated regulations are quite
irrelevant without the necessary industrial infrastructure for actually prac-
ticing controlled T&D; and these are, in turn, impossible without the neces-
sary investments. This also underscores the point made earlier, that central
governments define the hazardous waste issue first and foremost as a prob-
lem of industrial innovation and the defense of a fledgling (T&D) industry,
while local authorities and other groups see it as a regulatory problem.
From the latter vantage point, the T&D industry is seen more as part of the
problem than as part of the solution. Granted their common priority to
nurture an inherently fragile industry, however, governments have adopted
very different practical approaches; those that have grasped the public
investment nettle (usually in partnership with T &D customers, that is,
waste producers) have, on the whole, performed better at providing a stable
T&D capacity than have those, like the USA and the UK (and, before 1985,
the Netherlands) that have left it to private enterprise. The evidence is that
public investment in one form or another will become increasingly necessary
to ensure a viable and progressive T&D industry. Furthermore, this
political-economic initiative is a more fundamental step than the secondary
question of what specific regulations are to be established.
Despite a lack of T&D infrastructure, and relatively slight research
resources, Hungary also has an elaborate hazardous waste classification
scheme, akin to formal risk analysis. However, it was borrowed from the
Austrian and FRG systems rather than developed within the Hungarian
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context. Whether this is relevant to the Hungarian spectrum of industrial
production or to its institutional processes of regulation generally is a moot
point. There is, for example, an interesting institutional dimension specific
to a centrally planned economy that potentially alters the whole focus of
regulation. Such systems have an established practice of collecting produc-
tion process data, which could help provide better upstream waste regula-
tion, thus reducing waste arisings. This access to production decisions is
largely impossible in market or mixed economies because competition
(absent in Hungarian industry) causes extreme anxiety about keeping such
"internal" information private. Even accurate waste-arisings information is
difficult to obtain, because of the same alleged fears of industrial espionage.
Thus, the appropriate and feasible point of regulation in the overall life-
cycle also varies with the general political-economic system. In general, the
Hungarian institutional climate encourages classification of process types
according to some kind of toxic waste output index, whereas Western
economies focus on waste classification or disposal-site classification.
Each point of intervention in the overall behavioral system involves
regulation of a different set of specific practices, actors, and relationships -
it therefore requires different information, different forms of risk analysis,
and a different set of technical and institutional instruments. Development
of appropriate technical tools has to be sensitive to such differences, which
are not always clear-cut, as significant national variances within the EC's
toxic and dangerous waste framework demonstrate.
It is interesting to note that Hungary has seen public opposition to
hazardous waste facility siting plans, and this opposition has been success-
ful. It may be worth considering this as a reflection of a different balance
between the cultural awareness of environmental risks and the available lev-
els of economic investment from the typical situation in market economies.
The standard notion that "environmentalism" only comes with "post-
industrial" affluence and values might be undermined by a close examina-
tion of this phenomenon. Unfortunately, we did not have the opportunity
to follow this up.
12.2. Uncertainties - Institutionalizing Ignorance
In Chapters 9-11, I attempt to abstract some more general, theoretical
insights and to analyze more fully the public credibility dimension. The
prime focus is upon the nature of uncertainties and the interaction between
technical and institutional uncertainties in regulation. Following especially
Chapter 5, Chapter 9 shows that the conventional policy approach generally
attributes implementation weaknesses to uncertainty (e.g., in the volumes of
waste arisings) and peripheral lapses in performance. The uncertainty is
assumed to be a lack of observational precision or analytical rigor, including
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the lack of clarity as to legal-technical definitions. This corresponds with
observations on the Dutch and US systems, that institutional behavioral
uncertainty between the relevant parties leads to the elaboration of
inflexible technical norms to try to reduce the uncertainty. This generates a
"need" for more precise and universal risk analysis; and the generation of
risk knowledge via methods of analysis and testing also becomes more
inflexibly prescribed by regulatory bureaucracies, whether or not these for-
mal models and methods correspond with real risk situations.
We show that, in reality, even apparently concrete unambiguously dis-
coverable facts, such as volumes of waste arisings, are unavoidably subject
to social construction through the ways that institutional actors and
interests define terms (such as "hazardous" or "waste") and make necessary
supplementary judgments. Many of these are behavioral judgments that
are indeterminate and represent implicit conflicts of basic perspective, or
structural uncertainty in the system, rather than the lack of technical
resolution.
In Chapter 9 this fundamental distinction between technical and
structural uncertainty was clarified by considering technologies or risk-
generating systems as organizational-technical networks. In theory such
multipolar networks are fully coordinated, but this is impossible in practice,
and cross-cutting commitments and rationalities mean that conflict and lack
of coordination is built into the system, even if inadvertently. With this
perspective on technology it is also easier to see that expert disagreement is
not merely a function of lack of data and precision or "transcience" (which
is what the traditional focus on zero-infinity risks naturally highlights); it is
endemic, because it involves different definitions of the risk-generating sys-
tem or technology. As an automatic property of scientific method, technical
experts tend to strip their risk definitions of the implicit
social-organizational assumptions and parameters that underpin and frame
the technical model that is the basis of their formal risk analysis. Although
it may have less serious implications, even for highly structured technologies,
I argue that expert disagreement can be seen as a function of different
expert definitions of the relevant technology. In more heterogeneous,
dispersed systems, such as pesticides use and hazardous waste management,
these system definitions or problem structures can become far more seri-
ously dislocated. Participants' experiences of a dispersed technological sys-
tem are objectively different, in terms of both technical parameters and
social relationships. Indeed, the very notion of expertise becomes more
problematic because no single discipline can claim to comprehend all the
dispersed nodes of the system and its interconnections, and some highly
relevant forms of knowledge of the system's operation or effects may hardly
be organized at all [11]. This point was most graphically illustrated in
Chapter 9 with the example of the conflict between scientific toxicologists
and farm workers (plus their clinical doctors) over the safety of 2,4,5-T.
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The point of the more theoretical analysis offered in Chapter 9 and
outlined above is to prepare the way for a very different interpretation,
given in Chapter 11, of the public perception (and, thus, public rationality)
problem from that which dominates current policy thinking and "scientific"
risk-perception studies. The approach in Chapter 9 is consistent with the
argument that modern technologies do not have "impacts" on an essentially
passive, static physical and social environment - they create "interference
effects" by active, but unforeseen, interference with other proliferating tech-
nological networks [12]. The degree of ignorance and inevitable unforeseea-
bility of such effects is of a different, less controllable quality than the
former sort of impact; yet it is not reflected in any risk-analytic methods.
The standard approaches:
(1) Gloss over and misrepresent ignorance and structural uncertainty as
probabilistic uncertainty in "known" relationships.
(2) Attempt subjective probability analysis of expert judgments using
Bayesian statistical methods.
(3) Bracket off ignorance and structural uncertainty as not a part of risk
analysis, but as a policy responsibility.
A typical example of the first kind is where plant discharges of toxic
materials lead to exposures. Models of environmental movement, transfor-
mation, accumulation, etc., are developed and human doses estimated.
Dose-effect models are then used to estimate health damage. Analyses of
uncertainties then center, often elaborately, upon "data gaps and modeling
assumptions" [13], once the pollutants, exposure pathways, and population
of concern have been identified. The larger uncertainties (more authenti-
cally called ignorance, as outlined before) as to whether the model whose
uncertainties are being analyzed is even modeling the relevant pollutants,
pathways, or populations are not within the frame of attention. This was
exemplified in the official 1984 inquiry into the incidence of excess childhood
leukemias around the controversial Sellafield (Windscale) UK nuclear repro-
cessing plant [14). The inquiry (and all its critics) focused entirely upon the
plant's (large) marine discharges of radioactivity, and concluded, from
known discharge rates and environmental and dose-effect models, that the
observed excess cancer rates were 40 times higher than estimated from the
models. Uncertainty in the models was analyzed and regarded as unlikely
to bridge such a factor of 40. While this particular uncertainty analysis is
itself questionable, the more significant point here is that the whole of the
analysis and ensuing debate accepted this particular scientific frame of
reference. At least one other potential pathway - totally different - was
entirely ignored; namely, the "dirty worker effect" whereby employees are
contaminated at the plant, bring home the contamination, and their families
suffer exposure.
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Another example was the explosion of an underground valve house in
the Abbeystead UK water transfer scheme after civil engineers had vented
the water tunnel. A methane explosion killed 16 and maimed the rest of a
party of visitors being shown the plant (ironically, for reassurance about
flooding). The engineers, operating within a physical engineering cognitive
framework, had totally ignored the possibility of methane generation in the
tunnel, even though in other social and professional networks this appears
to have been standard knowledge. Interestingly, also, the elaborate Euro-
pean "Seveso Directive", designed to control risks at hazardous chemicals
plants, contains no provisions that would have prevented this accident,
because the installation was not to anyone's knowledge using or storing
hazardous chemicals (there were not even any "no-smoking" signs).
This overall approach, therefore, focuses upon known uncertainties
only - that is, uncertainties that can be reduced to probabilistic methods.
It then acts as though it has thereby comprehended all uncertainties.
The second approach to uncertainty, which fences it off as not the
responsibility of risk analysis, is still only conscious of definable uncertainty
- of what is knowably unknowable - such as which dose-effect model should
be used to estimate low-dose human effects? It sometimes recognizes that
analysis may be intrinsically evaluative, but then refers to the choice of
inferences across known uncertainties, as if this represents the only type of
ignorance. Ricci and Cirillo [15] do, at least, acknowledge a distinction
between "differences among assumptions about the technology under study"
and "scientific" analysis of causes alld effects. But the former are put down
to "the realities of life" and dismissed, then the latter are sorted out for the
usual kinds of uncertainty, using examples that again already take a given
model of environmental pathway and exposure for granted. The final con-
clusion is that the "inability to know" (as distinct from "uncertainty") is
restricted to known unknowables (such as the dose-effect function ques-
tion). Only these, with no hint of deeper cognitive framework dislocations,
are considered as the source of the "uneasy communion between science and
policy". Indeed, it is significant that this particular treatment of uncer-
tainty is determined by an explicit model of the "natural" social relationship
between risk analyst and policymaker (or risk analysis and policy), where
being explicit about too many uncertainties is seen as the main problem.
Who identifies the ignorance behind the analyst's initial premises and risk
problem definitions, and what different institutional forms of analysis-
policy-public relationships might improve consideration of this prior ques-
tion are not conceivable concerns.
The conventional definition of uncertainties (and of rationality)
corresponds with particular taken-for-granted institutional relationships of
decision making. Yet it is in this institutional arena, where knowledge and
social relationships interact, that we need to analyze options. The dimen-
sions of interaction between technical and institutional factors (including
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behavioral uncertainties and social-cultural determinants of rationalities),
as analyzed in this book, are a necessary framework for the fundamental
reconsideration and redevelopment of this dominant approach to risk
management.
12.3. Processing Uncertainty - Dialectics of Credibility
In Chapter 10 we explored the implications of the conventional approach to
uncertainty and rationality, and we critically evaluated the assumption that
more science will reduce uncertainty and thus will provide more authorita-
tive regulation. This was linked to the distinction drawn in Chapter 3,
between "intrinsic" risks and "situational" risks for the same waste. Even
the attempt to specify intrinsic risk parameters or to specify precise testing
methods and laboratory protocols for "definitive" risk classification involves
an implicit universal definition of a standard risk situation or "scenario".
No matter how precise and repeatable such parameters may be (and there
are always problems of defining proper replication [16]), the inevitable lack
of correlation between that implicit scenario and actual diverse risk situa-
tions remains a major problem for realistic risk management, and this gap
undermines the credibility of regulation. Indeed, the more the precision and
standardization, the greater the gap between the model and (diverse) situa-
tional realities. The pressure to produce standardized, precise, and
inflexible scientific frameworks of risk assessment to "cover" such hetero-
geneous and structurally uncertain systems leads, it was argued, to forms of
regulatory science that undermine regulatory credibility rather than sustain
it. The inconsistency between the pretensions of such "caricatured"
scientific frameworks and the extent of expert guesswork and, even, in some
instances the outright fabrication that is needed to create these frameworks,
is becoming too large for them to be a credible symbolic projection in the
face of empirical failure to give effective regulation.
In some regulatory cultures, such as that of the UK, there is less insti-
tutional pressure than elsewhere to employ universal, precise tests and risk
criteria, and therefore more discretionary freedom locally to tailor practical
regulation to variable risk situations. However, although in the UK it may
be easier to recognize the situational variability of risks, the conventional
view of science still causes structural conflict to be misperceived as technical
uncertainty. Thus, even here, the standard reaction to loss of public credi-
bility is to try to reduce the appearance of technical uncertainty by intensi-
fying statements about expert consensus on the lack of evidence of harm,
and by holding official inquiries that drip with such reassuring perspectives
[17]. Unfortunately for the credibility of such exercises, their limitations are
increasingly being exposed by critical scrutiny, often quasi-public "peer
review". Thus, the limiting assumptions of the UK PAC's 2,4,5-T risk
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analysis were eventually exposed, to the discredit of official expertise.
Analysis (again from outside normal peer review) of Sir Douglas Black's
report into excess childhood cancers near the Sellafield nuclear reprocessing
plant has exposed that committee's undue reliance for its reassuring conclu-
sions upon inputs (again exempted from peer review) concerning radiation
effects from the National Radiological Protection Board [18]. Yet the
NRPB relies upon several assumptions whose aggregate uncertainties are
greater than the theoretical discrepancy, used to dismiss the connection,
between Sellafield discharges and excess leukemias. Some of the points
embodied in the NRPB assumptions take the form of structural uncertain-
ties and downright ignorance. Both were socially processed and artificially
reduced by the Black inquiry into marginal technical uncertainty, and
attempted symbolic reassurance. The fact that such processes of reduction
are usually by no means deliberate is all the more witness to the depth of
institutionalization of the false view of uncertainty and the role of science
that I have described. To reiterate, even in the UK political culture, which
is able to use scientific knowledge in a less adversarial, less elaborated, and
more informal way, there is a dominant assumption or symbolic suggestion
that more scientific investigation leads to less uncertainty, more rational
consensus, and more public acceptability. This is now open to doubt, as the
public image of secure scientific method and definitive problem definition is
contradicted by increasingly competent critical reviews in public. Local
authorities, traditionally subservient to national technical expertise, have
been increasingly involved in developments of independent critical expertise.
Overall, therefore, although the institutional styles of science differ
between the UK and the USA (see also Section 12.4), there is a common
underlying view that uncertainty in regulatory authority is technical, and
can be resolved by intensification (or purification) of technical effort and
greater expert authority. Expert ignorance, structural uncertainty, or objec-
tive conflict of perspectives and rationalities are not recognized and their
implications are therefore left to wreak uncontrolled damage on the viability
of regulation.
In Chapter 11 we extended the critical perspective to analyze the dom-
inant "rational" response to the public concern issue. This response,
developed through "scientific" risk perception studies and their incorpora-
tion into various extensions of decision analysis, was shown to suffer from
similar basic limitations as does the general regulatory use of science. This
approach neglects the potential for development of negotiation, broader
social learning, and the more constructive and consistent expressions of
public concern. It was argued that the dominant approach represents a form
of political deskilling - ultimately provocative and self-defeating. The dom-
inant interpretations and uses of psychological risk-perception work do not
recognize the fundamentally social basis of individual values. Therefore the
intrinsic values of people's familiar social and cultural environments are
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automatically denied. In cutting out this dimension, this approach
suppresses appreciation of structural conflict and ignorance, and hence
reduces the resilience of regulation.
The three more abstract chapters (9-11), relating to rationality, uncer-
tainty, and public concern, were developed without preconceptions as to the
practical implications of their analytical orientation. The overall conclusion
drawn here is that the problems raised by the complexities of public concern
and credibility and the failings of orthodox uses of science and rationality
(including the symbolic uses), considerably strengthen a tentative conclu-
sion in favor of strong regional institutions, with public management of
T&D in collaboration with regional industries, and restrictions upon
unnecessary interregional movements of waste. A major reason for this is
the need, which emerges from our analysis, to develop greater public
identification with, and a sense of responsibility for, regulatory practices
that are part of a more comprehensive industrial strategy altogether - that
is, including more concern for upstream production as well. The analysis of
the bureaucratic processing of uncertainty suggests that the costs of back-
end uncertainties are higher than is normally recognized, which in turn
means greater attention must be paid to, e.g., waste-reducing production
decisions. Only in this way, we conclude, can the mounting difficulties of
public reactions be resolved; and this implies more integrated regional
responsibilities. However, before we return to practical suggestions, and
bearing in mind the need to respect local differences, we need first to discuss
what the comparative institutional analysis has been able to offer.
12.4. Comparative Political Cultures - What Can We
Learn?
The comparative empirical content of this book naturally raises the question
of what has been learned specifically from a comparative framework. One of
the main points of the discussion in Chapter 2 was that the comparative
analysis of institutions or political cultures has shown why apparently
technical decisions about the risks of particular chemicals, drugs, practices,
or technologies have resulted in very different regulations in different sys-
tems. The reasons for such differences, of course, are that the decisions are
not purely technical decisions. Social and cultural factors pervade them.
Even if described in purely technical terms, they arise from different institu-
tional settings, and their role is to regulate or influence behavior, which
means influencing social and economic relationships. Not only do they
emerge from, but they also enter established local social structures of
interaction and authority, adding one more dimension to several that
already exist. In order to change and control behavior in the intended ways,
they must also coincide with established practices and relationships in other
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senses. They must, in other words, find the best balance between such a
perfect fit with existing practices that no one notices them - they have no
effect - and such a complete misfit that no one recognizes them as feasible
or legitimate - also no effect.
The first value of a comparative institutional analysis is to demon-
strate more clearly the origins of divergent regulatory decisions and prac-
tices. "Technical" decisions in different institutional contexts are shaped
by, and need to satisfy, different modes of organizational interaction,
administrative procedures, cultural traditions, etc. They are, in other
words, addressing a different cluster of specific problem definitions in each
context. There are good reasons why the Netherlands, for example, uses
precise, inflexible concentration thresholds to define hazardous wastes, while
the UK uses only imprecise criteria, and the FRG comprehensively specifies
waste types, but without concentration thresholds. What is "the best"
approach is relative to the context of surrounding norms, practices, and con-
straints, including cultural attitudes, economic behavior, and general
administrative traditions.
Because large volumes of waste are transported between regulatory
systems, the practical importance of this insight is greater in the case of
hazardous wastes than for many other issues, such as road safety, pesti-
cides, or contraceptive pills. In addition to indirect questions of equality of
trading conditions, the direct risks of losing wastes, and the consequent
public health hazards in the process of transfer, are significant in them-
selves. They are exacerbated by the technical discrepancies in standards,
modes of regulation, etc. However, the political cultural framework shows
that technical knowledge and practice reflect institutional-cultural factors
that cannot be homogenized across nations. This underlines the point of
Chapter 5, that practical policy emphasis should be devoted to reducing the
pressure on the international system by restricting international waste
movements. This is preferable to the illusory goal of eradicating loopholes
by developing more precise universal technical definitions and standards. Of
course, it would imply other conditions to make it work - we return to these
later.
In addition, the political cultural framework can generate important
insights about other "discrepancies" among national regulatory practices.
Some of these are difficult to explain without employing a cultural frame-
work. Why, for example, is the same ignorance of the mysteries of landfill
chemistry (which may naturally transform wastes into better, or worse, pro-
ducts) treated as benign in the UK, yet threatening in the USA, especially
in California? Different physical conditions cannot fully explain the
apparently large discrepancies of policy attitude. Why does the USA adopt
a comprehensive, "all-or-nothing" strategy of regulation, while the UK
proceeds ad hoc and incrementally; and why does the USA adopt elaborate,
precise hazardous waste lists and criteria and other regulations, while the
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UK uses imprecise, negotiable criteria? Why have only the USA and the
Netherlands reacted to the discovery of past uncontrolled waste dumps by
passing emergency clean-up legislation, when they are by no means the only
countries to have suffered the problem? Why have the Dutch established
an elaborate formal system of inflexible numerical standards for defining
hazardous waste, when they do not even have significant industrial treat-
ment and disposal infrastructure in place to deal with the wastes?
The first question above can be rephrased as a question about social or
cultural responses to uncertainty in nature. Anthropological insight would
argue that the dominant ethos of UK regulatory culture is one of confidence
in the rather informal, elite social milieu of decision making; this is but-
tressed by extreme forms of integrative social ritual to support its authority
in mystique and social exclusion, for example, by concealing conflicts within
the elite from public view [19]. Constitutional and legal tradition support
this paternalistic cultural system, for example, by collective cabinet respon-
sibility, the Official Secrets Act, etc. The fundamental ethos has been that
social uncertainties between parties can be negotiated in confidence and
privacy as events transpire - there is no need for grand, inflexible projec-
tions of norms or sanctions to constrain others, in a legalistic fashion, well
into the future. Uncertainty in nature dissolves into this social milieu, and
becomes an element of flexible, confident ad hoc management, as does any
other uncertainty. Thus, nature is assumed to be an essentially benign sink,
not merely diluting, but actively cleaning up many of our otherwise risky
waste practices. The UK culturE'! requires a relatively quiescent public,
prepared to engage in the rituals of integration, such as public inquiries, or
at least to spectate in silence. It also requires an integrated government
system. In the hazardous wastes case, at least, both of these conditions may
be eroding, with potentially far-reaching cultural and regulatory
implications.
The US response to uncertainty in nature tends to be the opposite of
the dominant UK response, and can be explained sociologically by reference
to the opposite tendencies in US political culture. Here, there is an almost
institutionalized mistrust between actors in the policy sphere (as reflected in
the adversarial legal culture), and a suspicion of all authority. There is,
therefore, greater social uncertainty between parties given partial and com-
peting powers in the system - the executive, the legislature, and the judici-
ary (as well as powerful public interest and lobbying groups of various
kinds). Uncertainty in nature is a metaphor for uncertainty in social or pol-
icy affairs - it must be assumed to be full of adverse intent or potential, so
it must be immediately and uncompromisingly controlled. One cannot trust
how uncertainty might be used by other policy actors. Uncertainty is a hos-
tage to fortune in the USA. Thompson has likewise characterized the US
political culture of regulation as a fragmentary sectist culture, dominated by
competing, well-bounded groups, anti-authority, suspicious, zealous, and
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with a strong tendency to impute bad faith on the part of competitors - in
short, a set of witchcraft-invoking sects, each anxious to maintain its boun-
daries and identity against a "malevolent" outside world [20]. The institu-
tions of government are themselves more fragmented than most European
ones and, in a historically populist culture, much more responsive to the
sectist social environment. While some environmentalist groups become
established and more hierarchical as they become more closely identified
with "the establishment", conversely, some government agencies and indus-
tries behave more like sects themselves as they become more embattled and
defensive.
This anthropological analysis of institutional styles and political cul-
tures can also explain the underlying "all-or-nothing" syndrome of US regu-
lation, where the adversarial sectist culture forces not only universalistic,
numerical, inflexibility upon regulators - "equal treatment for all". - but
also an "all at the same time" political requirement, however infeasible in
practice. Precise numerical norms are, of course, consistent with a lack of
trust: no room for evasion must be given (or appear to be given). An asso-
ciated element of the same cultural style may be a tendency observable in
the USA, to go hard for idealized regulatory solutions, such as "zero
landfill" and even "zero waste production". This tends to produce extreme
outcomes of localized progress toward such strict ideals, but interspersed
with a widespread lack of control. The same cultural elements are manifest
in public opposition to T&D facility siting, which has approached a public
siting veto. The result appears to be more industrial innovation to produce
less wastes, combined with more illegal waste dumping.
A further value of the political cultural framework is to suggest how
deeply ingrained may be elements of decision-making style. There is, for
example, a current fashion to praise the efficiency of the UK "consensus"
mode as an alternative to the extreme elaboration of the US system [21].
However, it is at least possible that the US regulatory culture is consistent
with a competitive, dynamic economy. Probably few of those who bemoan
the "inefficiency" of US regulatory culture would be happy with the less
competitive, paternalistic economic systems of Europe.
The uses and styles of science are also shaped by such institutional
cultural patterns [22]. With more integrative policy rituals, more confident
and integrated policy institutions and power elites, and in the absence of
strong sectist penetration, UK policy can maintain authority without the
need for elaborate, precise, and specific scientific justifications. This leaves
scientists and policy institutions free to use discretion, to formulate policies
in general terms, and to be unafraid of ignorance, because it is less likely to
be used as a resource by critics. In the UK, the American (and less so, the
Dutch) use of precise universal regulatory numbers and tests would not only
be curious, but also a potential institutional threat to the social position of
scientists, because it would imply a reduction in their discretionary power
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and a radical confinement of their institutional role in policy. This is the
cultural undercurrent of a British scientist's derogatory remark that numer-
ical concentration limits for specifying hazardous wastes - as used in the
Netherlands - is "a system which can be run by monkeys" [23].
The FRG appears to have a similarly authoritative central institu-
tional framework for scientific expertise in policy, with hierarchical federal
scientific bodies free from formal review and criticism, as in the UK [24].
However, whereas the whole network of policy institutions in the UK is
hierarchical and informally close-knit, the FRG's postwar federal constitu-
tion breaks down this nexus, placing real autonomy and power (over other
policy, administrative, and legal levers, such as export bans on wastes) in
the hands of strong regional governments and courts. Even so, strong col-
lectivist cultural norms, as reflected in the accepted authority of the LAGA
(the joint committee of state waste experts), and significant industrial
voluntary compliance, underlie and defend the effectiveness of formal regu-
latory arrangements. It is also interesting that the experience of public
conflict over the siting of new facilities has led to requests from state
authorities for greater federal intervention and standardisation.
The Netherlands is an interesting and complex case for comparative
political cultural analysis. Although it has typical European
parliamentary-executive unity, the Netherlands also has long traditions of
coalition government, which (unlike single-party government) requires
issue-by-issue negotiation of parliamentary and cabinet votes. This tends to
encourage fundamentalist, single-issue oriented politics, which is also a
dominant feature of US political culture. This in turn allows interest
groups to specialize and become more influential in that area. Furthermore,
the Netherlands government administration, unlike that of the UK, is frag-
mented at the central level (the "tubed" policy system), with more radical
interest-group penetration into individual ministries, and more routine stra-
tegic leaking of "confidential" policy information. There is more open
conflict among ministries than is allowed to see light of day in the UK.
Public interest environmentalist groups in the Netherlands are articulate
and influential, with even formal recognition in government advisory com-
mittees. Scientific expertise is, as in the USA, but not in the UK and FRG,
relatively more evenly distributed amongst contending interests. This plur-
alist political culture has structural affinities with that of the USA (although
informal Dutch government-industry collaboration is more close-knit and
coherent), and produces similar regulatory results. For example, there
seems to be a similar "all-or-nothing" syndrome in the Dutch inability thus
far to establish a T&D infrastructure, despite progressive legislation in
1979; and there is a reflection of the institutional uncertainty in the Dutch
use of precise concentration limits and numerical soil cleaning standards as
regulatory instruments in this field.
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It may also be a reflection of political cultural factors that only the
Dutch and US systems have reacted to the past waste-dumps problem by
giving it official legislative recognition. Both countries saw extreme public
reaction, amounting to political crisis, where no others did. The implemen-
tation difficulties of these "clean-up" programs, and of the other US and
Dutch modes of regulation, suggest a stronger role of public symbolic action
in policy than in those countries that are less influenced by institutional
uncertainty and "sectist" styles of organization. Edelman's notion of poli-
tics as symbolic action [25] is useful to understand why some political cul-
tures tend more than others to articulate policy objectives and promises
that are less realistic, in response to more extreme needs of symbolic legiti-
mation to contending policy actors.
One can also use the anthropological framework to analyze certain
tensions and dynamics within institutional frameworks. For example, in
Chapter 7 we explained the increasingly adversarial position of the UK local
waste-disposal authorities with respect to central government and industry
as they have found it impossible to exercise the burdens of regulation placed
upon them. Their predominant exclusion from the informal elite networks
of negotiation and lobbying over policy, and from access to the higher
reaches of technical expertise, has seen them move away from the hierarchy
of integrated government and toward the style of outsider, sect-like groups,
demanding more clearcut, less negotiable forms of regulation, because they
are increasingly placed by circumstances in that social position. In dynam-
ics such as these we can see the interactions between organizational pat-
terns and technical discourse in both its empirical and symbolic (legitimiz-
ing) aspects.
12.5. Political Cultures, Regulatory Styles, and
Legitimation
The above anthropological analysis of political cultures is consistent with all
that has gone before in this book. It provides a framework for understand-
ing the relationship between technical discourse and tacit institutional
prescriptions or concerns.
It is also consistent with our analysis of the tacit concern for credibil-
ity, legitimation, and the maintenance of cherished forms of social interac-
tion that thread explicit discourse about risks and regulations. However, to
understand its relationship with the legitimation issue we need first to over-
come a problem with the political cultures framework; that is, a tendency to
reduce all questions to its own terms. In other words, for example, the
"adversarial" US cultural model or the "consensual" UK one are often
thought to define styles of decision-making interaction monolithically
throughout their domain, without consideration of the cross-cutting
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influence of other factors, some of which may be contingent, others strad-
dling different cultural domains, and of comparable significance [26].
In Chapter 3 we emphasized the importance of issue characteristics
that may be regarded as universal, wherever the issue falls. We also
analyzed at length the general legitimation problem, and the misleading
views of scientific rationality and technology, which universally pervade
regulation. There are also variable styles and tendencies within each sup-
posedly monolithic cultural system, such as between different regulatory
agencies, according to factors that include their age, institutional
"confidence", the kind of activity and actors they regulate, etc. [27]. As
noted earlier, specific regulatory initiatives are additions to a pre-existing
milieu of interaction, which is already "regulating" behavior in a variety of
ways - market interactions, legal and administrative traditions, cultural
norms, pressure group lobbying, other legislation and formal regulations,
etc. These are not replaced by new regulations. Clearly, the specific pat-
tern of regulation will be particular to an evolved milieu of this kind, includ-
ing the technical characteristics of the activity under regulation. Some ele-
ments of regulation, to be credible or feasible, will have to be consistent
with established wider patterns of institutional interaction, custom, etc.
This is part of their negotiation of legitimacy. These wider patterns tend to
be the very parameters that are picked up in comparison of political cul-
tures - the use of numerical or imprecise standards, adversarial or consen-
sual decision processes, etc.
This generates a question that has been raised before, though in a
rather different way. If comparative political cultural analysis shows that
different regulatory policy decisions are often reached on the same issue by
different cultures, does this mean that actual regulatory effects differ much
in the end? In other words, how far do the elements of political culture
picked up in a comparative policy analysis reflect the domain of legitima-
tion, or symbolic action, more than the real-world outcomes, even including
specific policy decisions (which may be reshaped by the real world of their
implementation). Of course, legitimation of a given set of institutional rela-
tions and processes is a regulatory outcome; it is not "merely" symbolic
action, supposedly divorced from the material world behind it. But unlike
specific outcomes it is indirect, and continuous.
To a significant extent, therefore, political cultural analysis offers
analysis of modes of legitimation in different regimes. It indicates the
significance that people in society place, not only upon decision outcomes,
but also upon the quality of the social interactions leading to - and beyond -
decisions. It also indicates the tacit processes of social identity-maintenance
through sequential specific issues and decisions. But these processes are
more differentiated, complex, and dynamic than rigid use of the monolithic
political cultural comparative framework would allow.
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The complexity of the legitimation dimension is indicated by examin-
ing one comparative aspect, namely, the different images of science that
predominate in regulatory discourse in the USA and UK. McCray has
pointed out [28] that different implicit models of what science is, and where
its boundaries with value questions lie, pervade US debates on the analysis
of risk. The dominant model in the USA is of a formal science, where
methods are fully specifiable, usually quantifiable, and where a heavy
emphasis is placed upon the explicability and external accountability of
detailed reasoning and observation. This model, or ideology, of science is
consistent with the dominant political culture of mutual mistrust and public
accountability of expertise and all authority. The dominant UK model used
in public debate is its opposite - science is largely a craft activity involving
accumulated experience and refined intuition, which cannot be formally
specified, codified, and externally checked. Only other mature experts can
judge, and their judgments are legitimately inaccessible except to a
privileged (and socially trustworthy) few. This model of science supports all
the key institutional properties of UK regulation - expert discretion;
attenuated peer review; only indirect and limited public accountability; the
mysterious fusion of policy and scientific considerations in regulation; and
informal negotiation of standards and practices, sheltering behind these
ideological defenses.
These alternative stereotypes of scientific authority have a long history
of interaction [29], and they can be seen as modes of legitimation, each
appropriate to its own wider political culture. As a symbolic language of
legitimation, each is,partially true, and partially false; partially descriptive,
and partially prescriptive. It would appear from this that the influence of
political cultures goes even deeper than the processes of using science in
negotiating institutional credibility described earlier. It seems as if different
political cultures employ fundamentally different forms of science. However
I argue that these different forms are common to the more fundamental
ways in which uncertainty and scientific rationality are interpreted in indus-
trial societies. The images of science outlined above, although they do
reflect institutional realities in each culture, also playa rhetorical role. The
predominant style and content in using science in different local cultures
naturally reflects elements of that culture, but the process is universal. The
tendency for US regulation, for example, to use science in a more standar-
dizing way, being less sensitive to the needs for situational variation, both
affects real regulatory outcomes and is a function of the political culture and
its modes of legitimation or symbolic action. The empirical and symbolic
worlds are interconnected.
The political cultural framework, used carefully, makes several impor-
tant contributions. But in addition to cross-cutting factors that
differentiate its analytic categories, we have shown that there are further
questions which go deeper than that framework. These are to do with the
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general purchase of images of rationality that encompass even different
specific images of science in different institutional settings and political cul-
tures. These more general processes have to do with the most basic ways in
which rationality, uncertainty, and technology are defined in industrial
society, definitions that constrain our vision of options and responsibilities
in relation to technology.
12.6. Science and the Dialectics of Credibility
A central issue of this book has been the social processing of uncertainty. I
started with the term in its broadest sense, encompassing social uncertainty,
relating to incompatible world views and problem definitions, and technical
uncertainty, or imprecision within a given problem definition or value
framework. The main argument has been that regulatory bodies tend to
respond to situations typified by the former, as if they were only the latter.
Chapters 9-11 offered three connected arguments:
(1)
(2)
(3)
Scientific approaches in risk analysis assume a given risk system or
technology - a taken-for-granted problem definition.
Scientific approaches in regulation also assume that scientific models
and methods are of universal applicability, and that uncertainties are
marginal within those frameworks.
Rational approaches to risk perceptions and decisions again assume a
common problem setting and see divergent perceptions as marginal
adjustments to the attributes of a taken-for-granted risk source or
technology.
These elements reinforce each other to create a pervasive mythology of
risk management, in which more fundamental conflict, diversity, and
ignorance are either inconceivable or, if encountered, illegitimate. The cen-
tral pillar of this mythology is that rationality is ultimately unitary, and if it
could be properly established would lead to the common acceptance of a
procedural framework within which public decisions on regulation could be
made and enacted. This is supported by the established idea of science,
that its essential modus operandi is uncertainty seeking - that science
automatically roots out and explores the uncertainties in existing
knowledge. In this view, if science is harnessed to regulation, then the fun-
damental uncertainties are at least within our conception, and can be con-
tained within a structured decision methodology. This belief, inculcated by
the influential Mertonian and Popperian traditions in sociology and philoso-
phy of science [30], implies that science is always driven by the aim of criti-
cally testing and revising its own basic frameworks and premises. However,
this reassuring view has been fundamentally revised in the past decade or
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more [31]. In the newer view, scientific knowledge is developed within tradi-
tions that allow the framing of coherent and precise scientific questions.
The productive questions are defined within a taken-for-granted theoretical
and methodological framework, whose authority is not normally questioned.
The tradition contains not only it's own rules of "scientific method", but
also specific explanatory terms and technical practices. In other words,
recognized uncertainties are limited to puzzles and anomalies within a
framework of certainty as to the fundamentals of that scientific tradition.
To take an example, the use of in vitro experiments on cell damage to
define radiation or chemical carcinogenic risks has, perforce, to assume that
there are no significant intercellular or system-wide mechanisms that affect
processes of damage or repair. The normal processes of science define the
uncertainties within that premise; they do not critically explore the premise
itself for the uncertainties lying beneath and beyond it. To take another
example from Chapter 10, the EP test for defining toxic waste takes for
granted that analytical uncertainties relate to details of laboratory method
that have not been exactly replicated, rather than to the more fundamental
question of whether the conditions of laboratory testing accurately simulate
real-world waste conditions.
Within science, knowledge develops by the creation of an artificial con-
viction that the basic framework is correct. This certainty as to the funda-
mentals allows attention to be focused on narrower problems and uncertain-
ties. Anomalous signals are often interpreted by ad hoc additions to expla-
natory idioms, so as to defend existing theoretical commitments, even to the
extent of rationalizing difficult data away as spurious results. Rather than
being the subject of critical scrutiny, existing knowledge becomes part of the
normative framework for shaping acceptable problems, and for evaluating
new evidence and ideas. This "functional dogma", to use Kuhn's terms [32],
is not a guilty secret or a weakness of science - it is a productive property.
However, when science is used in public policy this fundamental tendency to
take its existing frameworks for granted leads to an under-recognition of
more basic ignorance, or conflict of frameworks. Whereas this might have
no wider implications in science outside public policy, in public domains it
has direct implications for the social acceptance and credibility of expertise.
Thus, whatever specific image of scientific rationality predominates -
the US "public accountability" or the UK "priesthood" model - styling
regulation on conventional "rational" grounds leads the process badly
astray. It encourages the bureaucratic processing of ignorance, of latent
conflict of perspectives and world views, and of other more basic uncertain-
ties, into an emasculated version of marginal uncertainties, supposedly
manageable within a single, rational decision framework.
In this way conventional scientific rationality is implicated in a per-
vasive legitimation crisis [33]. Following Habermas, one can see that, in
postwar times especially, political legitimation has been achieved (via
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images of rationality) through active ideological cultivation of alienation on
the part of the mass public. Technology has been portrayed as coming from
science, in a realm beyond normal access and experience. However, this
ideological process has destroyed any plenum of political discourse in which
to try to establish common values and meanings in the face of rapid techno-
logical change and public disorientation. Communicative interaction, in the
context of common but taken-for-granted values, is breaking down, and has
to be replaced by communicative discourse, where new conjunctions of
meaning and value are re-negotiated. Instead, in the face of credibility and
legitimation problems, we have an intensification of the rationalistic ideol-
ogy that created the mess in the first place. A practical example of this is
the intensified scientific effort to reduce technical uncertainties (e.g., to
define "hazardous wastes" and risk criteria more precisely), within a basic
framework that remains unquestioned. This is closely associated with inten-
sifying attempts to gain public credibility and reassurance by reference to
the greater control offered by more science and risk analysis. In order to
gain credibility there is a drive to intensify scientific approaches; yet this
intensification creates less credible scientific knowledge (as evidenced in
Chapter 10) and imposes alien categories of problem definition and social
values. Existing modes of legitimation, intensified by the perceived need for
more public justification, thus create more alienation - that is, more legiti-
mation crises. This is a self-fueling downward spiral into social brittleness
and non-viability.
12.1. Implementation and Credibility
An important part of the dynamics of legitimation and credibility is the
relationship between center and periphery in regulatory processes. This can
also be seen as the relationship between policymaking and implementation.
The institutional gap between central policymaking and peripheral imple-
mentation is all the more serious because of the underlying processes in the
legitimation domain, outlined above. The typical response to the difficulties
of local implementation - facility siting problems, enforcement deficits,
intersystem loopholes, etc. - is to respond from the center. The aggregate
effect of local difficulties is greater central policy concern and control, which
leads to the intensification of scientific effort - more precise definitions,
standardized analyses, etc. - and to a corresponding escalation of the
scientific rhetoric of legitimation. This only tends to disconnect science
even more from diverse, concrete local experiences and situations, making
implementation more difficult.
We can now see why I have stressed implementation processes in this
book. Both the institutional distance and the linear rational view of the
relationship between central policymaking and peripheral enforcement are
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seen to be all the more damaging as the public credibility or legitimation
issue grows. Central government bodies respond to legitimation problems
with the false idea that the implementation lapses that are to blame, are
only due to deficits (of technical precision or competence, or of other
resources) at the periphery. This is contradicted by the wealth of empirical
research, including that described in this book, which shows that local
enforcement and implementation have a different set of social constraints
and conflicts to negotiate, which are different from those envisaged by the
center and implied in the linear model [34].
Diver provides a discussion of the complex rationalities of regulation
in its different aspects, and the nondetermined character of policy rules for
implementation [35]. He points out that even attempts in recent years to
define increasingly precise and less discretionary decision rules for regula-
tion in US environmental, health, and safety areas, including the
specification of allowed scientific inferences and models, still leave certain
ambiguities as to where the line should be drawn between compliance costs,
regulatory (and other transaction) costs, and estimated regulatory benefits.
There is always a residual value indeterminacy, even if it has to be bought
by ingenious reclassification [361.
In a rational hierarchical model of regulation, implementation should
take place in a context where legislation and statute making have already
resolved the significant value conflicts and goal ambiguities, leaving only
technical rule following (the rules may specify how to balance conflicting
objectives, as in cost-benefit discharge optimization). In reality, the imple-
mentation context is never so clear-cut, and value conflicts remain after
legislation, to be renegotiated through the ambiguous phrases of the law.
This is especially the case in European contexts, but also even in the USA.
When regulators face multiple and conflicting goals represented by different
parties, they quite reasonably respond in a "partially committed" way.
Rather than attempt once and for all to resolve the conflict, they break it
down into sequential negotiations, incremental (and reversible) adjustments,
conflict-absorbing procedures (e.g., major public inquiries in the UK), and
reactive strategies. This is not irrational. Indeed, it may well be a source of
resilience in the system because it keeps genuinely conflicting values in con-
tinual negotiation with one another, adapting to new circumstances and bal-
ances of interest as they arise.
Local rationalities of compromise and ambivalence, far from being a
mere deficit of competence, therefore, may actually be a source of regulatory
resilience, avoiding the unviable implications of a literal translation of cen-
tral policy languages, which are embroiled in symbolic reassurance
processes. The question is whether escalation of the central legitimizing
language of scientific rationality strengthens the position of local institutions
or not. The conclusion of our analysis is that it only tends to make their
situational problems worse. This is a further strong argument in favor of
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more decentralized, regional regulation, on the crucial condition that regula-
tory decentralization is supported by adequate resources, powers and other
factors described later.
12.8. Toward the Reestablishment of Context
So far, we have argued that, although they may have made for progress in
the past, conventional models of science embedded deep in the existing
approaches to regulation are becoming counterproductive in the new con-
text of public justification. This argument was amplified in Chapter 11 by
showing that a "rational" approach to the interpretation of public concern
also violates the ultimate grounding of that concern. Despite its liberal
intention of incorporating public concern into decision analyses, the
approach converts what are fundamentally different frameworks of experi-
ence and problems into extra "attributes" within the assumed and imposed
single problem definition of the policymaker. This is an identical form of
response to the scientific one outlined earlier. A framework (which implies
certain value commitments) is taken for granted, and uncertainty - here
attributes, probabilities, and weightings - is recognized and analyzed only
within that framework. Different frameworks of meaning and experience
remain unexplored, only distantly - and mutely - signaled by reference to
multiple "attributes" of the taken-for-granted technology and its "natural"
social relationships of management. The end result is that, in response to a
problem fundamentally to do with the quality of social relationships, the
technical "knowledge" of experts is elaborated yet further, while the institu-
tional relationships themselves remain unexamined and unreformed.
Rational approaches to policy management, especially the decision-
analytic developments of economics and psychology, are fundamentally
authoritarian, and ultimately unviable in any significant policy issues,
because they inadvertently relegate all social experience that is different
from theirs to an analytical context, which they assume can be
comprehended by marginal adjustments to the existing framework (by
adding attributes). It is taken to be a natural equilibrium about which only
marginal adjustments are conceivable. That different equilibria altogether
might be feasible is simply not a consideration.
In their present form, therefore, the scientific foundations of risk
analysis and the economic and psychological foundations of risk
perception-decision analysis, tend to add frills and adornments endlessly,
like Baroque art, almost as an escape from reality rather than in apprecia-
tion of it.
Our interpretation of technology, risk analysis, regulation, and the
social roots of public risk perceptions indicates that on pragmatic grounds
alone (quite apart from moral or political judgments), the context cannot be
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adequately comprehended by such marginal elaborations in analytic models
and their fixed underlying frameworks. The elaboration only entrenches the
existing social relationships of analysis and decision-making, which are
already part of the problem. In human systems, context is substance. And
with modern forms of technology, "context" is increasing in scale and
significance, while being decreasingly comprehended by conventional analyt-
ical approaches.
We can restate and perhaps clarify the implications of this point by
using the language of information processing, as we did in the discussion of
compensation for siting risks in Chapter 11. The usual situation is one in
which existing analytical methods attempt to channel fundamentally diverse
strands of social information into a single framework for decision making.
In terms of Figure 12.1, regulatory bodies channel their evaluation of the
human and environmental costs, risks, and benefits of regulation into formal
feedbacks in standards, advice, mandatory rules, fiscal incentives, etc.
(feedback A). These are negotiated and justified in a continual interaction
with expertise, public reactions, industrial lobbying, etc. The bureaucratic
processing and reduction of structural ignorance and conflict into the lan-
guage of "manageable risks" cannot be fully concealed from the public,
because they eventually see the consequences of ignorance and the inade-
quacy of the scientific language of justification. The full implications of real
back-end ignorance and conflict are not transmitted upstream in formal
regulatory signals to the point of production and innovation, because of the
false description of these as manageable by conventional means. Public
realization of the inadequacy of this process is obstructed from mature
expression: it is strangled by the impoverished languages of scientific risk
analysis and risk perception-decision analysis, and by general cultural
norms of parochialism and self-interest. Thus obstructed (and localized), it
seeks other outlets, which results in sporadic eruptions of apparently
extreme reaction, e.g., to facility siting, via feedback B in Figure 12.1. This
analysis is supported by the observation of many chemical company execu-
tives [371, that they are far more influenced in production decisions by their
judgment of the future of direct public reactions than they are by formal
regulations. Thus, we have a situation in which public experience is being
thwarted of constructive expression via the language and process of regula-
tion, which effectively, but inadequately, shelters the front end of innovation
from social access. The result is the worst of all worlds: public quiescence
artificially cultivated by the language of regulation; suppressed concern; and
unpredictable, increasingly intransigent expressions of that concern when it
does find occasional outlets. This is not a viable strategy.
The conventional regulatory channel, as reflected in the dominant lan-
guage (and relationships) of rationality, is simply incapable of transmitting
the necessary richness of the original information. The main substance of
this information which the conventional scientific approach neglects, is the
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structural uncertainty in the system, which back-end regulation cannot
manage. Therefore, the mechanisms do not produce decisions that com-
mand credibility. Even if any given decision were in some abstract sense
"correct", the processes in which it is embedded are not. In an alternative
approach, the overloaded and distorting channel would be restructured to
allow articulation and more direct negotiation among different frameworks
and, thus, the recognition of the need to absorb some of the structural
indeterminacy and uncertainty in more up-stream regulatory attention.
12.9. Uncertainty, Pragmatic Rationality, and Social
Learning
The above critique of the conventional abstract, "Utopian" rationality [38]
includes the point that this rationality obliterates questions of the quality of
processes or interactions ("context") by focusing, instead, upon the rational-
ity of decisions as separate products or events.
All of our arguments have shifted the orientation toward open-
endedness. The starting point for this is the recognition, which was offered
long ago by Tribe [39], that technology itself is more appropriately viewed
as process rather than as hardware, and that its most significant conse-
quences are nearly always the least direct and least foreseeable. This is a
lethal criticism of rationalistic technology-assessment programs, especially
when combined with the point that technologies engender unforeseeable
social changes that alter our patterns of social interaction and our values.
Therefore, deciding about technologies is as much a matter of choosing
which social values we wish to live with, as of pretending to evaluate and
identify its consequences in the framework of taken-for-granted values.
There ought rationally to be a dialectical interaction between technological
progress and social learning, whereby each adapts, adapts to, and
encourages the (nonpredetermined) development of the other.
Institutional processes that help us to recognize intrinsic ignorance
about consequences; conflicting frameworks of experience and value; and
different fundamental definitions of technology and problem structures gen-
erally, are a necessary element of that social learning. This implies recogni-
tion that the overall direction of technology is not locked into an inevitable
historical logic, untouchable by human aspiration or concern. That is, regu-
lation is, or can be, about more than efficient "cleaning up" after technologi-
cal innovation. However, the more critical rationality opened up by our
analysis of the problems of conventional rationality needs to be given at
least some shape, to point to alternative ways of progress. For example, by
definition, ignorance cannot be carried in knowledge, so how are we to han-
dle and respect it? What, if anything, is to give the open-endedness a sense
of order and direction, if we are to release ourselves from the admittedly
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baneful ideological grip of conventional rationality and technological
determinism?
There are no answers in the simple mold of existing givens. The
essential difference is akin to that between liberal systems and critical
theory - between "adaptive management" and "political learning". What
we have criticized above is "adaptive management", which stretches con-
ventional rationality within existing methods and institutions to incorporate
public concern. The social control of front-end technological innovation is
essentially concealed and protected by the mythology of conventional
rationality which pervades regulation. This understates the ignorance and
lack of understanding of the consequences and interactions of technology, in
the ways described above; in so doing, it understates the overall costs and
social uncertainties that should be accounted against the upstream innova-
tion decisions. By thus undermining the constructive transmission of social
intervention from regulation to innovation, it allows technological change to
continue as impenetrably and as apparently (to the vast majority, authenti-
cally) uncontrollably as ever. If it is not dismissed as irrationality, public
concern arising from this social inaccessibility of technical change is inter-
preted by this regulatory rationality as a marginal extra weighting to
specific technological risk attributes.
This is "adaptive management" within conventional rationality. It not
only arbitrarily propagates and defends a myth of technological determin-
ism; in the very same process it undermines and suppresses political learn-
ing. As Forrester has put it [40], the critical rationality opened up as an
alternative here "leads us beyond the consideration of transforming the
value, whatever that is, of each outcome and utility - to practical political
considerations of political identity and direction."
We can substantiate this more reflexive and interactive model of
rationality by reference to modern understandings of science. From the
outside, scientific knowledge looks hard - it is revealed by disciplined
method. Yet detailed internal social analysis, including long-term partici-
pant observation of laboratory life [41], has shown that key terms do not
have natural revealed meanings - they are negotiated between practitioners
(who may be very few in number in any given specialty). The application of
existing established rules of theory or method to new cases is never totally
clear-cut, and assignment of observations and behaviors to explanatory
classifications can involve choices among ambiguous alternatives. Whether
or not a given experiment and its observations have really been replicated
usually relies upon social agreement as to which elements of practice are
important and which are not. Practice is so complex that it is impossible
for a competent expert to be aware of every detail of experiment and
inference.
None of this account implies that scientific knowledge is reducible to
sociological processes - nature has a say; but technical or natural
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constraints do not alone determine knowledge outcomes. Social processes
are of necessity involved in the creation, maintenance, and cultural repro-
duction of coherent bodies of scientific knowledge. The point for the
present discussion is that the internal social and technical achievement of
scientific consensus has been pervasively misunderstood and misrepresented
as revealed knowledge. The rich world of social negotiation charted by the
sociology of science has not been visible to the public. Indeed, misrepresen-
tation by defenders of crude rationalism scares the uncommitted back into
the rationalist fold by counterposing monolithic scientific rationalism
against the (1930s Marxist) view that scientific knowledge is only a function
of dominant social-ideological interests [42]. This false Hobson's choice
utterly obliterates the far more complex and pertinent implications that can
be derived from the sociology of science.
However, the increased involvement of science in public decisionmak-
ing since World War II and the decreasing conclusiveness of scientific claims
in such arenas have led to a closer public scrutiny and visibility of the inter-
nal process of science. This has, in turn, led to wider recognition that these
processes are not as tidily rule-bound and methodical as the "hard" image
implied, and that the precise use of inference rules, observation terms, etc.,
is open to negotiation. Values may therefore enter the process of scientific
knowledge construction and development, without necessarily leading to its
degeneration. Nor are they necessarily linked to particular social interests
[431. Scientific definitions of hazard and waste in hazardous waste are evi-
dent examples; so, too, is the negotiability of the framework used to define
the risk system in analyzing, say, the risks of 2,4,5-T usage. Exclusive use
of controlIed laboratory toxicology-test data imposes one framework, but
one that is incomplete and impoverished. The scientific negotiation of
terms is equivalent to the negotiation of the reach and fit of such frames of
meaning, and when these are used in policy they imply value commitments,
even if the scientists themselves are scrupulously impartial. Some have
assumed that this kind of negotiation e.g., about inferences, only occurs
where policy-relevant values are in play (see the "risk assessment policy"
choices discussed in Chapter 10). However, the social negotiation of such
commitments appears to stretch much deeper than this, into the heart of
scientific knowledge, which has no apparent (or, at least, no clear-cut) pol-
icy implications. Thus, the aim must be to establish institutional relation-
ships and the associated images of scientific rationality, which do not pre-
tend that science can be reduced to social values choices, and which equalIy
do not imagine that science always provides "natural" truths if kept pure of
ideological contamination. The notions of inference policies (e.g., over
which models to use in human low dose-effect extrapolation) and of "tran-
science" are useful, so long as the institutional processes alIow unprejudiced
exploration of the scope and boundaries of such policy-scientific arenas, if
necessary into hitherto purely "scientific" areas. The ideas of robust and
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pragmatic rationality developed by Ezrahi, Ravetz, and Rip [44] appear to
be promising in this respect.
If science used in the public arena tries to maintain the conventional
image of "revealed" knowledge and natural consensus, this will encourage
erosion of credibility, as our discussion of legitimation crises has explained.
We need new institutional processes that open up internal scientific
processes to progressive dialectical interaction with external expressions of
social values. This is emphatically not to argue that science should be sub-
jected to democratic referenda. It is more that a new style of regulatory
scientific knowledge needs to be developed, which is inherently more provi-
sional and expressly incomplete, leaving room for external input negotiated
in from other frames of social experience. This emphasizes the necessary
correspondence between a new, more open-textured style of knowledge and
new, more open-textured social relationships of decision making. More
shared responsibility for regulation, as indeed the current fashion for "dere-
gulation" implies, requires more shared influence in the cultivation of associ-
ated knowledge, which inevitably means a manifestly less "closed" system of
knowledge.
Instead of this, under present circumstances, as parts of science are
drawn in as an authority in the management of complex heterogeneous risk
systems, so the conventional images only further help to exclude relevant
pieces of empirical experience and information, as well as legitimate values,
from the decision process. The 2,4,5-T case described in Chapter 9 is a
good example. So, too, is the whooping cough vaccine issue, where pressure
for a comprehensive uptake led to reassuring assertions about the risks. But
these reassurances used mean figures ignoring the much higher risk to indi-
viduals with contraindications, such as allergic sensitivity. This suppression
of social learning concealed the need for a debate of the moral dilemma
between the social good of full eradication and the higher private risks of
brain damage for a significant sensitive subpopulation that would occur in
achieving the social goal. The eventual public diffusion of the sensitivity
point led, in any case, to erosion in the credibility of the official scientific
point of view, and of the program based upon it: better to have encouraged
the debate in the first place. The same kind of basic options exist in most
areas between socially closed, baroque bootstrapping (degeneration) or an
institutional opening toward broader negotiation, even of "scientific" regula-
tory frameworks. In the hazardous waste field these options are reflected in
the ubiquitous tension between unrealistic, universalistic risk models and
criteria (encouraged by existing modes of legitimation) and situational
authenticity.
The problem of finding an overall normative orientation to guide
interaction results from recognition of the legitimate indeterminacy in the
more open-ended framework of public rationality advocated here. Critical
theory argues that scientific rationality has become an ideology of social
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control in industrial societies, foreclosing open-endedness in the myths of
technological determinism that conceal and protect the power structures
involved in technological commitments. One critical view of such symbolic
action [45] tends to see the use of "objective" scientific images to justify the
exercise of power as an elite conspiracy. In this view, the symbolic domain
of political language and procedures (the social equivalent of "body lan-
guage") and the empirical real world are decoupled, the former being mani-
pulated to mystify and protect the latter. Critical theory sees the processes
of communicative action - the use of language and symbolic action generally
- as more integrated into empirical reality. It, too, is part of the empirical
domain; this is reflected in the term communicative action [46]. This dis-
tinction is significant, not because critical theory denies mystification and
the systematic distortion of public communication, but because it gives a
clue to a normative framework that can offer guidance to improvement. In
other words, the idea of communication action suggests that we can replace
the now sterile and self-defeating norms of conventional rationality in regu-
lation with the norms of improving the forms of public communication, and
thus all-round political learning. What we have at present is its opposite -
political deskilling, which results in sporadic, uncontrolled, and damaging
outbursts of public hostility, further polarization, and brittleness in the
overall system.
Alternative process models are available, even if - of necessity - they
are not so clearly defined. Indeed, the decision-analytic methods of Raiffa
and colleagues criticized in Chapter 11 could, with careful adaptation, be
consistent with such a new "social heuristic". Von Winterfeldt's value-tree
analysis [47] has been used to elicit value structures in a more public
domain, among competing groups in policy issues. The soft systems metho-
dology of Checkland and colleagues [48] is another proved approach to the
constructive elicitation of unconscious problem-value frameworks held by
different parties to decision issues, which encourages a social learning pro-
cess framework for interaction, rather than the conventional "rational" util-
itarian one. An underlying inspiration of the "soft systems" method is the
theory of "appreciative systems" developed by Vickers [49].
None of these (and other similar) frameworks guarantees a progressive
articulation of the collective values in the context of concrete decisions -
indeed, one suspects that in order to be successful the formal elements of
such techniques are crucially buttressed by considerable craft skill and sen-
sitivity on the part of their practitioners. This is only another statement of
the truth that there will always be a gap between empirical social practice
and the public language describing it. Indeed, it is necessary and desirable
that such a tension should exist. The moral heuristic contained in the myth
of rationality is a combination of "description" and "prescription". It may
"describe" a consensual state that is achievable, but in so doing it avoids
another potentially realized state, of the bare confrontation of starkly
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incompatible ultimate values. To the extent that the myth describes one
state plausibly and mentally annihilates the other, it is, of course, prescrib-
ing it. The alternative approach of critical rationality does not claim to des-
troy myth, nor the tension between description and prescription that myth
embodies. Part of the repair job on public rationality is to reestablish a
progressive tension, encouraging the development of a collective social
insight. The present version is more of a degenerative shell that is losing
any positive moral purchase.
Another kind of model for the critical heuristic of public rationality is
one suggested, for example, by Forester [50] and Majone [51]. This is the
analogy with legal discourse. Here, progress is made by constructive tension
between accumulated tradition and new interpretation. The body of legal
knowledge is never so rule bound that it cannot be creatively adapted and
developed to reach out and appreciate new circumstances. It is open tex-
tured, and thus open to the social negotiation of new expressions of value
and meaning. Being open, it encourages mature social articulation of such
values. There is dialectical interaction and development between authorita-
tive expert knowledge based in legal tradition, and critical social values. It
retains authority just because it does not become too dogmatic, rule bound,
socially exclusive, and authoritarian. At its best, it is an appreciative
system [52].
But there is a pertinent difference between such processes at their best
and the more closed ways in which policy scientific expertise relates to its
context. Penetration does occur, of course, but the very fact that it tends to
be "penetration", not interaction, reflects an inherent institutional closure,
an incipient polarization, and the opposite of social learning. The very fact
that the role of science is tied to risk-based problem definitions (as opposed
to a social, network-based recognition of diverse problem definitions) means
that science is already institutionally harnessed to prejudiced values and
authoritarian styles of decision making, however neutral scientists try to be.
An argument against the kind of analysis given above is that there is
bound to be social stratification and exclusion in even the most democratic
decision-making processes. Arguing for the opening of existing institutional
processes of expertise toward broader negotiation of the underlying frame-
works, and exposing the basic sociological roots of the tensions over risks, as
in Chapter 11, is therefore only to encourage a kind of fundamentalism that
would destroy all public institutional authority. This is a legitimate point
of view, deserving a proper reply.
My response is to suggest that we look as dispassionately as possible
at the related problems of uncertainty and public reactions, which are argu-
ably two of the most pervasive modern concerns of policymakers. Despite
the intensified attentions of experts, uncertainties are felt to be increasing
relentlessly. Despite apparent overall increases in public safety, people still
often resist the "improvements" offered by promoters of this or that
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chemical product or technology. The answer to these conundrums, and to
the above counter-argument, is that uncertainties are only felt to be more
pervasive or significant because of the (growing) commitments, and the
ambitions for control, that they threaten. Uncertainty as such has not
increased, as if it were some objectively existing entity. The scale, pace,
and vulnerability of the interlocked technological, financial, organizational,
and emotional commitments represented in modern industrial societies are
what have increased, and it is these that are multiplying the sense (and
cost) of uncertainty - that is, threat. The problem is not uncertainty, but
vulnerability, brought about by the rate and scale of those commitments.
Likewise, I would argue, fol1owing Chapter 11, that the public concern
problem is not one of fundamental1y waning public credulity and trust.
There is every reason to believe that this trust in decision making has never
been anything better than a reluctant or guarded tolerance. The present
hue and cry about public perceptions may only be uncovering uncomfort-
able facts about the typical state of public trust in experts, elites, and the
like - that it was always pretty low. I would argue that what has changed is
not levels of public credulity or trust, but the demands we make of that
credulity by the rate and inscrutability of reasons for the technological and
social changes that are going on.
Thus, the arguments about opening up regulatory discourse to ac-
knowledge more fundamental uncertainties, conflicts, and divergent under-
lying problem structures, have nothing to do with destroying authority per
se. They have to do with keeping a growing authoritarianism, vulnerability,
and alienation in check, and with defending "scientific rationality" as now
institutionalized from its own self-defeating tendencies. They are concerned
with reestablishing legitimate and viable authority in the technological
sphere.
I have shown that the currently dominant approach is not merely
based on paternalistic individual attitudes among decision-making elites, but
is far more deeply rooted in institutional practices, languages, and analytic
categories. Indeed, the worry is that many individuals in policymaking,
regulation, and industry recognize, at a personal level, the processes I have
described in which huge ignorance and the lack of real control is concealed
by the forms of science and public language of justification and reassurance.
Many policymakers sense the problems, but feel trapped and unable to see
any alternative way of doing things. If the view of public attitudes given
above is reasonable, then they do not believe the myths either. So, we have
the baroque situation where no one believes them. They have, in other
words, outlived their usefulness.
A shift toward the more open-ended dialectical mode of regulation wil1
not remove the tension between our public language and the reality it is
claimed to represent. It wil1 not, in other words, do away with myths in
public affairs - that is not the point. The essential aim, as McNeill has
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aptly put it [53], is the care and repair of our public myths. The current
mythology of rationality in risk management and regulation is on a degen-
erative path, and is in need of radical repair toward a less orderly, but more
enriched - and enriching - successor; one with social purchase.
12.10. Some Practical Conclusions
It may seem odd to leap from highly general, abstract issues back to the
problems of hazardous waste. However, the issue of public acceptance is
central, and is bound to grow in importance. It affects all other practical
aspects in one way or another, and not only facility siting. The uses of sci-
ence are also central, and directly affect technical instruments and norms.
Some implications are more direct than others, so that the following vary in
their specificity. Overall, they are offered to provoke thought rather than as
inescapable conclusions from our analysis. They are based upon defensible
arguments, but they do not claim to be indisputable. The universal validity
of any observations ought also to be qualified by the political and cultural
considerations discussed before.
One general practicality seems to be that public concern over and
involvement in chemical waste management are going to grow, and cannot
be ignored. Therefore, the questions of how to develop social learning con-
structively rather than exacerb.ate polarization through this concern seem to
be crucial in the medium term. Some countries, such as the FRG, Austria,
and Denmark, have partly grasped the nettle by encouraging domestic
waste disposers to take more interest in and responsibility for their own
household waste. This should have at least three beneficial effects:
(1) It increases knowledge.
(2) It puts industrial waste hazards in more measured perspective.
(3) It should actually improve waste regulation.
All of these also tend to encourage a sense of shared responsibility,
which must be better than the dominant notion elsewhere, that "social
learning" is fostered by more effort in public relations to show how well
things are being managed by "the experts".
Other countries seem to fear that encouraging people to take responsi-
bility and to develop interest is tantamount to inviting them to interfere in
expert management of a complex system that they do not understand.
Better to encourage them to stay uninterested. This seems an ultimately
futile approach.
Other means of developing more resilient social learning systems of
regulation are discussed in the previous section. However, we would argue
that the dimension of public credibility generally strengthens the argument,
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already taken from our institutional analysis, in favor of mainly decentral-
ized, but more integrated systems of regulatory responsibility. The argu-
ment is that public opposition can only be mitigated by public identification
with, and a sense of responsibility for, what is going on. Social learning
situations that involve critical debate are only feasible in such contexts. At
the same time the structural features of hazardous waste life-cycles also mil-
itate in favor of strong local management. Precisely how local is not amen-
able to general prescription, but depends upon existing structures of govern-
ment, cultural attitudes of identification, industrial concentration, etc.
However, the Lander in FRG, the Provinces in the Netherlands, the states
in the USA, and something like the disbanded metropolitan councils in the
UK (akin to regional amalgamations of most existing UK local waste dispo-
sal authorities) would seem to be appropriate. Again, this also depends on
whether they are envisaged as T&D managers or as regulators of (private
sector) T&D managers.
The problem that is then exacerbated, of course, is the inconsistency
that allows large loopholes between regional authorities, and
economic-regulatory strains as the better facilities are undermined by all
the business going to cheaper options elsewhere. Legislated minimum stan-
dards are a familiar, limited means of dealing with this difficulty, but there
seems to be a strong parallel argument in favor of reducing movements of
waste between regions and nations as much as is possible. This not only
encourages a certain local sense of responsibility for wastes, which might
help place public support behind enforcement and new facility siting, but
also it accords with the inherent limits to technical harmonization of the
regulatory frameworks of different systems, analyzed in Chapter 5. Also,
given that hazardous waste can be moved around far more easily than can
production (the waste source) itself, its management is more vulnerable to
shifts in public opinion (e.g., against "foreign" waste). It would seem a pru-
dent insurance against likely developments in public opinion to plan now for
reduced intersystem movements of waste and for correspondingly more
thorough localized arrangements, than to have them suddenly enforced in
the future.
Restriction of intersystem waste movements and regional management
raise the questions of finance and control. Our analysis suggests that those
systems that rely on private free-market investment for their T&D capacity
have problems in obtaining adequate, stable investment in more capital-
intensive, "high-technology" T&D facilities. Again, countries and regions
will differ according to the size and nature of their domestic waste market,
but a general current in favor of joint public-private facilities investment
emerges from our studies. Involving local waste producers in the invest-
ment encourages them to use the facilities, especially if rebates are offered
to those who do enter into partnership.
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The question of who manages such facilities (and the associated pick-
up and transport systems) is separate. Again, our analysis favors single
public-company management, because this reduces the complexity and
behavioral uncertainties that otherwise plague the hazardous waste life-
cycle. Regulation (e.g., inspection and registration) is also thereby made far
more feasible. Of course, countervailing inefficiencies may be generated in
waste recovery and recycling, and a close comparison of the Hessian,
Bavarian and UK recycling industries would be valuable in this regard.
We claim that the significance of these qualitatively different uncer-
tainties for hazardous wastes has not been clearly identified before. All
strategies that reduce them therefore increase in value, that is, in the per-
ceived cost it is worth incurring to achieve this reduction. Simpler institu-
tional life-cycles is one strategy, so too is upstream waste reduction.
So far these suggestions deal mainly with T&D industrial infrastruc-
tures, and not with regulation as conventionally seen. The nature of
hazardous waste generation and movement makes it logical to manage
waste T&D itself as the major aspect in its regulation. However, it could
well be that the strengthening of local regulatory bodies (e.g., at provincial
level in the Netherlands, or local authority regional amalgamation in the
UK) could create bodies with sufficient resources and e~pertise to deal with
private waste T&D companies adequately, without having to enter into
T&D management themselves. At the moment this does not seem to be
true (there are very few exceptions).
Whatever the merits of public or private T&D management, another
strong point from our analysis has been that adequate regulatory knowledge
to define the fantastic variety of risk situations is never going to be held by
even a well-endowed local body. They therefore need to be aided by a well-
informed, interested but measured public involvement. This will be all the
more true if T&D is in private hands, because the waste life-cycles will be
more complex and variable. A major point arising from our (and other)
analysis of implementation is that enforcement powers are not automati-
cally established by the creation of formal rules and powers in legislation.
The shape and outcomes of local enforcement bargaining is open to consid-
erable influence by articulate, organized public opinion and lobbying at the
local level; indeed, it is undermined by lack of such public interest. Yet
apparent lack of interest should not be read as lack of concern, which may
suddenly crystallize and erupt in unpredictable and unconstructive ways.
Developing more sustained and measured local public interest - as may be
conceptualized in the foregoing ideas of critical rationality and social learn-
ing, and encouraged by more integrated regional responsibilities - could
therefore be in the interests of all parties, including industry.
Self-regulation by waste producers and handlers is also inevitable in
part. Necessity should, as far as possible, be converted into virtue by more
open-textured relationships between (enhanced) local regulatory bodies,
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local industries, and local populations and/or workforces. Of course,
conflict will be never far away, if not endemic, but at least if constructively
channeled via the heuristics outlined earlier, it would avoid the extremes of
alienation that are festering away in the increasingly brittle and ultimately
unviable systems that predominate today.
These "practical" ideas are deliberately sketchy, because as broad
principles they would need to be worked into a more concrete, detailed
shape in different local circumstances by experienced local practitioners. As
a final practical point I return to an earlier observation, that a new perspec-
tive on familiar problems - to see them in a new way, maybe as new prob-
lems - is also a practical contribution. It seems appropriate to finish by
referring to a theme that has bridged the two parts of this book, namely the
complex and fundamental correspondence between knowledge and social
relationships. I hope the reader will find it as valuable as I have done to
turn to the thoughts of someone who was taxed with practical problems
very far indeed from those of regulation, but who was exploring the same
question - what is "telling the truth"? Dietrich Bonhoeffer's conclusion, fol-
lowing a long tradition in moral philosophy, was that "what is true" is, in
the end, relative to the evaluation of the kind of human relationship that
the knowledge supports [54]. Conventional scientific rationality, as it is
used in risk management and regulation, is germane or "true" to a particu-
lar kind of social relationship in policy regulation and technology. Social
authority is assumed to be naturally and legitimately based upon narrow
bodies of expertise, which are assumed to be able to reveal truths and
"best" decisions. The horizon of moral or political competence and choice is
absolutely restricted to how best to clean up at the back end of technolo-
gies. Where these technologies come from, why, from what earlier assump-
tions, values, commitments, and foregone alternatives at the stage of inno-
vation, are taken to be entirely other questions, normally answered - or
rather, preempted - by the myths of technological determinism that are
supported by conventional scientific rationality in regulation. This only
consolidates a kind of gross public schizophrenia in which we are supposed
to confine our ultimate horizons to a detailed examination of the print,
while others invisibly manage the story.
The conventional "truth" used in policy corresponds with social rela-
tionships that are determined by the protected social interests that control
technology and that are restricted to individual private utility. The social
experience of alienation, of being increasingly controlled by arbitrary, even
capricious forces of unintelligible technological and related social change, is
reduced to the framework of those individualistic relationships - and is
thereby morally invalidated. Yet this kind of social experience - and con-
crete versions of it in many specific issues - lies at the heart of "extreme"
public reactions to rationalist policy management. So we need a new, more
open-textured kind of knowledge, or discourse, corresponding to a
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recognition of the neglected dimensions of social relationships. This more
open-textured discourse, and its institutional embodiments, will naturally
recognize that the exploration of human meaning and value is not exhausted
in the control and distribution of risks (even if this is somehow "equitable"),
but may also include engagement in the direction and development of
technology.
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